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  1. David Alm (2008). Consequentialism and the Autonomy of the Deontic. Utilitas 20 (2):199-216.
    I distinguish between two forms of consequentialism: reductionist and anti-reductionist. Reductionist consequentialism holds that the deontic properties of rightness and wrongness are identical with the axiological properties of optimality and suboptimality, respectively. Anti-reductionist consequentialism denies this identification, hence accepting what I call the autonomy of the deontic. In this article I ignore reductionist consequentialism. Instead I argue that anti-reductionist consequentialism is deeply problematic or even incoherent. Simply put, the main point is that the criterion of rightness of any ethical theory (...)
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  2. Vuko Andrić & Martin Kerz (2014). Ein Plädoyer für den Rechtsnormen-Konsequentialismus. Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 140:87-98.
    How can legal norms be morally evaluated? In this paper we discuss and defend consequentialism about legal norms. According to this doctrine, the legitimacy of legal norms depends entirely on the consequences of the norms’ validity. Consequentialism about legal norms shares the advantages of both act- and rule-consequentialism while avoiding the respective disadvantages. In particular, consequentialism about legal norms has prima-facie plausibility like act-consequentialism and for similar reasons: it qualifies as a version of collective act-consequentialism. At the same time, the (...)
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  3. Vuko Andrić & Attila Tanyi (2016). Multi-Dimensional Consequentialism and Degrees of Rightness. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):711-731.
    In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the (...)
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  4. Vuko Andric & Attila Tanyi (2016). Multidimensional Consequentialism and Risk. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):49-57.
    In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal (...)
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  5. G. E. M. Anscombe (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
    The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...)
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  6. Joseph Boyle (2004). Medical Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (1):51-60.
    The use of terminal sedation to control theintense discomfort of dying patients appearsboth to be an established practice inpalliative care and to run counter to the moraland legal norm that forbids health careprofessionals from intentionally killingpatients. This raises the worry that therequirements of established palliative care areincompatible with moral and legal opposition toeuthanasia. This paper explains how thedoctrine of double effect can be relied on todistinguish terminal sedation from euthanasia. The doctrine of double effect is rooted inCatholic moral casuistry, but (...)
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  7. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):149-172.
  8. Michael Cholbi (2014). Agents, Patients, and Obligatory Self-Benefit. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2):159-184.
    Consequentialism is often criticized for rendering morality too pervasive. One somewhat neglected manifestation of this pervasiveness is the obligatory self-benefit objection. According to this objection, act-consequentialism has the counterintuitive result that certain self-benefitting actions turn out, ceteris paribus, to be morally obligatory rather than morally optional. The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, I consider and reject four strategies with which consequentialists might answer the obligatory self-benefit objection. Despite the apparent consequentialist credentials of these answers, none of these strategies (...)
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  9. Adam Cureton (2015). Making Room for Rules. Philosophical Studies 172 (3):737-759.
    Kantian moral theories must explain how their most basic moral values of dignity and autonomy should be interpreted and applied to human conditions. One place Kantians should look for inspiration is, surprisingly, the utilitarian tradition and its emphasis on generally accepted, informally enforced, publicly known moral rules of the sort that help us give assurances, coordinate our behavior, and overcome weak wills. Kantians have tended to ignore utilitarian discussions of such rules mostly because they regard basic moral principles as a (...)
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  10. Paul Hurley (2014). Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):225-232.
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  11. Paul Hurley (2013). Consequentializing and Deontologizing: Clogging the Consequentialist Vacuum". Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3:123-153.
    That many values can be consequentialized – incorporated into a ranking of states of affairs – is often taken to support the view that apparent alternatives to consequentialism are in fact forms of consequentialism. Such consequentializing arguments take two very different forms. The first is concerned with the relationship between morally right action and states of affairs evaluated evaluator-neutrally, the second with the relationship between what agents ought to do and outcomes evaluated evaluator-relatively. I challenge the consequentializing arguments for both (...)
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  12. Matthew H. Kramer (1996). How Not to Oppugn Consequentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):213-220.
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  13. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
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  14. Elinor Mason (2004). Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference. Utilitas 16 (3):316-321.
    James Lenman argues that consequentialism fails as a moral theory because it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of our actions. I agree that it is impossible to predict the long-term consequences of actions, but argue that this does not count as a strike against consequentialism. I focus on the principle of indifference, which tells us to treat unforeseeable consequences as cancelling each other out, and hence value-neutral. I argue that though we cannot defend this principle independently, we cannot (...)
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  15. D. Miller (2003). Axiological Actualism and the Converse IntuitionResponse to Parsons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):123.
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  16. Nikil Mukerji (2016). The Case Against Consequentialism Reconsidered. Springer.
    This book argues that critics of consequentialism have not been able to make a successful and comprehensive case against all versions of consequentialism because they have been using the wrong methodology. This methodology relies on the crucial assumption that consequentialist theories share a defining characteristic. This text interprets consequentialism, instead, as a family resemblance term. On that basis, it argues quite an ambitions claim, viz. that all versions of consequentialism should be rejected, including those that have been created in response (...)
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  17. Nikil Mukerji (2014). Consequentialism, Deontology and the Morality of Promising. In Johanna Jauernig & Christoph Lütge (eds.), Business Ethics and Risk Management. Springer 111-126.
    In normative ethics there has been a long-standing debate between consequentialists and deontologists. To settle this dispute moral theorists have often used a selective approach. They have focused on particular aspects of our moral practice and have teased out what consequentialists and deontologists have to say about it. One of the focal points of this debate has been the morality of promising. In this paper I review arguments on both sides and examine whether consequentialists or deontologists offer us a more (...)
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  18. Howard Nye, David Plunkett & John Ku (2015). Non-Consequentialism Demystified. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4).
    Morality seems important, in the sense that there are practical reasons — at least for most of us, most of the time — to be moral. A central theoretical motivation for consequentialism is that it appears clear that there are practical reasons to promote good outcomes, but mysterious why we should care about non-consequentialist moral considerations or how they could be genuine reasons to act. In this paper we argue that this theoretical motivation is mistaken, and that because many arguments (...)
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  19. Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
    The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine. -/- In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the (...)
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  20. David S. Oderberg (2000). Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Moral Theory_ sets out the basic system used to solve moral problems, the system that consequentialists deride as 'traditional morality'. The central concepts, principles and distinctions of traditional morality are explained and defended: rights; justice; the good; virtue; the intention/foresight distinction; the acts/omissions distinction; and, centrally, the fundamental value of human life.
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  21. Marek Piechowiak (1989). Petera Knauera koncepcja wyboru moralnego. W sprawie kreatywizmu antropologicznego we wspólczesnej teologii moralnej. Roczniki Filozoficzne 37 (2):21.
    PETER KNAUER'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL CHOICE ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CREAITVENESS IN MODERN MORAL THEOLOGY Summary The author undertakes a critical analysis of the ethical views of Peter Knauer who is one of the most influential theological moralist today. The author tends to show the consequences of Knauer's theory which consequences are destructive for morality. The first part of the paper presents Knauer's standpoint in view of the conception of moral choice and shows three crucial points of his system. They are (...)
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  22. Douglas W. Portmore, Consequentialism and Coordination Problems.
    Imagine both that (1) S1 is deliberating at t about whether or not to x at t' and that (2) although S1’s x-ing at t' would not itself have good consequences, good consequences would ensue if both S1 x's at t' and S2 y's at t", where S1 may or may not be identical to S2 and where t < t' ≤ t". In this paper, I consider how consequentialists should treat S2 and the possibility that S2 will y at (...)
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  23. Douglas W. Portmore, Maximalism Vs. Omnism About Permissibility.
    The performance of one option can entail the performance of another. For instance, I have the option of baking a pumpkin pie as well as the option of baking a pie, and the former entails the latter. Now, suppose that both of these options are permissible. This raises the issue of which, if either, is more fundamental than the other. Is baking a pie permissible because it’s permissible to perform some instance of pie-baking, such as pumpkin-pie baking? Or is baking (...)
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  24. Ryan Preston-Roedder (2014). A Better World. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.
    A number of moral philosophers have endorsed instances of the following curious argument: it would be better if a certain moral theory were true; therefore, we have reason to believe that the theory is true. In other words, the mere truth of the theory—quite apart from the results of our believing it or acting in accord with it—would make for a better world than the truth of its rivals, and this fact provides evidence of the theory’s truth. This form of (...)
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  25. Alex Rajczi (forthcoming). On the Incoherence Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-20.
    For a long time many philosophers felt the incoherence objection was a decisive objection to rule-consequentialism, but that position has recently become less secure, because Brad Hooker has offered a clever new way for rule-consequentialists to avoid the incoherence objection. Hooker’s response defeats traditional forms of the incoherence objection, but this paper argues that another version of the problem remains. Several possible solutions fail. One other does not, but it introduces other problems into the theory. I conclude that the new (...)
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  26. Alex Rajczi (2011). The Argument From Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism and a Defense of Moral Options. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):315.
    The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice between moral options only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results. This paper argues for moral options and thus against act-consequentialism. The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless our moral system allows options. One such thing is the opportunity for individuals to enact plans for their life from among alternatives. Because planning one’s (...)
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  27. Jason Rogers (2010). In Defense of a Version of Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 22 (2):198-221.
    In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I (...)
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  28. Joakim Sandberg (2011). My Emissions Make No Difference. Environmental Ethics 33 (3):229-48.
    “Since the actions I perform as an individual only have an inconsequential effect on the threat of climate change,” a common argument goes, “it cannot be morally wrong for me to take my car to work everyday or refuse to recycle.” This argument has received a lot of scorn from philosophers over the years, but has actually been defended in some recent articles. A more systematic treatment of a central set of related issues shows how maneuvering around these issues is (...)
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  29. S. Andrew Schroeder (2011). You Don't Have to Do What's Best! (A Problem for Consequentialists and Other Teleologists). In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press
    Define teleology as the view that requirements hold in virtue of facts about value or goodness. Teleological views are quite popular, and in fact some philosophers (e.g. Dreier, Smith) argue that all (plausible) moral theories can be understood teleologically. I argue, however, that certain well-known cases show that the teleologist must at minimum assume that there are certain facts that an agent ought to know, and that this means that requirements can't, in general, hold in virtue of facts about value (...)
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  30. Anthony Skelton (2016). E. F. Carritt (1876-1964). In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    E. F. Carritt (1876-1964) was educated at and taught in Oxford University. He made substantial contributions both to aesthetics and to moral philosophy. The focus of this entry is his work in moral philosophy. His most notable works in this field are The Theory of Morals (1928) and Ethical and Political Thinking (1947). Carritt developed views in metaethics and in normative ethics. In meta-ethics he defends a cognitivist, non-naturalist moral realism and was among the first to respond to A. J. (...)
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  31. Anthony Skelton (2013). Griffin, James (1933-). In James Crimmins (ed.), Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic
    A short, opinionated encyclopedia entry on James Griffin, in which some of his views are discussed and evaluated.
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  32. Jussi Suikkanen (2014). Consequentialist Options. Utilitas 26 (3):276-302.
    According to traditional forms of act-consequentialism, an action is right if and only if no other action in the given circumstances would have better consequences. It has been argued that this view does not leave us enough freedom to choose between actions which we intuitively think are morally permissible but not required options. In the first half of this article, I will explain why the previous consequentialist responses to this objection are less than satisfactory. I will then attempt to show (...)
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  33. T. Zamir (2001). One Consequence of Consequentialism: Morality and Overdetermination. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 55 (2):155-168.
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