Knobe wants to help adjudicate the philosophical debate concerning whether and under what conditions we normally judge that some side effect was brought about intentionally. His proposal for doing so is perhaps an obvious one--simply elicit the intuitions of "The Folk" directly on the matter and record the results. Knobe concludes that people's judgment that a side effect was brought about intentionally apparently rests, at least in part, upon how blameworthy they find the agent responsible for it. Knobe's appreciably straightforward (...) approach to this question does not settle the matter, however. Simply raising that question can itself affect our evaluation of the side effect in question as either something good or something bad. As a result, Knobe's experiments effectively bias subjects' responses toward judging the given side effects more negatively than they might have otherwise. Subjects failed to assign a high level of praise for good side effects because taking into account whether they were brought about intentionally or unintentionally makes them suspect. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Echoing bell hooks’s discussions on “black rage,” this article explores the politics of “Dalit rage” by juxtaposing some instances of projections of Dalits as an “angry,” “illiberal,” and “intolerant” constituency with examples of anger from Dalit literature. While these projections in “mainstream” media and caste Hindu–dominated civil society narratives often represent them as engulfed in the emotive states marked by anger, intolerance, and impatience, the instances from Dalit literature archive a “Dalit rage” that demands to be dissociated from the Nietzschean (...) category of ressentiment. Through B. R. Ambedkar’s readings of Nietzsche in Philosophy of Hinduism and Nietzsche’s readings of Manu’s Manavadharmashastra in Twilight of the Idols, this article draws a fine line of differentiation between Nietzsche’s contempt for ressentiment and Manu’s disdain for anger. “Dalit rage” occupies a distinctly different thymotic space and articulates a Dalit predicament that exploits rage as a marker of protest, resistance, and caste-ridden social conflicts. This article shows why we cannot bracket Nietzsche’s contempt for ressentiment with Manu’s demands of the sudras (and, in extension, other “lower castes”/Dalits) to be “meek” by exploring Manu’s perpetuation and legitimization of the varna order through a “morality of breeding” and Nietzsche’s more wholesale rejection of morality as he deems it a pia fraus (moral fraud). Thus this “Dalit rage” offers us a repository of the limits of a liberal democracy and enables an Ambedkarite reading of Nietzsche whose project of constructing ubermensch is markedly different from Manu’s “morality of taming” through a “morality of breeding.”. (shrink)

Since the English translation first appeared in 1923, Rudolf Otto's volume has established itself as a classic in the field of religious philosophy. It offers an in-depth inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational.

We review scholarship that examines relationships - and distinctions - between religion and delusion. We begin by outlining and endorsing the position that both involve belief. Next, we present the prevailing psychiatric view that religious beliefs are not delusional if they are culturally accepted. While this cultural exemption has controversial implications, we argue it is clinically valuable and consistent with a growing awareness of the social - as opposed to purely epistemic - function of belief formation. Finally, we review research (...) on continuities between religious and delusional cognition, which reveals that religious content is quite common in delusions and which provides tentative evidence for a positive relationship between religious belief and delusion-like belief in the general population. (shrink)

Should we let personal responsibility for health-related behavior influence the allocation of healthcare resources? In this paper, we clarify what it means to be responsible for an action. We rely on a crucial conceptual distinction between being responsible and holding someone responsible, and show that even though we might be considered responsible and blameworthy for our health-related actions, there could still be well-justified reasons for not considering it reasonable to hold us responsible by giving us lower priority. We transform these (...) philosophical considerations into analytical use first by assessing the general features of health-related actions and the corresponding healthcare needs. Then, we identify clusters of structural features that even adversely affected people cannot reasonably deny constitute actions for which they should be held responsible. We summarize the results in an analytical framework that can be used by decision-makers when considering personal responsibility for health as a criterion for setting priorities. (shrink)

Background Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) use electrical or magnetic stimulation to treat mental disorders and may raise different ethical concerns than other therapies such as medications or talk therapy. Yet little is known about stakeholders’ perceptions of, and ethical concerns related to, these interventions. We aimed to better understand the ethical concerns of a variety of stakeholder groups (patients with depression, caregivers of patients, members of the public, and psychiatrists) regarding four PEIs: electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), (...) deep brain stimulation (DBS), and adaptive brain implants (ABI).Methods We conducted a national survey of these four stakeholder groups, using an embedded video vignette experiment depicting a patient with treatment-resistant depression and her psychiatrist discussing the possibility of treatment with one of the four PEIs.Results Participants’ ethical concerns varied by stakeholder group, by PEI, and by the interaction of the two. The three non-clinician groups tended to have similar ethical concerns, but to differ from psychiatrists. Similar concerns were raised with regard to the two implantable technologies, DBS and ABI. Overall, there was relatively little concern about the involuntary use of PEIs, though some expressed concern about the adequacy of information provided during the consent process. There was also significant concern that patients may not receive helpful therapies.Conclusions To our knowledge, this is the first national survey that includes multiple stakeholder groups and multiple PEI modalities. A better understanding of the ethical concerns of stakeholders can help to shape clinical practice and health care policy regarding PEIs. (shrink)

In the face of environmental crises such as climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss—which all adversely impact on health—Gils-Schmidt and Salloch explore whether physicians can be justified in taking climate issues into account in clinical care.1 While their approach centres on the ‘climate-sensitive’ decisions, physicians can carry out on the micro-level of clinical decision-making, they encourage further discussions on how climate-related issues can be included across different levels of decision-making in healthcare. We propose a list of tasks and a model (...) to assist with navigating the range of factors and structural elements an environmentally sensitive ethics must address. Stephen Gardiner’s notion of a perfect moral storm is central to understanding these issues.2 Gardiner describes how a perfect moral storm occurs in the centre of three overlapping conditions for human action and policymaking in the face of climate change. This storm is driven by: (1) a lack of interest among current generations to meet global needs and accommodate the well-being of future generations, (2) a lack of ecological concerns for other parts of nature than humans and (3) weak ethical and political theories and institutions shaping policy decisions on issues with severe implications across borders and generations. Moreover, these conditions are embedded in the existing, complex world of ethically unjustified power imbalances and social injustice. The growing awareness of healthcare’s climate footprint has amplified and accelerated global, grassroots action to make healthcare more environmentally friendly. This includes incorporating environmental impacts into quality improvement methodologies, building communities of practice to explore how to make …. (shrink)

When viewed the history of Islamic thought, it is seen that the scholars have made an effort to understand the nature of the speech of God and make sense of it. Essentially, understanding and grasping of the words of God are an effort to look from the physical realm to the metaphysical one. In spite of this fact, the scholars as the indomitable seekers of truth are in search of finding some clues to say about it. While some of them (...) consider the “divine speech” as an attribute of God, many others view it as a divine act. It is also admitted by all of them that whether being attributive or act of God, the reflection of the divine speech is the Qur’ân. In this sense, three views have been put forward on the question of the belonging of the Qur’ânic words. According to the dominant and preferred point of view among these views, Qur’ân belongs to God in terms of wording and meaning. Accordingly, the revelation of the Qur’ân, which was revealed to the Prophet Mohammed consists of both wording and meaning. Therefore, there is no intervention or contribution of Gabriel or Muhammad in constituting of Qur’ân. According to the second approach, the meaning of Qur’ânic text belongs to God, however, its words pertain to Mohammed. This view signals that Gabriel revealed nothing more than the meanings of Qur’ân. Mohammed understands the meanings conveyed to him and then said them in Arabic expression patterns and phrases. According to the third approach, the meanings of Qur’ânic text belongs to God, however, its words pertain to Gabriel. In other words, only meanings of text were given to Gabriel, and its words are formed by him. In the present study, the mentioned approaches which are put forward by scholars about the belonging of Qur’ânic words will be examined in terms of the integrity of the Qur’ân and Tafsir rumors (riwâyât) of the classical period. In a nutshell, it can be said that there is no disagreement among scholars in the field of the belonging of the meanings of Qur’ânic text to God. The main disagreement is whether the Qur’ânic words belong to God, Gabriel or Muhammad. Considering the integrity of Qur’ân and Tafsir rumors regarding to the circumstances of sending down of the Qur’ânic revelation, it has been determined that the prevailing view is more consistent than the other two views. (shrink)

David Hume (1711–1776) believed a ‘confederacy of authors’, brought together by the notoriously pugnacious William Warburton (1698–1779), were his most consistent and scurrilous critics. Warburton and his ‘School’ were Hume’s bêtes noires and embodied so much of what he fought against. Only there is reason to believe that the ‘Warburtonian School’ was more a useful fiction than a historical reality. The following deep dive into Humeana and the ‘stuff of anecdote’ digs up substantial conclusions about Hume’s philosophical project and context. (...) Any glorifying picture of Hume admirably ignoring sustained ‘Warburtonian’ name-calling is not an accurate description of the early reception of his writings. Hume did respond – at least, occasionally, privately and publicly. Moreover, the ‘Warburtonian School’ does not seem to exist – at least, it did not exist if it is taken to refer to a coherent group of writers, numbering more than two, concerned with attacking Hume. The response to Hume of ‘Warburtonians’ who can be identified was varied, disparate, and often positive. Warburton even came to like Hume’s historical writings. Hume’s claim that such a School existed may have led to the post hoc creation of the School in the minds of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century commentators. (shrink)

Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive (...) Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1). (shrink)

The mutakallimūn, who began to take care of nature as a result of their metaphysical concerns from the early period and with the influence of the dualist and materialist groups, suggested various theories that attempt to explain the structure and functioning of the universe. Over time, many subjects of physics became an indispensable part of Kalām and were used in the proof of the fundamental principles. Thus, in addition to the definition of body (jism), Kalām books began to contain detailed (...) topics such as time, space, movement and distance. After summarizing the definitions of body, which were made by the mutakallimūn, this article will examine the contents of Ibn Kamāl's epistle on ṭafra (leaping), which has many copies with various titles in the Turkish Libraries. In the beginning of the epistle, Ibn Kamāl mentions the descriptions of body suggested by the prominent mutakallimūn, and then, he compares the views of al-Naẓẓām, who believes in the finite division, with atomist mutakallimūn who accept the infinite division. He criticizes the idea of ṭafra with regard to the notion of body in Kalām. After explaining the arguments of both groups with their justifications, he points out the weaknesses of the arguments of each group, as well. In this connection, he revisits the theory of ṭafra, which is, he argues, a mandatory consequence of al-Naẓẓām’s definition of object, as he also reviews the opinions of Quṭb al-Din al-Rāzī in this direction. (shrink)

The ethics of belief involves an inquiry into what beliefs are legitimate to hold, including religious beliefs. Whatever the criteria determined in such an investigation, adopting a belief that does not meet this criterion is seen as illegitimate and it is considered an ethical violation. English mathematician W. K. Clifford (d. 1879) defines “sufficient evidence” as a criterion in his famous essay, “The Ethics of Belief”. Clifford’s evidence-centered argument becomes one of the most frequent references in the evidentialist objection against (...) theism. It turns out that this argument is not functional in the face of the diversity of beliefs. In this context, different suggestions are presented about what the ethics of belief could be. American philosopher William James (d. 1810), one of the founding names of pragmatism, offers a new proposal. In his classic work, “The Will to Believe”, James claims that Clifford is wrong in seeking the requirement of evidence for all beliefs. Because it is not possible to prove beliefs from the passionate nature of human beings, especially religious beliefs. Following this distinction, James proposes a new criterion for religious beliefs: a religious belief can be vivid or dead, forced or avoidable; and momentous or trivial. If a religious belief is vivid, forced, and momentous, it is necessary to have the courage to believe in it instead of suspending it. James' proposal is often valued as a strong counter-challenge or defense of religious beliefs. However, this argument also has aspects that are open to criticism. One of them is that the will to believe argument concurrently accepts conflicting religious beliefs or, in other words, confronts the issue of religious diversity. According to J. Hick, for example, this argument inevitably results in religious pluralism, even though James does not want to. Contrary to Hick, S. F. Aikin claims that the will to believe does not result in religious pluralism. According to Aikin, who draws attention to the relationship of argument with pragmatism, James obscures religious beliefs and removes them from being claims about truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the classical sense. So, which of the objections is valid? Does the will-to-believe argument result in religious pluralism by legitimizing more than one religious belief at the same time, or does it make a purely pragmatic proposition by devaluing religious beliefs? Which religion do I have the right to believe in according to the will to believe? The aim of this article is to provide an answer to the mentioned question. In the article, unlike the current evaluations, it is argued that the argument is closely related to James's theory of knowledge, radical empiricism, not pragmatism as it is usually made. For this purpose, after showing the relationship between the arguments of Clifford and James, the argument will be re-examined in this context and it will be revealed that James has two steps regarding religious beliefs: to make religious beliefs independent from factual beliefs; leaving theism to accept a monistic vision of God and basing religion on mystical experience, which is an emotional experience. As details emerge, it will become clear that James defends a natural religion that excludes traditional religions in his philosophical system and that he defends the beliefs of a humanized religion. With an individual definition of religion based on emotion, James on the one hand ensures the commonality of religious feeling, on the other hand, he makes religion independent from the field of facts. Therefore, with this study, it will be seen that the argument of the will to believe does not aim to legitimize believing in traditional religions, and diversity is not a fundamental problem. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of ‘perspectives’ to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore’s treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism (...) must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche’s pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. (shrink)

This article is focused on the theory of nature (ṭabʽ) advocated by some of the early Muʽtazilī scholars such as Muʻammar b. ʽAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830), Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), Abū ʽUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) and Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʽbī (d. 319/931) and its consequences about causality and miracle. The supporters of the ṭabʽ theory argue that Allah creates all beings with innate and permanent natures and these natures determine all movements and events in universe, and that necessary causal relationships (...) based on it prevail in the universe. But this understanding was criticized and rejected by the majority of Muslim theologians. The focal point of the criticism is God’s agency and His relationship with the universe. The acceptance of such necessary causality in the universe would make it impossible for God to intervene in nature, that is to create a miracle. So, miracles will be the work of the place where it occurs like all other acts when the concept of nature is accepted. In this case, it will not be possible to prove the omnipotence of God and belief in prophethood, which forms the basis of two principles of Islamic belief. This study deals with the dimensions of compulsory causality in the thought of naturalist Muslim theologians by addressing two questions: how the issue of miracle is grounded, and whether a divine intervention in nature of entities is possible. (shrink)

The role of imagery in encoding event-based prospective memories has yet to be fully clarified. Herein, it is argued that imagery augments a cue-to-context association that supports event-based prospective memory performance. By this account, imagery encoding not only improves prospective memory performance but also reduces interference to intention-related information that occurs outside of context. In the current study, when lure words occurred outside of the appropriate responding context, the use of imagery encoding strategies resulted in less interference when compared with (...) a standard event-based intention condition. This difference was eliminated when participants were not given a specific context to associate their intention . These results support a cue-to-context association account of how imagery operates in certain event-based prospective memory tasks. (shrink)

Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...) argue that for Helmholtz, the properties we perceive are not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. Rather, Helmholtz endorsed a relationalism about the properties we perceive: the properties of objects we perceive are all relational properties. I then suggest that once we take into account oft-neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz’s corpus, we are better able to make sense of his commitment to relationalism. (shrink)

Professor Foot's Hart Lecture, now published (1995), is largely devoted to an attack on people she calls ‘subjectivists’ and ‘noncognitivists', among whom she includes myself, although she is so good as to allow me, in a footnote, to reject thenames.She seems to imply thereby that this is a mere matter of nomenclature or terminology. But in truth her use of these terms makes one suspect that she has not fully understood either the issues or what I have said about them.It (...) may therefore be useful to explain yet again why I reject these descriptions. I have done so already in a paper to a conference in Moscow which she heard, and to which she kindly refers (Hare 1993a). These explanations would not be important if she were the only person to be confused about this matter; but the confusions are so widespread, even among professional philosophers who should know better, and are so often taught to succeeding generations of students, that it is worth while to make yet another attempt to clear them up - though the confusions are so insidious that I have not much hope that they will ever be eradicated. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain (...) stimulation). They found that a substantial minority agreed that seeing occurs in the Non-Blocker cases, and that in the Blocker cases significantly less agreed that seeing occurs. They thus hypothesized that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition than with a causal condition. This paper continues this line of enquiry with two new experiments. The paper investigates the generality and robustness of Roberts et al.’s findings by expanding the sense modalities tested from only vision to audition and olfaction as well. The paper also uses Gricean style thought experiments as a case study for investigating the “reflection defense” against the negative project in experimental philosophy. Our results replicate and extend Roberts et al.’s study and support their hypothesis that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition. They also provide an empirical reason to doubt the reflection defense. (shrink)

This is the first edition of Plato's Republic to be based on an exhaustive examination of all the textual evidence - manuscripts, including papyri; quotations and allusions in ancient authors; translations into Coptic, Arabic and Hebrew. The three primary manuscripts have been examined with particular care. Many new readings have been introduced in the text and a critical apparatus gives details for all relevant textual evidence.

The author, who pioneered this argument in 1961, here places it in the context of traditional discussions of the problem, and answers various criticisms that have been made.

Char et al. describe an interesting and useful approach in their paper, “Identifying ethical considerations for machine learning healthcare applications.” Their proposed framework, which see...

Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār is one of the important representatives of the Kalām thought of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School. He was born in A.H. 450/ C.E. 1058 in Bukhara that is one of the city of Transoxiana/Mawara al-nahr where Maturidi School has emerged around this socio-cultural environment. He completed his education and served as a leader (rais/ ṣadr) of the Hanafite scholars there until he was exiled to the city of Marv. Upon his return from exile, he passed away in (...) Bukhara in A.H. 534/ C.E. 1139. The present study aims to determine his method in Kalām. The introduction outlines the subject, significance, purpose, method, and sources of the research. In this study, it was employed a method that focuses on a person in which he/she is examined with his/her views and thoughts by taking into account his/her socio-cultural factors. By doing this, the first chapter of this study deals with the political, socio-economic, and scientific situation in Transoxiana, and the activities of diverse religions, sects, and philosophical schools in this region in A.H. V-VI/C.E. XI-XII. In the second chapter, it studies al-Ṣaffār’s life, scientific personality, works as well as the sources that he made references to in his works in detail. In the third chapter, the kalām method of al-Ṣaffār has been tried to be determined. For this purpose, it analyzes his extant works, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risālah fī al-kalām and elaborates first on his defense of the Kalām that gives great importance to reason (ʿaql) and to intellectual debates, if necessary, in theological issues. Then it explores his theory of knowledge with his ideas on the definition, possibility, sources, and types of knowledge, and the epistemological understandings he defensed or criticised. Furthermore, to determine his Kalām method, it evaluates his approach towards the value of ‘aql and naql (Qurʾān-Ḥadīth) as sources of knowledge. Since this issue is a distinctive tool for unveiling the kalām methods of different mutakallims and Muslim sects. Finally, it finds out the types of istidlāl, meaning inference of one thing from the other that he used when he argues and defends his views, and illustrates with examples. (shrink)

Yemeni writer Ahmed Qāsim al-Arīqī, in addition to his profession as a pharmacist, is a writer who has made a name for himself in the country's literary field, especially in the last fifteen years. A prolific writer, al-Arīqī is the author of poetry collections as well as stories and novels that emphasise awareness of the traditional issues of the Yemeni people. He has published "Maḳāmāt al-'Arīḳī" (2006), "Ġalṭṭetu Ḳalem" (2012), "Qurāt al-S̱-S̱elj" (2017), "Ta'riyya" (2018), "Zurbet al-Yumnā" (2018), "Da'wat al-Ḥuḳūl" (2019), (...) "Zuhr al-Ġarām" and "Sīret al-Kūbī" (2022). His novel "Yawma Māta al-Shaytan" (The Day Satan Died) was published electronically by Hindāwī Publishing House in 2022. The novel, which is approximately 120 pages, is written in six chapters. There are eleven passages in the first and fourth chapters, thirteen in the second and sixth chapters, twelve in the third chapter, and eight in the fifth chapter. The novel is about the adventures of a member of the army named Marwan Naji, who was wounded in the war between the Houthi militia and the Yemeni army, and after nine months in a coma, opens his eyes in a perfect world dominated by biological and technological advances. Symbolising the treatment of selfishness and various narcissisms with advanced vaccines through the death of Satan, the author describes Marwan's adventures in his world, which he sometimes describes as the realm of the jinn, in a very simple language, while not failing to criticise reality in its various political, social and religious dimensions. In fact, Marwan's world of imagination and fantasy is the main story of the novel, but not the only one. The author also includes the stories of family members in Marwan's world of turmoil, destruction, massacre, war and victory, giving the reader the opportunity to compare both worlds. While his mother Gusoun, his wife Hamide and his daughter Fatma, who later got engaged in time after being widowed, are the female characters of his real world, Professor Mari and Mariana, one of his seven wives, are the other important characters of his imaginary world. Gusûn is a devoted mother who does not leave the bedside of her comatose son, prays for him day and night and tries to do everything she can for his recovery. Gusûn, who is listened to at home to a certain extent, scolds her grandchildren to prevent the breakup of her son's home because of inheritance, defends that the existing wealth still belongs to her son and reminds them that she will not hesitate to spend money for his recovery. Gusûn's daughter-in-law Hamide also takes care of her husband, who shows no signs of recovery. Hamide, who is not as patient as her mother-in-law, is also a jealous woman. On the other hand, although both of them display false religious tendencies that have no relation with real life, Gusûn is more prone to the superstitious approaches put forward and adopted in the name of religion. Fatma is also a widow who, although she has the will to take care of her children and live her life alone, has been engaged for a long time to her uncle's son Münir, who, like her, took part in anti-regime demonstrations and whose love she believes in. Fatma, who is more conscious than her grandmother and mother, is not alien to the issues that society complains about and often participates in women's movements organised against the government. Professor Mari, one of the two important characters belonging to Marwan's imaginary world, is a psychologist and the chief physician of a large hospital who treats jealousy, anger, lying and selfishness, which are considered dangerous viruses, with vaccines developed by scientists. Professor Mari, who is personally involved in Marwan's treatment, also chairs the committee that records his memory and projects all his memories on a giant screen. Mariana, on the other hand, monitors Marwan's behaviour and thoughts through a biological chip to control the effect of the vaccines given to him, criticises him through the tragic images projected on the screen and provides information that will facilitate his adaptation to his new world. In the article, in which the author's main published works are briefly introduced along with a broad summary of the novel, the social messages that an author, who is not indifferent to the realities of the geography he lives in, tries to give directly and indirectly with a language far from locality, are tried to be determined through the mentioned female characters. It is seen that the desire to become a single nation by making; love, brotherhood, friendship and peace dominant lies behind the author's novelisation of the dream of an ideal world symbolised by the death of Satan. (shrink)

In this, the first of two ground-breaking volumes on the nature of language in the light of the way it evolved, James Hurford looks at how the world first came to have a meaning in the minds of animals and how in humans this meaning eventually came to be expressed as language. He reviews a mass of evidence to show how close some animals, especially primates and more especially apes, are to the brink of human language. Apes may not talk (...) to us but they construct rich cognitive representations of the world around them, and here, he shows, are the evolutionary seeds of abstract thought - the means of referring to objects, the memory of events, even elements of the propositional thinking philosophers have hitherto reserved for humans. What then, he asks, is the evolutionary path between the non-speaking minds of apes and our own speaking minds? Why don't apes communicate the richness of their thoughts to each other? Why do humans alone have a unique disposition to reveal their thoughts in complex detail? Professor Hurford searches a wide range of evidence for the answers to these central questions, including degrees of trust, the role of hormones, the ability to read minds, and the willingness to cooperate. Expressing himself congenially in consistently colloquial language the author builds up a vivid picture of how mind, language, and meaning evolved over millions of years. His book is a landmark contribution to the understanding of linguistic and thinking processes, and the fullest account yet published of the evolution of language and communication."A wonderful read - lucid, informative, and entertaining, while at the same time never talking down to the reader by sacrificing argumentation for the sake of 'simplicity'. Likely to be heralded as the major publication dealing with language evolution to date. Frederick J. Newmeyer, University of Washington. (shrink)

One of the divine quotations narrated from the timeline of Qur’ānic revelation is seen as a word of Prophet Mohammad in the 30th verse of the surah of al-Furqān. It’s observed that the speaker of this verse is Prophet Mohammad and he complains to God about his tribe which neglects the Qur’ān. In the present study, semantic structure and the meaning area of the phrase “mahjūr”, which is the key word in this verse, the meaning of it in the timeline (...) of Qur’ānic revelation and the interpretations attributed to it in the following centuries are traced. Likewise by examining Qur’ānic exegesis chronologically and investigating the interpretations of the exegetes on the relevant verse, it’s tried to see the semantic breaking points, changes and transformations regarding this verse in the historical process. Finally, the approaches of the exegetes who interpreted this verse in terms of the method of maqāsidī tafsir or the principle of teleological interpretation are determined. The approaches detected in this respect are first explained in a descriptive style, and then they’re evaluated in an analytical point of view. The findings and conclusions we reached in this study are as follows: As stated by the majority of exegetes, especially Qatāda, al-Zamakhsharī, Ibn Atiyya, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Sa‘ālibī, the aforementioned verse belongs to the Prophet Mohammed in terms of both wording and meaning. It hasn’t been determined that there’s a conflict about the pertaining of this word to him. According to this hadith quoted in surah al-Furqān, the Qurayshi polytheists made unwarranted objections to the Prophet and the divine instructions that he brought, his heart was narrowed in the face of their attitude towards the Qur’ān, and for these reasons he complained about his tribe to God. It can be said that this meaning seen in Mecca in the tenth year of his prophethood, namely, insulting the Qur’ān, abandoning it, and denying the themes in it, also includes Muslims after the revelation period. Accordingly, it can be thought that the aspect and situation of not acting on the provisions of the Qur’ān and not thinking about its verses are also valid for the interlocutors of the next period. In this direction, when we look at the history of tafsir, it has been determined that the exegetes who interpreted this verse in terms of teleological interpretation asserted different approaches. It was seen that al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī, Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī, al-Bikā‘ī, Kamālpasazāde, Sayhzāda and Ibn ʻĀshūr interpreted this complaint of the Prophet by associating it with the coming of punishment. Therefore, in compliance with them, this verse aimed to threaten all the interlocutors, especially the Quraysh. On the other hand, it has recognized that Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, Ibn Kathir, Bursavī and Sayyid Qutb evaluated this verse in the context of the types and ways to abandon the Qur’ān. Thus, they interpreted the relevant verse in terms of maqāsidī tafsir in a way that would cover both the first addressees of Qur’ānic revelation and other interlocutors in the following periods. In a nutshell, it can be considered that not endeavoring to understand and interpret the Qur’ān, or keeping it away from family and social life, law, understanding of earning and spending, not referring to it in such matters, or giving up living a life pursuant to it, are some of the routes and sorts of abandonment of it for Muslims. (shrink)