While the concept of adaptive preferences is an important tool for criticizing injustice, it is often claimed that using the concept involves showing disrespect for persons judged to have adaptive preferences. In this paper, I propose an account of adaptive preferences that does the relevant political work while still showing persons two centrally important kinds of respect. My account is based in what I call an indirect substantive account of autonomy, which places substantive requirements on the options available to a (...) person, rather than on the option that she ultimately prefers. This allows us to pinpoint cases in which a person's circumstances have rendered her insufficiently autonomous, without saying that any conception of the good must be non-autonomous tout court. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for the counter-intuitive conclusion that the same adaptive preference can be both prudentially good and prudentially bad for its holder: that is, it can be prudentially objectionable from one temporal perspective, but prudentially unobjectionable from another. Given the possibility of transformative experiences, there is an important sense in which even worrisome adaptive preferences can be prudentially good for us. That is, if transformative experiences lead us to develop adaptive preferences, then their objects can become prudentially (...) better for our actual selves than the objects of their non-adaptive alternatives would now be. I also argue, however, that the same worrisome adaptive preferences might still be prospectively prudentially objectionable: that is, our pre-transformation selves might be prudentially better off undergoing a non-adaptive alternative transformative experience instead. I argue that both claims hold across the range of the most broadly-defended accounts of well-being in the literature. (shrink)

Although the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I (...) aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive prefer.. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a tension in the capabilities approach between committing to political liberalism and ensuring full capability for all persons. In particular, I argue that the capabiliti...

In this article, I first propose four guidelines that follow from understanding the project of assigning victims duties to resist oppression as an ameliorative project. That is, if we understand the project to be motivated by the urgent aim of ending or mitigating the harm that oppression imposes on the oppressed, I argue that we should focus on developing and assigning duties that satisfy what I call the ability, weighting, fairness, and overdemandingness guidelines. Second, I develop the duty to be (...) a non-normative individual, which satisfies all four guidelines. (shrink)

Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, (...) I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw. (shrink)

A purely theoretical analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s basis of the capabilities approach in feminist (rather than more broadly liberal humanist) justice yields a philosophical project that may appear inconsistent, if not incoherent. However, I suggest in this paper that when the reader considers the project’s very concrete aims, there surfaces an intelligible reason for the apparent incongruities between her feminist and liberal commitments. Since even a capabilities approach rooted in feminist justice is itself radical and must win political support in (...) order to be implemented, I suggest that Nussbaum’s basis of the approach in feminist justice can perhaps be understood as a canny attempt to win support for her project on politically popular grounds, using the rhetoric of sex and social justice that has already been embraced by current economic powers. Once arguments based on morally irrelevant differences between sexes are politically endorsed, it will perhaps be easier to argue for the directly parallel moral irrelevance of differences based on accident of birth into the underdeveloped world. (shrink)

Political philosophers working on ideal and non-ideal theory sometimes seem to be stuck in a bind: while ideal theory risks being too ideal to be useful in the real world, non-ideal theory risks being so non-ideal that it stops far short of justice. In this paper, I highlight a third – and equally unappealing – possibility: that non-ideal theory, precisely because of its obvious engagement with real-world problems, might fail to recognize the unacceptable ways in which it is itself problematically (...) idealized. I highlight this problem through the case-study of adaptive preferences. Although work in adaptive preferences obviously fits into non-ideal theory, the actual work being done in the literature is idealized in that it takes only the circumstances and needs of adults into account. In the best case, this means that the needs of one of our most vulnerable populations – that is, children – are ignored. In the worst case, where the needs of children and adults conflict, the needs of children will be actively frustrated. In this way, non-ideal theory can fail to approximate justice precisely because it fails to recognize the idealizations that it itself employs. (shrink)

In this paper I show the short-comings of autonomy-based justifications for exemptions from paternalism and appeal to the value of settling to defend an alternative well-being-based justification. My well-being-based justification, unlike autonomy-based justifications, can 1) explain why adults but not children are exempt from paternalism; 2) show which kinds of paternalism are justified for children; 3) explain the value of the capacity of autonomy; 4) offer a plausible relationship between autonomy and exemption from paternalism; and 5) give political philosophers a (...) justification for exempting persons from paternalism even if broad scepticism about the capacity for autonomy is justified. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but (...) the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization. (shrink)

In this paper, I use the framework developed by Julie Rose in Free Time to offer an initial analysis of another under-theorized resource that liberal egalitarian states might owe their citizens: that is, the sense of moral of entitlement to make use of their basic liberties. First, I suggest that this sense of moral entitlement, like free time, might be necessary for the effective use of those basic liberties. Next, I suggest that this sense of moral entitlement (again, like free (...) time) might be the kind of all-purpose good that satisfies publicity and feasibility criteria. Together, this suggests that a sense of moral entitlement to make use of basic liberties is the kind of resource that is appropriate for distribution by a liberal egalitarian state, and that such states indeed owe their citizens. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that opposite-sex couples planning weddings have a duty to make their choices in ways that undermine the harmful norms that lead to most women taking their husband’s last names when they marry, and most weddings being extremely expensive. This duty, however, is not a duty to significantly reduce the prevalence of those norms, since doing so is generally not in the power of individual couples. Rather, it is a duty to provide observing couples around them (...) with new live options for their own weddings. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum grounds her version of the capabilities approach in political liberalism. In this paper, we argue that the capabilities approach, insofar as it genuinely values the things that persons can actually do and be, must be grounded in a hybrid account of liberalism: in order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a commitment to comprehensive autonomy, one that ensures that children develop the skills (...) necessary to make meaningful choices about whether or not to exercise their basic capabilities. Importantly, in order to show respect for parents who do not necessarily recognize autonomy as a value, we argue that the liberal state, via its system of public education, should take on the role of ensuring that all children within the state develop a sufficient degree of comprehensive autonomy. (shrink)

Philosophical Papers, Volume 41, Issue 2, Page 323-329, July 2012.

ABSTRACTSerene Khader and Rosa Terlazzo have each recently proposed theories of adaptive preferences which purport to both respect persons’ agency and provide an effective political tool. While Khader and Terlazzo thus share a similar goal, they take fundamentally different paths in its pursuit: Khader offers a perfectionist account of APs and Terlazzo an autonomy-based theory. In this paper, I argue first that if it is to adequately respect persons’ agency, a theory of APs should in some (...) way include autonomy considerations. If it is to provide an effective political tool, however, our theory should not be entirely autonomy-based, but include a condition addressing a preference’s compatibility with basic flourishing. The suggestion is thus that it is worth considering the possibility of a ‘mixed,’ rather than exclusively perfectionist or exclusively autonomy-based, theory of APs. I outline two such theories. The first, I argue, does quite well with respect to the political efficacy aim of AP theoriz... (shrink)

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in (...) outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history. (shrink)

Drawing inspiration from a well-attested historical tradition, I propose an account of cognition according to which knowledge is not only prior to belief; it is also, and crucially, not a kind of belief. Believing, in turn, is not some sort of botched knowing, but a mental state fundamentally different from knowing, with its own distinctive and complementary role in our cognitive life. I conclude that the main battle-line in the history of epistemology is drawn between the affirmation of a natural (...) mental state in which there is a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ and the rejection of such a natural mental state. For the former position, there is a mental state which is different in kind from belief, and which is constituted by the presence of the object of cognition to the cognitive subject, with no gap between them. For the latter position, all our cognition is belief, and the question becomes how and when belief is permissible. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that a proper understanding of what Leibniz meant by “hypercategorematic infinite” sheds light on some fundamental aspects of his conceptions of God and of the relationship between God and created simple substances or monads. After revisiting Leibniz’s distinction between (i) syncategorematic infinite, (ii) categorematic infinite, and (iii) actual infinite, I examine his claim that the hypercategorematic infinite is “God himself” in conjunction with other key statements about God. I then discuss the issue of whether the (...) hypercategorematic infinite is a “whole”, comparing the four kinds of infinite outlined by Leibniz in 1706 with the three degrees of infinity outlined in 1676. In the last section, I discuss the relationship between the hypercategorematic infinite and created simple substances. I conclude that, for Leibniz, only a being beyond all determinations but eminently embracing all determinations can enjoy the pure positivity of what is truly infinite while constituting the ontological grounding of all things. (shrink)

Throughout his long intellectual life, Leibniz penned his reflections on Christian theology, yet this wealth of material has never been systematically gathered or studied. This book addresses an important and central aspect of these neglected materials—Leibniz’s writings on two mysteries central to Christian thought, the Trinity and the Incarnation. -/- From Antognazza’s study emerges a portrait of a thinker surprisingly receptive to traditional Christian theology and profoundly committed to defending the legitimacy of truths beyond the full grasp of human reason. (...) This view of Leibniz differs strikingly from traditional perceptions of the philosopher as a “hard” rationalist and quasi-deist. Antognazza also sets Leibniz’s writings in the context of the important theological controversies of his day. (shrink)

What are intuitions? Do they exist as distinctive mental states? Do they have an epistemic function? Can we discern specific features that characterize intuitions? Questions like these are widely d...

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

This paper reflects on quality assessment and performance evaluation in higher education, namely by analysing the insufficient link between those two aspects. We start by reviewing the current state of the art regarding different processes and mechanisms of quality assessment and performance evaluation and discuss some of the major issues regarding the implementation of some of them. In particular, we analyse the current limitations regarding data collected, available and publicised on the performance of HEIs and the problems those limitations bring (...) to a fair evaluation of higher education. Through this analysis we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms of evaluation in higher education and the way these may lead to the promotion of better quality assessment practices and institutional management. (shrink)

From its beginning, Critical Theory aimed to explore the laws governing social life as a formational totality and the forces shaping and driving its historical evolution. So the attempt to develop a comprehensive conception of ‘society’ encompassing both its structural as well as its cultural components can be considered one of the defining hallmarks of Critical Theory through all its theoretical and generational variations. But what, then, is Critical Theory’s conception of society? To answer this question, the authors make use (...) of a three-tiered heuristic model distinguishing synthesis (what is society?), dynamis (what are the driving forces of social change?) and praxis ((how) can social change be motivated or influenced by social actors?). In this way, they are able to reconstruct not only the divergences and controversies between the different versions and approaches in Critical Theory across the four generations of authors writing in this tradition, but also four core points of convergence which can serve to differentiate between Critical Theory in the Frankfurt School tradition and other critical theories. These four points, we suggest, should be seen to form the backbone of any valid conception of society in contemporary Critical Theory. (shrink)

This contribution discusses Leibniz’s conception of the Christian church, his life-long ecumenical efforts, and his stance toward religious toleration. Leibniz’s regarded the main Christian denominations as particular churches constituting the only one truly catholic or universal church, whose authority went back to apostolic times, and whose theology was to be traced back to the entire ecclesiastical tradition. This is the ecclesiology which underpins his ecumenism. The main phases and features of his work toward reunification of Protestants and Roman Catholics, and (...) unification of Protestant churches are briefly explored, before turning to the issue of religious toleration. It is argued that a remarkably inclusive conception of toleration can be gleaned from a broad sample of Leibniz’s writings and correspondence. It is thanks to the philosophical and theological grounds of this conception that toleration can in principle be extended, for Leibniz, to all men and women of good will, including non-Christians, pagans, and atheists. (shrink)

Este trabajo presenta un contrapunto entre dos filosofías que participan en el debate que se establece, a propósito de la pregunta por la vida buena, entre los ámbitos ético -tradicionalmente unido a la razón- y estético -tradicionalmente unido a la sensibilidad-, tratando de determinar hasta qué punto es posible y conveniente sobrepasar los límites, bien definidos por la modernidad, de ambos campos. Ambas concepciones, la de Martha Nussbaum, en nombre de la literatura, y la de Ursula Wolf, en nombre de (...) la filosofía, remiten a Aristóteles y aceptan que para deliberar acerca de la vida buena es necesaria la comprensión que aportan tanto la obra literaria como la obra de arte; sin embargo, cada una de ellas asume un énfasis particular y ello permite una consideración amplia del estado actual de la discusión. (shrink)

This article focuses on trans-linguistic relationships between the German aphoristic writings of Israeli, Hebrew poet, and rabbi Elazar Benyoëtz and his personal library, which is one of the last and largest private book collections in Israel to contain the German-Jewish literary canon. By reading traces from the library’s marginalia and paraphernalia, analyzed here for the first time, the article presents five case studies that sketch Benyoëtz’s transformation during the 1960s and 1970s from a Hebrew poet into the most influential contemporary (...) writer of aphorisms in German. The article also presents points of departure for future research into the development of the Archiv Bibliographia Judaica, the largest encyclopedia of Jewish authors in the German language. (shrink)

Leibniz's metaphysics appears to go a long way towards monism: it supports a strong dependence of limited things on the absolute or God and understands this dependence not only as causal dependence but also as a pervasive ontological dependence which involves the communality of nature between absolute and limited. Yet, Leibniz stops short of affirming monism. Why? This paper takes a fresh look at Leibniz's reasons for opposing monism through the lens of a virtually unknown text of 1698 on the (...) metaphysical foundations of the infinite. Against the backdrop of the present-day monistic proposals of Jonathan Schaffer and Michael Della Rocca, the paper identifies and evaluates four different types of monism: 1. Whole-Part Monism; 2. World-Animal Monism; 3. God-Nature Monism and 4. Eleatic Monism. It argues that Leibniz's opposition to Whole-Part Monism, World-Animal Monism, and God-Nature Monism, is due to his conceptions of the infinite and of what it is to be “an absolutely absolute Being”. Furthermore, it argues that the only type of monism which could preserve Leibniz's demanding notions of real infinite and absolute is Eleatic Monism. The latter, however, is also rejected by Leibniz due to our first-hand experience of what it is to be a substance. (shrink)

Preterm discharge effects: Relationship between the maternal experience and newborn's psychobiological regulation The purpose of this study is to investigate how the past experiences of mothers and their potentially traumatic events during pregnancy may have influenced the processes of psychobiological self-regulation and cognitive development in a child born preterm. Eighty children who had a gestational age of < 32 weeks were examined at the 9th month of the corrected age. The mothers and children were divided in two groups: multipara mothers (...) and their children and the primipara mothers and their children. These children were examined on the basis of sleep disorders, nutritional problems and mental development. Perinatal data from clinical observations and data from standardized developmental tests were used to describe the differences. The children of primipara mothers who had unexpected preterm delivery presented major incidences of sleep disorders while the children of primipara mothers, who programmed preterm delivery, presented a major incidences of nutrition problems. The predictability of preterm delivery has a major influence on the capacity of newborns for self-regulation in the case of primipara mothers. (shrink)

Las redes sociales asociadas al conocimiento resultan de interés tanto a los estudios en Ciencia Tecnología y Sociedad, como al desenvolvimiento del pensamiento de la complejidad que se desarrolla en el país. Su análisis explica la naturaleza social de la producción científica y la existencia del capital social, cuyas características se vinculan con la satisfacción y resolución de las necesidades sociales dentro de la población cubana. Se muestra una red, conformada en torno a la Publicación Archivo Médico de Camagüey, durante (...) los años 2003, 2004 y dos bimestres del 2005 sobre el desenvolvimiento de las co autorías dentro de ella. Delineando en qué forma los investigadores se relacionaron entre sí, para valorar algunos de sus resultados. Se describen, los grupos esenciales de investigación y sus principales fortalezas. Constituye una herramienta de trabajo, al exponer los cambios que están ocurriendo en torno a la Universidad Médica Camagüeyana The social networks associated to human knowledge are useful to the studies in Science Technology and Society. Their analysis explains the social nature of the scientific production and the existence of social resources, which link the satisfaction and resolution of the social necessities inside the Cuban population. The characteristics of this networks conformed in Archivo Médico de Camagüey publication on the development of co authorship from 2003 to 2005 were presented in this article. The researchers were related to each other in this work to value in which way they function together and analyze some of their results. The essential groups of investigation and their main strengths were also described. It constitutes a work tool for further research works, to considering the changes that are happening about the scientific knowledge production in Camagüey University of Medicine. (shrink)

Preguntarse si desde un orden patriarcal, en esta búsqueda de sentido, que no acaba, el concepto de Amor no será un nuevo signo trascendente en reemplazo o resurrección del último Dios. Amor como uno de los pocos rasgos de trascendencia en esta civilización tecnológica que, en tanto, virtud del sometimiento, el genio del cristianismo enlaza a la mujer en la red de la lógica cristiana regida por dos dogmas de la fe: la ‘Encarnación’ y el ‘Amor’ e impone la exclusión (...) de las mujeres frente a la sexualidad, precio que pagarían por su admisión en lo sagrado. Con el correr de los siglos, en América Latina, existe una persistente presencia mariana y hay un deseo de consolidar el papel de las diosas madres, pero que desde la perspectiva de estas reflexiones no desestabilizan el credo cristiano. _Palabras clave_: sexualidad, virgen María, corriente mariana, Amor, diosa madre. (shrink)

El artículo aborda el fenómeno de la llamada derecha alternativa de Estados Unidos, que ha experimentado un auge considerable con la campaña y victoria electoral de Donald Trump en enero de 2017. A pesar de que se trata de un movimiento relativamente heterogéneo y no siempre bien definido ideológicamente, su búsqueda de una singularización identitaria de carácter excluyente permitiría abordarlo de forma unitaria. Al mismo tiempo, el artículo plantea la necesidad de entender la irrupción de esta nueva derecha a partir (...) de algunas de las características propias del sistema democrático-capitalista en el que nace. Así, la negación de una identidad humana propiamente dicha, con su correlato de afirmación de la proliferación identitaria, un sistema preferentemente formal de derechos, un acentuado individualismo y el enconamiento de la competencia social a raíz de la crisis económica, pueden encontrarse entre sus raíces explicativas. (shrink)

As one might expect, throughout his life Leibniz assumed an attitude of religious toleration both ad intra (that is, toward Christians of other confessions) and ad extra (that is, toward non-Christians, notably Muslims). The aim of this paper is to uncover the philosophical and theological foundations of Leibniz’s views on this subject. Focusing in particular on his epistolary exchange with the French Catholic convert Paul Pellisson-Fontanier, I argue that neither toleration ad intra nor toleration ad extra is grounded for Leibniz (...) in indifference toward the content of revealed religion. On the contrary, Leibniz remained convinced of the objective truth of the Christian religion as it is handed down by the millennia-old tradition of the truly universal church. In his view, reasons internal to the very nature of salvation and to the conception of God and man explicitly contained in or, at least, in accord with this tradition present religious toleration as the only justifiable answer to the differences among religions. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of Leibniz’s contribution to the rise of modern ‘science’. To be sure, it is now generally agreed that the modern category of ‘science’ did not exist in the early modern period. At the same time, this period witnessed a very important stage in the process from which modern science eventually emerged. My discussion will be aimed at uncovering the new enterprise, and the new distinctions which were taking shape in the early modern period under the (...) banner of the old Aristotelian terminology. I will argue that Leibniz begins to theorize a distinction between physics and metaphysics that tracks our distinction between the autonomous enterprise of science in its modern meaning, and the enterprise of philosophy. I will try to show that, for Leibniz, physics proper is the study of natural phenomena in mathematical and mechanical terms without recourse for its explanations to metaphysical notions. This autonomy, however, does not imply for Leibniz that physics can say on its own all that there is to be said about the natural world. Quite the opposite. Leibniz inherits from the Aristotelian tradition the view that physics needs metaphysical roots or a metaphysical grounding. For Leibniz, what is ultimately real is reached by metaphysics, not by physics. This is, in my view, Leibniz’s chief insight: the new mathematical physics is an autonomous enterprise which offers its own kind of explanations but does not exhaust what can (and should) be said about the natural world. (shrink)

"This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the (...) site FAQs." -- website. (shrink)

The present essay inserts itself in a more ambitious project, wich aim is to elucidate the empiricist commitments of the more influential twentieth century philosophers of science, including those, like Popper, who presented themselves as critics of empiricism. Such an elucidation might contribut..

Este comentario se centra en el primer capítulo de Abductive Reasoning (2006), donde Aliseda ofrece nuevas herramien-tas conceptuales para examinar los modelos metodológicos que trazan una distinción de contextos en la investigación científica. Elucidamos la posición de Popper frente al problema del descubrimiento y distinguimos dos sentidos en que deliberadamente utiliza ‘discovery’ en su LSD (1959), distinción que permite reforzar la heterodoxa interpretación que hace Aliseda de la metodología popperiana. Por último, nos detenemos en la comparación entre Popper y Simon (...) frente a la “lógica del descubrimiento”, ya que condensa las razones por las que Aliseda considera que la dicotomía descubrimiento-justificación está destinada al fracaso.This brief commentary focuses on the first chapter of Abductive Reasoning (2006), where Aliseda offers new conceptual tools for examining the methodological models in which a distinction between contexts of scientific research is traced. In particular, we analyze Popper’s position with respect to the problem of discovery and distinguish two different senses in which he deliberately uses the term ‘discovery’ in LSD (1959); this, in turn, lends support to Aliseda’s heterodox interpretation of the Popperian methodology. Last, we examine the comparison the author makes between Popper and Simon as it contains the primary reasons for asserting that the discovery-justification dichotomy is doomed to failure. (shrink)