In the recent literature a number of free will skeptics, skeptics who believe that punishment is justified only if deserved, have argued for these two points: first, that the free will realist who would justify punishment has the burden of establishing to a high level of certainty - perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt, but certainly at least by clear and convincing evidence - that any person to be punished acted freely in breaking the law; and, second, that that level of (...) evidence is simply not there. In this paper I make two parallel points against a quarantine theory of criminal justice. First, the free will skeptic who would justify universal criminal quarantine is also faced with a burden of proof, the burden to establish to a similarly high level that no human being ever acts freely. Second, there is not sufficient evidence for that conclusion either. I believe that the quandary that this creates for criminal justice can be resolved by distinguishing the methods associated with a particular approach from the approach itself: if our choice is between the methods of punishment and the methods of quarantine, the methods that constitute punishment are, I would argue, morally preferable to those that constitute quarantine. (shrink)

Scott Sehon is someone who takes the philosophy of criminal justice seriously, who believes that if we are going to condemn people to prison we should have pretty good grounds...

Kadri Vihvelin is one of the more important writers in the area of free will studies, and in this book she proposes to vindicate full-fledged compatibilism in the face of the apparent failure of th...

Justifying state punishment presents a difficulty for those who deny that human actions are free in the sense required by moral responsibility. The argument I make in this article, following work d...

An introduction to the history of analytic philosophy, up to about 1975, together with discussion of the analytic treatment of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and logical theory.

In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a (...) belief in freedom for some purposes but not for others. Along the way I argue that deliberation-compatibilism of the sort recently defended by Pereboom is subject to a very familiar sort of counterexample. The question that concerns me the most is whether punishment—this brutal institution that disposes of the lives of countless of our most vulnerable citizens—can be justified. I think it cannot, precisely because there is not sufficient evidence that human beings are free to choose between branching alternatives and so deserve to be treated like that. At least, if there is such justifying evidence it is more or less completely balanced by evidence that all events including human actions have causes. Moreover, I find compatibilism utterly unpersuasive. At the same time, I believe that I am a free agent; what I do is in large part up to me. I believe that the explanation of action cannot be reduced to causal explanation, and I believe that the logic of action requires a notion of branching time. I have two pictures of the universe; which of the two pictures I may rely upon will depend upon just what it is that I intend to do. Between the problem that preoccupies me, punishment, and my day-to-day choices, there is a wide gap. There are a lot of choices that, on the axis of justification, fall in between the two, many of them choices about how to treat those around us: whether to snub a friend who has insulted me, whether to castigate her, whether to reward a kind act with praise. Where to draw the line is a topic for another paper. The only principle that right now seems to me firm enough to act upon is this: the greater the likelihood of doing harm, the less likely the choice is to be justified. (shrink)

Is the negligence standard in accident law acceptable to the egalitarian? The egalitarian - the egalitarian who would compensate only losses for which the actor was not responsible - cannot accept either a system of strict liability for all accidents or a system of social insurance for all accidents. A system of tort law acceptable to the responsibility - egalitarian must be a system based on negligence. But what will negligence mean? A negligence system in which the notion of reasonableness (...) is based on efficiency, I argue, is a system that redistributes wealth from the less well off to those better off. I consider alternative notions of reasonableness, ending up with a principle of proportional responsibility and distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial cases. (shrink)

It has been proposed that, Under the restriction of singular terms to proper names, Singular de re propositions would be equivalent to certain de dicto propositions. But that is so only if a certain thesis--A thesis which is itself irreducibly de re--Is true of proper names. The conclusion is that the restriction to proper names is not, By itself, Sufficient to render the de re and de dicto equivalent.

This article describes some potential uses of Bayesian estimation for time-series and panel data models by incorporating information from prior probabilities in addition to observed data. Drawing on econometrics and other literatures we illustrate the use of informative “shrinkage” or “small variance” priors while extending prior work on the general cross-lagged panel model. Using a panel dataset of national income and subjective well-being we describe three key benefits of these priors. First, they shrink parameter estimates toward zero or toward each (...) other for time-varying parameters, which lends additional support for an income → SWB effect that is not supported with maximum likelihood. This is useful because, second, these priors increase model parsimony and the stability of estimates and thus improve out-of-sample predictions and interpretability, which means estimated effect should also be more trustworthy than under ML. Third, these priors allow estimating otherwise under-identified models under ML, allowing higher-order lagged effects and time-varying parameters that are otherwise impossible to estimate using observed data alone. In conclusion we note some of the responsibilities that come with the use of priors which, departing from typical commentaries on their scientific applications, we describe as involving reflection on how best to apply modeling tools to address matters of worldly concern. (shrink)

The writings of the Italian philosophers Giovanni Vailati and Mario Calderoni, sometimes called logical pragmatists, are not well-known in the English-speaking countries. A recent revival of interest is due in part to the reflection in the works of these men of later developments in analytic and pragmatic philosophy. This bibliography has three parts; In Part I are listed English and French translations of some of Vailati's writings, and commentaries in English and French on his work. Part II indicates the extent (...) of Vailati's correspondence with scholars of his time, and lists reviews by Vailati of the works of his contemporaries. Part III is a list of his major writings in Italian, with English translations of the titles. (shrink)

Five purposive relations are investigated: endeavoring, endeavoring for a certain purpose, bringing something about in a certain endeavor, bringing something about for a certain purpose, and bringing something about intentionally. No satisfactory analysis of these terms has yet been proposed, either in mentalistic -- belief, desire, intending -- or in action terms. While bringing something about for a certain purpose may seem too obscure to be taken as a primitive, there are at least two arguments in favor of it. First, (...) no analyses in terms of other primitives has worked; second, the rather natural definitions of the other notions which it makes possible take us some way toward understanding the structure of intentional action. (shrink)

As the research integrity officer at my university for two years, I handled eight allegations of plagiarism. These eight cases show that initial appearances can be mistaken, that policies for handling allegations of research misconduct cannot cover every contingency, and that many cases can be resolved collegially without resort to formal procedures.

Jon Elster's subtle and richly illustrated argument raises more avenues of inquiry and application than one could possibly explore in a short comment. I will therefore confine myself to addressing three interrelated questions: First, can the distinctions among interest, passion, and reason on which his analysis depends really be maintained? Second, what implications does his work hold for some republican and liberal theories that insist on a public sphere purged of interest and passion or that defend a private sphere providing (...) the space necessary to indulge interest and passion? Finally, what does his analysis tell us about the possibility of a meta-theory that would mediate among interest, passion, and reason? With regard to the first question, Elster's own argument suggests that the boundaries among interest, passion, and reason are at least permeable. Each motive masquerades as the other or becomes transmuted into the other. Moreover, once one takes the consistency and imperfection constraints into account, the external manifestations of the different motives will often be identical. A positivist, who believes that all that matters are external manifestations that can be measured or observed, might therefore hold that the distinctions Elster analyzes are ones that are hardly worth worrying about. (shrink)

To support the teaching of ethics in science and engineering, educational technologies offer a variety of functions: communication between students and instructors, production of documents, distribution of documents, archiving of class sessions, and access to remote resources. Instructors may choose to use these functions of the technologies at different levels of intensity, to support a variety of pedagogies, consistent with accepted good practices. Good pedagogical practices are illustrated in this paper with four examples of uses of educational technologies in the (...) teaching of ethics in science and engineering. Educational technologies impose costs for the purchase of hardware, licensing of software, hiring of support personnel, and training of instructors. Whether the benefits justify these costs is an unsettled question. While many researchers are studying the possible benefits of educational technologies, all instructors should assess the effectiveness of their practices. (shrink)

The value of any kind of data is greatly enhanced when it exists in a form that allows it to be integrated with other data. One approach to integration is through the annotation of multiple bodies of data using common controlled vocabularies or ‘ontologies’. Unfortunately, the very success of this approach has led to a proliferation of ontologies which itself creates obstacles to integration. The Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) consortium has set in train a strategy to overcome this problem. Existing (...) OBO ontologies, including the Gene Ontology, are undergoing a process of coordinated reform and new ontologies being created on the basis of an evolving set of shared principles governing ontology development. The result is an expanding family of ontologies designed to be interoperable, logically well-formed, and to incorporate accurate representations of biological reality. We describe the OBO Foundry initiative, and provide guidelines for those who might wish to become involved. (shrink)

This anthology includes 75 articles in nine areas of philosophy of religion. These areas include: traditional arguments for the existence of God; on the validity of religious experience; the problem of evil and other atheological arguments; the attributes of God; miracles and revelation; death and immortality; faith and reason; religious pluralism; and ethics and religion. The articles are arranged in a coherent framework, with the presentation of each area progressing from the classical to the contemporary and treated in a dialectic (...) (pro and con) fashion. (shrink)

The most comprehensive text in its field, this anthology includes 74 articles in 9 areas of philosophy of religion: The Concept of God; Traditional Arguments for the Existence of God; Religious Experience; The Problem of Evil; Miracles, Death and Immortality; Faith and Reason; Science, Religion, and Evolution; and Religious Pluralism. The arrangement of the articles and the introductions which accompany them help students place the readings in their historical or contemporary context, and to ensure that students can be exposed to (...) a spectrum of viewpoints. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: AN ANTHOLOGY, 7E introduces students to the philosophy of religion through a balanced blend of classic and contemporary articles. Using a topical approach, this engaging textbook begins by outlining traditional concepts of God, then moves into related fields of inquiry such as the problem of evil, feminist perspectives of God, and mystical experiences. In addition, the textbook presents traditional proofs of God's existence, along with counter arguments. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: AN ANTHOLOGY, 7E also examines the interplay between (...) religion and science, religion and faith, and religion and epistemology. (shrink)

Many college and university courses are complemented by collaborative or cooperative activities such as role playing, team projects, or problem solving in small groups. This paper summarizes the importance of multidisciplinary collaboration in professional ethics, describes two courses (Engineering Ethics and Professional Ethics) that involved a fieldwork component where students were required to interview a group of professional who deal with an ethical problem, and articulates the pedagogical value of complementing a course using a fieldwork assignment. By integrating a fieldwork (...) assignment into philosophy courses, students are not only better able to connect classroom learning to concrete ethical problems associated with a given profession but also, since fieldwork is conducted in groups, acquire a deeper understanding of collective moral responsibility. (shrink)