This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao’s contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being (...) and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)

Our inspiring mentor, Vincent Shen, who served as Lee Chair Professor in Chinese Thought and Culture at the University of Toronto, passed away on Wednesday, November 14, 2018, at age sixty-nine. Professor Shen joined the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Toronto in 2000 and was Department Chair from 2007 to 2010. He held joint appointments in Philosophy and Religious Studies. A specialist in Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy, he was a prolific writer and a highly regarded (...) scholar of East Asian studies, and his reputation earned him the position of Vice President of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.Professor Shen graduated from the Fu Jen Catholic... (shrink)

Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 remarks on Buddhism have not been given sufficient attention despite increasing research on him. The few works on this topic either focus on just one aspect of his view of Buddhism or fail to disclose the purpose and uniqueness of his attack of it. This essay analyzes his view of Buddhism comprehensively, in particular his insight into the paradox of Buddhist universal love and his rejection of Buddhist retribution and reincarnation from Confucian righteousness and qi 氣-monism. In (...) addition, it also explores the reason, context, and limitations of his criticism, that is, his reaction to the popular approach of “understanding Confucian classics through learning Buddhism” in the late Ming 明, his response to Zongmi’s 宗密 criticism of Confucian cosmology and human nature, and his misunderstanding of some Buddhist concepts. Yet his criticism is still illuminating to our understanding of the interaction of Confucianism with Buddhism and other religions. (shrink)

Liu, Xiaogan 劉笑敢, Zhuangzi’s Philosophy and Its Transformation 莊子哲學及其演變 Beijing 北京: People’s University of China Press, 2010, 433 pages.

Since being widely rediscovered in the beginning of the last century, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 has been accepted as one of the most outstanding thinkers in Chinese history. His works are now attracting the eyes of many scholars in Mainland China. However, compared with others, Wang Fuzhi's commentary on the Zhuangzi 莊子, specifically his book the Zhuangzijie 莊子解, has not been thoroughly investigated. Tan Mingran, one of the scholars who has devoted himself to this field, has made a terrific contribution (...) in a recent monograph on Wang Fuzhi, An investigation of Wang Fuzhi's study on the Zhuangzi: Focusing on the Zhuangzijie. This treatise discusses almost all... (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Decent Peoples The Idea of Toleration The Cosmopolitan Critique Intervention and Cosmopolitanism Acknowledgments Notes.

This article engages the views of PRC Confucian scholars who responded to the United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy's citing of Confucius in his majority opinion on same-sex marriage in 2015. It questions their separation of tolerance for homosexuality from legalization of same-sex marriage and argue that tolerance is not enough. The arguments in the mainland Confucian discourse about same-sex marriage highlights the historical and persistent entanglement of Confucianism with patriarchy. Instead of reviving traditional patriarchal society, further entrenching and (...) increasing gender inequality, contemporary Confucianism could shape its own unique modern society that aspires to (and hopefully one day achieving) gender equality together with sexual inclusivity by deconstructing the patriarchal Confucian family and reconstructing a different Confucian family ideal. Accepting same-sex marriage would lend weight to the latter, and there are Confucian reasons for legalizing same-sex marriage and recognizing its ethical value. (shrink)

On what we may call the institutional approach to justice, the most important duty of justice that individuals have is the duty to establish just institutions when they are absent. How should we understand this institutional duty in relation to more personal moral actions, such as taking direct personal action to mitigate institutional failures? Is this institutional duty a necessary responsibility of justice? Is it sufficient? I will discuss this question in the context of climate change: what responsibilities of justice (...) do individual actors have when their state is not complying with an ideal of just emissions? Do they have the duty to do what they reasonably can to reduce their personal direct emissions, perhaps even picking up the slack of non-compliers? Or is their duty of justice primarily that of doing their part to establish a just regulatory framework? I will examine some options of personal responsibility in response to climate change and argue that the most important duty is that of working to bring about better institutions. Taking direct personal action can be helpful, but not when they distract us from working towards institutional reform. (shrink)

IntroductionThe various special concerns and commitments that individuals ordinarily have, for example towards family members, friends, and possibly compatriots, present an interesting challenge for justice. Justice, after all, is said to be blind and imposes demands on persons that ought to be impartial, at least in some respects, to personal ties and relationships. Yet individual special concerns are obviously of moral importance and are deeply valued by participants in these relationships. Thus any conception of justice to be plausible has to (...) be able to accommodate to some extent the various types of valuable and valued special concern characteristic of ordinary social life. In particular, it is important to see how the impartial demands of justice can be maintained while accommodating special concern. (shrink)

Most people would not associate Confucian philosophy with contemporary education. After all, the former is an ancient Chinese tradition and the latter is a modern phenomenon. But this book shows otherwise, by explaining how millennia-old Confucian ideas and practices can inform, inspire and improve teaching and learning today. Drawing upon major Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mencius, as well as influential thinkers such as Confucius, Zhu Xi and Empress Xu, the various chapters address current educational issues and challenges (...) such as the following: How can humanity resolve the climate emergency? What (more) should schools do to promote education for girls? Is there more to lifelong learning than just skills upgrading? Is teacher-centred education really bad? What is missing in the existing frameworks on 21st century competencies? What new initiatives are needed to champion sustainable development? Confucian Philosophy for Contemporary Education answers the above questions and more by presenting a Confucian model of education. The author describes a Confucian school where Dao - a shared vision of human excellence - is realised through an inclusive, mindful, learning-centred and ultimately humanising form of education. This book is a useful resource for academic researchers, educators, students and general readers on Confucian philosophy and its continual relevance for present-day education. (shrink)

I outline what I call a relational account of toleration. This relational account helps explain the apparent paradox of toleration in that it involves two competing moral stances, of acceptance and disapproval, towards the tolerated. It also helps clarify the way toleration is a normative ideal, and not a position one is forced into out of the practical need to accommodate or accept. Specifically, toleration is recommended out of respect for that which the tolerant agent also disapproves of. This combination (...) of respect entangled with disapproval results from two different evaluative perspectives of the tolerant agent. The relational account explains how an agent can hold these competing evaluative perspectives. I also discuss the proper scope of state toleration under this relational account. (shrink)

Intellectual biography -- Confucius' life, personality and influence -- Critical exposition of Confucius' educational thought -- The concept of li -- The concepts of dao and he -- The concept of ren -- The concept of junzi -- The concepts of xue, wen and si -- The relevance of Confucius' work today -- Confucius and 21st century education -- Conclusion.

Le visage d'Edith Stein a disparu dans le martyre qu'elle subit à Auschwitz le 9 août 1942. Depuis lors, ses différents biographes ont tenté de recomposer les éléments de sa vie et de sa personnalité à partir d'une facette de sa personnalité. Edith Stein philosophe, Edith Stein carmélite, Edith Stein féministe: les approches se succèdent et esquissent les différents traits d'un visage dont l'unité demeure cachée dans le secret d'une destinée. Dans ce livre, Philibert Secretan propose une approche synchronique d'Edith (...) Stein. "Le portrait que je propose ici s'organise autour de trois données de fait : la conversion du judaïsme au christianisme ; le passage de la phénoménologie à la sagesse philosophique ; l'entrée au Carmel. Autant de faits qu'il s'agit de traiter non plus en diachronie, comme autant d'étapes d'une existence étalée dans le temps, mais en synchronie, comme autant de strates d'une personnalité dans laquelle continuent à résonner des échos de ces moments constitutifs de son être singulier". En conclusion, Philibert Secretan s'attache à montrer comment la vertu d'obéissance - à la vérité vue par l'intelligence jusqu'à la volonté de Dieu, de l'université au Carmel - unifie les strates qui constituent la personnalité d'Edith Stein. Un livre de vie. Un testament aussi, de celui qui sur le conseil de Paul Ricoeur a introduit la pensée d'Edith Stein en France. (shrink)

Pourquoi ajouter un ouvrage à tant d'autres qui saluent la mémoire et commentent l'oeuvre d'Edith Stein? Philosophe allemande de l'école phénoménologique (1891-1942), juive convertie au catholicisme et entrée au Carmel, elle laisse une oeuvre universitaire et spirituelle d'une rare densité. Philibert Secretan, portant le souci d'une philosophie chrétienne, a traduit et commenté de nombreux textes philosophiques, notamment d'auteurs allemands et espagnols. Profondément marqué par la pensée d'Edith Stein, il y discerne comme constantes la réflexion, l'élucidation, et la mise en forme (...) intellectuelle du "monde vécu". C'est cette constante application à penser qu'il a suivie à travers divers champs : celui des sciences (naturelles et humaines) interrogées sur leurs méthodes, celui de la politique et du droit, celui de l'éducation, celui d'une métaphysique réactualisée, et celui de la mystique invoquée au-delà de tout psychologisme et de toute émotivité irrationnelle. Cet ouvrage évoque l'apport d'Edith Stein aux débats actuels sur l'écologie, le féminisme, et la laïcité de l'Etat. Il alerte sur la valeur essentielle de la patience et du goût du silence. (shrink)

Selected writings, including those of Gʹyu-thog Yon-tan-mgon-po, 1126 to 1202, on the morality of Tibetan medicine.

本书收胡适的《一念》之诗引发奇想,进入时间遂道,直面当今公众,与中外哲人对话。书中融记叙、议论、描写于一体,图文并茂,实中领略到深刻的人生哲理。.

Like Thomas Hobbes, the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi imagines a human state of nature that is chaotic and violent, akin to Hobbes’s state of war of everyone against everyone. Like Hobbes, Xunzi pins this miserable human natural condition on the egoistical nature of people. And like Hobbes, Xunzi justifies the establishment of political authority because it brings order and peace among people. But while Hobbes takes the establishment and enforcement of positive laws by an all-powerful political authority to be sufficient (...) for keeping the state of nature at bay, Xunzi believes that positive laws alone are inadequate. Laws must be accompanied by a reformation of human nature if a well-ordered society is to be achieved and sustained. In contrast to Hobbes, then, Xunzi thinks that a well-ordered political society must have both good laws and good people. This is where the Confucian ideal of rituals comes in. Rituals have the important function of making people better in spite of their original bad nature that laws alone do not. Recalling the place of rituals in Xunzi’s ideal of a well-ordered society draws our attention to a crucial difference between Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s political philosophies. While Hobbes thinks that a peaceful political society among egotistical individuals is achievable so long as it is possible to secure the right incentive structure for them to cooperate, Xunzi thinks a stable civil order must take on the task of improving human nature. More basically, Xunzi and Hobbes see the aims of political society differently. For Hobbes, the chief purpose of politics is the peaceful co-existence of people in spite of their egoistical nature. For Xunzi, the central aim of politics is not just peaceful co-existence among individuals but their moral self-improvement and cultivation, their transformation from egoistical to social beings. (shrink)

Handbook for Buddhist ethical aspects for Bhutanese youngsters.

Using both Confucian texts and the work of American pragmatist John Dewey, this book offers a distinctly Confucian model of democracy.

Regards inquiets est une somme de réflexions qui s'échelonnent sur de nombreuses années. Elles témoignent avant tout d'un souci de clarté sur ce qui se dit, se pense, se débat sur cette place publique mondiale que sont les médias, sans pourtant prétendre y mêler sa voix. L'auteur a vu naître l'écologie et a appris à la prendre au sérieux. Il a vu s'effondrer la superstructure religieuse de notre civilisation. Il continue à penser que rien ne pourra la remplacer, que la (...) paix des religions est une condition essentielle du développement du monde, et que la démocratie est source de trop d'illusions pour que l'on puisse en faire une manière de modèle platonicien, de validité planétaire. L'auteur a vu le pouvoir du virtuel menacer d'obsolescence le réel, qui pourtant permet encore de penser à un ordre créé, incontournable et incomparable. Il croit à des valeurs jugées obsolètes et ne craint de se faire juger de réactionnaire, car il admet qu'il n'y a de vrai progrès que là où de nouvelles forces sont puisées au fondement des choses. La lucidité critique est la lumière dans laquelle il a rédigé ces pages. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

What is social entrepreneurship? In, particular, what’s so social about it? Understanding what social entrepreneurship is enables researchers to study the phenomenon and policy-makers to design measures to encourage it. However, such an understanding is lacking partly because there is no universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship as yet. In this paper, we suggest a definition of social entrepreneurship that intuitively accords with what is generally accepted as entrepreneurship and that captures the way in which entrepreneurship may be altruistic. Based on (...) this we provide a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship and identify a number of real cases from Asia illustrating the different forms it could take. (shrink)