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Summary Recognitional concepts are those concepts whose possession conditions require that one be able to correctly sort, identify, or categorize things that fall under them. Recognitional concepts therefore tie concept possession to specific types of behavioral or cognitive abilities.
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  1. The Thought of a Principle: Rödl’s Fichteanism.Bruno G. Anthony - forthcoming - In Marina Bykova (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Fichte. Bloomsbury.
    Sebastian Rödl portrays much of his work as attempts at articulating a German idealist view of self-consciousness. Although he rarely engages directly with German idealist texts, his accounts of first-person and second-person knowledge arrive at strikingly Fichtean theses regarding the necessary identity of subject and object in the former and the necessary reciprocity of subject and other in the latter. Despite this affinity, I argue, Rödl's accounts lack a feature that is essential to Fichte's and, indeed, to German idealism's distinctive (...)
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  2. Overcoming Aduality of Concepts and Causes: A Unifying Thread in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Robert B. Brandom - 2002 - In R.M. Gale (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell.
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  3. The 'Compositional Rigidity' of Recognitionality.Darragh Byrne - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):147-169.
    Abstract Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ?recognitional? concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ?inherited? by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics (...)
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  4. Human Likeness and the Formation of Empirical Concepts.Edward Calhoun - 1959 - Review of Metaphysics 13 (3):383 - 395.
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  5. There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
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  6. Recognitional Concepts and Compositionality.Richard E. Grandy - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:21-25.
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  7. Teoría Crítica, Justicia y Metafilosofía: La Validación de la Filosofía Política En Nancy Fraser y Axel Honneth / Critical Theory, Justice and Metaphilosophy: Validation of Political Philosophy in Fraser and Honneth [Spanish].Delfín Ignacio Grueso - 2012 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 16:69-98.
    SPANISH: ¿Puede un filósofo, sin más, tomar el lado de las víctimas, cuando se trata de situaciones de justicia e injusticia? ¿Puede carecer de un punto de vista objetivo acerca de lo que es moralmente bueno o malo? Si el filósofo sostiene que lo que las víctimas demandan, en lugar de redistribución, es reconocimiento, ¿debe proveer una convincente teoría de lo que es el reconocimiento y del modo como él juega un papel en las situaciones de justicia e injusticia? Este (...)
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  8. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
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  9. Concept Constitution.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:15-19.
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  10. A More Plausible Kind of "Recognitional Concept".Ruth G. Millikan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:35-41.
    It's a sort of moebus strip argument. Rather than circularly assuming what it should prove, it assumes one of the things Fodor says he has disproved. It assumes that the extensions of those concepts thought by some to be recognitional are in fact controlled by stereotypes. Why do I say that? Because Fodor assumes that what makes an instance of a concept a "good instance" is that it is an average instance, that it sports the properties statistically most commonly found (...)
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  11. On Unclear and Indistinct Ideas.Ruth G. Millikan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:75-100.
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  12. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
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  13. Words, Concepts, and Entities: With Enemies Like These, I Don't Need Friends.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):89-100.
    A number of clarifications of the target article and some corrections are made. I clarify which concepts the thesis was intended to be about, what “descriptionism” means, the difference between “concepts” and “conceptions,” and why extensions are not determined by conceptions. I clarify the meaning of “substances,” how one knows what inductions to project over them, the connection with “basic level categories,” how it is determined what substance a given substance concept is of, how equivocation in concepts occurs, and the (...)
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  14. Redistribuzione o riconoscimento? di Nancy Fraser e Axel Honneth.Marcus Ohlström, Marco Solinas & Olivier Voirol - 2010 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 23 (2):443-460.
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  15. A Study of Concepts.Peacocke Christopher - 1992 - MIT Press.
  16. Why Believe in Demonstrative Concepts?David Pereplyotchik - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):636-638.
    I examine two arguments for the existence of demonstrative concepts—one due to Chuard (2006) and another due to Brewer (1999). I point out some important difficulties in each. I hope to show that much more work must be done to legitimize positing demonstrative concepts.
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  17. Concepts and Perceptual Belief: How (Not) to Defend Recognitional Concepts.Bradley Rives - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):369-391.
    Recognitional concepts have the following characteristic property: thinkers are disposed to apply them to objects merely on the basis of undergoing certain perceptual experiences. I argue that a prominent strategy for defending the existence of constitutive connections among concepts, which appeals to thinkers’ semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions, cannot be used to defend the existence of recognitional concepts. I then outline and defend an alternative argument for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws.
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  18. On Clear and Confused Ideas.Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):148-149.
  19. Review of Bert van den Brink and David Owen (eds.), Recognition and Power. Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory. [REVIEW]Marco Solinas - 2010 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica (59):223-224.
  20. Scepsis and Scepticism.Italo Testa - 2012 - In De Laurentis Allegra & Edwards Jeffrey (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel. Bloomsbury/Continuum (2012). Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 273-278.
    Hegel's philosophy aims at responding to the questions raised by modern scepticism concerning the accessibility of the external world, of other minds, and of one's own mind. A key-role in Hegel's argumentative strategy against modern scepticism is played here by Hegel's theory of recognition. Recognition mediates the constitution of individual self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: self-knowledge is not logically independent of the awareness of other minds. At the same time, recognition institutes the possibility of objective reference to the world. In this way, (...)
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