This paper investigates the typology of copulative predication in Tarifit Berber. Three main copulas are identified: (1) verbal, (2) nominal and (3) locative. Given that these elements can all be used as predicates, a uniform configuration which accounts for their derivation is proposed. The structure consists of a lower lexical layer occupied by the predicate (VP, NP etc.) and a higher functional projection represented by the Predicate Phrase (PredP). The Pred – head then enters into (...) an agreement relation with the lower head in the complement position, yielding a predicational copula sentence. Since these constructions are all marked for tense/aspect, the derivation is extended further to a TP projection where the relevant feature is valued. In view of the unified syntactic analysis, the difference between various copula predicates is optimally reduced to the categorial status of the basic predicate occupying the lower lexical projection. The paper identifies another copula construction, which correlates with the proxemics-locative. An examination of this configuration from a close range reveals that this particular locative occupies the subject position whereas the Pred – head is only filled with a bare syntactic feature but encodes no phonological information. (shrink)

This paper examines some aspects of the grammar of measurement based on data from non-split and split measure phrase (MP) constructions in Japanese. I claim that the non-split MP construction involves measurement of individuals, while the split MP construction involves measurement of events as well as of individuals. This claim is based on the observation that, while both constructions are subject to some semantic restrictions in the nominal domain, only the split MP construction is sensitive to restrictions in the (...) verbal domain (namely, incompatibility with single-occurrence events and with individual-level predicates, and (un)availability of collective readings). It is shown that these semantic restrictions can be explained by a uniform semantic constraint on the measure function, namely, Schwarzschild’s [(2002). The grammar of measurement. The Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistics Theory, 24, 241–306] monotonicity constraint. In particular, I argue that, in the two constructions at issue, the measure function is subject to the monotonicity constraint, and that we observe different semantic restrictions depending on whether the measure function applies to a nominal or a verbal domain. (shrink)

Wiggins recently proposed construing frege's 'unsaturated expressions' as containing two elements, Viz., (1) a copula and (2) a general term standing for a concept; but he argued that concepts, So understood, Were not to be identified with properties. While accepting the above division of 'unsaturated expressions', I argue, Contra wiggins, That concepts, So understood, Were precisely to be identified with properties.

Let us suppose that thematic roles, or something very much like them, are needed to describe lexical and semantic patterns in the behavior of verbal predicates. But what about nouns? Is there evidence independent of verbal constructions motivating a system of nominal thematic relations? We suggest that the general problem of argument selection does in fact motivate a set of quintessentially nominal thematic proto-roles which we call Proto- Part and Proto-Whole. These nominal proto-roles are parallel (...) to but distinct from the verbal proto-roles of Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient proposed by Dowty (1991) to account for argument selection in verbal predicates. The resulting theory of nominal argument selection is properly semantic, that is, it distinguishes between argument positions purely on the basis of the semantic entailments of the predicates involved. Furthermore, it is non-dynamic, that is, it describes static patterns of lexicalization without hypothesizing any productive grammatical process that maps semantic arguments to syntactic arguments during the derivation of a sentence. (shrink)

This study offers syntactic and semantic evidence that there are three types of locative modifiers within the verbal domain that differ with respect to their syntactic base position and interpretation. Two of them are subject to semantic indeterminacy, thereby leading to multiple utterance meanings. The study aims at showing that the full range of interpretations can be derived within a rigid account of lexical and compositional semantics. Locative modifiers are invariably treated as first-order predicates adding a (...) class='Hi'>locative constraint. All semantic differences originate from the structural environment they are embedded in and the pragmatic resolution of semantic indeterminacy. The syntactic distribution of locative modifiers is shown to be derivable from interface conditions. (shrink)

The article discusses some logical, semantic and metaphysical consequences or correla­tions with the introduced typology of word order in verbal and nominal sentences, which in the European tradition represent speech patterns used in judgments. The combinatorics of word order gives four variants, of which three are actually represented by native lan­guages of distinctive philosophical traditions. It is shown that the Western word order predisposes the semantic intuition in favor of substantialism, the Arabic variety (in verbal sentences) is (...) in conformity with the process logic of sense discovered and described by A.V. Smirnov. The Sanskrit word order in predication predisposes to the understanding of thinking as a natural transition from one object to another, whereas the ontological type of the object is not predetermined. (shrink)

The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If (...) "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the semantics of copular be as displayed in its behaviour in be+AP configurations. I begin by arguing against the Partee/Dowty distinction between a semantically null be of predication and a thematically relevant agentive be, and I propose that there is one semantically relevant verb whose grammatical role is to turn an AP predicate into a verbal one. The denotation of be must thus be a function from denotations of Adjective Phrases to denotation of (...) Verb Phrases. I argue that these denotations are crucially different in kind: verbs (and thus VPs) denote eventualities, which are count entities and which are temporally locatable, while adjectives (and thus APs) denote mass entities, which are states and which are not temporally locatable. Be thus denotes a locating function which maps from the mass to the count domain, and is the analogue of the ‘packaging’ function in the nominal domain. After a comparison between the mass/count distinction in the verbal and nominal domains, I show how this theory accounts for properties of be in small clause and progressive constructions which have hitherto been explained by positing a so-called agentive be. (shrink)

The paper discusses the structure of non-verbal predication, with particular reference to the role of the copula. Differently from the main tenets of contemporary logico-philosophical and linguistic theories, a model of predication is proposed where the verbal component (specifically, tense information) is regarded as central in establishing the syntactic and semantic relation between a predicate and its subject. It is thus possible to recover some of the insights of the pre-Fregean analysis of predication. The proposed solution has (...) a number of significant consequences for the structure to be assigned to non-verbal predication, in particular for the semantics of small clause constituents, where the predication is established without the copula. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the problem of the meanings of the verb ‘be’ in Plato’s Timaeus. My claim is that, at least in that dialogue, existence emerges as the main and autonomous meaning of the verb ‘be’, contrary to the widespread view first defended in a series of studies by Charles Kahn according to which, in the Greek language and in Plato’s philosophy, the verb ‘be’ basically has a copulative-predicative and, more specifically, a truth-related meaning. I consider and (...) examine some passages from the Timaeus (27d5–28a4, 29b3–c3, 37e3–38b3, 51b7–52a7) where the concept of existence seems to be expressed in a clear and definite way by the use of the verb ‘be.’ I conclude by making some remarks on how we should understand the notion of existence, not least with reference to the problem of truth, within Plato’s philosophy and the Timaeus in particular. (shrink)

The study of the temporal structure of events in natural language is of prime importance in linguistics. Though there has been recent progress on formal theories of events, these theories do not address certain syntactic and semantic properties peculiar to languages such as Hindi. This paper concentrates on properties related to perfectivity. It motivates a small number of semantic features for events and their objects, such as whether an object exists independently of an event, whether it is totally affected by (...) the event, and so on. It then formalizes these features. It also shows how they can be formalized in an algebraic framework and applied in a categorial grammar to derive the properties of verbal and nominal predicates. The result is an integration of descriptive semantics with algebraic theories of objects and events. (shrink)

Although, in the literature, Principle C of Binding Theory is taken not to apply to copular sentences on the basis of English data alone, this study aims to show that this Principle applies to French copular sentences. French displays a dichotomy between predicational copular sentences and other subtypes of copular sentences : while the former use the verb est alone, the latter need an additional form, namely the neuter demonstrative pronoun ce. Evidence is given that, in French, the two terms (...) flanking the copula est cannot be referential because the post-copula term would be bound by the pre-copula one, in accordance with Principle C of Binding Theory. Thus, adding the pronoun ce modifies the structure of the sentence and gives rise to a Topic c’est Focus structure, which escapes Principle C. (shrink)

In this article we evaluate claims that language structure adapts to sociolinguistic environment. We present the results of two typological case studies examining the effects of the number of native (= L1) speakers and the proportion of adult second language (= L2) learners on language structure. Data from more than 300 languages suggest that testing the effect of population size and proportion of adult L2 learners on features of verbal and nominal complexity produces conflicting results on different grammatical (...) features. The results show that verbal inflectional synthesis adapts to the sociolinguistic environment but the number of genders does not. The results also suggest that modelling population size together with proportion of L2 improves model fit compared to modelling them independently of one another. We thus argue that surveying population size alone may be insufficient to detect possible adaptation of linguistic structure to the sociolinguistic environment. Rather, other features, such as proportion of L2 speakers, prestige and social network density, should be studied, and if demographic numeric data are used, they should not be used in isolation but rather in competition with other sociolinguistic features. We also suggest that not all types of language structures within a given grammatical domain are equally sensitive to the effect of sociolinguistic variables, and that more exploratory studies are needed before we can arrive at a reliable set of grammatical features that may be potentially most (and least) adaptive to social structures. (shrink)

English summary: It was not until the publication of Schelling''s Munich and Berlin lectures that we learned the decisive source for his theory of an identity of identity or identity doubled in itself. Schelling referred to what he called an older logic that was still acquainted with the figure of reduplication, for instance in Leibniz and Wolff. Philosophers in this tradition employed this term to refer to the specification of an aspect under which the subject-term is being considered. An often (...) quoted example: As consul, Fabius Maximus has authority over his father, but as son he stands under his fathers authority. Schelling gave the following turn to reduplication: Nature as nature does not coincide with the mind; and the mind as mind does not coincide with nature. Both have different truth conditions, so as to integrate an essential moment of difference into the identity formula. There is an X, however, which is strictly (seamlessly) identical with itself (the absolute subject = X) while transitively being both of them in turn; and it is only via X that the relata (nature and mind) are indirectly identified with each other: X is B and X is A (and X is strictly identical to itself). In addition to this, Schelling held a view of predication as kind of identification. He became acquainted with this view at the Tubingen Seminary through his teacher Gottfried Ploucquet. This insight helps us understand why Schelling reasonably thought that the identity-formula A=A is the genuine matrix of all veridical judgments. Taken together with his conviction that judging (Kant''s relative position) is a minor (or inferior) form of existential being (Kant''s absolute position) sheds light on why in 1806 Schelling made the radical contention in his Aphorisms: The strict sense of being (absolutely posited seamless self-sameness) is taken over by the looser sense of the copulative is which identifies subject and predicate; yes, this copula alone is existence itself and nothing else. Why should Schelling''s conception of nature-mind identity interest recent philosophers of mind? Because Schelling presents an ontologically neutral solution: Identity is a symmetrical relation that does not favor mind or matter, and prevents the idealistic reduction of nature to the mind. Nor can we conceive of the nature-mind identity as a fact inwardly disclosed to the mind (McGinn, Levine). Consciousness remains an enigma for itself; so does its identity with nature. Schelling teaches us that identity theories are not justified by self-evidence, but by an inference to the best explanation. German description: Nie ist genau erklart worden, was Schelling unter Identitat von Natur und Geist verstand. Dabei hat er sein reifes Denken Identitatssystem genannt und sich zeitlebens um kein zweites Problem begrifflich ahnliche Muhe gegeben. Da er aber seine Uberlegungen in Schriften verpackte, deren grosser systematischer Ausgriff sie schier erdruckte, ist, was er bis hinein in die Weltalter-Periode daruber herausfand, kaum eigens gewurdigt oder auch nur klar benannt worden. Die Schellingliteratur arbeitete entweder historisch oder liess sich vom Systemgedanken oder einzelnen in die Augen springenden Problemen blenden (z. B. Natur, Organismus, Freiheit, Existenz). Dabei ist Schellings Starke in einzelnen entscheidenden Argumenten versteckt, die, waren sie bekannt, die gegenwartige, auch analytische Diskussion durchaus zu inspirieren vermochten. Wir konnen heute urteilen, dass schon der junge Schelling in seiner Schrift Form der Philosophie eine differenzsensitive Form der Identitat im Sinn hatte, die er in den kommenden Jahrzehnten immer genauer auszubuchstabieren unternahm. Seine eigentlichen Quellen hat er kunstvoll verborgen. Es sind erstens die Identitatstheorie der Pradikation seines Universitatslehrers Ploucquet, die den Stiftlern in Tubingen eingeblaut wurde und die ihre merkwurdige Fixierung auf die ganz unkantische Auffassung vom Urteil als Subjekt-Pradikat-Identifikation (mit quantifiziertem Pradikator) erklart. Und zweitens Schellings Entdeckung einer alteren Logik, die mit der Figur der reduplicatio arbeitete. - So auch das Absolute: Als Geist ist es nicht Natur (und umgekehrt; Aussagen uber beide haben unterschiedliche Wahrheitsbedingungen), aber Geist und Natur werden beide vom Absoluten gewesen (transitiv ins Sein gehoben), und dies Absolute ist im striktest denkbaren Sinne mit sich identisch. So lasst sich die Schelling''sche Formel von der Identitat der Identitat und Differenz dem gesunden Menschenverstand vermitteln und Schellings aufrichtiger Jugendgedanke (Marx) aktualisieren. Er schneidet respektabel ab im Wettbewerb mit allerlei heutigen Leib-Seele-Identitatstheorien. (shrink)

Comment une proposition qui affirme que a est fatigué le matin et n’est pas fatigué le midi peut-elle être vraie ? Bolzano soutient que toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient, dans la composante-sujet, la représentation d’un temps. Dans cet article, je reconstruis et évalue les arguments de Bolzano en les comparant à ceux de son adversaire principal, le tenant de la position selon laquelle toute proposition portant sur une chose contingente contient une copule renfermant la représentation du temps (...) auquel l’objet représenté par la composante-sujet a la propriété représentée par la composante-prédicat . La conception bolzanienne de la modification du sujet ne peut résoudre le problème logique de la persistance qu’en assumant que des représentations-sujets qui contiennent différentes représentations de temps représentent différents individus dotés de déterminations temporelles. Mais ceci engendre une nouvelle question : comment un objet peut-il avoir différentes déterminations temporelles sans pour autant changer ?How can we can truly say that a is tired in the morning, and not tired at noon ? Bolzano holds that every proposition about a contingent thing contains an idea representing a time in its subject-part. In this paper I reconstruct and assess Bolzano’s arguments for his view of propositions about contingent things, comparing them to those of his main opponent, the view according to which every proposition about a contingent thing contains a copula combined with an idea that represents a time at which the object represented by the subject-part of the proposition has the property represented by the predicate-part . Bolzano’s subject-modification view could only solve the logical problem of persistence by assuming that subject-ideas containing different ideas of times represent different particulars bearing temporal determinations. But this creates a new question : how can an object have different temporal determinations and yet not change ? (shrink)

The availability in universal grammar of two separate copulas of predication & identity is supported by an analysis of pseudoclefts in Welsh. A single-copula analysis of the ambiguity between predicational & specificational interpretations of pseudoclefts in English cannot be extended to Welsh, where specificational interpretation (1) is permitted by only one of three copular paradigms, all of which may have a predicational interpretation, & (2) is possible with both of the D-structures used in the single-copula analysis to distinguish (...) between the two interpretations in English. It is argued that the differences between English & Welsh with respect to the interpretation of copular constructions can only be explained by positing a dual-copula analysis for Welsh & a single-copula one for English; the data confirm the existence of a type-shifting functor in English that is realized lexically as a copula in Welsh. 47 References. J. Hitchcock. (shrink)

Given the importance of pravṛtti and nivṛtti as shaping ideologies in the Mahābhārata and a host of other Indic texts, a study of the occurrence of the uses of √vṛt in the widest possible sense is a desideratum for an understanding of both the Mahābhārata and its Mokṣadharmaparvan. The present contribution discusses concentrations of occurrences of √vṛt-words in particular passages and considers whether these are associated with the communication of specific doctrines. Both nominal and verbal forms of √vṛt, (...) prefixed and unprefixed, are studied, with special attention being paid to the objects which they take; in particular, the grammatical cases used with the present participle vartamāṇa, are surveyed. It is concluded that √vṛt conveys the sense of “of operating or functioning in a particular state,” especially when used with a noun in the locative, thus differing from other verbs such as √as, √bhū and √gam. In addition, the greater frequency of √vṛt prefixed by pra- and ni-, as opposed to other prefixes, is noted, indicating how significant pravṛtti and nivṛtti had become as ideologies in our text. (shrink)

I am grateful to the editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for inviting me to write a comment on Kathleen Gill’s ‘On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events’. I readily concede that she is right in the central criticism she makes of my 1978 paper: that a properly metaphysical or ontological distinction between processes and events, if it is to be made at all, cannot be sustained on the basis of the informal linguistic criteria I offered in ‘Events, (...) Processes, and States.’ My main concern in that paper was to show that discussions of the Kenny-Vendler typology of activities, performances, and states had focused too narrowly on verb types, on adverbial phrases, on the domain of human action, and on English-language intuitions. Mine was one of several voices urging in the late 1970s that issues of tense logic and of the logic of verb types had to be placed in the broader context of verb aspect — a salient and pervasive structure in natural languages generally, and one that had been studied by philologists and linguists since the nineteenth century. Captivated, as I and others had become at the time, by evidence that the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns appears to be mirrored in verb predications, I went on to make some rather venturesome ‘ontological’ claims. It is satisfying, of course, that Gill accepts not only that there is ‘substantial evidence in favor of recognizing a grammatical distinction between the language of processes and [the language of] events’ but also that ‘similarities with count and mass expressions will allow us to apply techniques for han dling nominal expressions to verbal expressions’. It is more than satisfying that the phenomenon of verb aspect is now noticed and investigated by philosophers as well as by linguists. (shrink)

This paper presents an extensional account of manyand few that explains data that have previously motivated intensional analyses of these quantifiers :599–620, 2000). The key insight is that their semantic arguments are themselves set intersections: the restrictor is the intersection of the predicates denoted by the N’ or the V’ and the restricted universe, U, and the scope is the intersection of the N’ and V’. Following Cohen, I assume that the universe consists of the union of alternatives to the (...) nominal and verbal predicates, where an alternative to a property ψ is one that shares a pragmatic presupposition with ψ, and a pragmatic presupposition is one that is selected by context from a set of potential presuppositions associated with the sentence. A many/few-quantified sentence is then true iff the proportion of the scope to the restrictor is greater/less than some threshold, n. In addition to explaining various problematic cases from the literature, the analysis shows how the readings of a many/few-quantified sentence can be derived from the same syntactico-semantic structure, it being unnecessary to claim lexical or structural ambiguity. The analysis also provides strong support for the idea that natural language quantification is always purely extensional. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Thus Locke's mistake is not the simplistic one of bringing in a new type of perception --perception of the agreement of an idea with something which is not an idea. He attributes the certainty which is appropriate for a general verbal truth concerning archetypal ideas to a real truth concerning ectypal ideas. There is an additional difficulty in Locke's use of the distinction between (...) adequate and inadequate ectypal ideas when he uses them in his theory of self knowledge. How can we be sure that these simple ectypal ideas are adequate? We have certainty concerning the adequacy of our archetypal ideas because we have a complete knowledge of the archetype which is itself an idea. However, we are not given a complete knowledge of the archetype of simple ectypal ideas. We are assured of the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas only by assuming the truth of the causal principle. This leads to a circular argument. We can be assured of the adequacy of the causal relation considered as a product of our own construction. If the idea of the causal relation is archetypal, then the idea of this relation is adequate. However, when the causal relation is used to assure us of the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, the causal relation is no longer restricted to the level of archetypal ideas. In order to insure the adequacy of our simple ideas, the causal relation must be a relation between our ectypal ideas and something which is not an idea, viz., the power which causes the sensation. Archetypal ideas of relations are adequate, but this is not an archetypal idea of a relation, and thus we have no way of judging its adequacy. The only way to determine the adequacy of the causal connection is to show the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, but the adequacy of these simple ectypal ideas is itself predicated on the adequacy of the idea of the causal relation. Thus, the whole argument for the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas is circular. Either the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical as claimed in Book Three, or the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical, as claimed in Book Two. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical, then these simple ideas are archetypal and adequate but they afford us no knowledge about any extra-mental thing. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical then simple ideas are ectypal, but we cannot be assured of their adequacy because their adequacy is dependent on the causal relation whose adequacy is not assured. Thus, Locke's epistemology does not support his claim for intuitive knowledge of his own existence, but the mistakes he does make are not nearly as simplistic as they are often claimed to be. DONALD W. GOTTERBARN University of Southern California THE DISTINGUISHABLE AND THE SEPARABLE; A NOTE ON HUME AND CAUSATION In this note, I shall be concemed with only one part of Hume's doctrine of causation, and my criticism of this feature of his position will leave much of the remainder untouched. This is not to say that my point is unimportant, for I shall challenge Hume's fight to claim that there cannot in any case be a direct impression of connection, force, or power. He attempted to establish this claim by argument, and I wish to show that there is a fatal flaw in that argument. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 243 In order that what follows shall not be misunderstood, two points must be noted. First, I would not claim that we have an impression of connection, force, or power in all cases in which we hold that events are related as cause and effect. There are many instances in which this is not true, and the number and even the varieties of these cases could be greatly expanded beyond the illustrations which Hume gave in the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. I shall only argue that he did not offer adequate reasons for holding that there are no eases in which we can possibly have such... (shrink)

This paper presents a new logical analysis of quantity comparatives (i.e. More linguists than philosophers came to the party.) within the Delineation Semantics approach to gradability and comparison (McConnell-Ginet in Comparison constructions in English. PhD thesis, University of Rochester, Rochester, 1973; Kamp in Formal semantics of natural language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975; Klein in Linguist Philos 4:1–45, 1980) among many others. Along with the Degree Semantics framework (Cresswell in Montague grammar. Academic Press, New York, 1976; von Stechow in J (...) Semant 3:1–77, 1984; Kennedy in Projecting the adjective. PhD thesis. University of California, Santa Cruz, 1997, among many others) Delineation Semantics is one of the dominant logical frameworks for analyzing the meaning of gradable constituents of the adjectival syntactic category; however, there has been very little work done investigating the application of this framework to the analysis of gradability outside the adjectival domain. This state of affairs distinguishes the Delineation Semantics framework from its Degree Semantics counterpart, where such questions have been investigated in great deal since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, it has been observed [for example, by Doetjes (Seventeenth amsterdam colloquium. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2011); van Rooij (The vagueness handbook. Springer, Dordrecht, 2011c)] that there is nothing inherently adjectival about the way that the interpretations of scalar predicates are calculated in Delineation Semantics, and therefore that there is enormous potential for this approach to shed light on the nature of gradability and comparison in the nominal and verbal domains. This paper is a first contribution to realizing this potential within a Mereological extension of a simple version of the DelS system. (shrink)

In an attempt to accommodate natural language phenomena involving nominalization and self-application, various researchers in formal semantics have proposed abandoning the hierarchical type system which Montague inherited from Russell, in favour of more flexible type regimes. We briefly review the main extant proposals, and then develop a new approach, based semantically on Aczel's notion of Frege structure, which implements a version ofsubsumption polymorphism. Nominalization is achieved by virtue of the fact that the types of predicative and propositional complements are contained (...) in the type of individuals. Russell's paradox is avoided by placing a type-constraint on lambda-abstraction, rather than by restricting comprehension. (shrink)

This paper develops a valid reconstruction in first-order predicate logic of Leibniz’s argument for his complete concept definition of substance in §8 of the Discours de Métaphysique. Following G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, it construes the argument as resting on two substantial premises, the “merely verbal” Aristotelian definition and Leibniz’s concept containment theory of truth, and it understands the resulting “real” definition as saying not that an entity is a substance iff its complete concept contains every predicate of that entity, but iff (...) its complete concept contains every predicate of any subject to which that concept is truly attributable. An account is suggested of why Leibniz criticises the Aristotelian definition as merely nominal and how he takes his own definition to overcome this shortcoming: while on the Aristotelian basis the predication relation could generate endless chains, so that substances as endpoints of predication would be impossible, Leibniz’s definition reveals lowest species as such endpoints, which he therefore identifies with individual substances. Since duplicate lowest species make no sense, the Identity of Indiscernibles for substances follows. The reading suggests a Platonist interpretation according to which substances do not so much have but are individual essences, natures or forms. (shrink)

Mamluks reigned in Egypt a long time is an era of Kipchak Turks that have influence management, and Kipchak Turks has been influential in a period in the administration there. During this period, that Turkish rulers do not know Arabic language well, Turkish language is spoken in the palace and also idea of being closer to Turkish manager screated an interest in learning. One of the famous scholars realizing that interest is Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī. Abū Ḥayyān by learning Turkish language (...) especially from Fakhr al-dīn Divrigi and analysing written previously works, wrote Kitāb al-Idrāk li-lisān al-Atrāk. This book has consisted of introduction, vocabulary and grammar section. We also aimed in our study to examine Kitāb al-Idrāk in terms of content and than in terms of lexicography of the linguistic branch. -/- SUMMARY Mamluks reigned in Egypt a long time and in its reign Kipchak Turks had influence in management. Because of the Turkish rulers who have military background did not know Arabic language well, Turkish language was spoken in the palace and also idea of being closer of scholars and notable people to Turkish rulers got brought an interest in learning Turkish. One of the famous scholars realizing that interest is Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745/ 1344). The true name of Abū Ḥayyān is Muḥammed b. Yūsuf b. Ali b. Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī and he is an Andalusian linguist and exegete. Abū Ḥayyān who came from a Berber family born in the Matahsharesh village of Granada in 654/1256 and died in Cairo in 28th time 745 (11 July 1344). There is not much information about his family in the sources, but it is mentioned that he has a daughter whose name is Nada, a son named Hayyân in his name, and some grandchildren which are named Muḥammad and Ummu Ḥayyān. Abū Ḥayyān became a famous as Ethīr al-dīn and at the same time, he is also known as Naḥvī, Ghirnātī (Granadian), Ceyyānī, and Nafzī. He took lessons in Granada from great scholars such as Abd al-ḥaķ b. Ali al-Anṣarī, Abū Ḥasan al-Ubbezī, Abū Cafer Aḥmed b. Ibrahīm b. Zubair, Ibn Abū al-Ahvas and became a proficient scholar and teacher in matters such as morphology, syntax, language, commentary, hadith, methodology of Fiqh and Kalām. He wrote about 18 works in different sciences and if we mention some of that are al-Baḥr al-muhīt, al-Nahr al-mād, Tuhfat al-arīb bimā fī al-Qur'ān min al-gharīb and some of his works have reached to our time and some of those did not. Abū Ḥayyān left Andalus for various reasons and visited many centers of science and eventually continued his scientific activities in Cairo. Abū Hayyān, who is a great interest in learning languages, has learned Turkish language with the other popular languages ​​such as Persian, Amharic and Himyarite language and written books about these languages. His mainly works about Turkish language are the Kitāb al-Idrāk li-lisān al-Atrāk, Zehv al-mulk fi naḥv al-Turk, al-Af'al fi lisān al-Turk and al-Durret al-mudiyye fi lughat al-Turkiyye. These works did not reach to our days except Kitāb al-Idrak. Kitāb al-Idrāk consists of three sections, namely introduction, dictionary which includes 2200 words, and grammar that is composed of morphology and syntax and this book which is known as al-Idrāk is written in the Turkish which is spoken in XIV-XVI century tongue and named as Middle Turkish Period-Mamluk Kipchak Turkish. The first chapter begins with basmala and continues with detailed his genealogy, personal record, praise to Allah and salawat and salaam to Prophet Muhammad. After this introduction, it is explained the intention of writing this work. The second chapter is a dictionary which the words are explained in alphabetical order. Although Abū Ḥayyān speaks about 23 letters in the Kipchak alphabet, he does not explain the words related to all, but examines 19 items. In this dictionary, it does not take part some letters, that is letters sā, zāl, zā (letters of lips which is written in English th); letters dâd, ayn, fa (letters of throat) which Arabs use. In the third chapter, there is a part of the tasrif (knowledge of morphology) which is generally called knowledge of morphology today. In this section, it is dealt with about the types of words namely, name of diminutive, name of belonging name, plural, agent name, passive name, exaggerated factor name, infinitive, name indicating the location, name of device, arbitrary name, and idâd (which adds are derivation of noun from name like lık, lik at the end of the word) and then it comes to the end with shadda. Section of syntax which is called by the author as consisted of compound and is prepared according to systematic of Arabic grammar begins with the sentence structure in Kipchak language. After that it continues with definite-ambiguous names, verb (orders, past, imperfect verbs), subject-predicate in nominal sentence, nevāsiḫ (additional actions helped change the meaning of the noun phrase), Arabic leyte which express by the actual wish mold and the like, such as two mef'ūl area of ​​the heart of verbs in Arabic told (I think) were deaf ( Turkmen thinks he), acts like it yet scientists (verb phrase in), acts offender (verb-subject), the abutment of the verb nefiy prepositions, prepositions, the nehiy (ban), passive verbs and naib-i fail (so-called subject); other elements of the sentence, called the act müteallakat are: cognate accusativ, direct object, time period (time complement), the envelope space (located complement), state (envelope), causative object, the exception, the specification, conflict of laws, the annexation, the oat, the dependencies: adjective, conjunction, confirm, the apposition; conditional structure. After these, he mentions to letters of meanings (huruf al-maani), and concludes this chapter with information about the date, place, and name of the author of the book. Abū Hayyān used induction method in the book. Since he gave the forms of the words in double, then the triple, quadruple, quintet and other forms. He tried to teach the pronunciation of words by explaining the etymology of word sand the changes of the voices. He examined the words which are synonyms/ contrasted, synonym voice, singular/plural, and words that are passed by foreign languages into Turkish dialects then they are turned into Turkish word structure; brought out witnesses from proverbs and poetries. As a result, in this work, which consists of dictionary and grammar sections, it can be said that it is used predominantly in linguistic information - translation method . (shrink)

In this paper we bring together the results of our research into agreement in copular clauses in 4 four different Germanic languages—Dutch, German, Faroese, Icelandic—in order to provide an 5 overview of the results. These cases present a particularly interesting window into how verbal 6 agreement operates, since there are two potential controllers of agreement, which may disagree 7 in person and/or number (The source of the rumour BE the neighbours / you-SG / you-PL). We 8 will show that (...) there is variation at all levels in which nominal controls agreement: cross-linguistic, 9 inter-speaker within a single language, and intra-speaker. We argue that our data support the 10 following claims: (1) “Downward” agreement for person, as well as number, with a nominal that is 11 not in the canonical subject position is possible and in some cases preferred; (2) The agreement 12 patterns observed in Icelandic and Faroese support the hypothesis that in these languages there 13 are distinct Number and Person heads; (3) “Downward” agreement from a high position in the 14 left-periphery is a grammatically distinct phenomenon from agreement when the verb remains 15 in a lower position in the clause; (4) In some languages and some configurations, speakers 16 show a significant degree of indeterminacy in their judgments and production suggesting that 17 speakers use more than one grammar. We relate our findings to current discussions in the 18 generative literature on subject agreement and in particular differences between number and 19 person agreement, and possible connections to restrictions on object clitics, and we also discuss 20 questions that remain open, and invite new, cross-disciplinary research. (shrink)

Les énoncés spécificationnels à nom sous-spécifié du français peuvent se réaliser sous une forme non prototypique qui réalise deux fois le verbe être : le problème est c’est que… Les données indiquent que ces constructions sont peu fréquentes ; elles semblent toutefois suffisamment bien attestées - notamment avec certains lexèmes tels que preuve, fait, problème - pour qu’on puisse y voir une structure grammaticale et non la simple manifestation d’« accidents » de performance. Au plan grammatical, nous avons proposé de (...) les analyser comme des structures qui superposent deux emplois distincts du verbe être : d’abord, un emploi copulatif dans lequel la forme verbale a la particularité de pouvoir varier en temps ; en second lieu, la forme c’est, à laquelle nous accordons la valeur d’un auxiliaire de dispositif, comme on en trouverait dans les énoncés clivés ou pseudo-clivés. (shrink)

(1) Assuming the significates of non-complex terms, in this treatise I intend to investigate certain properties of terms, [properties] that are applicable to them only insofar as they are parts of propositions. (2) Now I divide this tract into three parts. The first is about the supposition of terms, the second about appellation, and the third about copulation. Supposition belongs to the subject, appellation to the predicate. Copula-.

It is commonly argued that natural language has the expressive power of quantifying over intensional entities, such as times, worlds, or situations. A standard way of modelling this assumes that there are unpronounced but syntactically represented variables of the corresponding type. Not all that much as has been said, however, about the exact syntactic location of these variables. Meanwhile, recent work has highlighted a number of problems that arise because the interpretive options for situation pronouns seem to be subject to (...) various restrictions. This paper is primarily concerned with situation pronouns inside of determiner phrases, arguing that they are introduced as arguments of (certain) determiners. Verbal predicates, on the other hand, are assumed to not combine with a situation pronoun. The various restrictions on their interpretation are shown to fall out from the semantic system that is developed based on that view. Further support for such an account comes from situation semantic analyses of donkey sentences as well as data on the temporal interpretation of nominal predicates. Its ability to account for this full range of data in a unified manner is shown to set it apart from previous proposals. The paper closes with an outlook on further extensions, including an account of quantifier domain restriction based on situation pronouns. (shrink)

Relational, operator, and predicate systems are distinguished on the basis that they correspond to the three possible pair-wise bracketings into two constituents of the three parts of a proposition: relation, subject, and object. It is asserted that the verbal propositional modality (left hemisphere) uses a predicate grammar, while the spatial-image operational modality (right hemisphere) uses an operator grammar. Verbal propositional memory has the capacity for extensive propositional embedding while spatial operational memory does not.

In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: (...) that if “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly read as an “is” simpliciter; and that if “at t” is treated as being associated with the copula, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly understood as expressing a disjunction of tensed copulas. I end the paper by explaining the importance of the issue. I indicate the ramifications interpretation of the tenseless copula has for the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics. (shrink)

In (1b), for the most part induces a so-called Quantificational Variability Effect (QVE) on the NP the linguists from the East Coast, yielding roughly the interpretation ‘most of the linguists from the East Coast came to NELS’. We claim that the two constructions above differ in the domain where they apply, producing similar but not identical quantificational interpretations over the NP. In particular, we argue that most of the NPs applies to the nominal domain, while for the most part (...) applies to the verbal domain. Our claim is based on two sets of novel semantic data. First, we show that the distribution of most of the NPs is parallel to that of all the NPs in terms of its selective compatibility with collective predicates. To account for this data, we extend Brisson’s (1998, 2003) analysis of all the NPs to most of the NPs, concluding that most is an ∃-quantifier introducing a group of a certain proportion. Second, we show that, when for the most part gives rise to a QVE on a definite NP, the collective interpretation is not available. We develop a semantic analysis of for the most part as a verbal modifier that explains the lack of collective readings and that extends to interpretations other than QVE. The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we introduce some general background on events and distributivity that are relevant to the current paper. In section 3, we propose the analysis of most of the NPs, followed by the analysis of for the most part in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses further issues. (shrink)

Nominalizations of modal predicates have received little, if any, attention in the semantic or philosophical literature. This paper will argue that nominalizations of modal predicates require recognizing a novel ontological category of modal objects and it will outline a new semantics of modals based on modal objects.

The recent investigations into knowledge and its elements viz facts, skills and objects have become prominent in various subfields of philosophy and other areas like linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. These investigations have been mainly on understanding the relation between the intentionality and its referential entities to know how they enrich knowledge with their existence. This article starts with an exploration of the fundamental aspects of judgemental sense from the knowledge origins perspective. To explain the consequences of this, (...) I start with reconstructing the notion of categorial intuitions described in Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigations by relating it to ‘knowledge origination’ as an intuitive fulfilment of signifying acts. This offers a relation of perceptual synthesis, operating implicitly among the signifying intentions upon grasping intended objects, in view of language structures such as copulas. This leads to the synthesis of intuitive aspects mainly from the categorial elements for a judgemental sense or thinking and the attitude from the very sphere of perception. The tension between categorial intuitions is understood as foundational acts and founded acts. Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigation describes the notion of passive synthesis, the genesis of categoriality in every realm of sensibility that allows one to formulate the relational role among the ‘act of knowing’ and phenomenological approaches to the judgemental sense. Thus, the investigation focuses on perceptual judgements and categories, which fulfils the judgemental sense of categorial elements and attitude. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that not only PPs and adverbs can act as predicates of the event argument of the verb, but certain NPs and certain clauses can, as well. I will give syntactic and semantic arguments that NPs that are cognate objects and clauses of (at least some) nonbridge verbs are optional predicates of the event argument of the verb. With respect to clauses, I will argue that for independent reasons the meaning of both independent and embedded sentences (...) can be construed as event-properties, namely as properties of intentional events. (shrink)

This article presents empirical evidence of the high referential specificity of sound-symbolic words, based on a FrameNet-aided analysis of collocational data of Japanese mimetics. The definition of mimetics, particularly their semantic definition, has been crosslinguistically the most challenging problem in the literature, and different researchers have used different adjectives (most notably, “vivid,” since Doke 1935) to describe their semantic peculiarity. The present study approaches this longstanding issue from a frame-semantic point of view combined with a quantitative method. It was found (...) that mimetic manner adverbials generally form a frame-semantically restricted range of verbal/nominal collocations than non-mimetic ones. Each mimetic can thus be considered to evoke a highly specific frame, which elaborates the general frame evoked by its typical host predicate and contains a highly limited set of frame elements, which correlate and constrain one another. This conclusion serves as a unified account of previously reported phenomena concerning mimetics, including the lack of hyponymy, the one-mimetic-per-clause restriction, and unparaphrasability. This study can be also viewed as a methodological proposal for the measurement of frame specificity, which supplements bottom-up linguistic tests. (shrink)

By the term nominalization I mean any process which transforms a predicate or predicate phrase into a noun or noun phrase, e.g. feminine is transformed into feminity. I call these derivative nouns abstract singular terms. Our aim is to provide a model-theoretic interpretation for a formal language which admits the occurrence of such abstract singular terms.

Research on the effects of perceptual manipulations on recognition memory has suggested that recollection is selectively influenced by task-relevant information and familiarity can be considered perceptually specific. The present experiment tested divergent assumptions that perceptual features can influence conscious object recollection via verbal code despite being task-irrelevant and that perceptual features do not influence object familiarity if study is verbal-conceptual. At study, subjects named objects and their presentation colour; this was followed by an old/new object recognition test. Event-related (...) potentials showed that a study-test manipulation of colour impacted selectively on the ERP effect associated with recollection, while a size manipulation showed no effect. It is concluded that verbal predicates generated at study are potent episodic memory agents that modulate recollection even if the recovered feature information is task-irrelevant and commonly found perceptual match effects on familiarity critically depend on perceptual processing at study. (shrink)

Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing (...) a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is (...) not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence. (shrink)

If we make the basic assumption that the components of a proposition have reference on the model of proper name and bearer, we face the problem of distinguishing the proposition from a mere list' of names. We neutralize the problem posed by that assumption of we first of all follow Wiggins and distinguish, in every predicate, a strictly predicative element (the copula), and a strictly non-predicative conceptual component (available to be quantified over). If we further allow the copula (...) itself to conform to the basic assumption, a regress ( Bradley's regress') arises: the referent of the copula will be instantiation, the instantiation of instantiation etc. To avert the regress, Wiggins simply legislates that the basic assumption is to fail for the copula. But we are entitled to regard the regress as constitution not a difficulty, but the solution: the infinitism it imports (capturable in a finitistic theory of meaning) is just what the unity of the proposition "is". (edited). (shrink)

All languages, both spoken and signed, make a formal distinction between two types of terms in a proposition – terms that identify what is to be talked about (nominals) and terms that say something about this topic (predicates). Here we explore conditions that could lead to this property by charting its development in a newly emerging language – Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL). We examine how handshape is used in nominals vs. predicates in three Nicaraguan groups: (1) homesigners who are not (...) part of the Deaf com- munity and use their own gestures, called homesigns, to communicate; (2) NSL cohort 1 signers who fashioned the first stage of NSL; (3) NSL cohort 2 signers who learned NSL from cohort 1. We compare these three groups to a fourth: (4) native signers of American Sign Language (ASL), an established sign language. We focus on handshape in predicates that are part of a productive classifier system in ASL; handshape in these predicates varies sys- tematically across agent vs. no-agent contexts, unlike handshape in the nominals we study, which does not vary across these contexts. We found that all four groups, including home- signers, used handshape differently in nominals vs. predicates – they displayed variability in handshape form across agent vs. no-agent contexts in predicates, but not in nominals. Variability thus differed in predicates and nominals: (1) In predicates, the variability across grammatical contexts (agent vs. no-agent) was systematic in all four groups, suggesting that handshape functioned as a productive morphological marker on predicate signs, even in homesign. This grammatical use of handshape can thus appear in the earliest stages of an emerging language. (2) In nominals, there was no variability across grammatical con- texts (agent vs. no-agent), but there was variability within- and across-individuals in the handshape used in the nominal for a particular object. This variability was striking in homesigners (an individual homesigner did not necessarily use the same handshape in every nominal he produced for a particular object), but decreased in the first cohort of NSL and remained relatively constant in the second cohort. Stability in the lexical use of handshape in nominals thus does not seem to emerge unless there is pressure from a peer linguistic community. Taken together, our findings argue that a community of users is essential to arrive at a stable nominal lexicon, but not to establish a productive morpholog- ical marker in predicates. Examining the steps a manual communication system takes as it moves toward becoming a fully-fledged language offers a unique window onto factors that have made human language what it is. (shrink)

This paper offers a new semantic theory of existentials (sentences of the form There be NP pivot XP coda ) in which pivots are (second order) predicates and codas are modifiers. The theory retains the analysis of pivots as denoting generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan 1987), but departs from previous analyses in analyzing codas as contextual modifiers on a par with temporal/locative frame adverbials. Existing analyses universally assume that pivots are arguments of some predicate, and that codas (...) are main or secondary predicates. It is shown that these analyses cannot account for the behavior of codas with quantifiers and for the interaction of multiple codas, both of which receive a simple treatment on the proposed theory. The assimilation of codas to frame adverbials explains several semantic properties which have not been analyzed in the semantic literature, and that distinguish existentials from their copular counterparts. Furthermore, it highlights important properties of the semantics of modification and its relation to predication. (shrink)

This work adopts the perspective of plural logic and measurement theory in order first to focus on the microstructure of comparative determiners; and second, to derive the properties of comparative determiners as these are studied in Generalized Quantifier Theory, locus of the most sophisticated semantic analysis of natural language determiners. The work here appears to be the first to examine comparatives within plural logic, a step which appears necessary, but which also harbors specific analytical problems examined here.Since nominal comparatives (...) involve plural and mass reference, we begin with a domain of discourse upon which a lattice structure (Link's) is imposed, and which maps (via abstract dimensions such asweight in kilograms) to concrete measures (in N,R+). The mapping must be homomorphic and Archimedean. Comparisons begin as simple predicates on dimensions or measures; from these we derive classes of predicates on the domain, i.e., generalized determiners (quantifiers), and show, e.g., how monotonicity properties follow in the derivation. This results in a proposal for a logical language which includes derived determiners, and which is an attractive target for semantics interpretation; it also turns out that some interesting comparative determiners are first order, at least when restricted to nonparametric and noncollective predications. (shrink)