The main purpose of this article is to discuss what the Ismāilīs, unlike other Muslims, say about the fall of Adam to earth or the reason why man is on earth. In this study in close relation to the subject the hierarchy of existence and the concepts of hadd/hudûd and tawhid that emerge in this context are principally emphasized, for in Ismāilism the emergence of worlds and all kinds of existence occur according to a certain hierarchy. This (...) class='Hi'>hierarchy is also seen as the criterion for determining the divine limits to be obeyed. In this context, a crucial term of hadd or hudûd in its plural form refers to the degrees of all beings, ordered from simple to complex, in their divine station. Parallel to this teaching, the fault Adam committed in eternity is regarded as a kind of crossing the line, for he did not show the required devotion to those who are superior to him. In this context, another important concept dealt with in the article in connection with the subject is tawhid, the Oneness of God, for it should not be forgotten that the Prime Intellect invites the entire Realm of Creation to accept the Oneness of the Creator. The most important rule of responding to this invitation is that creatures in both worlds are to recognize and obey those who are superior to them in order to wake to the principle of tawhid and thus attain perfection. It is emphasized in the article that two forms of explanation, one of which can be considered representative and the other philosophical, come to the fore in Ismāilī classical sources on the subject of Adam's fall to earth. In representative narratives the reason for Adam's being on earth is explained as regaining the position he lost due to the fault he committed in the eternal world. This fault was committed by the spiritual Adam, who represents the whole humanity, not the physical one, and actually symbolizes the defectiveness of Nafs (psyche). The story of Adam's exit from Paradise, which takes place in the Qur’ān, is also interpreted in accordance with this narrative, whereas in more compatible explanations with the philosophy of Neoplatonism, the development of Nafs (psyche) is at the core. Nafs is incomplete because it emerges into the realm of existence after the Intellect. Due to this, the reason orlde creation of the material orld is to make Nafs better with knowledge and wisdom and to ensure its ultimate development. In this case, Nafs realizes itself through Adam, who is its supreme representative on earth. The reason why cosmos initially starts its movement is basically this imperfection of Nafs. Hereby, in both elucidations in the article, it is stated that the emphasis is on the faultiness of nafs. In other words, Nafs or Adam, its earthly form, experiences a loss of station and falls into timely existence due to a deficiency caused by distance from God. For this reason, in order for Nafs to mature or for Adam to regain his original station, the material world must exist and a seven-stage process must be experienced. (shrink)

Poststructuralism and Whiteheadian process thought each uniquely dismantle the anthropocentric hierarchies and speciesed constructions we have used to calculate our ethics with non-human bodies. Yet each perspective uniquely continues, despite its own affirmations, to privilege the identity and construction of the human over other bodies. In an effort to move past these shortcomings and into a more creative ethical imagination, this article reads Whiteheadian metaphysics as an affirmation of poststructural singularity, and uses poststructural criticism to deconstruct Whitehead’s subtler form of (...) anthropocentrism. By joining these traditions together, this article makes clear their respective blind spots, moves past the limited and troubled framework of species upheld in each, and advances the truly novel, creaturely relations for which both traditions adamantly call. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry’s argument for justice in On abstinence. I aim to show that (i) in addition to being an inner order of soul, justice is attributed to external actions and (ii) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. The relevant harm, I argue, consists in taking the lives of living creatures and taking products from them by force or without care. I (...) contend that Porphyry extends moral concern for others to all living creatures, but not merely on the basis of animal suffering. Finally, I argue that that the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence does not support the subordination of moral concern for animals and plants to higher virtues of purity and theory. (shrink)

Mettre le noos en relation avec les idées de « panaristos » et de « méga nèpios » permet d’étudier les spécificités du concept noétique chez Hésiode lequel est le plus souvent amalgamé, dans les recherches sur l’évolution historique du noos/noein, à Homère. La présente étude propose d’articuler davantage le noos/noein dans les objectifs poétiques propres aux Travaux et Jours d’où émerge une vision particulière de l’activité psychique de l’individu grec archaïque, depuis le sot ignorant (Persès et les mauvais rois) (...) jusqu’au poète sachant (Hésiode lui-même). Il convient également de montrer comment Hésiode établit une nouvelle hiérarchie des créatures sur la base du noos qui devient consubstantiel à la dikè. Ensemble, ces deux paramètres sont insérés dans un discours à la fois poétique et politique où s’illustre entre autre le mythe des races. Le noos sert tout particulièrement l’autorité poétique d’Hésiode contre celle des rois et révèle une vision à part de l’intelligence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:For the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis by William GreenwayRyan JuskusFor the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis William Greenway GRAND RAPIDS, MI: EERDMANS, 2015. 178 PP. $18.00The morning I started reading William Greenway's For the Love of All Creatures, my toddler stumbled into my bedroom holding an injured cockroach. After my startled response caused him (...) to drop it, I trapped and threw the cockroach outside. Had no children been present, I probably would have killed it. Later, I read Greenway's injunction to "love the cockroach," for "we reflect the image of God when we are wholly and without qualification seized by love for the cockroach and for every creature" (102). Did I love that injured cockroach, I wondered; was I seized in a "transcendent moment," my love "absolute and unqualified" (102)? Unpreoccupied by such quotidian dilemmas, Greenway instead proposes a spirituality of grace, of awakening to having been seized by love for all creatures. The moral and spiritual genius of "the primeval history" of Genesis 1–11, he argues, is its holding together the "knowing, insightful idealism" of the seven-day Creation narrative with the "hyperrealism" of the Flood narrative (140). Together they proclaim the "decisive, life-affirming asymmetry" that gracious love is more primordial and ultimate than evil (144). Greenway's book joins a growing body of literature reclaiming biblical texts from overly anthropocentric readings. Asserting the priority of moral sensibility to ethical reasoning, Greenway does not help me know whether I loved that cockroach—beyond mourning that in a fallen world, we "choose the lesser of two evils" (103)—but his Creation spirituality contributes a distinctive approach to animal ethics.Greenway contrasts his creature-loving reading with both materialist and anthropocentric interpretations, against which he argues that the redactors skillfully wove together the Genesis 1–11 narratives to bear a "spiritual truth" that awakens readers to love for all creatures (4). Contrasting this spiritual wisdom to two other influential Creation narratives—the Babylonian Enuma Elish and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, the latter carried to completion by Charles Darwin—Greenway draws out the interconnections between politics, cosmology, anthropology, God, and evil that each narrative renders.A provocative but carefully developed reading of the Flood as the "birth of the God of grace" and an interpretation of the seven-day Creation through the lens of exiled, suffering Israel, follow (67). The latter, Greenway argues, cultivates a life-affirming spirituality with an "infinite sensitivity to every other [End Page 205] being" (105). The both/and character of the primeval history's spirituality is summed up in Greenway's oft-repeated phrases "seized by love for all creatures" (i.e., idealism) yet "with eyes wide open to injustice and suffering" (i.e., realism). For a criterion to evaluate Creation narratives, Greenway distinguishes between a "logic of domination" and a "logic of dominion." He concludes that whereas the Hobbesian-Darwinian narrative recognizes fallenness and the Enuma Elish promotes realism, both fail to testify to the asymmetry between good and evil that Greenway thinks essential to a creature-loving spirituality of dominion. Gracious love is the most primordial and ultimate reality. The ethic of daily life, lived along the continuum between domination and dominion, is to "maximize dominion" (121).Regardless of whether one accepts Greenway's premises regarding authority, epistemology, and biblical interpretation, his argument is insightful and thought provoking. Engaging the oppressed communities highlighted by feminist, womanist, and postcolonial thinkers would have complicated his story of "the modern West" and his assessments of sacrifice, hierarchy, sin, and imago Dei. Also, a number of ambiguities—such as claiming to value multiple religious traditions while arguing for the superiority of Genesis—beg for further clarity. However, Greenway's contribution to a life-affirming spirituality in harmony with biblical testimony is laudatory. He may not help me know how to love a cockroach, but he successfully accounts for why such an ethical dilemma coheres with a Genesis-cultivated spirituality. The book would have wide appeal in undergraduate, seminary, or ecclesial contexts. [End Page 206]Ryan JuskusDuke UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Dieser Artikel stellt Cora Diamonds Begriff des Mitgeschöpfs dar und untersucht dessen Relevanz für tierethische und tierpolitische Diskurse. Die traditionelle Tierethik hat eine rationalistische, naturalistische und reduktionistische Tendenz. Diamonds Moralphilosophie stellt dem einen praxissensitiven Ansatz gegenüber, der Emotionen und die moralische Imagination umfasst, wobei Diamond die Bedeutung des Menschseins betont. Letztere entspringt zwar einem epistemischen Anthropozentrismus, jedoch folgt aus diesem keine Mensch-Tier-Hierarchie: Diamond plädiert dafür, andere Tiere als Mitgeschöpfe, als Gefährten auf sterblichen Pfaden, zu begreifen. Dabei zeigt Diamond an ihrer (...) Interpretation von J.M. Coetzees The Lives of Animals, wie Konzepte von anderen Tieren auf das eigene Selbstverständnis rückwirken. Abschließend erörtert der Artikel den Vorwurf des Quietismus und die Schwierigkeit der politischen Umsetzbarkeit in Diamonds Philosophie. -/- [This article outlines Cora Diamond’s concept of the fellow creature and examines its relevance for animal ethics and animal politics. Diamond’s moral philosophy contrasts the rationalistic, naturalistic, and reductionistic tendency of traditional animal ethics with a practice-oriented approach that encompasses emotions and the moral imagination. Diamond emphasizes the importance of being human, which emanates from an epistemic anthropocentrism, but from which no human-animal hierarchy follows: She pleads for recognizing other animals as fellow creatures, as companions on mortal paths. In her interpretation of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, Diamond shows how conceptualizing other animals influences one’s own self-understanding. Finally, the article discusses the reproach of quietism and the difficulty of political feasibility in Diamond’s philosophy.]. (shrink)

This article engages with the care ethics of Laudato Si’ through the lens of postcolonial ecofeminism. Laudato Si’ speaks of the family of creation where nature is both a nurturing mother and a vulnerable sister, reflecting patriarchal associations of women with nature, fragility, and the virtue of care. This indirectly undermines the need for men to engage in care/social reproduction work as well as the strengthening of women’s agency. While this kin-centric ecology acknowledges the interdependence of creatures, it maintains (...) the hierarchy of humans over nature and underlines this family’s headship by an all-powerful Father. Laudato Si’s family ecology and God language inadvertently reifies women–nature–care connection and reinforces the logic of male domination. This study recommends exploring gender inclusive images of the Trinity and the family of creation in mutual relations to foster care that promotes both the agency of women and nature. (shrink)

The immense distance between God and creatures is a core statement of Gregory of Nyssa’s thought, which makes it distinctive not only in theology, but also in cosmology, anthropology, and spiritual doctrine. For him, the main distinction between beings that articulates all reality is not that of intelligible and sensible, but the one between infinite God and creatures. This paper, dealing with some selected texts regarding the creation of man, points out the main roots of Gregory’s theism: a (...) high comprehension of God’s transcendence and a proper philosophy of time and creation. From here, Gregory’s understanding of the hierarchy of beings as a non-dialectic unity of creation supported by a transcendent participation in God, and his articulation of Eternity and Time within the unique creative action of God, could be seen as a deep Christian comprehension of reality that is still intriguing for contemporary thinkers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of AnimalsChristopher Key ChappleThe Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals. By Paul Waldau. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. xv + 303 pp.At the Parliament of World Religions held in Cape Town in 1999, Dada Vaswani, a leading spiritual voice within India, proclaimed that the nineteenth century brought the liberation of slaves, that the twentieth (...) century brought the liberation of women, and that the twenty-first century will bring the liberation of animals. For Paul Waldau, a key piece in this transformation will result from the insights of ethology, the specialized branch of biology that offers new information regarding the consciousness of animals. Scientific research has revealed that animals occupy a complex world, replete with desires and emotions. Based on this scientific research, Waldau asserts that a new morality will arise that acknowledges the inherent moral standing of animals, and will overturn the long-held view that animals serve only one purpose: to serve humanity. Otherwise, he asserts, humans will remain enmeshed in the tyranny of speciesism.In this meticulous study, Paul Waldau assesses the origins of the term "speciesism," coined by Ryder in 1970. He explores the link between speciesism and slavery, colonization, and the oppression of women and children. Just as ethical discourse has been altered through history regarding these issues, Waldau suggests that as more information becomes available, human attitudes regarding animals will evolve. However, due to entrenched religious views, this change will be gradual. This book consists of a sustained argument for expanding our categories of worth beyond purely anthropocentric values. Waldau suggests that although humans hold a power advantage over animals, "[d]ifferences in abilities, and even hierarchy, to the extent they exist, do not automatically imply the propriety of dominance, let alone tyranny" (p.39).To develop his argument, Waldau writes about three higher-order mammals that merit consideration: the great apes, elephants, and cetaceans (whales and dolphins). Each of these groups of animals display complex abilities and have, in proportion to the size of their bodies, large brains. Genetically, chimpanzees and humans share 98.4% identical DNA. Chimpanzees can develop high language functioning and use [End Page 293] tools, subverting the assumptions that these two capabilities are uniquely human. In regard to elephants, Waldau writes that "[b]oth Aristotle and Pliny designated elephants as the animals closest to humans in intelligence" (p. 79). He particularly notes their highly developed matriarchal social structure and their ability to communicate over long distances. Similarly, Waldau summarizes recent research on cetaceans' ability to protect one another through echolocation and a highly intricate communication system based on touch and soundings. Because of this scientific resarch, Waldau asserts that Descartes was wrong to proclaim that "dumb animals do not think" (p. 89).Waldau's underlying argument asks that humans not "lump" all animals together under one umbrella category, but assess each group of animals according to its own gifts. He asks that we not regard humans as utterly unique (and hence better), but pay attention to current scientific research and ethical insights that value animals for their inherent worth. Though Waldau does not attempt to establish a new hierarchy of more-valued creatures, he does argue persuasively that great apes, elephants, and the cetaceans deserve greater respect, and that we need to re-examine and hopefully deconstruct the inherited cultural understanding of all animals as simply "other."This brings us to the primary focus of the book: an investigation of the place of animals in Buddhist and Christian traditions. In Buddhism, animals suffer their fate because of negative karma, and, at best, can hope to be reborn as a human being capable of receiving the Buddha's teachings. Waldau cites various texts, from the Jataka tales to the Mahayana sutras, that accord conscience and agency to specific animals. He claims, however, that Buddhist cultures have generally not gone out of their way to cultivate a culture of animal benevolence, citing the example of elephant trainers in Southeast Asia. Some mention of the Buddhist practice of purchasing and releasing animals, widely practiced in East Asia, would have been helpful. Unlike some authors, Waldau... (shrink)

W. V. Quine famously defended two theses that have fallen rather dramatically out of fashion. The first is that intensions are “creatures of darkness” that ultimately have no place in respectable philosophical circles, owing primarily to their lack of rigorous identity conditions. However, although he was thoroughly familiar with Carnap’s foundational studies in what would become known as possible world semantics, it likely wouldn’t yet have been apparent to Quine that he was fighting a losing battle against intensions, due (...) in large measure to developments stemming from Carnap’s studies and culminating in the work of Kripke, Hintikka, and Bayart. These developments undermined Quine’s crusade against intensions on two fronts. First, in the context of possible world semantics, intensions could after all be given rigorous identity conditions by defining them (in the simplest case) as functions from worlds to appropriate extensions, a fact exploited to powerful and influential effect in logic and linguistics by the likes of Kaplan, Montague, Lewis, and Cresswell. Second, the rise of possible world semantics fueled a strong resurgence of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy that saw properties and propositions widely, fruitfully, and unabashedly adopted as ontological primitives in their own right. This resurgence — happily, in my view — continues into the present day. -/- For a time, at any rate, Quine experienced somewhat better success with his second thesis: that higher-order logic is, at worst, confused and, at best, a quirky notational alternative to standard first-order logic. However, Quine notwithstanding, a great deal of recent work in formal metaphysics transpires in a higher-order logical framework in which properties and propositions fall into an infinite hierarchy of types of (at least) every finite order. Initially, the most philosophically compelling reason for embracing such a framework since Russell first proposed his simple theory of types was simply that it provides a relatively natural explanation of the paradoxes. However, since the seminal work of Prior there has been a growing trend to consider higher-order logic to be the most philosophically natural framework for metaphysical inquiry, many of the contributors to this volume being among the most important and influential advocates of this view. Indeed, this is now quite arguably the dominant view among formal metaphysicians. -/- In this paper, and against the current tide, I will argue in §1 that there are still good reasons to think that Quine’s second battle is not yet lost and that the correct framework for logic is first-order and type-free — properties and propositions, logically speaking, are just individuals among others in a single domain of quantification — and that it arises naturally out of our most basic logical and semantical intuitions. The data I will draw upon are not new and are well-known to contemporary higher-order metaphysicians. However, I will try to defend my thesis in what I believe is a novel way by suggesting that these basic intuitions ground a reasonable distinction between “pure” logic and non-logical theory, and that Russell-style semantic paradoxes of truth and exemplification arise only when we move beyond the purely logical and, hence, do not of themselves provide any strong objection to a type-free conception of properties and propositions. -/- Most of my arguments in §1 are largely independent of any specific account of the nature of properties and propositions beyond their type-freedom. However, I will in addition argue that there are good reasons to take propositions, at least, to be very fine-grained. My arguments are thus bolstered significantly if it can be shown that there are in fact well-defined examples of logics that are not only type-free but which comport with such a conception of propositions. It is the purpose of §2 to lay out a logic of this sort in some detail, drawing especially upon work by George Bealer and related work of my own. With the logic in place, it will be possible to generalize the line of argument noted above regarding Russell-style paradoxes and, in §3, apply it to two propositional paradoxes — the Prior-Kaplan paradox and the Russell-Myhill paradox — that are often taken to threaten the sort of account developed here. (shrink)

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which equates the ultimate end of human life with happiness, is thought by many readers to argue that this highest goal consists in the largest possible aggregate of intrinsic goods. Richard Kraut proposes instead that Aristotle identifies happiness with only one type of good: excellent activity of the rational soul. In defense of this reading, Kraut discusses Aristotle's attempt to organize all human goods into a single structure, so that each subordinate end is desirable for the sake (...) of some higher goal. This book also emphasizes the philosopher's hierarchy of natural kinds, in which every type of creature achieves its good by imitating divine life. As Kraut argues, Aristotle's belief that thinking is the sole activity of the gods leads him to an intellectualist conception of the ethical virtues. Aristotle values these traits because, by subordinating emotion to reason, they enhance our ability to lead a life devoted to philosophy or politics. (shrink)

RESUMO A tradução árabe de alguns trechos do tratado de metafísica "Elementatio Theologiae" de Proclo, conhecida com o nome de "Liber de Causis" e atribuída erroneamente a Aristóteles, influenciou três grandes pensadores dominicanos da Idade Média: Alberto Magno, Tomás de Aquino e Meister Eckhart. Composto de 31 proposições, defende a tese da existência de uma causa primeira que dá o ser a tudo o que existe, sem nenhuma exceção. Os estudiosos são unânimes em reconhecer que este livro pseudoepigráfico possui um (...) peso relevante nos momentos centrais da obra eckhartiana, tanto latina quanto alemã. Em particular, o turíngio lança mão da auctoritas do "Liber de Causis" para sustentar a imanência-transcendência simultânea da causa primeira com relação às criaturas, a doutrina da hierarquia dos entes, a concepção do ser como ratio prima da criaturalidade, a inefabilidade de Deus. Além desses aspectos ontológicos, este trabalho apresenta também o aspecto especificamente antropológico do esvaziamento de toda criatura como conditio sine qua non para a união com o único Uno, um traço inconfundível da presença do "Liber de Causis" na obra de Meister Eckhart. ABSTRACT The Arabic translation of some stretches of the treatise on metaphysics "Elementatio Theologiae" of Proclus, known under the name "Liber de Causis" and wrongfully attributed to Aristotle, influenced three great Middle Age Dominican thinkers: Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart. Composed by thirty-one propositions, it advocates on the thesis of existence of a root cause that gives the being all things existing, with no exception. Scholars are unanimous in acknowledging that this pseudoepigraphic book has a relevant weight in the central topics of the Eckhartean works, on both the Latin and the German ones. Particularly, the Thuringian scholar makes use of the "Liber de Causis’s" auctoritas to hold that the simultaneous immanence-transcendence of the root cause regarding the creatures, the doctrine of the hierarchy of beings, the conception of the being as a ratio prima of creatureness, God’s ineffability. Besides those ontological aspects, the present work also presents the specifically anthropologic aspect of the emptying of all beings as conditio sine qua non for the union with the One Being, an unmistakable trait of the presence of Liber de Causis in Meister Eckhart’s work. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea, commonly presupposed but seldom explicitly stated in discussions of certain philosophical problems, that the objects and phenomena of the world are structured in a hierarchy of "levels", from the bottom level of microparticles to the levels of cells and biological organisms and then to the levels of creatures with mentality and social groups of such creatures. Parallel to this "layered model" of the natural world is an ordering of the sciences, with physics (...) as our "basic" science and the "special sciences" forming a ladder-like hierarchy, from chemistry to biology to psychology and the social sciences, all grounded in basic physics. Focusing on two formulations of this model, the emergentist model of C. Lloyd Morgan and the reductionist model due to Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam, the paper discusses such questions as these:What makes a given level of objects "higher" or "lower" than another? What makes a given property "higher" or "lower" than another property. Are objects and properties always comparable with respect to "higher" and "lower"? Can an overarching hierarchy of entities and properties be developed that comprehends the entire natural order? The issues turn out to be quite complex, and no definitive general conclusions are reached. (shrink)

Aquinas’ natural law theory contains a set of basic goods, such as survival, reproduction and the pursuit of truth. However, whether and how there is a hierarchical relationship among these goods remains disputed. Given the importance of Aquinas’ natural law theory for Christianity and the philosophy of law, this issue merits a closer investigation. By carefully examining various modern scholars’ theories and Aquinas’ texts, it is demonstrated that according to Aquinas, firstly, there are hierarchies of basic goods and sins; secondly, (...) these hierarchies are horizontal and vertical according to the order of participation and the dignity of substances, respectively.Contribution: This research reconsiders the modern debate over Aquinas’ hierarchical theory of basic goods and provides a more authentic understanding of Aquinas’ own view, which can be applied to his theory of sin. Aquinas’ natural law theory can hence be clarified in a more profound way. (shrink)

Since Hartshorne rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects, this seems to deny Hartshorne's God any causal influence via providing initial subjective aims to the world's creatures. If there are no specific eternal objects as possibilities to be actualized by creatures, there can be no specific initial aims. Hartshorne's metaphysics, however, can be rendered coherent at this point by interpreting the initial aims as hierarchies of indeterminate possibilities which are not specific until rendered so by creatures. Such an (...) interpretation is coherent with his doctrine of possibility understood as a hierarchy of indeterminate potentiality. A further issue remains, nevertheless, in regard to Hartshorne's claim that the possibilities offered by God to creatures are both infinite and yet limited. It is difficult to see how they can be both. (shrink)

The question whether Frege’s theory of indirect reference enforces an infinite hierarchy of senses has been hotly debated in the secondary literature. Perhaps the most influential treatment of the issue is that of Burge (1979), who offers an argument for the hierarchy from rather minimal Fregean assumptions. I argue that this argument, endorsed by many, does not itself enforce an infinite hierarchy of senses. I conclude that whether or not the theory of indirect reference can avail itself (...) of only finitely many senses is pending further theoretical development. (shrink)

I reconstruct Martin Buber’s conception of grace to show its importance for unifying his religious orientation and anarchist tendencies. I first lay out an Augustinian account of grace and concomitant defense of hierarchy and submission. I then examine Buber’s anarchism and previous analyses of his notion of grace, which were incomplete insofar as they ignored his redefinition of what is given by grace and who gives these gifts. The primary gifts of grace he identifies are who we are (meant (...) to be), moral norms and reality, each of which come to us not just from God, but also from relations with other creatures. Buber corrects the classic Augustinian notion of grace by replacing radical dependence on God with radical creaturely interdependence. Once hierarchy and submission to an inscrutable authority are no longer taken to be necessary for human flourishing, we are free to think along broadly anarchist lines. (shrink)

This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no (...) ontological significance for Frege. It was just a ‘short expression’ (his term) to indicate that the customary relation between sign, sense, and reference is suspended in what he called the exception case of indirect context. Once the hierarchy is abandoned, the alleged problem of just what indirect sense is, as well as questions as to why Frege said so little about it and why he did not examine iterative indirect contexts are resolved. Of course, with no hierarchy, Davidson’s “unlearnability argument” turns out to be a non-starter. Some objections to my interpretation are considered and answered. Additionally, comparisons to Dummett’s one-level view of sense, which is similar to mine are made, as well as to some two-level views (Parsons and Skiba). (shrink)

: Dennis Des Chene's Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought reconstructs the discourse of late scholastic natural philosophy, and assesses Descartes' agreements and disagreements. In a critical discussion, I offer a different interpretation of late scholastic theories of final causality and of God's concursus with created efficient causes. Fonseca's and Suárez' conceptions of final causality in nature depend on their claim that a single action can be the action of two agents at once--in particular, of God and (...) of a creature. I discuss both their theory of action and its implications for natural teleology. I then compare Descartes, emphasizing his demolition of the Aristotelian hierarchy of causes, with unmoved movers (culminating in God) regulating the action of inferior moved movers. Aristotle argues that unmoved causes are needed to produce a stable world-order; he takes arts (tÁxnai) as his models of unmoved causes, and uses this model to support natural teleology. Descartes radically simplifies this system by denying all unmoved movers other than God, and denying anything analogous to an art in non-human nature. I explore the implications for Descartes' notion of concursus and his criticism of natural teleology, and discuss his resulting difficulties in explaining natural stability. (shrink)

Dennis Des Chene's Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought reconstructs the discourse of late scholastic natural philosophy, and assesses Descartes' agreements and disagreements. In a critical discussion, I offer a different interpretation of late scholastic theories of final causality and of God's concursus with created efficient causes. Fonseca's and Suárez' conceptions of final causality in nature depend on their claim that a single action can be the action of two agents at once--in particular, of God and of (...) a creature. I discuss both their theory of action and its implications for natural teleology. I then compare Descartes, emphasizing his demolition of the Aristotelian hierarchy of causes, with unmoved movers regulating the action of inferior moved movers. Aristotle argues that unmoved causes are needed to produce a stable world-order; he takes arts as his models of unmoved causes, and uses this model to support natural teleology. Descartes radically simplifies this system by denying all unmoved movers other than God, and denying anything analogous to an art in non-human nature. I explore the implications for Descartes' notion of concursus and his criticism of natural teleology, and discuss his resulting difficulties in explaining natural stability. (shrink)

I analyze the hierarchies of the bounded and the weak bounded forcing axioms, with a focus on their versions for the class of subcomplete forcings, in terms of implications and consistency strengths. For the weak hierarchy, I provide level-by-level equiconsistencies with an appropriate hierarchy of partially remarkable cardinals. I also show that the subcomplete forcing axiom implies Larson’s ordinal reflection principle atω2, and that its effect on the failure of weak squares is very similar to that of Martin’s (...) Maximum. (shrink)

As biological and moral creatures, humans contain physical and psychological needs that correspond to various development stages. According to Lee, a hierarchy of biological and individual needs provides an objective basis for ethics. The anthropocentric hierarchy of needs provides a model for examining the needs of the environment as well. A sound world order must be based on an ethical theory that integrates the needs of humans and the environment of which they are a part. Political and (...) economic systems must universally address all needs at all levels. (shrink)

To read the relationship between potestas divina and potestas humana in a simple ontological hierarchy would lead to not understanding the multiple meanings that they entail on the theological, metaphysical, anthropological, ethical, juridical and political levels, and which are instead present in the works of F. Suárez. With an epistemological focus, the article analyzes suárezian speculative and theoretical choices in arguing the human condition and in constantly relating it to cooperation with God. In Suárez there is the full appreciation (...) of the human faculties of creature, who desires and loves, and who has received from the Divine Legislator the source of the most profound freedom, that is the potestas humana. At the same time, there is an enhancement of every entity, finite or infinite; the only adequate analogy is that of intrinsic attribution. For potestas divina, God is Dominus; for potestas humana, vir and foemina are dominus and domina, capable of governing himself/herself, of living righteously in the community, of welcoming and sharing the charity that is of God. (shrink)

Attempts to extend the classical Hausdorff difference hierarchy to the case of partitions of a space to k > 2 subsets lead to non‐equivalent notions. In a hope to identify the “right” extension we consider the extensions appeared in the literature so far: the limit‐, level‐, Boolean and Wadge hierarchies of k ‐partitions. The advantages and disadvantages of the four hierarchies are discussed. The main technical contribution of this paper is a complete characterization of the Wadge degrees of Δ02‐measurable (...) k ‐partitions of the Baire space. (© 2007 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

Investigates the resolution of contradictions and ambiguous derogations in a code, by means of the imposition of partial orderings.

The paper provides a new argument against the classical invariance criterion for logical terms: if all terms with a permutation invariant extension qualify as logical, then for any arbitrary true contingent sentence K of the meta-language, there would be a logically true object-language sentence 'φ' such that K follows from the sentence 'φ is true'. Thus, many logically true sentences would be a posteriori. To prevent this fatal consequence, we propose to alter the invariance criterion: not only the term's extension, (...) but also its semantic clause must satisfy certain invariance conditions. The paper ends with the observation that the new criterion makes explicit the dependency of the classification of terms into logical and non-logical ones at the different levels of the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic (...) is to be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

I analyze the hierarchies of the bounded resurrection axioms and their “virtual” versions, the virtual bounded resurrection axioms, for several classes of forcings. I analyze these axioms in terms of implications and consistency strengths. For the virtual hierarchies, I provide level-by-level equiconsistencies with an appropriate hierarchy of virtual partially super-extendible cardinals. I show that the boldface resurrection axioms for subcomplete or countably closed forcing imply the failure of Todorčević’s square at the appropriate level. I also establish connections between these (...) hierarchies and the hierarchies of bounded and weak bounded forcing axioms. (shrink)

Through transatlantic contact and subsequent debates, the “humanity” of Amerindians was first established for Europeans according to the dictates of philosophical anthropology and theology. This hierarchical and colonial anthropology is problematic precisely because it normalizes a singular, indigenous way of “being human” as the only correct and universal formulation of the “human being,” i.e., Man. Consequently, people that live outside this constructed definition are exposed to dispossession, dehumanization, and genocide because they are deemed outside the bounds of Mankind. Through a (...) three-part analysis, this work will examine Bartolomé de Las Casas’ categorization of Amerindians though his formulation of “barbarianism,” compare this taxonomy with Orson Scott Card’s “Hierarchy of Foreignness,” and finally argue that Indigenous traditions of thought—as seen in “grounded normativity” and “place-thought”—allow not only for the dissolution of colonial anthropologies but also permit for a teleological suspension of Man. (shrink)

We refine the arithmetical hierarchy of various classical principles by finely investigating the derivability relations between these principles over Heyting arithmetic. We mainly investigate some restricted versions of the law of excluded middle, De Morgan's law, the double negation elimination, the collection principle and the constant domain axiom.

Numerous eukaryotic DNA processing enzymes, such as DNA polymerases and ligases, bind the processivity factor PCNA, which acts as a platform to recruit and regulate the binding of enzymes to their DNA substrate. Multiple PCNA‐interacting motifs (PIPs) are present in these enzymes, but their individual structural and functional role has been a matter of debate. Recent cryo‐EM reconstructions of high‐fidelity DNA polymerase Pol δ (Pol δ), translesion synthesis DNA polymerase κ (Pol κ) and Ligase 1 (Lig1) bound to a DNA (...) substrate and PCNA demonstrate that the critical interaction with PCNA involves the internal PIP proximal to the catalytic domain. The ancillary PIPs, located in long disordered regions, are instead invisible in the reconstructions, and appear to function as flexible tethers when the enzymes fall off the DNA. In this review, we discuss the recent structural advancements and propose a functional hierarchy for the PIPs in Pol δ, Pol κ, and Lig1. (shrink)

Four classes of naturally rare vascular plant species are described and classified, based on parameters of spatial distribution and longevity. Properties intrinsic to these time/space parameters are explored and an importance hierarchy of causes of rarity is proposed for each class. These hierarchies serve as the basis for a predictive classification. Human causes of rarity such as habitat destruction and taxonomic difficulties are not considered in detail here but are discussed as confounding factors in the elucidation of rarity in (...) vascular plants. Several examples are provided to illustrate this classification and provide testable hypotheses concerning the origins of natural rarity in plant species. (shrink)

We introduce and study hierarchies of extensions of the propositional modal and temporal languages with pairs of new syntactic devices: point of reference-reference pointer which enable semantic references to be made within a formula. We propose three different but equivalent semantics for the extended languages, discuss and compare their expressiveness. The languages with reference pointers are shown to have great expressive power (especially when their frugal syntax is taken into account), perspicuous semantics, and simple deductive systems. For instance, Kamp's and (...) Stavi's temporal operators, as well as nominals (names, clock variables), are definable in them. Universal validity in these languages is proved undecidable. The basic modal and temporal logics with reference pointers are uniformly axiomatized and a strong completeness theorem is proved for them and extended to some classes of their extensions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 89 To fill the gap between the two worlds seems to have been one of the most important of their problems. Philo filled it with angels and powers, the Gnostics, whatever their individual differences, filled it with other supernatural creatures begotten by their chief god. Origen filled it with Intelligences, created and corporeal spirits who rose or fell according to their sinfulness (p. 437). The discrepancy (...) between the two worlds remains to be bridged by the later Greek philosophers not by reason but by the appeal to myth, imagination and authority. Only in Plotinus, among the late Greek philosophers, does Boas find a significant remainder of rationalism. Plotinus's problem is similar, to be sure, to that of the other late thinkers: to bridge the metaphysical gap. Appeals to myth and to the authority of earlier Greek thinkers are quite as irrational here as in the earlier thinkers. And the resort to powerful metaphors is as pronounced in Plotinus as in any other philosopher one can name. All this is brought out very well. Yet Boas finds it important to try to expound Plotinus's philosophy as "... a sample of rationalism with axioms and inferences, with dialectical distinctions, with the Law of Contradiction utilized to produce consistency" (p. 455). He doesn't claim to have succeeded in doing this; on the contrary, his account gives little ground on which to justify the attempt, and one wonders why it was undertaken. This is not to deny that Plotinus uses rational arguments and logical inferences, but rather to say that the semblance of a "rational structure" depends instead on poetical and metaphorical elements. Nevertheless, the discussion of Plotinus's thought as a "sample of rationalism" is of interest because it serve to bring out an element in the conception of rationalism which emerges only too rarely in the book? Boas pays special attention to Plotinus's "full fledged hierarchy of being," and his attempt to derive (or "deduce"?) the degrees of being from the One. This rests on the "principle of plenitude," or on the notion that all possible being must be exemplified in existence. This in turn is suggested by one or more powerful metaphors. Plotinus's speculative imagination, in other words, was still unfettered to a considerable degree by authority, revelation, or other restrictions. Kegardless of how adequate one might judge Plotinus's system to be in terms of axioms, definitions and consistency (and surely it is very inadequate), Boas's interest in him as a "sample of rationalism" derives from this freedom in speculation and in choice of "assumptions." This does not mean that logical criteria are not the proper tools of the critic nor that they can be disregarded by the speculative philosopher. It means only that Greek rationalism rested on considerably more; a magnificently free and speculative strain of mind. This is one matter that Boas's discussion makes amply clear. JOHN D. GOHEEN Stanford University Origbne et la Philosophie. By Henri Crouzel. (l~tudes Publi6es sous la Direction de la Facult6 de Th6ologie SJ de Lyon-Fourvi~re; Aubier, 1962. Pp. 238.) This is a painstaking and important essay set between fairly narrow limits. It deliberately stays short of becoming a study of Origenism rather than Origen, and thus avoids the mistake made by so many books about Origen. The field is quite difficult of course. We are still a long way from proper evaluation of the Christian-Hellenist synthesis in 4 However, explicitly stated on pp. 355-356. 90 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the thinking of many Christian figures from the second century to the fourth. Could not the same be said perhaps, rnutatis mutandis, of some Hellenist writers, Celsus, Porphyry, Plotinus? Origen, as well as being more important, is considerably more complicated than most. Is he the first great Christian sumrnator, ~ la Aquinas? Is he a Platonist masquerading as a Christian? Or a Christian masquerading as a Hellenist? In the rough phrase that used to be applied in the schools of theology, auctores scinduntur, sometimes with extreme acrimony. He has been receiving a good deal of attention over the past fifty years, from Bohringer, De Faye, Koch--the list is awfully long-right... (shrink)

The paper places the work of G. Gaus into the tradition of political thought experimenting. In particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision by the heuristic device of idealized Members of the Public is presented as an iterated thought experiment, which stands in marked contrast with more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. The consequences are drawn, and issues of utopianism and realism briefly discussed.

This translation of selections from the De universo grew out of a graduate seminar on William of Auvergne held at Marquette University in 1995. It translates and annotates large parts of the De universo and of the De anima.

We introduce a new hierarchy of computably enumerable degrees. This hierarchy is based on computable ordinal notations measuring complexity of approximation of${\rm{\Delta }}_2^0$functions. The hierarchy unifies and classifies the combinatorics of a number of diverse constructions in computability theory. It does so along the lines of the high degrees (Martin) and the array noncomputable degrees (Downey, Jockusch, and Stob). The hierarchy also gives a number of natural definability results in the c.e. degrees, including a definable antichain.

Some reasons to regard the cumulative hierarchy of sets as potential rather than actual are discussed. Motivated by this, a modal set theory is developed which encapsulates this potentialist conception. The resulting theory is equi-interpretable with Zermelo Fraenkel set theory but sheds new light on the set-theoretic paradoxes and the foundations of set theory.

This paper analyses the relatively neglected topic of hierarchy in the philosophical foundation of human rights. It develops a transcendental-discursive approach. This approach develops the idea that all human rights could be derived from a small set of fundamental rights that are interconnected and that incorporate all ulterior possible specific rights. This set is then applied to an analysis of human rights as they have been formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The claim is that this prior (...) set of transcendental rights is discursively implied whenever we talk about human rights. Thinking about the hierarchy of rights pragmatically means thinking about prioritising their implementation. Some consequences for practical philosophy and politics concerning the role of states, enterprises and world citizenship are then discussed. (shrink)

Assuming the existence of a measurable cardinal, we define a hierarchy of Ramsey cardinals and a hierarchy of normal filters. We study some combinatorial properties of this hierarchy. We show that this hierarchy is absolute with respect to the Dodd-Jensen core model, extending a result of Mitchell which says that being Ramsey is absolute with respect to the core model.

This research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 06640178 and No. 06640336), Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan Mathematics Subject Classification: 03E05 --> Abstract. Following Carr's study on diagonal operations and normal filters on \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\cal P}_{\kappa}\lambda$\end{document} in [2], several weakenings of normality have been investigated. One of them is to consider normal filters without \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\kappa$\end{document}-completeness, for (...) example, see DiPrisco-Uzcategui [3]. The other is weakening normality itself while keeping \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\kappa$\end{document}-completeness such as in Mignone [10] and Shioya [11]. We take the second one so that all filters are assumed to be \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\kappa$\end{document}-complete. In Sect. 1 a hierarchy of filters on \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} ${\cal P}_{\kappa}\lambda$\end{document} is presented which corresponds to the length of diagonal intersections under which the filters are closed. It turns out that many ranks exist between \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $FSF_{\kappa\lambda}$\end{document} and \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $CF_{\kappa\lambda}$\end{document}. We consider seminormal ideals in Sect. 2 and determine the minimal seminormal ideal extending Johnson's result in [6]. Its precise descripti on changes according to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $cf(\lambda )$\end{document} although we can write it in a single form as well. We also prove that a nonnormal seminormal ideal \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $I\supset NS_{\kappa\lambda}$\end{document} exists if and only if \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\lambda$\end{document} is regular. (shrink)

This book presents new results in computability theory, a branch of mathematical logic and computer science that has become increasingly relevant in recent years. The field's connections with disparate areas of mathematical logic and mathematics more generally have grown deeper, and now have a variety of applications in topology, group theory, and other subfields. This monograph establishes new directions in the field, blending classic results with modern research areas such as algorithmic randomness. The significance of the book lies not only (...) in the depth of the results contained therein, but also in the fact that the notions the authors introduce allow them to unify results from several subfields of computability theory. (shrink)

Connections between partially ordered connectives and Henkin quantifiers are considered. It is proved that the logic with all partially ordered connectives and the logic with all Henkin quantifiers coincide. This implies that the hierarchy of partially ordered connectives is strongly hierarchical and gives several nondefinability results between some of them. It is also deduced that each Henkin quantifier can be defined by a quantifier of the form equation imagewhat is a strengthening of the Walkoe result. MSC: 03C80.

Recent studies indicate that indicative conditionals like "If people wear masks, the spread of Covid-19 will be diminished" require a probabilistic dependency between their antecedents and consequents to be acceptable (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). But it is easy to make the slip from this claim to the thesis that indicative conditionals are acceptable only if this probabilistic dependency results from a causal relation between antecedent and consequent. According to Pearl (2009), understanding a causal relation involves multiple, hierarchically organized conceptual dimensions: (...) prediction, intervention, and counterfactual dependence. In a series of experiments, we test the hypothesis that these conceptual dimensions are differentially encoded in indicative and counterfactual conditionals. If this hypothesis holds, then there are limits as to how much of a causal relation is captured by indicative conditionals alone. Our results show that the acceptance of indicative and counterfactual conditionals can become dissociated. Furthermore, it is found that the acceptance of both is needed for accepting a causal relation between two co-occurring events. The implications that these findings have for the hypothesis above, and for recent debates at the intersection of the psychology of reasoning and causal judgment, are critically discussed. Our findings are consistent with viewing indicative conditionals as answering predictive queries requiring evidential relevance (even in the absence of direct causal relations). Counterfactual conditionals in contrast target causal relevance, specifically. Finally, we discuss the implications our results have for the yet unsolved question of how reasoners succeed in constructing causal models from verbal descriptions. (shrink)

Semantic framework of the discussion about the equivalence and interchangeability of the original drugs and generics is considered in the article. Generics are identical to the original drugs in terms of chemical structure, nevertheless some patients and doctors consider that generics are less effective and have more severe side effects than original drugs. These discussions are considered as an example of a public deliberation concerning the achievements of technoscience. The conflicting parties determined the identity either from the chemical structure of (...) the drug (according to D. Chalmers – secondary intensional) or from the phenomenal characteristics of the situation of its application (primary intensional). In this regard, the method of resolving the conflict is the alignment of the hierarchy of methods for determining equivalence in biomedicine. The methodology of evidence-based medicine already has such a hierarchy, which makes it possible to determine the validity of outcomes of clinical trial. According to this hierarchy, the phenomenal characteristics of the outcome of treatment (quality and life expectancy of patients) are more important than instrumentally established indicators. Thus, new clinical data on the efficacy and safety of a generic should give the opportunity to cancel the recognition of drug equivalence. More generally, this means that technoscience achievement which directly affects a person can only be assessed by him/her. The recognition of such priority is the basis of the ‘division of linguistic labor’ during public deliberation concerning the achievements of technoscience. (shrink)