In this paper we discuss a view of the Machine Learning technique called Explanation-Based Learning (EBL) or Explanation-Based Generalization (EBG) as a process for the interpretation of vague concepts in logic-based models of law.The open-textured nature of legal terms is a well-known open problem in the building of knowledge-based legal systems. EBG is a technique which creates generalizations of given examples on the basis of background domain knowledge. We relate these two topics by considering EBG''s domain knowledge as (...) corresponding to statute law rules, and EBG''s training example as corresponding to a precedent case. (shrink)

This paper builds a dialectical system of explanation with speech act rules that define the kinds of moves allowed, like requesting and offering an explanation. Pre and post-condition rules for the speech acts determine when a particular speech act can be put forward as a move in the dialogue, and what type of move or moves must follow it. A successful explanation has been achieved when there has been a transfer of understanding from the party giving the explanation to (...) the party asking for it. The dialogue has an opening stage, an explanation stage and a closing stage. Whether a transfer of understanding has taken place is tested by a dialectical shift to an examination dialogue. (shrink)

I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the spirit of (...) scouting some of the surrounding terrain in order to see just what Schonbein’s claim is and what arguments or options may be open to the dynamicist. (shrink)

In Robert West’s talk last week, dynamical systems theory (DST) was applied to a specific problem involving interacting symbolic systems, without much reference to how those systems are embodied or related to other types of systems. Despite this level of abstraction, DST can yield interesting results, though one might be left wondering if it really leads to understanding, or what it all means. In particular, Robert noted problems he has in convincing referees that the sort of explanation he gave can (...) give a useful understanding, and that it doesn’t invoke dubious notions with its references to emergence, holism, and mathematical openness. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemiesis one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of great (...) philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies, and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the second of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the superiority of a critical realist understanding of interdisciplinarity over a mainstream understanding of it. I begin by exploring the reasons for the failure of mainstream researchers to achieve interdisciplinarity. My main argument is that mainstream interdisciplinary researchers tend to hypostatize facts, fetishize constant conjunctions of events and apply to open systems an epistemology designed for closed systems. I also explain how mainstream interdisciplinarity supports oppression and gross inequality. I argue that mainstream interdisciplinarity (...) is not true interdisciplinarity and refer to it accordingly as ‘condisciplinarity’. By way of example, I examine the condisciplinarity of the World Health Organization’s ecological model applied to the issue of men’s violence against women. Specifically, I argue that critical realist interdisciplinarity is preferable because it acknowledges inter alia the empirical, actual and real layers of reality, which allows it to develop depth-explanations of phenomena. In practice, this means that critical realist interdisciplinarity can potentially provide explanations that, compared to condisciplinarity, are broader (include more of the human and non-human context) and deeper (include for example individuals’ conscious and unconscious psychological motivations). In the World Health Organization’s example of the causes of men’s violence against women, condisciplinarity resulted in the absence of historical, global and unconscious aspects of the problem. It is also restricted the analysis to reductive, constant-conjunction based theories of the causes of the problem, specifically ‘risk factors’, thereby providing a relatively shallow explanation for the problem. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ is one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of (...) great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of_The Open Society and Its Enemies_, and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the first of two volumes of _The Open Society and Its Enemies_. (shrink)

It is an open question whether we ever successfully explain earlier states by appealing to later ones, and, further, whether this is even possible. Typically, these two questions are answered in the same way: if we give and accept ‘backwards explanations,’ they must be possible; if they are impossible, we are right to reject them. I argue that backwards explanations are brittle—they fail if the future event does not occur—and this is part of the reason they are (...) not accepted about the actual world. This does not mean, however, that they must be rejected entirely. I argue that backwards explanations are possible for certain systems. This shields unificationism about scientific explanation from some recent criticisms. (shrink)

‘If in this book harsh words are spoken about some of the greatest among the intellectual leaders of mankind, my motive is not, I hope, to belittle them. It springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men.’ - Karl Popper, from the Preface Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in two volumes in 1945, Karl Popper’s The Open Society (...) and Its Enemies is one of the most influential books of all time. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a ‘vigorous and profound defence of democracy’, its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems and through underground editions become an inspiration to lovers of freedom living under communism in Eastern Europe. Popper’s highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thoughts of great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies and why it demands to be read today and in years to come. (shrink)

‘If in this book harsh words are spoken about some of the greatest among the intellectual leaders of mankind, my motive is not, I hope, to belittle them. It springs rather from my conviction that, if our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men.’ - Karl Popper, from the Preface Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in two volumes in 1945, Karl Popper’s _The Open Society (...) and Its Enemies _is one of the most influential books of all time. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a ‘vigorous and profound defence of democracy’, its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems and through underground editions become an inspiration to lovers of freedom living under communism in Eastern Europe. Popper’s highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thoughts of great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ and why it demands to be read today and in years to come. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ is one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of (...) great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of _The Open Society and Its Enemies_, and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the second of two volumes of _The Open Society and Its Enemies_. (shrink)

Periodic tables (PTs) are the ‘ultimate paper tools’ of general and inorganic chemistry. There are three fields of open questions concerning the relation between PTs and physics: (i) the relation between the chemical facts and the concept of a periodic system (PS) of chemical elements (CEs) as represented by PTs; (ii) the internal structure of the PS; (iii)␣The relation between the PS and atomistic quantum chemistry. The main open questions refer to (i). The fuzziness of the concepts (...) of chemical properties and of chemical similarities of the CE and their compounds guarantees the autonomy of chemistry. We distinguish between CEs, Elemental Stuffs and Elemental Atoms. We comment on the basic properties of the basic elements. Concerning (ii), two sharp physical numbers (nuclear charge and number of valence electrons) and two coarse fuzzy ranges (ranges of energies and of spatial extensions of the atomic orbitals, AOs) characterize the atoms of the CEs and determine the two-dimensional structure of the PS. Concerning (iii), some relevant ‘facts’ about and from quantum chemistry are reviewed and compared with common ‘textbook facts’. What counts in chemistry is the whole set of nondiffuse orbitals in low-energy average configurations of chemically bonded atoms. Decisive for the periodicity are the energy gaps between the core and valence shells. Diffuse Rydberg orbitals and minute spin–orbit splittings are important in spectroscopy and for philosophers, but less so in chemical science and for the PS. (shrink)

In the last couple of years, a few seemingly independent debates on scientific explanation have emerged, with several key questions that take different forms in different areas. For example, the questions what makes an explanation distinctly mathematical and are there any non-causal explanations in sciences (i.e., explanations that don’t cite causes in the explanans) sometimes take a form of the question of what makes mathematical models explanatory, especially whether highly idealized models in science can be explanatory and in (...) virtue of what they are explanatory. These questions raise further issues about counterfactuals, modality, and explanatory asymmetries: i.e., do mathematical and non-causal explanations support counterfactuals, and how ought we to understand explanatory asymmetries in non-causal explanations? Even though these are very common issues in the philosophy of physics and mathematics, they can be found in different guises in the philosophy of biology where there is the statistical interpretation of the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution, according to which the post-Darwinian theory of natural selection explains evolutionary change by citing statistical properties of populations and not the causes of changes. These questions also arise in philosophy of ecology or neuroscience in regard to the nature of topological explanations. The question here is can the mathematical (or more precisely topological) properties in network models in biology, ecology, neuroscience, and computer science be explanatory of physical phenomena, or are they just different ways to represent causal structures. The aim of this special issue is to unify all these debates around several overlapping questions. These questions are: are there genuinely or distinctively mathematical and non-causal explanations?; are all distinctively mathematical explanations also non-causal; in virtue of what they are explanatory; does the instantiation, implementation, or in general, applicability of mathematical structures to a variety of phenomena and systems play any explanatory role? This special issue provides a platform for unifying the debates around several key issues and thus opens up avenues for better understanding of mathematical and non-causal explanations in general, but also, it will enable even better understanding of key issues within each of the debates. (shrink)

Both Aristotle and Ernst Mayr present theories of dual explanation in biology, with proximal, clearly physical explanations and more distal, biology-specific explanations. Aristotle’s presentation of final cause explanations in Posterior Analytics relates final causes to the necessary material, formal, and efficient causes that mediate them. Johnson and Leunissen demonstrate the problematic nature of historical and recent interpretations and open the door for a new interpretation consistent with modern evolutionary theory. Mayr’s differentiation of proximate and ultimate/evolutionary causes (...) provides a key to appropriating Aristotle for modern use, if care is taken to differentiate Mayr’s proximate/distal and mechanical/evolutionary distinctions from his intentional/non-intentional distinction. Building on Mayr, and noting his appropriation of ancient and recent commentary, a strong case can be made for nested explanation, wherein evolutionary explanations are instantiated in systems of mechanical explanations. Biological concepts of organism, gene, function, etc., are etiologically prior to mechanical explanations of function, but temporally posterior to mechanical explanations of historical adaptation. Such an analysis sheds light on recent arguments within evolutionary biology while highlighting the importance of epistemology in contemporary science. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of (...) great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies , and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the first of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)

Since the constructibility quantifiers, used in the mathematical system to be developed, will all assert the constructibility of open sentences, an explanation is given of the kinds of open sentences that will be asserted to be constructible. Each of these open sentences will be assigned to a specific ‘level’, depending on the kind of objects or open sentences that can satisfy it, thus providing the basis for the Simple Type Theoretical characteristic of the system (...) to be developed. The satisfaction relation under discussion will be taken to be a primitive of the system. The relevance of Quine's objections to modality for this system is taken up. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of (...) great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies , and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the second of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)

The article explores a set of issues determining the synergetics of artificial cognitive systems: conditions for the realization of non-equilibrium stability of systems, synthesis options of artificial cognitive system, as well as mechanisms of self-organization of consciousness formed on its basis. Artificial cognitive systems are proposed to include not only artificial intelligence systems imitating human thinking, but any multilevel systems that perform the functions of recognizing and remembering information, decision-making, storage, explanation, understanding and production of new knowledge. The defining (...) property of a cognitive system is the ability to make decisions. It is shown that the content of the cognitive system is consciousness, interpreted within the framework of the information concept as an information environment in which the extended model of reality is realized. Consciousness can be qualified as an open dynamic system. The state of such systems is determined by the processes occurring in them (thought processes - in the case of consciousness). For such systems, called "living", there is a realization of mechanisms of stable disequilibrium. The implementation of an artificial cognitive system is technically carried out on the basis of an artificial neural network, and organizationally - according to the actor or reactor model. Self-organization processes determining the synergetics of consciousness are a special case of the extreme principle, which is a consequence of the law of excessive reaction of supersystems, regulating the existence of dissipative systems at the expense of supersystem resources. The initiation of self-organization of consciousness is carried out by the process of thinking, which, due to the non-equilibrium stability of consciousness, does not stop. Thus thinking can be interpreted as a process of varying system parameters in search of suitable ones for extended modeling of reality. (shrink)

This thesis describes a method to control rare events in non-equilibrium systems by applying physical forces to those systems but without relying on numerical simulation techniques, such as copying rare events. In order to study this method, the book draws on the mathematical structure of equilibrium statistical mechanics, which connects large deviation functions with experimentally measureable thermodynamic functions. Referring to this specific structure as the "phenomenological structure for the large deviation principle", the author subsequently extends it to time-series statistics that (...) can be used to describe non-equilibrium physics. The book features pedagogical explanations and also shows many open problems to which the proposed method can be applied only to a limited extent. Beyond highlighting these challenging problems as a point of departure, it especially offers an effective means of description for rare events, which could become the next paradigm of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. (shrink)

Symmetry-based explanations using symmetry breaking as the key explanatory tool have complemented and replaced traditional causal explanations in various domains of physics. The process of spontaneous SB is now a mainstay of contemporary explanatory accounts of large chunks of condensed-matter physics, quantum field theory, nonlinear dynamics, cosmology, and other disciplines. A wide range of empirical research into various phenomena related to symmetries and SB across biological scales has accumulated as well. Led by these results, we identify and explain (...) some common features of the emergence, propagation, and cascading of SB-induced layers across the biosphere. These features are predicated on the thermodynamic openness and intrinsic functional incompleteness of the systems at stake and have not been systematically analyzed from a general philosophical and methodological perspective. We also consider possible continuity of SB across the physical and biological world and discuss the connection between Darwinism and SB-based analysis of the biosphere and its history. (shrink)

In this article, I present a novel approach to the scientific understanding of consciousness. It is based on the hypothesis that the full range of phenomenal qualities is built into the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous background field and proceeds on the assumption that conscious systems employ a universal mechanism by means of which they are able to extract phenomenal nuances selectively from this field. I set forth that in the form of the zero-point field (ZPF) physics can offer a (...) promising candidate that is qualified for playing the dual role as both the carrier of energy and consciousness. The appropriate mechanism, which rests upon the principle of dynamical coupling of ZPF modes, is a unique feature of quantum systems, suggesting that the dividing line between conscious and non-conscious systems is defined by the differentiation between quantum systems and classical systems. The presence of this mechanism in the brain is supported by the neurophysiological body of evidence, leading to a consistent explanation of the dynamical properties of the neural correlates of consciousness. Building on these findings, I lay the foundations for the conceptually coherent integration of consciousness into the physical worldview, derive an indicator for the quantity of consciousness of a given system, and outline the further steps toward a theory of consciousness. (shrink)

There is a deeply entrenched view in philosophy and physics, the closed systems view, according to which isolated systems are conceived of as fundamental. On this view, when a system is under the influence of its environment this is described in terms of a coupling between it and a separate system which taken together are isolated. We argue against this view, and in favor of the alternative open systems view, for which systems interacting with their environment are (...) conceived of as fundamental, and the environment's influence is represented via the dynamical equations that govern the system's evolution. Taking quantum theories of closed and open systems as our case study, and considering three alternative notions of fundamentality: (i) ontic fundamentality, (ii) epistemic fundamentality, and (iii) explanatory fundamentality, we argue that the open systems view is fundamental, and that this has important implications for the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of science, and for metaphysics. (shrink)

A naturalistic theory of rationalization is defended against a fundamental objection. The theory claims that: The rationalizing relation can be fully analysed in causal explanatory terms. However, is rendered problematic by the fact that: Rationalizations exhibit a higher degree of intensionality than ordinary physical causal explanations. To show that can be maintained in the face of , I develop an account of on which and may be reconciled. ;The opening chapter gives an account of the intensionality of ordinary physical (...) causal explanations by developing a counterfactual analysis of causal relevance. Chapter II examines the nature and intensionality of rationalizations. It is argued that despite , a rationalization partly involves a causal relevance relation between its explanans and explanandum. ;In Chapter III, I consider an argument which implies that is false: Davidson's argument that there can be no psychophysical laws. An attempt is made to give a clear and compelling representation of this argument. As I interpret it, the argument depends on the alleged insolubility of the problem of causal deviance in action. ;Chapter IV develops a general theory of deviance according to which any functional system may produce output in a deviant way, and applies this theory to agents. A negative consequence of the theory is that an action may be performed in a deviant way even if the agent's intention causally explains the action . A positive consequence of the theory is that an action is performed in a non-deviant way just in case there is an appropriate causal explanation of why the agent's intention causes him to act. My specific suggestion is that an agent performs an action in a non-deviant way when and only when his intention causes him to act because he "knows how" to act in that way. ;In the last chapter, it is argued that our solution to the problem of deviance can be adapted to account for in causal explanatory terms. In this way and are reconciled. (shrink)

Data-sharing is a desired default in the field of public health and a source of much ethical deliberation. Sharing data potentially contributes the largest, most efficient source of scientific data, but is fraught with contextual challenges which make stakeholders, particularly those in under-resourced contexts hesitant or slow to share. Relatively little empirical research has engaged stakeholders in discussing the issue. This study sought to explore relevant experiences, contextual, and subjective explanations around the topic to provide a rich and detailed (...) presentation of what it means to different stakeholders and contexts to share data and how that can guide practice and ethical guidance. A qualitative design involving interviews was undertaken with professionals working in public health institutions endowed with data, ethics committees, and advisory agencies which help shape health research in Africa. A descriptive form of thematic analysis was used to summarize results into six key themes: The role of HDSSs in research using public health data and data-sharing; Ownership and funding are critical factors influencing data-sharing; Other factors discourage data-sharing; Promoting and sustaining data-sharing; Ethical guidance structures; and Establishing effective guidance. The themes reveal factors regarding the willingness or not to share and an intricate ethical system that current discourse could reflect. Many of the concerns resonate with the literature, but a whole other gamut of people and process issues; commitments, investments, careers, and the right ethical guidance are needed to realize a sustainable goal of reaching ‘share’ as a default. (shrink)

One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied (...) in contemporary philosophy of science. More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress two of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) it's heuristic nature and (2) the dynamics underlying the meaning-explanation of the terms involved. Both display what we take to be the main epistemological idea behind the qiyās, namely: the open texture of the meaning of normative statements. To put it more generally, the notion of co-relational inference suggests that every form of parallel reasoning based on meaning presupposes that the concept of meaning involved is open to contextual changes. Moreover the latter indicates that the whole process deployed is intrinsically dialectic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.1 (2004) 12-22 [Access article in PDF] Art of a Child with Autism:Drawing Systems and Proto Mathematics Julia Kellman Sung, a five year old girl with autism, was enrolled by her mother in the university Saturday art program with the hope that Sung's favorite church school teacher, a graduate student in art education, would be able to tutor her daughter during the weekly classes. (...) Though hesitant because of her inexperience with autistic children and because of Sung's frequently angry tantrums on Sundays and the little girl's inability to speak, the young teacher, nonetheless, agreed to the plan. Her concerns proved unfounded, for Sung was able to work in the midst of the churning mass of noisy pre-K classmates without any signs of the fury that drove her to screaming, biting fits in church school. Additionally, and to everyone's delight, Sung's ability to develop as an image-maker was itself confirmed within the first few weeks of art class, dispelling any remaining doubts of her art aptitude or the value of art classes for the little girl.Additional questions and considerations arose about Sung and her art during the classes. How might one understand Sung's changing imagery? What might such explanations and images suggest about Sung herself and her activities? What might her art indicate about her similarity to other children and their art making? The possible answers to these and related queriespresented themselves during the semester, suggesting new avenues for inquiry surrounding both the wordless little girl and her Saturday morning creations.What follows is the story of Sung and her graphic development as it unfolded during the art class. Further, it is an attempt to uncover what Sung's drawings suggest about methods that are useful in the examination of the art of an autistic child. Documentation was carried out with a 35 mm. camera and color copier throughout the semester. Ethnographic methods including participant observation and interviews were employed to gather contextual data. Alfred Schutz's phenomenological sociology allowed for [End Page 12] consideration of nonverbal and verbal social interactions and behaviors. 1 A search of the literature of early mathematical development and drawing systems provided the underpinnings for early insights and later hypotheses. Here is Sung's story. Sung Sung, thick black hair swung forward to hide her face, lies prone in the middle of the busy classroom oblivious to the surging, chattering children around her, so intent is she on the sketchbook in which she draws. Next to her left elbow teeters a stack of a half dozen boxes of thick craypas from which she snatches colors, never looking at the hue she grabs. Her drawing behavior has a pattern; it looks like this. Shuffle through the identical boxes. Choose a box. Open it. Snatch out a bright waxy craypa. Hold it close to the eyes. Sniff it. Lick it. If the craypa passes muster, scribble with it in rich heavy lines — banana-like arcs, large solid dots the size of cherries, rectangular patches, and a variety of forms that come and go from one drawing to the next, like heat lightening on a summer evening. Her less frequent forms include: an enclosed yellow irregular shape with a dark dot in the middle suggesting a fried egg; a two-sided zig-zag; X forms; and solid and empty trapezoids made sail-like with superimposed crosses serving as mast and boom.Unlike the chosen craypas, however, those that do not pass Sung's inspection suffer a terrible fate; they are broken in two and their pieces tossed without ceremony to opposite sides of the room to be trodden into flat, bright smears by the other children in the class, pathetic traces of Sung's art. The craypas boxes themselves also play a role. For when they are closed they are used as blocks or toys, objects to be neatly stacked and restacked or placed side by side on the floor. When they are open, however, they are mere receptacles, passively holding... (shrink)

It is argued that those who defend the Everett, or ‘many-worlds’, interpretation of quantum mechanics should embrace what we call the general quantum theory of open systems (GT) as the proper framework in which to conduct foundational and philosophical investigations in quantum physics. GT is a wider dynamical framework than its alternative, standard quantum theory (ST). This is true even though GT makes no modifications to the quantum formalism. GT rather takes a different view, what we call the (...) class='Hi'>open systems view, of the formalism; i.e., in GT, the dynamics of systems whose physical states are fundamentally represented by density operators are represented as fundamentally open as specified by an in general non-unitary dynamical map. This includes, in principle, the dynamics of the universe as a whole. We argue that the more general dynamics describable in GT can be physically motivated, that there is as much prima facie empirical support for GT as there is for ST, and that GT could be fully in the spirit of the Everett interpretation—that there might, in short, be little reason for an Everettian not to embrace the more general theoretical landscape that GT allows one to explore. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion argument is a general ontological argument, applicable to any properties deemed supervenient on a microproperty basis, including biological properties. It implies that the causal power of any higher-level property must be reducible to the subset of the causal powers of its lower-level properties. Moreover, as Kim’s recent version of the argument indicates, a higher-level property can be causally efficient only to the extent of the efficiency of its micro-basis. In response, I argue that the ontology that aims (...) to capture experimentally based explanations of metabolic control systems and morphogenetic systems must involve causally relevant contextual properties. Such an ontology challenges the exclusiveness of micro-based causal efficiency that grounds Kim’s reductionism, since configurations themselves are inherently causally efficient constituents. I anticipate and respond to the reductionist’s objection that the nonreductionist ontology’s account of causes and inter-level causal relations is incoherent. I also argue that such an ontology is not open to Kim’s overdetermination objection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.1 (2004) 12-22 [Access article in PDF] Art of a Child with Autism:Drawing Systems and Proto Mathematics Julia Kellman Sung, a five year old girl with autism, was enrolled by her mother in the university Saturday art program with the hope that Sung's favorite church school teacher, a graduate student in art education, would be able to tutor her daughter during the weekly classes. (...) Though hesitant because of her inexperience with autistic children and because of Sung's frequently angry tantrums on Sundays and the little girl's inability to speak, the young teacher, nonetheless, agreed to the plan. Her concerns proved unfounded, for Sung was able to work in the midst of the churning mass of noisy pre-K classmates without any signs of the fury that drove her to screaming, biting fits in church school. Additionally, and to everyone's delight, Sung's ability to develop as an image-maker was itself confirmed within the first few weeks of art class, dispelling any remaining doubts of her art aptitude or the value of art classes for the little girl.Additional questions and considerations arose about Sung and her art during the classes. How might one understand Sung's changing imagery? What might such explanations and images suggest about Sung herself and her activities? What might her art indicate about her similarity to other children and their art making? The possible answers to these and related queriespresented themselves during the semester, suggesting new avenues for inquiry surrounding both the wordless little girl and her Saturday morning creations.What follows is the story of Sung and her graphic development as it unfolded during the art class. Further, it is an attempt to uncover what Sung's drawings suggest about methods that are useful in the examination of the art of an autistic child. Documentation was carried out with a 35 mm. camera and color copier throughout the semester. Ethnographic methods including participant observation and interviews were employed to gather contextual data. Alfred Schutz's phenomenological sociology allowed for [End Page 12] consideration of nonverbal and verbal social interactions and behaviors. 1 A search of the literature of early mathematical development and drawing systems provided the underpinnings for early insights and later hypotheses. Here is Sung's story. Sung Sung, thick black hair swung forward to hide her face, lies prone in the middle of the busy classroom oblivious to the surging, chattering children around her, so intent is she on the sketchbook in which she draws. Next to her left elbow teeters a stack of a half dozen boxes of thick craypas from which she snatches colors, never looking at the hue she grabs. Her drawing behavior has a pattern; it looks like this. Shuffle through the identical boxes. Choose a box. Open it. Snatch out a bright waxy craypa. Hold it close to the eyes. Sniff it. Lick it. If the craypa passes muster, scribble with it in rich heavy lines — banana-like arcs, large solid dots the size of cherries, rectangular patches, and a variety of forms that come and go from one drawing to the next, like heat lightening on a summer evening. Her less frequent forms include: an enclosed yellow irregular shape with a dark dot in the middle suggesting a fried egg; a two-sided zig-zag; X forms; and solid and empty trapezoids made sail-like with superimposed crosses serving as mast and boom.Unlike the chosen craypas, however, those that do not pass Sung's inspection suffer a terrible fate; they are broken in two and their pieces tossed without ceremony to opposite sides of the room to be trodden into flat, bright smears by the other children in the class, pathetic traces of Sung's art. The craypas boxes themselves also play a role. For when they are closed they are used as blocks or toys, objects to be neatly stacked and restacked or placed side by side on the floor. When they are open, however, they are mere receptacles, passively holding... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., & Kim, J. (eds.) (1992). Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of Naturalism. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, R., Danermark, B. & Price, L. (2018). Interdisciplinarity and wellbeing: A critical realist general theory of interdisciplinarity. London and New York: Routledge. Blau, P.M. (1981). Introduction: diverse views of social structure and their common denominator. In Blau, P.M. & Merton, R.K. (eds.), Continuity in Structural Inquiry (pp. 1–23). Beverly Hills: Sage. Blau, P.M. (1987). Microprocess and macrostructure. In K.S. Cook (ed.), Social Exchange Theory (pp. 83–100). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Brooks, R.A., & Maes, P. (eds). (1994). Artificial life IV; proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Coleman, J. S. (1987). Microfoundations and macrosocial behavior. In: J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, & Neil J. Smelser (Eds.). The Micro-Macro Link (pp. 153–73). Berkeley: University of California. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Elster, J. (1985). Making sense of Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J.A. (1974). Special sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28(2), 97–115. Fodor, J.A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics, 17, 59-79. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hempel, C.G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press. Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world. Mind, 102, 555-586. Humphreys, P. (1997). How properties emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, 1-17. Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3–36. Kincaid, H. (1997). Individualism and the unity of science. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Lewis, D.K. (1986). The plurality of worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nigel, G., & Conte, R. (eds.) (1995). Artificial societies; The computer simulation of social life. London: UCL Press. O’Connor, T. (1994). Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 91-104. Popper, K.R. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. Sawyer, R. K. (2001). Emergence in sociology: contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory. American Journal of Sociology, 107, 551-585. Sawyer, R. K. (2004). The mechanisms of emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34, 260–282. Sawyer, R. K. (2005). Social emergence: societies as complex systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sawyer, R.K. (2003). Nonreductive individualism: Part 2, Social causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, 203–224. Winch, P. (1993). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy‭ (SAMT, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: SAMT. (shrink)

Roughly speaking, classical statistical physics is the branch of theoretical physics that aims to account for the thermal behaviour of macroscopic bodies in terms of a classical mechanical model of their microscopic constituents, with the help of probabilistic assumptions. In the last century and a half, a fair number of approaches have been developed to meet this aim. This study of their foundations assesses their coherence and analyzes the motivations for their basic assumptions, and the interpretations of their central concepts. (...) The most outstanding foundational problems are the explanation of time-asymmetry in thermal behaviour, the relative autonomy of thermal phenomena from their microscopic underpinning, and the meaning of probability. A more or less historic survey is given of the work of Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs in statistical physics, and the problems and objections to which their work gave rise. Next, we review some modern approaches to (i) equilibrium statistical mechanics, such as ergodic theory and the theory of the thermodynamic limit; and to (ii) non-equilibrium statistical mechanics as provided by Lanford's work on the Boltzmann equation, the so-called Bogolyubov-Born-Green-Kirkwood-Yvon approach, and stochastic approaches such as `coarse-graining' and the `open systems' approach. In all cases, we focus on the subtle interplay between probabilistic assumptions, dynamical assumptions, initial conditions and other ingredients used in these approaches. (shrink)

Sophists’ apologia. -/- Sophists were the first paid teachers ever. These ancient Greek enlighteners taught wisdom. Protagoras, Antiphon, Prodicus, Hippias, Lykophron are most famous ones. Sophists views and concerns made a unified encyclopedic system aimed at teaching common wisdom, virtue, management and public speaking. Of the contemporary “enlighters”, Deil Carnegy’s educational work seems to be the most similar to sophism. Sophists were the first intellectuals – their trade was to sell knowledge. They introduced a new type of teacher-student relationship (...) – the mutually beneficial communication on equal terms. They taught pupils how to think independently and how to persuade others, which was inseparably connected with the rise of democracy in the most advanced Greek polices. Sophists were the first to proclaim that all people are naturally equal. They put forward the idea of natural rights and social contract, working out the fundamentals of the present-day law. In addition, they developed the basics of philology, psychology, logic, and gave a scientific explanation to the origins of religions. They embodied definite positive ideals of their epoch. Sophistry flourished in the second half of the Vth through he first third of the IVth centuries B. C. The period coincides with the heyday of the entire Greek history – the so called Greek Miracle epoch. Sophists expressed some present-day concepts of Ancient Greek ideology and mentality, characteristic of its Golden Age times. The Ancient Athens of the times of Periclus were similar to the Florence of Renaissance as to the type of social structure. That is why (?) the art of eloquence (public speaking) was highly respected in Florence. The two cities had a lot of features of the present-day capitalist society, which was due to their role as the main centres of industry of their “worlds-economies”. During the subsequent Hellenic period, the Old Order was restored, based on the feudal rent recipients’ rule. The degradation of society resulted in the decline of sophistry. Sophistry represents the highest point in the evolution of Greek philosophy. It is also the most prominent school as to the novelty of its ideas. That was owing to the common propensity for innovation typical of Periclus’ Golden Age, which in its turn resulted from the establishment of the individualistic and rationalistic thinking similar to present-day mentality. Among other aspects, close attention was paid to ethnic issues; some humanistic ideas such as Master and Servant ethics and Enlightment as the primary condition of man’s freedom, received scientific grounding. The genre of philosophical dialogue was developed, as well as the rationalistic scientific gnoceology, aimed at consistently opposing any religion. Dialectics, the most outstanding achievement of the Antiquity, was also worked out by the sophists. Zeno of Helleas was one of the sophists. Democrites’ ideas were, too, quite close to dialectics. Socrates’ contemporaries regarded him ironically, as shown, for example, in the Aristophanes’ comedy “Clouds”. Nevertheless, this scholar can still be referred to as a sophist, although of somewhat weird personality. Socrates’ popularity, which came later, should be attributed to the fact that he was the first philosopher ever to have been sentenced and executed by law, rather than to any valuable scientific contributions. Sophistry as such, rather than Socrates, marks the line between pre-Socratic and post- Socratic schools. Plato, with the exception of his latest works, is considered to belong to the same philosophical school. Specifically, there are valid reasons to believe that he was paid fees by his disciples. In Plato’s Dialogues, all points of view will be proven and then disproved, so that an integral philosophical system is hard to observe. Plato’s “Idealism” is but one of the many possible theories. His ideal philosophy is a high-minded argument of wise men. As late as towards the end of his life, Plato betrayed the ideals of sophistry, turning into the world’s first proponent of totalitarianism. Sophistry is Greek classical literature. Later on, philosophy, as well as the entire Greek civilization, started to fall into decline. Over 500 subsequent years, Hellenistic-Roman scholars never came up with anything novel. The entire process of antique philosophical evolution can be subdivided into the following six stages: Phoenician (IX–VIIth centuries B. C.), archaic (VIth – the first half of IVth century B. C., classic (the epoch of sophistry: the second half of the Vth through the first decades of the IIIrd centuries B. C.), late antique (middle of the IIIrd – first decades of the VI th centuries B.C.) The fact that early in the VIth century B. C. sophistry was rejected in Athens, has a lot to do with the consequences of their defeat in Peloponnesian war, a social catastrophe. Ever since, the prevalent part of the criticism of sophistry is a criticism of sophists’ immoral ways of life and personalities, rather than the essentials of their philosophy. For instance, Aristotle’s criticism primarily concerns their pragmatism and tendency to make a profit out of teaching. However, Aristotle himself taught his disciples along similar lines, showing them how to “be able to prove both opposites”. It was Aristotle who summed up sophists’ century-long elaborations. The traditional modern interpretation of sophists as shown in Plato’s dialogues appears to be groundless. The truth of the matter is that Plato regards sophists as more serious philosophers than Socrates was. It becomes especially clear in the dialogue titled “Protagoras”, which shows the latter as gaining an undoubted victory over Socrates. Generally speaking, Plato’s works never regard sophists as weak or worthless opponents. A common opinion as to the essence of sophists’, in particular, Protagoras’s philosophy, has hitherto not been worked out. Many researchers renounce the very existence of any specific philosophical position in sophistry. The term “relativism” itself now has a bad name. However, it should be borne in mind that Protagoras doctrine emerged as a result of an attempt to get out of the ontological dead-end to which the entire Greek natural philosophy had come. To this purpose, he employed Anaxagoras’s idea about everything comprising everything, whereupon he built his physical-ontological theory, and Zeno of Helleas’s concept that all objects are such and different at the same time in the same respect. According to Protagoras’s philosophy, every object does not only seem, but is different from every other object, including human beings. Therefore, every person is his or her own measure of all other entities. The objective reality is the Ego’s relations with the outer world. Every object’s essence is defined through its interaction with ourselves. Nothing remains stagnant – every existence already contains non-existence, and vice-versa. However, the relativity of being is not to be regarded as absolute. That means, that relatively stable and therefore relatively cognizable entities do exist, among them the words we say. Doubt is not considered absolute by relativists either, which differentiates them from skeptics and agnostics. They dare to believe. Uncertainty is Godly – here, Protagoras becomes very close to the concept of apathetic theology. Gorgius shared Protagoras’s views and tried to prove them applying the same method as Zeno applied when upholding Parmenidis’s philosophy. He argued that if one accepts the opposite point of view and agrees that nothing can exist and not exist at the same time, one is bound to come to an the absurd conclusion that nothing is cognizable and nothing exists. To prove that there is a universal contradiction within the Existence itself, Protagoras and his followers in their turn put forward a number of special logical arguments, called rules of contraries, or sophisms. The most well-known of them is the Euathle’s sophism, which proves that an object can be such and different at the same time in the same respect. Generally speaking, all relationships of any entity are extraneous. The idea that all entities, including concepts, exist and do not exist at the same time, was also accepted by Plato. It should be stressed, that Plato’s philosophy as a whole is relativists’ greatest achievement. In his dispute against relativism, Aristotle put forward the main concepts of his ontology: the existence falls into the existence in possibility and the existence in reality, or substance and accidence – the ever changing “sublunary” world and the stable world of divine heavenly bodies. This division made his system self-contradictory to the point of absurd. Aristotle quite realized, that the direct disproof of relativism is hardly possible, which fact makes his criticism a mere tautology. It is very indicative in this respect that materialists, idealists and even skeptical agnostics applied the same arguments do disprove relativism. That demonstrates that the inner contradiction between any forms of “absolutism” and relativism is the most fundamental philosophical problem. Relativist ideas were repeatedly renewed throughout history, provided the social conditions were favourable. In variations, the concepts were advanced by Tzuan Tsi and ancient Chinese sophists, apostle Paul, Nicolas of Cusa, Galileo, Rene Descartes, G. Berkley, D. Hume, Ch. S. Pierce, E. Mach, A. Bogdanov, F. de Saussure, N. Bore, P. Feuerabend, U. Quain and others. However, no consistent relativist ontological system was developed after Protagoras. Meanwhile, a valid relativist theory could provide a clue to a fuller and more adequate general physical concept of the world, and to a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics. -/- Relativism as an ontological system of beliefs. -/- The relativist principle of relativity of all that exists is fundamental for the entire system of philosophy. Absolutely everything exists, but, at the same time, no existence is absolute. Anything is possible, but those entities only exist for us with which we interact this way or another, i. e., reality is interaction, “I interact – hence, I exist”. However, an overly close relationship between entities leads to non-existence – in other words, there is a certain existential optimum. For all of us, information, or perceptible heterogeneities, is real. Each of us is the center of a definite system of interactions with the world. If God is an endless Possibility, then the World is but the man’s dialogue with God. However, the ties that bind us with the world are of some definite kind, which predetermines our reality. The principle of relativity constrains itself, as any relativity is relative. On the one hand, that calls forth the Evil – caused by our own weakness. On the other hand, it makes our world relatively stable and cognizable. Generally speaking, the world is what we are. Everybody has an own Universe, but since people are fairly similar, our universes can be regarded as one Universe with common laws and regulations. It is possible for us to change the degree of objects’ existence in relation to ourselves and one another. It is equally important, though, to remain ourselves (keep following our “warrior’s path”). Since everything exists and no existence is absolute, the process of cognition should involve a criticism of everything but never a complete rebuttal of anything. The criterion of verity for any theory then is in its capacity to build itself upon a bigger number of diverse statements than in any other theory. Theoretically, all philosophies should ideally be complementary. The question of what in fact happened is meaningless unless we specify the “we”, the “where” and the “when”. The past can only exist as part of the present. When we change, our past undergoes corresponding qualitative objective changes, all of which are irreversible. The contemporary physics regards all objects of the Universe as existing for one another, which results in absurd conclusions. In fact, only what we interact with, exists. The so called “speed of light in vacuum” c is the maximum speed of direct interaction and direct exchange of signals. Specifically, at the oncoming speed c with a significant blue parallax the gamma-quantum is unable to interact with the matter. When this speed is reached, the gravitational mass of objects in relation to one another becomes equal to zero (imaginary), whereas their inertial mass equals infinity. Further acceleration will bring us into an entirely different Universe. That means that the Universe is an open system, which fact destroys all present-day cosmological models. Anything is possible in this world. Our reality is magic. Every bit of space contains a potentially limitless number of bits of other, however virtual, universes, as well as an infinite number of particles, which are still virtual for us (as postulated by quantum mechanics). In other words, there exists an infinity of different realities. With all the above in mind, the different levels of entities’ existence, in particular, of Life and Reason, should be taken into consideration. For example, to which extent a live system exists in relation to the inanimate forms of being is very indefinite, as what life is has to be determined by living creatures. An even greater compass of levels of existence can be brought about through interaction – that is the core idea of Godel’s theorem. As a result, the range of forms of existence tends towards infinity – the evolution of matter through super-intelligence will bring us up to God’s heights. A more generalized mathematical model of the physical world, including a universal operator of the co-existence of objects, can be developed based on the above considerations. The bonds between objects become weaker owing to 1) a high speed, 2) acceleration, 3) rotation, 4) strong gravity, 5) strong fields of other kinds, 6) the difference of levels of existence , 7) phase shifts. Yet, there always is an existential optimum. Such mathematical model is to operate certain non-transitive algebras. Relativist ontology assumes that the notion of “temperature” is relative, thus making it possible to ignore the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In its turn, that will allow for phase shifts. A perpetual motion machine of the second type will become a reality. Rotation could presumably be used to increase inertial and decrease gravitational mass, slowing down the time. An experimental research could shed light on the mentioned effects. (shrink)

This work examines whether the environmentally-induced decoherence approach in quantum mechanics brings us any closer to solving the measurement problem, and whether it contributes to the elimination of subjectivism in quantum theory. A distinction is made between ,collapse, and ,decoherence,, so that an explanation for decoherence does not imply an explanation for collapse. After an overview of the measurement problem and of the open-systems paradigm, we argue that taking a partial trace is equivalent to applying the projection postulate. A (...) criticism of Zurek's decoherence approach to measurements is also made, based on the restriction that he must impose on the interaction between apparatus and environment. We then analyze the element of subjectivity involved in establishing the boundary between system and environment, and criticize the incorporation of Everett's branching of memory records into the decoherence research program. Sticking to this program, we end by sketching a proposal for ‘environmentally-induced collapse’. (shrink)

In the modern world, with the processes of social development gaining accelerated rates, a new philosophical image of the world emerges, accompanied by the formation of a new social philosophy. Contemporary social philosophy is not a monosemantically defined field of the usage of notions, because it generalizes the most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and man. In this sense social philosophy is always incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, a temporary, theoretically "imperfect", "nonsystematic". Over the last few (...) decades social philosophy has suffered a deep crisis. This crisis was evoked by changes in the paradigm of science. Philosophy was too slow with its reaction to these changes; its former means of cognition failed to explain the new, rapid processes of social life. Philosophy began to get out of the crisis for two reasons. First, social theory felt the need of new, more general means of explanation, of a metatheory, which can be nothing else but philosophy. Second, philosophy itself changed its orientation, entered the paradigm of integrity, accepted the idea of society as an open system. The task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain truth, but also to show how this truth can become active. Contemporary philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy has no absolutely accomplished truth any more: it is searching for the truth of its time. (shrink)

Autism and Asperger syndrome are psychiatric conditions diagnosed primarily on the basis of deficits and problems in social behaviour; interaction and communication. At present the explanation of these behavioural features is dominated by three cognitive models. However, it is a characteristic of each of these models that they only explain a sub-set of the overall features.The aim of this paper is to suggest an alternative conceptual theory of autism and Asperger syndrome that unites the current three models. Thus, the aim (...) is to situate the existing models as special cases of the one being proposed here. This alternative conceptualisation draws heavily on distinctions and ideas present in the philosophy of science, most especially in the area of critical realism. Central to the theory is the idea that the core “problem” in autism and Asperger syndrome concerns ontological depth. More specifically, that people with these conditions find it difficult to cope with phenomena characterised by depth , open systems and high internal relationality. (shrink)

While most of us have accepted that our theories are human constructs and approximations of the truth, many of us still think of ‘natural laws ’ as things that exist ‘out there’, and that the work of science is thus the discovery or uncovering of these laws and their expression in mathematical formulae. This notion has serious implications for the science-theology debate. This article challenges the notion that ‘natural laws ’ adequately describe or prescribe nature. It argues that law statements (...) are idealised abstractions that only weakly explain and describe reality, and that mathematics, the ‘language’ of science, is not immutable. It challenges the prescriptive nature of law statements by arguing that we are limited beings who cannot know reality in itself. Our meta-scientific commitments co-determine what and how we think of laws, and the complexity of reality defies human analysis and explanations. Far from having ontic status or being complete and accurate descriptions of reality, natural laws at best mimic the key structures and relationships of the reality they refer to. We would do better to think of reality as an open system of inseparable, interacting and ever-moving components, with the observer an integral part of the system. It is an illusion to believe that these incredibly rich representations of the phenomena are unconstructed isomorphisms we merely discover in the real world. Instead they are constructed – painstakingly so – and there is no evidence that they are isomorphic with structures in the real world. It is an illusion to believe that these incredibly rich representations of the phenomena are unconstructed isomorphisms we merely discover in the real world. Instead they are constructed – painstakingly so – and there is no evidence that they are isomorphic with structures in the real world. William R. Stoeger, S.J. (shrink)

In the modern world, with the processes of social development gaining accelerated rates, a new philosophical image of the world emerges, accompanied by the formation of a new social philosophy. Contemporary social philosophy is not a monosemantically defined field of the usage of notions, because it generalizes the most complicated and rapidly changing objects such as society and man. In this sense social philosophy is always incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, a temporary, theoretically "imperfect", "nonsystematic". Over the last few (...) decades social philosophy has suffered a deep crisis. This crisis was evoked by changes in the paradigm of science. Philosophy was too slow with its reaction to these changes; its former means of cognition failed to explain the new, rapid processes of social life. Philosophy began to get out of the crisis for two reasons. First, social theory felt the need of new, more general means of explanation, of a metatheory, which can be nothing else but philosophy. Second, philosophy itself changed its orientation, entered the paradigm of integrity, accepted the idea of society as an open system. The task of contemporary philosophy is not only to attain truth, but also to show how this truth can become active. Contemporary philosophy is the means of both thinking and action. Philosophy has no absolutely accomplished truth any more: it is searching for the truth of its time. (shrink)

The intent of this work is to re-envision science in order to bring about the self-consciousness of scientific consciousness, to bring self-reflection to scientific thinking. I refer to the process of science becoming conscious of itself. A word of explanation regarding this apparent anthropomorphization of science is in order: My delineation of a direction of thought about the relation between scientific and normative thinking involves listening to the mute language of the history of science, the sensual speech of the history (...) of scientific discovery and invention. To decipher and render intelligible the sphere of thought generated by the history of scientific theorizing we must read it metaphorically, for example, seeing the relationship between classical and quantum theory as a metaphor "mutely appealing for an imaginative leap" . The history of science may be seen as a metaphor of the process of self-consciousness: the story of the soul understanding itself in the act of trying to understand the world. ;In this vein, the development of the notion of complementarity in the context of physics, and of autopoiesis in the context of open systems in biology and chemistry, represent moments of self-reference and potential self-consciousness in the history of science. The self-consciousness of anything, including science, amounts to a self-recognition. The history of scientific ideas, and their value to those who originated, inherited or used these ideas, must be the ground upon which the cultivation of self-discovery, self-recognition, and self-possessed expression of the human being must occur. Self-possession, as the understanding of one's own limits, is one of the necessary conditions for maturity and moral responsibility. ;In the concepts of autopoiesis and complementarity, science refers directly to itself in the process of making reference to nature: it becomes necessary to describe the describing system in order to proceed with a clear description of the subject matter at hand. In other words, the instrument must account for itself, the theory must, as a matter of theoretical necessity, compensate for its own epistemological limitation and gain perspective on its perspective. (shrink)

The method of analogy is considered as it is used in epistemological considérations of both the object of creation and the creative process itself in art and the sciences. Both areas of creativity are considered within the context of the general systems theory concept of an open system which offers a convenient vehicle for relating the scientist and the artist with the product of his creation. It also provides a convenient method for the explanation of the essential nature (...) of the created object. It is shown how the creative process in both art and science can be viewed as a heuristic search for the structure of an open system‐the object of creation.Similarities in the two areas‐art and science‐are emphasized over the differences, in order to demonstrate the power of the method of analogy. (shrink)

In the past two decades, individual explanations of scientific misconduct have increasingly given way to systemic explanations. Where did this interest in systemic factors come from? Given that research ethicists often present their interventions as responses to scientific misconduct, this article tests the hypothesis that these systemic explanations were triggered by high-visibility cases of scientific norm violation. It does so by examining why Dutch scientists in 2011 explained Diederik Stapel’s grand-scale data fabrication largely in systemic terms, whereas (...) only fifteen years earlier, in the René Diekstra affair, such explanations had been close to absent. Drawing on a wealth of historical sources, the article suggests that cases like Stapel’s as such do not explain why early 21st-century commentators exchanged individual explanations for systemic ones. Only against the background of an existing discourse of criticism of the science system, developed in the 1990s and 2000s in response to rapidly increasing competition for research funding, could the Stapel affair achieve notoriety as an example of how systemic factors provoke bad conduct. (shrink)

Examples involving infinite suspended chains or infinite trains are sometimes used to defend perceived weaknesses in traditional cosmological arguments. In this article, we distinguish two versions of the cosmological argument, suggest that such examples can only be relevant if it is one specific type of cosmological argument that is being considered, and then criticize the use of such examples in this particular type of cosmological argument. Our criticism revolves around a discussion of what it means to call a system (...) closed, and what it means to call an explanation complete. Our analysis makes no suppositions about the nature of the infinite, and is therefore independent of many of the issues around which contemporary discussions of the cosmological argument have tended to revolve. (shrink)

This article attacks “open systems” arguments that because constant conjunctions are not generally observed in the real world of open systems we should be highly skeptical that universal laws exist. This work differs from other critiques of open system arguments against laws of nature by not focusing on laws themselves, but rather on the inference from open systems. We argue that open system arguments fail for two related reasons; 1) because they cannot account (...) for the “systems” central to their argument (nor the implied systems labeled “exogenous factors” in relation to the system of interest) and 2) they are nomocentric, fixated on laws while ignoring initial and antecedent conditions that are able to account for systems and exogenous factors within a fundamentalist framework. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I concur with Dengsø and Kirchhoff that if we are to ground cognition more deeply in contemporary biology, we need to focus on the organism-environment relationship as the unit of biological explanation most relevant to cognitive science. This entails questioning the individualistic bias that has pervaded 4E cognitive science. However, can we overcome that bias while retaining (...) a commitment to the importance of phenomenological descriptions for 4E cognitive science? Perhaps we can, but probably not if we continue to rely on classical Western phenomenology. Certain strands of Buddhist thought might be more compatible with sympoiesis. (shrink)

The concept of time-coarsened density matrix for open systems has frequently featured in equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, without being probed as to the detailed consequences of the time averaging procedure. In this work we introduce and prove the need for a selective and non-uniform time-sampling, whose form depends on the properties of the bath. It is also applicable when an open microscopic sub-system is coupled to another finite system. By use of a time-periodic minimal coupling (...) model between these two systems, we present detailed quantitative consequences of time coarsening, which include initial state independence of equilibration, deviations from long term averages, their environment size dependence and the approach to classicality, as measured by a Leggett–Garg type inequality. An interacting multiple qubit model affords comparison between the time integrating procedure and the more conventional environment tracing method. (shrink)

While Gödel's (first) incompleteness theorem has been used to refute the main contentions of Hilbert's program, it does not seem to have been generally used to stress that a basic ingredient of that program, the concept of formal system as a closed system - as well as the underlying view, embodied in the axiomatic method, that mathematical theories are deductions from first principles must be abandoned. Indeed the logical community has generally failed to learn Gödel's lesson that Hilbert's (...) concept of formal system as a closed system is inadequate and continues to use it as if there were no incompleteness theorem. In this paper I will stress the role of Gödel's incompleteness theorem in showing the inadequacy of such a concept of formal system and the need for a more articulated view of mathematical theories. More generally I will argue that Gödel's result entails that, as an alternative to mathematical logic, a new concept of logic is required: logic as the theory of communicating inference processes. (shrink)

I flesh out the sense in which the informational approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, as defended by Pitowsky and Bub and lately by a number of other authors, is (neo-)Bohrian. I argue that on this approach, quantum mechanics represents what Bohr called a “natural generalisation of the ordinary causal description” in the sense that the idea (which philosophers of science like Stein have argued for on the grounds of practical and epistemic necessity) that understanding a theory as a theory of (...) physics requires that one be able to “schematise the observer” within it is elevated in quantum mechanics to the level of a postulate in the sense that interpreting the outcome of a measurement interaction, as providing us with information about the world, requires as a matter of principle, the specification of a schematic representation of an observer in the form of a ‘Boolean frame’—the Boolean algebra representing the yes-or-no questions associated with a given observable representative of a given experimental context. I argue that the approach’s central concern is with the methodological question of how to assign physical properties to what one takes to be a system in a given experimental context, rather than the metaphysical question of what a given state vector represents independently of any context, and I show how the quantum generalisation of the concept of an open system may be used to assuage Einstein’s complaint that the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics runs afoul of the supposedly fundamental methodological requirement to the effect that one must always be able, according to Einstein, to treat spatially separated systems as isolated from one another. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine how faith-led practices in family firms affect organizational stewardship. Current studies highlight the relevance of religious adherence for family businesses, yet provide limited understanding of how this shapes the key traits of these organizations. Drawing on six autobiographies of family business leaders who openly express their adherence to their faith, and adopting an open-systems analysis of these autobiographies, we demonstrate that faith-led values influence organizational and leadership practices. Overall, our study suggests (...) that the influence of religious beliefs in the organizational practices of family businesses have greater repercussions than previously thought. By introducing a faith-led approach to stewardship, we enrich the theoretical discussion around stewardship and the relevance of religion in family business. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine how faith-led practices in family firms affect organizational stewardship. Current studies highlight the relevance of religious adherence for family businesses, yet provide limited understanding of how this shapes the key traits of these organizations. Drawing on six autobiographies of family business leaders who openly express their adherence to their faith, and adopting an open-systems analysis of these autobiographies, we demonstrate that faith-led values influence organizational and leadership practices. Overall, our study suggests (...) that the influence of religious beliefs in the organizational practices of family businesses have greater repercussions than previously thought. By introducing a faith-led approach to stewardship, we enrich the theoretical discussion around stewardship and the relevance of religion in family business. (shrink)