Background In August 2017, Chile lifted its complete ban on abortion by permitting abortion in three limited circumstances: 1) to save a woman’s life, 2) lethal fetal anomaly, and 3) rape. The new law allows regulated use of conscientious objection in abortion care, including allowing institutions to register as objectors. This study assesses medical and midwifery students’ support for CO, following legal reform. Methods From October 2017 to May 2018, we surveyed medical and midwifery students from seven universities located in (...) Santiago, Chile. Universities included 4 secular and 3 private religiously-affiliated universities; all offering medical degrees with a specialization in obstetrics and gynecology and five offering midwifery degrees. We used generalized estimating equations to identify characteristics associated with student support for CO, intentions to use CO to refuse to care for someone seeking abortion, and support for CO at the institutional level. Results 333 of the 413 eligible students who opened the survey, completed the questions on conscientious objection; 26% were seeking medical degrees with an ob-gyn specialty, 25% were seeking midwifery degrees, and 49% were seeking medical degrees and had not yet decided their specialty. While nearly all endorse requirements for conscientious objecting clinicians to inform and refer abortion-seeking patients, a minority would personally use conscientious objection to avoid caring for a patient seeking abortion. About half of religious-university students and one-fifth of secular-university students support objections at the institutional level. Conclusions Most students support the regulated use of CO which preserves patients’ access to abortion care. Religious-university student views on the use of conscientious objection in abortion care are discordant with those of their institutions which currently support institutional-level objections. (shrink)

Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one’s own head. I argue that this open space conforms (...) to the above criteria and hence is consistent with being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encompasses sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of experience. (shrink)

I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because (...) I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time. (shrink)

While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal (...) judgement about the target experience of the investigation. I examine historical and contemporary examples of first-person experiments: Mariotte’s demonstration of the visual blind spot, Kanizsa’s subjective contours, the Tse Illusion, and investigations of the non-uniform resolution of the visual field. I discuss the role that phenomenal contrast plays in these methods, and how they overcome typical introspective errors. I argue that their intersubjective repeatability is an important factor in their scientific status, however, it is not the only factor. That they control for extraneous factors and confounds is another factor which sets them apart from pseudoscience (e.g., the perception of auras), and hence another reason for classifying them as genuine experiments. Furthermore, by systematically mapping out the structure of visual experience, these methods make scientific progress. Praises of such first-person experimental approaches may not always be sung by philosophers and psychologists, but they continue to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the phenomenology of awakening in Chinese Zen Buddhism. In this tradition, to awaken is to ‘see your true nature’. In particular, the two aspects of awakening are: (1) seeing that the nature of one’s self or mind is empty or void and (2) an erasing of the usual (though merely apparent) boundary between subject and object. In the early Zen tradition, there are many references to awakening as chopping off your head, not having eyes, nose (...) and tongue, and seeing your ‘Original Face’. These references bear a remarkable resemblance to an approach to awakening developed by Douglas Harding. I will guide the reader through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments which investigate the gap where you cannot see your own head. I will endeavour to show that these methods, although radically different from traditional meditation techniques, result in an experience with striking similarities to Zen accounts of awakening, in particular, as experiencing oneself as empty or void and yet totally united with the given world. The repeatability and apparent reliability of these first-person methods opens up a class of awakening experience to empirical investigation and has the potential to provide new insights into nondual traditions. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a version of panpsychist idealism on first-person experiential grounds. As things always appear in my field of consciousness, there is prima facie empirical support for idealism. Furthermore, by assuming that all things correspond to a conscious perspective or perspectives (i.e., panpsychism), realism about the world is arguably safeguarded without the need to appeal to God (as per Berkeley’s idealism). Panpsychist idealism also has a phenomenological advantage over traditional panpsychist views as it does not commit (...) perceptual experience to massive error by denying that perceived colours are properties of things. Finally, I argue that the subject combination problem for panpsychism has been motivated by the problematic assumption that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from the first-person perspective is fruitful for reframing the subject combination problem and for seeing how subjects could potentially combine for the idealist. (shrink)

Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be (...) accounted for by domain-general factors: attention, working memory limits and conceptualization. As these factors are shared with the production of perceptual judgments, errors in phenomenal judgments are not due to faulty domain-specific processes. Furthermore, this account defends phenomenal judgments against general scepticism by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgments. (shrink)

I am aware of the tree and its leaves, but am I aware of my awareness of these things? When I try to introspect my awareness, I just find myself attending to objects and their properties. This observation is known as the ‘transparency of experience’. On the other hand, I seem to directly know that I am aware. Given the first observation, it is not clear how I know that I am aware. Fred Dretske thought that the problem was so (...) acute that he issued the challenge of answering ‘How do you know that you are not a zombie?’ I propose that a view found in the Advaita Vedanta, that awareness is self luminous, reconciles these two observations. I understand self-luminosity as the thesis that: (1) I am implicitly aware of my awareness and (2) I am phenomenally aware of a distinct phenomenal character of my awareness. In support of the first claim, that I apparently only attend to objects in the world when introspecting perceptual experience, suggests that I do not know my awareness explicitly, but rather that I must know it implicitly. In support of the second claim, I argue that the mere fact that I am perceptually conscious is not sufficient to allow me to know that I am perceptually conscious. In particular, the qualities I am perceptually aware of do not tell me that I aware of them, rather they just seem to be properties of objects. I also assess whether strategies for responding to Cartesian sceptical scenarios can be employed against Dretske’s consciousness scepticism. I argue that these strategies either fail to distinguish me from a zombie or they do not adequately describe my epistemic situation. By contrast to other accounts, if awareness has its own distinct phenomenal character, then it cannot be considered to be a prima facie property of the world, hence the self-luminosity of awareness provides a plausible account of how I know that I’m not a zombie. (shrink)

Objectives Practitioners in contemplative traditions commonly report experiencing an awareness that is distinct from sensory objects, thoughts, and emotions (“awareness itself”). They also report experiences of a void or underlying silence that is closely associated with this awareness. Subjects who carry out the Headless Way exercises frequently report an experience of emptiness or void at the same time as other contents (void-like experiences). The goals of this study were to (1) assess the reliability of these methods in eliciting the recognition (...) of awareness and void-like experiences in participants who had no prior exposure to these techniques, (2) investigate the prevalence of these experiences in these tasks, and (3) to differentiate these experiences from closely related and potential precursor experiences. -/- Method Twenty adults participated in in-depth individual interviews in which they were guided through the Headless Way exercises. A thematic analysis was conducted on the interview transcripts. -/- Results Twelve of the participants reported a void-like experience, and five participants reported an experience of awareness itself. These experiences were respectively categorized as subsets of the more general categories of perceptual absences and the sense of not being person-like. Another novel finding was the real-time reports of awareness and void-like experiences during the exercises. -/- Conclusions Our findings provide preliminary evidence that the Headless Way exercises can effectively induce experiences of emptiness and awareness in participants without prior experience. The findings suggest that such experiences can be elicited outside of a traditional meditation context, including in non-meditators. Furthermore, the experience of not being person-like and of perceptual absences may be precursors and more general forms of recognizing awareness itself and the void-like nature of the mind. (shrink)

Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. (...) We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Phenomenal objectivism explains perceptual phenomenal character by reducing it to an awareness of mind-independent objects, properties, and relations. A challenge for this view is that there is a sense in which a distant tree looks smaller than a closer tree even when they are the same objective size (perceptual size variation). The dual content view is a popular objectivist account in which such experiences are explained by my objective spatial relation to the tree, in particular visual angle (perspectival size). I (...) describe a series of first-person experiments for investigating size experience. I use a ruler as a first-person method for operationalising perspectival size (Experiment 1). I use the corridor illusion (Experiment 2), outlining one’s head in the mirror (Experiment 3), and outlining the size of objects on glass (Experiment 4) to show a phenomenal difference in size for items in different depth contexts, despite being identical in visual angle. These finding demonstrate that visual angle cannot account for these spatial experiences. Psychological evidence provides further support for the thesis that subjects do not experience visual angle when depth information is present. Together this evidence supports the hypothesis that perceptual size variation cannot be accounted for by visual angle, hence undermining a plausible version of the dual content theory. This outcome, combined with problems raised by alternative objectivist accounts of size variation, provides support for a subjectivist account of size experience. (shrink)

Este artículo, escrito en clave autoetnográfica, recupera mi experiencia en la práctica de las artes marciales. Se centra en el sentido que adquiere la masculinidad entre mis compañeros varones, así como en mi propia transformación física y emocional para integrarme a ese mundo estrictamente masculino. El escrito supone un doble desafío: en la dimensión teórica, pretende arrojar luz sobre el sentido de la práctica marcial y su relación con las regulaciones que orientan la masculinidad. En la dimensión metodológica, busca explorar (...) la práctica de la autoetnografía, sus potencialidades y limitaciones. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, propomos estratégias de captação de regiões polêmicas em corpus produzido a partir de publicações do Twitter, partindo de quadro teórico que enfatiza a perspectiva dialógica. Com base nessas estratégias, fornecemos entradas para a análise da materialidade oriunda do universo tecnodiscursivo em circulação em ambientes digitais. Em razão da produção do corpus da investigação, avançamos na compreensão de traços que compõem imagens discursivas em torno de Diego Maradona em circulação no Twitter por ocasião de seu falecimento. Para tanto, (...) explicitamos e problematizamos técnicas de captação e produção de um corpus digital de pesquisa, através da delimitação de um espaço discursivo no Twitter que circundou a morte de Maradona. Os resultados obtidos se dirigem tanto às condições de utilização dessas plataformas por analistas do discurso, quanto à cartografia das regiões do dizer que se configuram nesse espaço e dos embates que nelas ganham consistência. ABSTRACT In this article, we propose strategies for capturing polemical regions in a corpus of posts from Twitter, setting out from a theoretical framework that emphasises a dialogic perspective. Based on these strategies, we provide entry points for analysing the materiality of the techno-discursive universe that circulates in digital environments. By producing this research corpus, we acquired a clearer understanding of elements that compose discursive images surrounding Diego Maradona in circulation on Twitter following the player’s death. Towards this aim, we formulated and critically considered techniques for extracting and producing a digital research corpus by delimiting a discursive space on Twitter surrounding Maradona’s death. The results obtained pertain to the conditions for use of these platforms by discourse analysts, the cartography of the regions configured in this space and the clashes that become consolidated within them. (shrink)

With growing vigor, political philosophers have started questioning the Westphalian system of states as the main actors in the international arena and, within it, the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. In this article I add to these questionings by showing that, when it comes to migratory natural resources, i.e., migratory species, a plausible theory of territorial rights should advocate a regime of shared sovereignty among states. This means that one single entity should represent their interests and maybe also (...) those of third parties, managing and making decisions over the resource as a whole. Although such a regime might be the tacit goal of existing international conventions regarding wildlife, it remains untheorized in political philosophy and largely under-theorized in international law. By presenting the critical situation of the monarch butterfly in North America, I point to the inadequacy of the compartmentalized current regime, which generates injustice in migration; namely, the phenomenon whereby range states of a given species may neglect or over-exploit it while in their territory, to the detriment of others. I suggest that more flexible and imaginative governance arrangements are needed to deal in a better way with these and similar natural resources. (shrink)

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my (...) somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge (...) Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet. (shrink)

Given the grim global statistics of extreme poverty and socioeconomic inequalities, moral and political philosophers have focused on the duties of justice and assistance that arise therefrom. What the needy are morally permitted to do for themselves in this context has been, however, a mostly overlooked question. Reviving a medieval and early modern account of the right of necessity, I propose that a chronically deprived agent has a right to take, use and/or occupy whatever material resources are required to guarantee (...) her self-preservation, or the means necessary to acquire them. There are three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: the need is basic, the claimant does not violate other equally important moral interests, and it is a last resort. I present two recommendations to be followed by the claimants, and offer some examples where this principle may be applied today. I reply to the objections that understanding the right of necessity in this way kills its intuitive plausibility, and that it is a remedy worse than the disease. I conclude that, while not the best solution for the problem of global poverty, the exercise of this right should be accepted if we believe in the human right to subsistence. (shrink)

This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal (...) judgements are due to domain-general factors, which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism. Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability. In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience. In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience that I seem to be looking from here. Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend. (shrink)

The Scottish sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson and the Chinese Confucianist Mencius give benevolence (ren) a key place in their respective moral theories, as the first and foundational virtue. Leaving aside differences in style and method, my purpose in this essay is to underline this similarity by focusing on four common features: first, benevolence springs from compassion, an innate and universal feeling shared by all human beings; second, its objects are not only human beings but also animals; third, it is sensitive to (...) proximity; and finally, it has to be constantly cultivated in order to become a character trait. I will conclude with some brief remarks as to how this understanding of benevolence as rooted in feeling rather than reason, and in personal rather than impersonal relationships, helps to illuminate part of the discussion in moral philosophy today. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta un análisis cualitativo preliminar de los contratos laborales firmados entre cuatro músicos de Europa del este y la dirección de la Orquesta Sinfónica de Antioquia en 1949, mientras dichos músicos estaban en los campos de refugiados europeos donde los sobrevivientes de la guerra fueron congregados para su atención y rehabilitación. Con este análisis se pretende problematizar la inserción de estos personajes como agentes de modernización cultural en Medellín, haciendo énfasis en las condiciones políticas y socioculturales (...) que caracterizaban a Colombia a comienzos de la década de 1950. La nacionalidad de estos músicos (tres checos y un rumano) era objeto de sospecha desde la legislación migratoria colombiana, que desde la década de 1920 establecía un catálogo de extranjeros que no debían entrar al país, pues podían traer ideologías contrarias a la defensa de la propiedad privada. Al contrastar estos contratos laborales con la política migratoria colombiana y con la responsabilidad pedagógica cívica que se le imponía a la actividad musical académica, se plantean algunas preguntas para debatir acerca de la narrativa oficial que presenta a estos músicos como agentes de modernidad importados e integrados a un proceso de modernización cuya representación se ha caracterizado por la ausencia de conflicto. (shrink)

Why do we assign to countries rights to all the positive utilities from their natural resources, but hold them under no duty to bear costs for the negative utilities generated by those resources for those beyond their borders? In this paper I suggest that this ‘volcanic asymmetry’ has been overlooked by statist and cosmopolitan theories and that, despite of the arguments that might be given on its behalf, keeping this asymmetry requires further normative justification. I present two ways of getting (...) rid of it, conclude that neither is satisfactory, and point to an alternative path. (shrink)

What does the basic right to subsistence allow its holders to do for themselves when it goes unfulfilled? This book guides the reader through the morality of infringing property rights for subsistence, in a global context.

Este trabajo aborda algunos aspectos de la dimensión social y política del museo en la actualidad, a partir de la articulación de distintas perspectivas vinculadas con las políticas de los bienes comunes, la sociomuseología y la museología participativa. Este cruce teórico permitió diseñar un escenario o un subescenario -según qué lectura se pondere- político-museológico en el que, consideramos, existe una apuesta por una diferenciación de los modelos tradicionales.

El presente artículo es producto de un trabajo etnográfico que se realizó durante más de un año en una escuela primaria pública que contaba con apoyo de un servicio de Educación Especial. Los principales hallazgos versan sobre cotidianeidad de los procesos de evaluación de estudiantes con discapacidad. El trabajo es un llamado a humanizar las prácticas docentes.

Salvador Bucca fue Profesor Titular de Lingüística de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, entre 1955 y 1983. Se formó en Italia y Estados Unidos. En calidad de docente y director del Centro de Estudios Lingüísticos, visitó en reiteradas ocasiones el nordeste argentino, para estudiar las lenguas de las comunidades locales. En este artículo nos enfocamos en sus viajes a la provincia de Formosa para realizar trabajo de campo en 1961, 1964 y 1968. En este sentido, (...) señalamos la importancia de su figura en torno a la gestación de los primeros estudios sobre las lenguas indígenas chaqueñas. Este trabajo forma parte de un estudio más amplio de los documentos donados por la familia del Dr. Salvador Bucca al Archivo del Laboratorio de Documentación e Investigación en Lingüística y Antropología (DILA), tarea iniciada en 2019 por parte de un equipo de la Universidad Nacional de Formosa con la transcripción de los cuadernos de campo del Dr. Bucca. La fuente que presentamos corresponde a un extracto del Cuaderno N° 4, donde el lingüista describe su viaje a través de la predominantemente rural provincia de Formosa en el invierno de 1964. En este sentido, se destacan los problemas de movilidad y hospedaje, y la reticencia de algunos funcionarios y miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad a colaborar con la investigación. La contracara está representada por los misioneros de los distintos cultos cristianos que le facilitaron el contacto con sus informantes locales. (shrink)

El propósito del trabajo es comparar las trayectorias filosóficas de Paul Ricoeur y Mario Presas. Se sostiene que una adecuada comprensión del giro de la fenomenología a la hermenéutica, en el cual ubicamos a ambos, implica poner en relieve su pertenencia inicial a la fenomenología existencial francesa de la primera mitad del siglo XX. Se precisará la denominación fenomenología existencial y el impacto que tuvo en la concepción de la hermenéutica que fue desarrollada a partir de ella. Para concluir, proponemos (...) una periodización de la producción de Presas en relación con su lectura de la obra de Ricoeur. (shrink)

Given the conceptual gap in the global justice debate today (where most of the talk is about the duties of the rich, but little is said about what the poor may do for themselves), in this article I reintroduce the idea of a right of necessity. I first delineate a normative framework for such a right, inspired by these historical accounts. I then offer a contemporary case where the exercise of the right of necessity would be morally legitimate according to (...) that framework – even though illegal and probably condemned by the standard moral norms. The case is that of a small group of Paraguayan campesinos (small farmers) suffering from the effects of a severe drought. In the third part, I introduce the concept of noncivil disobedience: I call an act of noncivil disobedience a conscientious, public, illegal and forcible act whose performance, while not necessarily intended directly as a means to bring about social and/or political change, may help to trigger these changes indirectly. In the fourth part, I suggest that certain instances where the right of necessity is overtly exercised – as in the case of the famine-struck Paraguayan campesinos – may also be interpreted in terms of noncivil disobedience, insofar as they serve a double function: as a means of satisfying immediate need, and as a marker of discontent in a society where the equal rights of individuals are a nominal ideal which remains unfulfilled in practice. I then address two objections that may be raised against resurrecting the idea of a right of necessity and identifying it in certain instances with noncivil disobedience. I conclude by suggesting that, at the point of convergence between the two, a basic right like the right of necessity recovers its value as an active, (rather than passive) entitlement of its holders, while the use of force enters the picture as a legitimate means that – at least under certain circumstances – may be resorted to within the limits of civil society. (shrink)

Earlier work has demonstrated that attention is indirectly cognitively malleable by processes of self-association – processes by which agents explicitly associate an item with the self. We extend this work by considering the manipulation of attention to both salient and non-salient objects. We demonstrate that self-association impacts attentional processing not only of non-salient objects, but also regarding salient items known to command attention. This result indicates the flexibility and susceptibility of attentional processing to cognitive manipulation.

In Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory, Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – (...) an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong’s theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free. (shrink)

Measures and theories of information abound, but there are few formalised methods for treating the contextuality that can manifest in different information systems. Quantum theory provides one possible formalism for treating information in context. This paper introduces a quantum inspired model of the human mental lexicon. This model is currently being experimentally investigated and we present a preliminary set of pilot data suggesting that concept combinations can indeed behave non-separably.

El propósito es una lectura de la tercera edición del Facundo como estrategia de Domingo Faustino Sarmiento para la concreción de fines políticos. El estudio se centra en el nuevo escrito que el autor inserta en esta edición: "El Chacho, último caudillo de la montonera de los llanos". Se aborda, desde el campo de la Historia Intelectual, la historicidad del concepto "caudillismo", analizando los usos que hace Sarmiento del término en sus diversos contextos de enunciación. A su vez se propone (...) un análisis de la historicidad del texto mismo, observando las estrategias discursivas con que opera su autor para intervenir en la escena política. The aim is a reading of the 3rd edition of Facundo as a strategy by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento to achieve political purposes. The study focuses on the addition by the author in this edition of: "El Chacho, último caudillo de la montonera de los llanos". It discusses, from the field of Intellectual History, the historicity of the concept of "warlordism", analyzing the uses that Sarmiento makes of the term in its various contexts of enunciation. At the same time it proposes an analysis of the historicity of the text itself, observing the discursive strategies that the author operates to intervene in the political scene. (shrink)

El presente trabajo reflexiona sobre la estructura dual del signo dada por la conjunción del significado, aquello que es objeto de comprensión, y el significante, el medio material que permite expresar lo comprendido. Sin embargo, considerando la vida de emociones despertadas por estímulos cargados de valoración estética, en particular el movimiento corporal y la música, la estabilidad y armonía de di-cha estructura dual son puestas en cuestión. En dicho contexto de inestabilidad, la creatividad y la transformación se manifiestan como condiciones (...) esenciales y necesarias para la marcha del lenguaje. (shrink)

From the end of the twelfth century until the middle of the eighteenth century, the concept of a right of necessity –i.e. the moral prerogative of an agent, given certain conditions, to use or take someone else’s property in order to get out of his plight– was common among moral and political philosophers, who took it to be a valid exception to the standard moral and legal rules. In this essay, I analyze Samuel Pufendorf’s account of such a right, founded (...) on the basic instinct of self-preservation and on the notion that, in civil society, we have certain minimal duties of humanity towards each other. I review Pufendorf’s secularized account of natural law, his conception of the civil state, and the function of private property. I then turn to his criticism of Grotius’s understanding of the right of necessity as a retreat to the pre-civil right of common use, and defend his account against some recent criticisms. Finally, I examine the conditions deemed necessary and jointly sufficient for this right to be claimable, and conclude by pointing to the main strengths of this account. Keywords: Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, right of necessity, duty of humanity, private property. (shrink)

Recent scientific studies suggest that the destabilisation of the earth's climate and biodiversity loss are not separate, but interdependent phenomena. In this context, some have proposed the creation of a ‘Global Safety Net’ of ecoregions that should be preserved to stop further biodiversity loss, preventing at the same time the growth of CO2 emissions produced by deforestation and allowing natural carbon removal. In this article, I suggest that a first step to achieve this might be to replace permanent sovereignty over (...) natural resources in these areas with permanent guardianship. I propose to take some inspiration from a model that has already been implemented over an entire continent with a fair degree of success. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty froze the sovereign claims of seven countries over Antarctica. However, these countries plus 47 others today have been remarkably successful at jointly preserving the continent for peace, science, and the protection of the environment, especially since the signature of the Environmental Protocol in 1991. After outlining some principles that could give form to a Global Environmental Protocol for Ecoregions, I address a series of objections and offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

At Universitat Politècnica de València, Meridies, an internship programme that places engineering students in countries of Latin America, is one of the few opportunities the students have to explore the implications of being a professional in society in a different cultural and social context. This programme was analyzed using the capabilities approach as a frame of reference for examining the effects of the programme on eight student participants. The eight pro-public-good capabilities proposed by Melanie Walker were investigated through semi-structured interviews. (...) The internship is an environment in which students can put into practice the knowledge they have acquired in undergraduate studies and to find practical relevance in what they studied. Occasionally, this also entails a critical questioning of what they have learned, a greater awareness of the limits of the contents of their studies and of the way things were taught, and interest in less explored issues that are closely linked to social justice. However, tensions can arise between the pro-public-good oriented perspectives of this programme, and a more instrumental vision. One way to overcome these tensions is to foster consideration of reflexivity, that is, the dynamic relationship between technology and society. To do so, the programme must create space before and during the internship, and upon the return of the students, to discuss and collectively reflect upon their lived experience. Additionally, it ought to engage supervisors in this educational journey, both at the university and in the host institutions, and also involve socially committed organisations in this task. (shrink)