Critical edition of the Arabic Nicomachean Ethics including an introduction on the influence of this major Aristotelian work on Arabic literature, as well as an annotated English translation, both by the late Douglas M. Dunlop.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Approaches to Teaching Spenser’s “Faerie Queene”Patricia B. PhillippyApproaches to Teaching Spenser’s “Faerie Queene,” edited by David Lee Miller and Alexander Dunlop; ix & 207 pp. New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1994, $37.50.In many respects, the teaching of Spenser’s Faerie Queene is an experience that most completely encapsulates both the challenges and the rewards of introducing students to the literature of the early modern period. As (...) a work whose length, complex narratives, substantial cast of characters, and polyvocal allegories are often daunting to undergraduates, Spenser’s epic can easily appear as a riddle to be solved rather than a work to be appreciated, let alone enjoyed. Too frequently the constraints of the syllabus and the resistance of students result in a one-dimensional rendering of the text, which permits students to feel that they have “learned something” about Spenser, and about literature generally, by seeing simple, point-by-point allegorizations (Archimago as the Pope, Duessa as Catholicism) as the work’s whole meaning. However, if these difficulties can be surmounted, few other works can equal the great opportunities available in The Faerie Queene to enrich students’ understanding of Elizabethan aesthetic, ethical, social, and political climates, and, perhaps more significantly, to impress upon them the fact that literature, as the most self-conscious of written works, seeks to elicit a multiplicity of meanings from its readers. Thus the task of critical reading appropriately moves toward expansiveness rather than inclusiveness, toward calling forth a plethora of meanings rather than eliminating all but the one “right” reading.Valuable help in overcoming the problems posed by Spenser’s work in the classroom is found in Approaches to Teaching Spenser’s “Faerie Queene.” The collection includes six essays that suggest various strategies for introducing the text to students, and nine essays devoted to more advanced study of the poem. The majority of essays in the former group concentrate on Book 1, and negotiate the practical difficulties of incorporating The Faerie Queene into undergraduate survey courses by suggesting methods to help students to bridge the gap between the work’s cultural context and their own, while also stressing the need to appreciate the text’s distinctiveness.The “special topics” essays treat individual books and themes within a variety of methodological frameworks and in light of cultural touchstones, such as the Renaissance association of painting and poetry (aided by the volume’s eight illustrations), Elizabethan colonial and imperial attitudes about Ireland, and early modern treatises and conduct books describing women’s character. A “Materials” section includes a descriptive bibliography of texts for classroom use and for students’ assigned readings, a wonderfully inclusive bibliography describing editions, reference works, background reading, and critical interpretations for the instructor’s use, and an outline of aids to teaching, such as portraits, films, and music. Even the experienced teacher of Spenser will find this a useful summary of the available materials. [End Page 278]While rooted in practical pedagogy, the essays in this collection also, for the most part, offer provocative comments on Spenser’s poem that are of scholarly interest beyond the classroom as well. Julia M. Walker’s discussion of Britomart alongside Elizabethan portraiture and Dorothy Stephens’ reading of the “feminine” in Book 4 are abridgments of longer articles from Modern Philology and ELH, respectively, and Theresa M. Krier’s provocative comments on the gendering of Spenserian symbol and allegory point toward her work in progress. Overall, the collection recommends numerous innovative techniques to energize and enliven one’s teaching of the poem and to enhance students’ experiences of it. While teachers’ awareness of the demographics and dynamics of their own students may preclude the adoption of specific approaches suggested in this volume, its essays dramatically illustrate the need to avoid reductive readings of The Faerie Queene and, at the same time, offer worthwhile guidance to prevent students from wandering endlessly through the woods of semiotic indeterminacy, error, and despair.Patricia B. PhillippyTexas A&M UniversityCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

COVID-19 has created additional challenges in mental health services, including the impact of social distancing measures on care and treatment. For situations where a detention under mental health legislation is required to keep an individual safe, psychiatrists may consider whether to conduct an assessment in person or using video technology. The Mental Health Act 2003 does not stipulate that an assessment has to be conducted in person. Yet, the Code of Practice envisions that detention assessments would be conducted face to (...) face in all circumstances. During the pandemic, the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, a statutory body with a duty to promote best practice of the Act, has been asked whether it may be acceptable and indeed preferable for some assessments to be conducted via video technology. Where an assessment is needed to determine if a patient needs to be detained, and where there is a need for social distancing or the need for ‘shielding’, remote assessments may in some circumstances be preferable. In this article, we outline the modification of the Mental Welfare Commission’s previous outright rejection of virtual assessments as the pandemic progressed and discuss the ethical and legal issues the possibility of remote assessments has exposed. We also discuss the limits and when a virtual assessment is not considered ethical. As the pandemic moves from a state of emergency into a ‘new normal’ in psychiatric services during second, or subsequent, waves, the use and place of remote assessments for detention needs to be considered. (shrink)

Background: When a genetic mutation is identified in a family member, internationally, it is usually the proband’s or another responsible family member’s role to disclose the information to at-risk relatives. However, both active and passive non-disclosure in families occurs: choosing not to communicate the information or failing to communicate the information despite intention to do so, respectively. The ethical obligations to prevent harm to at-risk relatives and promote the duty of care by genetic health professionals is in conflict with Privacy (...) laws and professional regulations that prohibits disclosure of information to a third party without the consent of the proband. In New South Wales, Australia, amendments to Privacy legislation permits such disclosure to living genetic relatives with the process defined under guidelines although there is no legal duty to warn. This study assessed NSW GHP’s awareness and experience of the legislation and guidelines. Methods: An online survey collected demographics; theoretical knowledge; clinical scenarios to assess application knowledge; attitudes; confidence; experience with active non-disclosure. A link to correct answers was provided after completion. Knowledge scores above the median for non-parametric data or above the mean for parametric data were classified as ‘good’ or ‘poor’. Chi square tests assessed associations between confidence and knowledge scores. Results: While many of the 37 participants reported reading the guidelines, there was limited awareness of their scope and clinical application; that there is no legal duty to warn; and that the threat does not need to be imminent to warrant disclosure. No association between confidence and ‘good’ theoretical or applied clinical knowledge was identified. Uncertainty of their professional responsibility was identified and in the several case examples of active non-disclosure that were reported this uncertainty reflected the need for further understanding of the guidelines in regard to the processes required before disclosure was initiated. Conclusions: There is a need for further education and training about the guidelines associated with the legislation that would be relevant to support disclosure. The findings may inform future strategies to support introduction of policy changes in other jurisdictions where similar regulatory regimes are introduced. (shrink)

Aurel Kolnai was born in Budapest, in 1900 and died in London, in 1973. He was, according to Karl Popper and the late Bernard Williams, one of the most original, provocative, and sensitive philosophers of the twentieth century. Kolnai's moral philosophy is best described in his own words as intrinsicalist, non-naturalist, non-reductionist", which took its original impetus from Scheler's value ethics, and was developed by using a natural phenomenologist method. The unique combination of linguistic analysis and phenomenology yields highly original (...) ideas on classical fields of moral theory, such as responsibility and free will, the meaning of right and wrong, the universalisability of ethical norms, the role of moral emotions, internalism vs externalism, to mention a few. The volume presents a selection of essays by Kolnai, including his main political theoretical work, "What is Politics About", available in English here for the first time. The second half of the book Kolnai's work is analyzed in a series of essays by eminent scholars. (shrink)

This paper considers Kant's understanding of conceptual representation in light of his view of geometry.

This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to facilitate the application of empirical information and clearly exhibit its warrant. My argument targets rationalistic interpretations such as R. Lanier Anderson’s. It is common ground in this dispute that making concepts “distinct” issues in the premises on which all deductive justification rests. Against the view that concepts are made distinct only by analysis, which is carried out by (...) the understanding independently of experience, I contend that for Wolff some distinct concepts are arrived at through experience. I emphasize that Wolff countenances empirical methods of obtaining distinct concepts even in mathematics. This striking feature of his view indicates how its empiricist elements can be reconciled with his injunction to follow “mathematical” method. (shrink)

Kant’s Mathematical World (KMW) is a strikingly original, richly detailed account of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics as a reckoning with the long-held understa.

Francis Dunlop; Form, Content and Rationality in Morality and Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 11, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 78–97.

Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS), published in 1786, has proved difficult to situate in the context of eighteenth-century responses to Newton. One point beyond dispute is that Kant is not satisfied with the “metaphysical foundations” thus far proffered by Newton and his followers. He echoes some familiar Leibnizian criticisms (such as those concerning absolute space) and, in a passage we will examine closely, insists that rejecting “the concept of an original attraction” would put Newton “at variance with himself” (...) (4:515). In light of Kant’s robust defense of the immediacy and universality of gravitational attraction, the overall similarity between his three “mechanical laws” and Newton’s “Axioms, or Laws of Motion” has made it the “standard” view that Kant “intends to justify Newtonian science in general and Newtonian mechanics in particular as stated in” Newton’s laws of motion (Watkins 2019, 89). But it is unclear whether the alternative “foundations” he proposes are for Newton’s theory of motion or something more akin to Leibniz’s physics. Recent scholarship has documented the Leibnizian provenance of Kant’s three laws, and argued for the relevance of later figures strongly influenced by Leibniz. (shrink)

J. H. Lambert proved important results of what we now think of as non-Euclidean geometries, and gave examples of surfaces satisfying their theorems. I use his philosophical views to explain why he did not think the certainty of Euclidean geometry was threatened by the development of what we regard as alternatives to it. Lambert holds that theories other than Euclid's fall prey to skeptical doubt. So despite their satisfiability, for him these theories are not equal to Euclid's in justification. Contrary (...) to recent interpretations, then, Lambert does not conceive of mathematical justification as semantic. According to Lambert, Euclid overcomes doubt by means of postulates. Euclid's theory thus owes its justification not to the existence of the surfaces that satisfy it, but to the postulates according to which these "models" are constructed. To understand Lambert's view of postulates and the doubt they answer, I examine his criticism of Christian Wolff's views. I argue that Lambert's view reflects insight into traditional mathematical practice and has value as a foil for contemporary, model-theoretic, views of justification. (shrink)

Newton characterizes the reasoning of Principia Mathematica as geometrical. He emulates classical geometry by displaying, in diagrams, the objects of his reasoning and comparisons between them. Examination of Newton’s unpublished texts shows that Newton conceives geometry as the science of measurement. On this view, all measurement ultimately involves the literal juxtaposition—the putting-together in space—of the item to be measured with a measure, whose dimensions serve as the standard of reference, so that all quantity is ultimately related to spatial extension. I (...) use this conception of Newton’s project to explain the organization and proofs of the first theorems of mechanics to appear in the Principia. The placementof Kepler’s rule of areas as the first proposition, and the manner in which Newton proves it, appear natural on the supposition that Newton seeks a measure, in the sense of a moveable spatial quantity, of time. I argue that Newton proceeds in this way so that his reasoning can have the ostensive certainty of geometry. (shrink)

This study develops and tests an empirical model of consumer punishing behaviours in third-party ethically questionable situations. The model examines the impact of perceived injustice, consumer-company identification, identification with the victim, and consumer involvement on punishing behaviours. A number of ‘real-life’ ethical scenarios are employed to generate over 1000 data responses from a self-administered questionnaire. The positive influence of perceived injustice on punishing behaviours is the most supported hypothesis of the study. The relation between consumer-company identification and punishment is in (...) part mediated through perceived injustice and also depended upon the employed scenario, with both negative and positive relations identified. An important positive relationship between identification with the victim and punishment behaviour was identified. No significant support exists for the influence of consumer involvement in the issue on punishing behaviours. (shrink)

Francis Dunlop; Form, Content and Rationality in Morality and Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 11, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 78–97.

Francis Dunlop; Louis Arnaud Reid on Understanding, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 143–151, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

Francis Dunlop; The Abolition of Morality?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 33, Issue 3, 16 December 2002, Pages 473–484, https://doi.org/10.1111/146.

Francis Dunlop; The Education of the Emotions, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 245–255, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

Francis Dunlop; Thinking in Images, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 265, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.tb0.

There exists a significant disparity within society between individuals in terms of intelligence. While intelligence varies naturally throughout society, the extent to which this impacts on the life opportunities it affords to each individual is greatly undervalued. Intelligence appears to have a prominent effect over a broad range of social and economic life outcomes. Many key determinants of well-being correlate highly with the results of IQ tests, and other measures of intelligence, and an IQ of 75 is generally accepted as (...) the most important threshold in modern life. The ability to enhance our cognitive capacities offers an exciting opportunity to correct disabling natural variation and inequality in intelligence. Pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers, such as modafinil and methylphenidate, have been shown to have the capacity to enhance cognition in normal, healthy individuals. Perhaps of most relevance is the presence of an ‘inverted U effect’ for most pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers, whereby the degree of enhancement increases as intelligence levels deviate further below the mean. Although enhancement, including cognitive enhancement, has been much debated recently, we argue that there are egalitarian reasons to enhance individuals with low but normal intelligence. Under egalitarianism, cognitive enhancement has the potential to reduce opportunity inequality and contribute to relative income and welfare equality in the lower, normal intelligence subgroup. Cognitive enhancement use is justifiable under prioritarianism through various means of distribution; selective access to the lower, normal intelligence subgroup, universal access, or paradoxically through access primarily to the average and above average intelligence subgroups. Similarly, an aggregate increase in social well-being is achieved through similar means of distribution under utilitarianism. In addition, the use of cognitive enhancement within the lower, normal intelligence subgroup negates, or at the very least minimises, several common objections to cognitive enhancement. Subsequently, this paper demonstrates that there is a compelling case for cognitive enhancement use in individuals with lower, normal intelligence. (shrink)

In his 1763 Prize Essay, Kant is thought to endorse a version of formalism on which mathematical concepts need not apply to extramental objects. Against this reading, I argue that the Prize Essay has sufficient resources to explain how the objective reference of mathematical concepts is secured. This account of mathematical concepts’ objective reference employs material from Wolffian philosophy. On my reading, Kant's 1763 view still falls short of his Critical view in that it does not explain the universal, unconditional (...) applicability of mathematical concepts. (shrink)

Francis Dunlop; The Education of the Emotions, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 245–255, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

Francis Dunlop; Louis Arnaud Reid on Understanding, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 143–151, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

The work and ideas of Rudolf Laban, dancer, choreographer and seminal theoretician of movement and dance, have had a profound impact across a range of disciplines. This book explores this impact.

In a crucial passage of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims that the concept of motion is central to our understanding of change and temporal order. I show that this seemingly idle claim is really integral to the Deduction, understood as a replacement for Locke’s “physiological” epistemology (cf. A86-7/B119). Béatrice Longuenesse has shown that Kant’s notion of distinctively inner receptivity derives from Locke. To explain the a priori application of concepts such as succession to this mode of sensibility, Kant construes (...) the mind as receptive to its own activity. As Longuenesse understands Kant’s response to Locke, “motion” becomes little more than a metaphor for the action of understanding on inner sense. For Michael Friedman, in contrast, this passage evidences Kant’s deep concern with the foundations of Newtonian science. He reads it as a reference to inertial motion, the standard by which temporal intervals are measured. I show that Longuenesse’s and Friedman’s interpretations are in fact complementary. Both Locke and Kant are deeply concerned with the quantification of time. So Longuenesse is right that §24 is meant to supplant Locke’s account, and Friedman correctly takes it as the foundation of Kant’s account of the application of quantitative concepts to time. Kant aims, specifically, to explain cognition of time as continuous magnitude. However, Longuenesse leaves Kant without an answer to Locke’s challenge that continuous magnitude cannot be understood on the basis of discrete magnitude. And on Friedman’s view Kant’s account of the understanding’s activity presupposes, and thus cannot explain, the achievements of the mathematical sciences (such as the representation of temporal continuity). On my reading, Kant’s key contention is that we must regard the segregation of temporally ordered representation into units as the work of the understanding, rather than (as Locke views it) of sensibility. By giving the understanding this role, Kant succeeds where he takes Locke to fail. I show how the power to unify temporal representation can be ascribed to the understanding on the basis, not of assumed mathematical or scientific knowledge, but of its characterization as the power of judgment. (shrink)

This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation (...) language is mastered. (shrink)