Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of (...) God – it is only contingently true that there is a world. Therefore, as long as we do not have an argument showing that necessarily there is a world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism. (shrink)

We describe the solution of the Limit Rule Problem of Revision Theory and discuss the philosophical consequences of the fact that the truth set of Revision Theory is a complete 1/2 set.

Although physicalism has been the dominant position in recent work in the philosophy of mind, this dominance has not prevented a small but growing number of philosophers from arguing that physicalism is untenable for several reasons: both ontologically and epistemologically it cannot reduce mentality to the realm of the physical, and its attempts to reduce subjectivity to objectivity have thoroughly failed. The contributors to After Physicalism provide powerful alternatives to the physicalist account of the human mind from a dualistic point (...) of view and argue that the reductive and naturalistic paradigm in philosophy has lost its force. The essays in this collection all firmly engage in a priori metaphysics. Those by Uwe Meixner, E. J. Lowe, John Foster, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne are concerned with ways to establish the truth of dualism. Essays by William Hasker, A. D. Smith, and Howard Robinson deal with the relation between physicalism and dualism. Benedikt Paul Göcke argues that the “I” is not a particular and Stephen Priest that “I have to understand myself not as a thing but as no-thing-ness.” In the final essay, Thomas Schärtl argues that there are limits to dualism as indicated by the concept of resurrection. By including two classical essays by Plantinga and Swinburne, the volume conveniently brings together some of the best and the newest thinking in making the philosophical case for dualism. "Seven of these essays are by eminent philosophers: Lowe, Foster, Plantinga, Swinburne, Hasker, Smith, and Robinson, each recapitulating his well-known position in the debate. To have these seven essayists together under one cover constitutes a remarkable book, which can be used as a textbook in philosophy of mind as well as in philosophy of religion courses, and which also opens up the debate in an original way among colleagues at an advanced level." —Fergus Kerr, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

In transformation research of late, accounts on the relation between intentionality and agency on the one hand, and the more routinised and structured side of social co-existence on the other, are increasingly nuanced. However, we observe a deficiency in the way arguments are set up by the interlocutors: both, scholars who grant intentionality a central role and those who emphasise its limitations generally do so at the level of ontology – debating degrees of human capacity for conscious planning versus a (...) largely unconscious reproduction. We wish to shift this question from an ontological to a pedagogical one, exploring possibilities to cultivate and learn intentionality. We do so by developing the concept of consciousness-in-nature that we derive from, and contextualise in, the traditions of deep ecology and (Westernised) Buddhism which both view human beings as inseparable from nature and one another. With consciousness-in-nature we refer to an understanding of humans as a part of nature that has developed the capacity for (self-) reflection and deliberation – a capacity that is not static or firm but can be nurtured and cultivated or clouded over and subdued. From this standpoint, we lay out an understanding of the role of (re)learning consciousness for processes of social change and explore potentials for its nurturing. (shrink)

Over the past century, the rise and fall of economic policy orders has been shaped by a paradox, as intellectual and institutional stability have repeatedly caused market instability and crisis. To highlight such dynamics, this volume offers a theory of economic ideas in political time. The author counters paradigmatic and institutionalist views of ideas as enabling self-reinforcing path dependencies, offering an alternative social psychological argument that ideas which initially reduce uncertainty can subsequently fuel misplaced certainty and crises. Historically, the book (...) then traces the development and decline of the progressive, Keynesian, and neoliberal orders, arguing that each order's principled foundations were gradually displaced by macroeconomic models that obscured new causes of the Great Depression, Great Stagflation, and Global Financial Crisis. Finally, in policy terms, Widmaier stresses the costs of intellectual autonomy, as efforts to 'prevent the last crisis' have repeatedly obscured new causes of crises. (shrink)

Pars 1. Logica -- pars 2. Ontologia -- pars 3. Cosmologia -- pars 4. Psychologia -- pars 5. Theologia naturalis -- pars 6. Physica generalis -- pars 7. Physica particularis corporum totalium huius mundi -- pars 8. Physica particularis corporum partialium telluris nostræ.

Affective congruency effects in the evaluation task can be explained by either spreading of activation or response competition. Eliminating effects of response compatibility by using other tasks (semantic categorisation, naming task) typically also eliminates affective congruency effects. However, there is no need for processing the affective information of the stimuli in these tasks either, which could be necessary for an affectively mediated spreading of activation (Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). We introduced a new task to further test this hypothesis. (...) The valent/neutral-categorisation task does not confound affective congruency with response compatibility, but still requires a processing of the stimuli's valence. No affective congruency effect was obtained with this task in two experiments, disfavouring a conditional spreading activation account. On the other hand, a significant priming effect was found for associated word pairs in Experiment 1, providing evidence for the sensitivity of the task to detect spreading activation processes. (shrink)

The advent of ChatGPT by OpenAI has prompted extensive discourse on its potential implications for science and higher education. While the impact on education has been a primary focus, there is limited empirical research on the effects of large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based chatbots on science and scientific practice. To investigate this further, we conducted a Delphi study involving 72 researchers specializing in AI and digitization. The study focused on applications and limitations of LLMs, their effects on the science (...) system, ethical and legal considerations, and the required competencies for their effective use. Our findings highlight the transformative potential of LLMs in science, particularly in administrative, creative, and analytical tasks. However, risks related to bias, misinformation, and quality assurance need to be addressed through proactive regulation and science education. This research contributes to informed discussions on the impact of generative AI in science and helps identify areas for future action. (shrink)

We study classes of ultrafilters on ω defined by a natural property of the Loeb measure in the Nonstandard Universe corresponding to the ultrafilter. This class, the Property M ultrafilters, is shown to contain all ultrafilters built up by taking iterated products over collections of pairwise nonisomorphic selective ultrafilters. Results on Property M ultrafilters are applied to the construction of extensions of probability measures, and to the study of measurable reductions between ultrafilters.

Que valent les formes de pensée traditionnelles face à l'apparition des régimes totalitaires? La démocratie a-t-elle présenté des lacunes favorisant l'émergence en son sein de tels régimes? Que devient l'idéal de progrès, de bonheur et de liberté des citoyens? Leo Strauss et Hannah Arendt ont tous deux affronté ce dilemme et posé la question de la portée de la philosophie politique. C'est leur démarche, strictement parallèle mais radicalement opposée, que Carole Widmaier confronte dans une étude stimulante : du constat (...) de la crise à leur parcours dans l'histoire de la pensée et à leur rapport respectif à la tradition et à la modernité. Tandis que Strauss invite à réhabiliter l'idée classique d'une nature humaine, Arendt montre la nécessité d'abandonner cette idée pour approcher l'existence humaine et ses différentes modalités. D'une part la défense d'un mode de vie philosophique retiré, la recherche de la vérité, de l'autre le « souci du monde » et l'attention à l'événement. Une réflexion salutaire pour affronter les maux de la modernité et s'ouvrir au changement politique. (shrink)

The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy.

Recent studies have shown that Nicola Salvi the architect of the Trevi Fountain intended to present the “potenza non limitata” of water as an existential element of nature, focusing the whole appearance of the fountain on the person in the center, Oceanus. But Salvi’s principal, pope Clement XII., claimed in his other projects such as the restoration of the arch of Constantine or like the new eastern fascade of S. Giovanni in Laterano, which refer especially to Constantine, like this emperor (...) the leader of Christianity. Thus Salvi’s philosophical purpose seems not to be in line with to the intentions of the pope. But how could Salvi convince the pope let him build the prestigious fountain? This paper tries to show that Salvi’s model was influenced by the epiphanies of Neptun or Poseidon in the first book of the Achilleis of Statius and in the 13th book of the Iliad. Transferring these on the epiphany of Oceanus in the Trevi Fountain, Salvi was able to combine his thoughts about the power of water with the metaphorical presentation of a universal ruler, as the pope wanted to present himself. (shrink)

Although 'most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world' (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, 'Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self-Knowledge', Erkenntnis , 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because 'the claim is hopelessly vague' (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction', Journal of (...) Philosophy , 72 (1975), p. 552). I argue that physicalism in fact should be the thesis that every existing particular essentially exemplifies properties the exemplification of which does not conceptually entail the existence of conscious beings. Physicalism thus is a purely philosophical thesis with no intrinsic relation to physics. 1. (shrink)

The existence of God is once again the focus of vivid philosophical discussion. From the point of view of analytic theology, however, people often talk past each other when they debate about the putative existence or nonexistence of God. In the worst case, for instance, atheists deny the existence of a God, which no theists ever claimed to exist. In order to avoid confusions like this we need to be clear about the function of the term 'God' in its different (...) contexts of use. In what follows, I distinguish between the functions of 'God' in philosophical contexts on the one hand and in theological contexts on the other in order to provide a schema, which helps to avoid confusion in the debate on the existence or non-existence of God. (shrink)

I start by way of clarifying briefly the problem of special divine intervention. Once this is done, I argue that laws of nature are generalizations that derive from the dispositional behaviour of natural kinds. Based on this conception of laws of nature I provide a metaphysical model according to which God can realize acts of special divine providence by way of temporarily changing the dispositions of natural entities. I show that this model does not contradict scientific practice and is consistent (...) with the assumption that the physical realm is causally closed. I then argue that prima facie any putative candidate for an act of God could also be seen as a random event or as indicating that there is something wrong with our formulation of the corresponding law of nature. While there is no sufficient philosophical or scientific reason to prefer one of these models, I argue that there are sufficient and legitimate theological reasons to endorse a framework in which at least the obtaining of some anomic states of affairs is seen as the effect of special divine intervention. Doing so, theology has the hermeneutic resources to uncover a dimension of meaningful reality, which without faith could not be seen. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDot-probe studies usually find an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli only in anxious participants, but not in non-anxious participants. In the present study, we conducted two experiments to investigate whether attentional bias towards angry faces in unselected samples is moderated by the extent to which the current task requires social processing. In Experiment 1, participants performed a dot-probe task involving classification of either socially meaningful targets or meaningless targets. Targets were preceded by two photographic face cues, one angry and one (...) neutral. Angry face cues only produced significant cueing scores with socially meaningful targets, not with meaningless targets. In Experiment 2, participants classified only meaningful targets, which were either socially meaningful or not. Again, mean cue... (shrink)

According to the Greek Commentators in late antiquity, Aristotle's Categories is primarily concerned with simple expressions in so far as they signify things. But what is it for a simple expression to signify a thing? As for (non-empty) singular terms, it is safe to say that they denote things. But what about general terms? How do they signify things? The question is crucial to the theory of the Categories , since, as is argued in the first section of this paper, (...) there is some truth in the Commentators' thesis that (part of) the Categories aims to elucidate the signification of simple expressions, including general terms. Of course, various prima facie plausible accounts of how general terms signify things are available; the second section discusses the basic assumptions which underlie them. A detailed analysis of Cat. 2a19-34 in the third section shows that the Categories ' account is two-fold: On the one hand some general terms denote things (among the latter, the most prominent are τα καθ' υπoκειμενoυ λεγoμενα). What is denoted by a given general term does not stand in any relation to the objects falling under the term but is something that they are . Some general terms, on the other hand, connote things. What is connoted by a general term is a property which the objects falling under the term are related to by virtue of having it (τα εν υπoκειμενω oντα are such properties). (shrink)

C-systems were defined by Cartmell as models of generalized algebraic theories. B-systems were defined by Voevodsky in his quest to formulate and prove an initiality conjecture for type theories. They play a crucial role in Voevodsky’s construction of a syntactic C-system from a term monad. In this work, we construct an equivalence between the category of C-systems and the category of B-systems, thus proving a conjecture by Voevodsky.

In climate science, climate models are one of the main tools for understanding phenomena. Here, we develop a framework to assess the fitness of a climate model for providing understanding. The framework is based on three dimensions: representational accuracy, representational depth, and graspability. We show that this framework does justice to the intuition that classical process-based climate models give understanding of phenomena. While simple climate models are characterized by a larger graspability, state-of-the-art models have a higher representational accuracy and representational (...) depth. We then compare the fitness-for-providing understanding of process-based to data-driven models that are built with machine learning. We show that at first glance, data-driven models seem either unnecessary or inadequate for understanding. However, a case study from atmospheric research demonstrates that this is a false dilemma. Data-driven models can be useful tools for understanding , specifically for phenomena for which scientists can argue from the coherence of the models with background knowledge to their representational accuracy and for which the model complexity can be reduced such that they are graspable to a satisfactory extent. When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

We generalize the construction of lattice-valued models of set theory due to Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to a wider class of algebras and show that this yields a model of a paraconsistent logic that validates all axioms of the negation-free fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

Leibniz in his works around Theodizee and "Monadology" (disregarding his "vinculum substantiale") and the middle Brentano in his works on Philosophy of History of Philosophy as well as in epistemologico-moral treatises present models of an epistemically well-founded nature transformed into theories of history. Whereas Leibniz interprets catastrophes as necessary phases--candidates for a turning-point to the better and the best world,--Brentano's outlook is more modest in contrasting uprising stages with pitfalls of pragmatism, skepticism, and mysticism. Either philosopher in his respective world-view (...) cannot, however, cope with an "anthropodizee", the defence of human dignity against man's own aggressive products. (shrink)

Review by: Michael Benedikt The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 112-115, March 2013.

In his last work, Relire le relié, Michel Serres develops a philosophy of religion that circumvents the conventional demarcations of reason and faith, knowledge of the world and knowledge of revelation, or agnosticism and apology. In a structuralistically-informed relecture, he exposes the basic traits of religion. With its narratives and theologoumena, it captures and describes being-in-the-world as an event of universal synthesis. It is – in Serres’ diction – about the basic relatio of energy and information, entropy and negentropy, chaos (...) and order. This relié is described neither as an effort or act of a subject, a system, a language community, nor sufficiently as an emergence effect of evolutionary-natural processes. The recording of this synthesis forbids both any dichotomy of an irresolvable hiatus as well as the construction of a unitary space of any kind. (shrink)

Le problème philosophique du principe, tout particulièrement et exemplairement dans son traitement métaphysique, réside dans la difficulté à conjoindre d’un côté l’unité, l’antériorité, la supériorité, la différence, la transcendance du principe vis-à-vis de ce dont il est principe (sans quoi le principe n’est pas principe), et de l’autre côté la présence ou la relation effective du principe à la multiplicité dont il est principe (sans quoi le principe n’est principe de rien). Cette double di...

The contributions to this collection deal with the fundamental problem of unity, which plays a decisive role in many contemporary debates (even when this role ...

On the one hand, arguably, I am neither this nor that. Arguably, neither is God this or that – so, am I God? Otherwise it seems that I must be this and God must be that. On the other hand, the being of the universe is not something of which I could plausibly be construed as the ultimate cause. That is God's creative act. Because I do not create the universe, I am not God. So I am God and I (...) am not God. Here's a solution: God is One but also Three, I am but one. (shrink)

Does the contemporary built environment—the ensemble of our humanly created surroundings—make us happy? This question prompts a consideration of the psychological dimensions of economic value, and of Tibor Scitovsky's revisions of standard economic theory. With Scitovsky as a starting point, a model of value based on modern complexity theory and a Maslow‐like rendition of human needs can account for some of the more important exceptions to the law of diminished marginal utility, including those that may undermine the built environment in (...) a market economy. (shrink)

This work deals with the expressive power of logics on finite graphs with access to an additional "arbitrary" linear order. The queries that can be expressed this way are the order-invariant queries for the logic. For the standard logics used in computer science, such as first-order logic, it is known that access to an arbitrary linear order increases the expressiveness of the logic. However, when we look at the separating examples, we find that they have satisfying models whose Gaifman Graph (...) is complex -unbounded in valence and in treewidth. We thus explore the expressiveness of order-invariant queries over well-behaved graphs. We prove that first-order order-invariant queries over strings and trees have no additional expressiveness over first-order logic in the original signature. We also prove new upper bounds on order-invariant queries over bounded treewidth and bounded valence graphs. Our results make use of a new technique of independent interest: the application of algebraic characterizations of definability to show collapse results. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Brandom's definition of necessity, which is part of the incompatibility sematnics he develops in his fifth John Locke Lecture. By comparing incompatibility semantics to standard Kripkean possible worlds semantics for modality, we motivate an alternative definition of necessity in Brandom's own terms. Our investigation of this alternative necessity will show that - contra to Brandom's own results - incompatibility semantics does not necessarily lead to the notion of necessity of the modal logic S5.

In a first step I show that given a philosophically<br>warranted concept of God, arguments for<br>the existence of God are either questionbegging<br>or merely stipulative. In a second step<br>I argue that non-stipulative knowledge of God<br>and His existence is intelligible if and only if<br>there is an intellectual intuition of God. I<br>further argue that to obtain this intuition,<br>spiritual training may be necessary. Consistently<br>in this latter case, spirituality becomes a<br>conditio sine qua non in order to assess the truth<br>of theism.