There used to be a time when anyone in religious circles who thought about personal identity in the tradition of Locke or Hume would quickly and firmly be silenced, not with an argument but with a kind of confession of faith: human beings are created by God with a soul and a body; the soul is immortal and the body will be restored to its original glory in the resurrection. With this sort of statement, the servants of the church obstructed (...) any rational investigation into the nature of the human person because they believed that such a topic was unsuitable for the autonomous thinking that modernity gave rise to. Whether one regrets or welcomes it, the influence of religion is on the wane and there is now a general feeling that no authority can be ascribed to what is not open to rational interrogation.If rational thought always coincided with wisdom, this would not cause any substantial problems. There would not even be anything wrong with foolish or impetuous thinking, were it not that such thinking can result in concrete political and legal measures. For instance, Francis Galton's idea that the quality of a person could be identified with the quality of their inherited characteristics would not have presented any danger were it not for the fact that, on the basis of this idea, eugenics was practised until quite recently, even in the most `civilized' of countries. Obviously there is something that can be said for a religious authority tempering over-enthusiastic declarations about such sensitive matters.The implication of the traditional dogma concerning the human person was that all human life must be respected. In borderline cases dealing with the beginning and end of life, this dogma had to be interpreted. The ability to do this, however, seems not to rest on clear and rational arguments but on the kind of wisdom that is based more on a common understanding, trust and compassion than on cold, rational principles.Whether one can ascribe authority to religious dogma will depend on the extent to which one accepts the idea that our ethical beliefs can be supported by rational arguments. Certain philosophers have doubts about this. In `Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy', Bernard Williams demonstrates that ethical convictions can only be understood as forms of confidence: we have confidence that someone or something is important, that it is advisable to be courageous in certain circumstances, that it is important to be loyal or that it is meaningful to remain faithful. If this is true, the question that must be posed is the following one: what if confidence is lacking? What if indifference or boredom take over? What if nothing appears any longer to be worthy of care or struggle? In such circumstances, being courageous or faithful is no longer so evident. In communities where it makes little difference to do one thing and to ignore others, heroes and saints are comparatively rare and philosophers feel themselves called upon to defend the credit-worthiness of ethical concepts with rational arguments and complex theories. Williams believes that in such cases they are biting off more than they can chew. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue over moral confidence, and when we do, the results are often narrow-minded.I leave it to the reader of the present issue to judge whether Williams is correct or not. In the articles by Göran Collste, `Should Every Human Being Get Health Care?', and John Hymers, `Not a Modest Proposal: Peter Singer and the Definition of Person', we can review a series of rational considerations about the human person that could give rise to concrete political and legal measures. The two subsequent articles deal with the relevance of conceptions of the person for concrete economic practice. Rudi Visker is dealing with the problem of a multicultural society and Armin Grunwald presents some reflections on technology development between social science and philosophy. (shrink)

This article aims at providing a framework to assess corporate social responsibility with international banks. Currently, it is mainly rating institutions like EIRIS and KLD that provide information about firms’ social conduct and performance. However, this is costly information and it is not clear how the rating institutions arrive at their conclusion. We develop a framework to assess the social responsibility of internationally operating banks. We apply this framework to more than 30 institutions and find significant differences among individual banks, (...) countries, and regions. Furthermore, it appears that social responsibility of these banks has significantly improved between 2000 and 2005. (shrink)

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive‐nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex‐systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to (...) underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account *Received August 2008; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B‐9000 Belgium; e‐mail: Bert[email protected]. (shrink)

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...) interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. (shrink)

We investigate how conventional asset managers account for environmental, social, and governance factors in their investment process. We do so on the basis of an international survey among fund managers. We find that many conventional managers integrate responsible investing in their investment process. Furthermore, we find that ESG information in particular is being used for red flagging and to manage risk. We find that many conventional fund managers have already adopted features of responsible investing in the investment process. Furthermore, we (...) argue and show that ESG investing is highly similar to fundamental investing. We also reveal that there is a substantial difference in the ways in which U.S. and European asset managers view ESG. (shrink)

How do Dutch people let each other know that they disagree? What do they say when they want to resolve their difference of opinion by way of an argumentative discussion? In what way do they convey that they are convinced by each other’s argumentation? How do they criticize each other’s argumentative moves? Which words and expressions do they use in these endeavors? By answering these questions this short essay provides a brief inventory of the language of argumentation in Dutch.

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year their landmark works The Uses of Argument and La nouvelle rhétorique. The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman’s inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars (...) in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned. (shrink)

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. Per agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review the IARC’s carcinogenicity evaluations. First (...) we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures – more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problem of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, and of the extrapolation from animal experiments. Then we address a very important question, viz. how we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important, we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings. (shrink)

Some common explanations of issue polarization and echo chambers rely on social or cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. Accordingly, suggested interventions like “be more open-minded” target these mechanisms: avoid epistemic bubbles and don’t discount contrary information. Contrary to such explanations, we show how a much weaker mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization in epistemic communities with little to no mechanisms of exclusion. We present a network model that demonstrates how a dynamic interaction between the preference for belief and common structures (...) of epistemic communities can turn very small unequal distributions of initial beliefs into full-blown polarization. This points to a different class of explanations, one that emphasizes the importance of the initial spread of information. We also show how our model complements extant explanations by including a version of biased assimilation and motivated reasoning—cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. We find that mechanisms of exclusion can exacerbate issue polarization, but may not be the ultimate root of it. Hence, the recommended interventions suggested by extant literature is expected to be limited and the problem of issue polarization to be even more intractable. (shrink)

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causal–structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided, which sheds light on explanatory (...) unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study. 1 Introduction2 The Theory of Classical Genetics3 Three Philosophical Accounts of the Theory of Classical Genetics3.1 The structuralist account3.2 Kitcher’s unificationism3.3 Darden and theory change in science4 A Common Lacuna: Where is Causality?5 Woodward’s Interventionist Account of Causation6 Causal Bayes Nets and Their Interrelations6.1 Causal Bayes nets6.2 Relations among causal nets6.3 Credal nets and their interrelations7 The Theory of the Gene and its Causal Graph8 A First Exemplar: Stem Length in Pea Plants8.1 Three crosses on stem length in pea plants8.2 The causal graph for stem length in pea plants8.3 Morgan’s explanatory principles and the credal net for stem length in pea plants9 Explaining Mendel’s Crosses: A Causal–Structural Account10 Monohybrid Crosses with Complete Dominance11 Exemplars,Explanatory Patterns, Generic Credal Nets, and Mechanism Schemas12 Incomplete Dominance13 Anomalies14 Multi-hybrid Crosses with Independent Assortment15 Multi-hybrid Crosses with Linkage and Crossing-Over16 Double Crossing-Over and the Linear Order of the Gene17 Causal–Structural Explanation18 Explanatory Unification19 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

Geschiedwetenschap was lange tijd vooral geschiedschrijving. Historische verhalen werden gebruikt om heersende gebruiken en opvattingen in het heden te ondersteunen. In de 19de eeuw werd de geschiedbeoefening een echt academische wetenschap. Deze professionalisering heeft voor veel goeds gezorgd, maar kan soms ook een last blijken. Met name het ontstaan van elkaar al dan niet verketterende 'scholen' en 'richtingen' heeft ertoe geleid dat historici soms meer bezig waren met het bestrijden van elkaars opvattingen dan met het onderbouwen van hun eigen standpunten.0Een (...) keur aan auteurs brengt in dit boek deze 'last der geschiedenis' en hoe daarmee om te gaan in kaart. Op welke manieren gingen historici sinds de professionalisering van hun vak in de 19de eeuw gebukt onder dominante representaties en benaderingswijzen van het verleden? Hoe hebben zij soms getracht, tegen de stroom in, daarmee te breken, en wat heeft dat aan nieuwe inzichten opgeleverd? (shrink)

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel)'s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two (...) partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity. (shrink)

This paper explores the hypothesis that first-order linguistic activities are better understood in terms of ecological, values-realizing dynamics rather than in terms of rule-governed processes. Conversing, like other perception-action skills is constrained by multiple values, heterarchically organized. This hypothesis is explored in terms of three broad approaches that contrast with models of language which view it as a cognitive system: conversing as a perceptual system for exploring dialogical arrays ; conversing as an action system for integrating diverse space-time scales ; (...) and conversing as a caring system for embodying the context-sensitivity and interdependency necessary to realize values. Approaching language as a caring action-perception system leads to a reconsideration of cognitive dimensions of linguistic activities, including consciousness, pragmatics, suffering, and hope. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop an ethical framework for the marketing of corporate social responsibility. Methods The approach is a conceptual one based on virtue ethics and on the corporate identity literature. Furthermore, empirical research results are used to describe the opportunities and pitfalls of using marketing communication tools in the strategy of building a virtuous corporate brand. Results/conclusions An ethical framework that addresses the paradoxical relation between the consequentialist perspective many proponents of the marketing of (...) CSR adopt, and ethical perspectives which criticize an exclusive profit-oriented approach to CSR. Furthermore, three CSR strategies in relation to the marketing of CSR are discussed. For each CSR strategy it is explored how a corporation could avoid falling into the promise/performance gap. (shrink)

Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In (...) a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that “compassion” is a more adequate emotion than “sadness”. The emotion “sadness” is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion “compassion” is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. (shrink)

At the bottom of all human activities are “values,” the conviction that some things “ought to be” and others not. Science, however, with its immense interest in mere facts seems to lack all understanding of such‘requiredness.’… A science … which would seriously admit nothing but indifferent facts … could not fail to destroy itself.

In the past 25 years, many philosophers have endorsed the view that the practical value of causal knowledge lies in the fact that manipulation of causes is a good way to bring about a desired change in the effect. This view is intuitively very plausible. For instance, we can predict a storm on the basis of a barometer reading, but we cannot avoid the storm by manipulating the state of the barometer (barometer status and storm are effects of a common (...) cause, viz. atmospheric conditions). In §1 we present textual evidence which shows that this view is very popular. In §2 we show that this standard view is too restrictive: the practical value of causal knowledge is wider. In §3 we introduce the distinction between ‘manipulative policy’ and ‘selective policy’ as a theoretical framework to account for this wider practical value. (shrink)

The use of coercion is morally problematic and requires an ongoing critical reflection. We wondered if not knowing or being uncertain whether coercion is morally right or justified is related to professionals’ normative attitudes regarding the use of coercion. This paper describes an explorative statistical analysis based on a cross-sectional survey across seven wards in three Norwegian mental health care institutions. Descriptive analyses showed that in general the 379 respondents a) were not so sure whether coercion should be seen as (...) offending, b) agreed with the viewpoint that coercion is needed for care and security, and c) slightly disagreed that coercion could be seen as treatment. Staff did not report high rates of moral doubt related to the use of coercion, although most of them agreed there will never be a single answer to the question ‘What is the right thing to do?’. Bivariate analyses showed that the more they experienced general moral doubt and relative doubt, the more one thought that coercion is offending. Especially psychologists were critical towards coercion. We found significant differences among ward types. Respondents with decisional responsibility for coercion and leadership responsibility saw coercion less as treatment. Frequent experience with coercion was related to seeing coercion more as care and security. This study showed that experiencing moral doubt is related to some one’s normative attitude towards coercion. Future research could investigate whether moral case deliberation increases professionals’ experience of moral doubt and whether this will evoke more critical thinking and increase staff’s curiosity for alternatives to coercion. (shrink)

Mechanistic approaches are very common in the causal interpretation of biological and neuroscientific experimental work in today’s philosophy of science. In the mechanistic literature a strict distinction is often made between causal relations and constitutive relations, where the latter cannot be causal. One of the typical reasons for this strict distinction is that constitutive relations are supposedly synchronic whereas most if not all causal relations are diachronic. This strict distinction gives rise to a number of problems, however. Our end goal (...) in this paper is to argue that it should be given up, at least in the context of the biological and the psychological sciences. To that effect, we argue that constitutive relations in this context are diachronic, thus undermining the aforementioned reason. We offer two cases from scientific practice in which constitutive relations are regarded as both diachronic and causally efficacious, review three existing ways of dealing with the apparent diachronic nature of interlevel relations in mechanisms and propose a new account of diachronic, causal constitutive relevance. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) aggravates issues of discrimination as has been argued by several authors. For this purpose, I first take up the lively philosophical debate on discrimination and present my own definition of the concept. Equipped with this account, I subsequently review some of the recent literature on the use AI/ADM and discrimination. I explain how my account of discrimination helps to understand that the general claim in (...) view of the aggravation of discrimination is unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the use of AI/ADM can, in fact, increase issues of discrimination, but in a different way than most critics assume: it is due to its epistemic opacity that AI/ADM threatens to undermine our moral deliberation which is essential for reaching a common understanding of what should count as discrimination. As a consequence, it turns out that algorithms may actually help to detect hidden forms of discrimination. (shrink)

Ethicists differ considerably in their reasons for using empirical data. This paper presents a brief overview of four traditional approaches to the use of empirical data: “the prescriptive applied ethicists,” “the theorists,” “the critical applied ethicists,” and “the particularists.” The main aim of this paper is to introduce a fifth approach of more recent date (i.e. “integrated empirical ethics”) and to offer some methodological directives for research in integrated empirical ethics. All five approaches are presented in a table for heuristic (...) purposes. The table consists of eight columns: “view on distinction descriptive-prescriptive sciences,” “location of moral authority,” “central goal(s),” “types of normativity,” “use of empirical data,” “method,” “interaction empirical data and moral theory,” and “cooperation with descriptive sciences.” Ethicists can use the table in order to identify their own approach. Reflection on these issues prior to starting research in empirical ethics should lead to harmonization of the different scientific disciplines and effective planning of the final research design. Integrated empirical ethics (IEE) refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descriptive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative. The paper ends with three suggestions for consideration on some of the future challenges of integrated empirical ethics. (shrink)

Introduction. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Préface. Bert HAMMINGA and Neil DE MARCHI: Idealization and the Defence of Economics: Notes Toward a History. Part I: General Observations on Idealization in Economics. Kevin D. HOOVER: Six Queries about Idealization in an Empirical Context. Bernard WALLISER: Three Generalization Processes for Economic Models. Steven COOK and David HENDRY: The Theory of Reduction in Econometrics. Maarten C.W. JANSSEN: Economic Models and Their Applications. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA: Idealization and Empirical Adequacy (...) in Economic Theory. Izabella NOWAKOWA and Leszek NOWAK: On Correspondence between Economic Theories. Uskali MÄKI: Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics. Part II: Case Studies of Idealization in Economics. Nancy CARTWRIGHT: Mill and Menger: Ideal Elements and Stable Tendencies. Wolfgang BALZER: Exchange Versus Influence: A Case of Idealization. Kees COOLS, Bert HAMMINGA, Theo A.F. KUIPERS: Truth Approximation by Concretization in Capital Structure Theory. Daniel M. HAUSMAN: Paul Samuelson as Dr. Frankenstein: When an Idealization Runs Amuck. Hugo A. KEUZENKAMP: What if an Idealization is Problematic? The Case of the Homogeneity Condition in Consumer Demand. Werner DIEDERICH: Nowak on Explanation and Idealization in Marx's 'Capital'. Gérard JORLAND: Idealization and Transformation. Jack BIRNER: Idealizations and Theory Development in Economics. Some History and Logic of the Logic Discovery. Discussions. Leszek NOWAK: The Idealizational Methodology and Economics. Replies to Diederich, Hoover, Janssen, Jorland and Mäki. (shrink)

Opinions are rarely binary; they can be held with different degrees of conviction, and this expanded attitude spectrum can affect the influence one opinion has on others. Our goal is to understand how different aspects of influence lead to recognizable spatio-temporal patterns of opinions and their strengths. To do this, we introduce a stochastic spatial agent-based model of opinion dynamics that includes a spectrum of opinion strengths and various possible rules for how the opinion strength of one individual affects the (...) influence that this individual has on others. Through simulations, we find that even a small amount of amplification of opinion strength through interaction with like-minded neighbors can tip the scales in favor of polarization and deadlock. (shrink)

This book discusses issues regarding conceptualization, governance and implementation of responsible innovation. It treats different approaches to making responsible innovation a reality and it contains new case studies that illustrate challenges and solutions. Research on Responsible Innovation is by its nature highly multidisciplinary, and also pro-active, design-oriented and policy-relevant. Until a few years back, the concept of Responsible Innovation was hardly used - nowadays it is increasingly receiving attention from both researchers and policy makers. This is indispensable reading for anyone (...) interested in or working on innovation. (shrink)

In clinical moral decision making, emotions often play an important role. However, many clinical ethicists are ignorant, suspicious or even critical of the role of emotions in making moral decisions and in reflecting on them. This raises practical and theoretical questions about the understanding and use of emotions in clinical ethics support services. This paper presents an Aristotelian view on emotions and describes its application in the practice of moral case deliberation.According to Aristotle, emotions are an original and integral part (...) of (virtue) ethics. Emotions are an inherent part of our moral reasoning and being, and therefore they should be an inherent part of any moral deliberation. Based on Aristotle's view, we examine five specific aspects of emotions: the description of emotions, the attitude towards emotions, the thoughts present in emotions, the reliability of emotions, and the reasonable principle that guides an emotion. We then discuss three ways of dealing with emotions in the process of moral case deliberation. Finally, we present an Aristotelian conversation method, and present practical experiences using this method. (shrink)

Commemorate[s] the centennial of the meeting of the Linnean Society, July 1, 1858, and the paper of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace which were read there.

The impressive young scholar Bert Mosselmans, analyzing the theory and policy of Jevons, a major figure in the field of the history of economics, has put together a volume with broad international appeal, particularly in Europe, North America and Japan, that offers a synthetic approach to Jevons’ economic theory, applied economics and economic policy. Adopting a relativist approach to his subject, Mosselmans focuses on all aspects of Jevons’ theory, tying the different strands together where appropriate and discriminating where necessary. (...) Examining the relation between theory and practise he situates Jevons within the history of economic thought and in relation to his logic, ethics, religion and aesthetics. Ideal for scholars working in the fields of philosophy and history as well as economics, this ambitious and insightful work offers a comprehensive analysis of one of the founding fathers of modern economic thought, whose work marked a new chapter in its history, bridging the gap between classical and neo-classical economics. (shrink)

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of (...) the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine which scale best correlates with performance, and whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies. (shrink)

Little is known about how health care professionals deal with ethical challenges in mental health care, especially when not making use of a formal ethics support service. Understanding this is important in order to be able to support the professionals, to improve the quality of care, and to know in which way future ethics support services might be helpful.

The philosophical essays collected here are predicated on the conviction that we live in a time when all-encompassing philosophical systems can no longer be seriously entertained as a true reflection of extant reality. Instead, an indefinite number of perspectives on - or discursive appropriations of - what is thought of as 'reality' are possible. Sometimes they diverge and sometimes they intersect in surprising ways, as these essays show. While the belief in an all-inclusive philosophical system is rejected, the author shows (...) that every perspective displays a coherence and illuminating power of its own.<BR> The collection is divided into two parts. The first considers philosophy, the individual and society, covering themes including the deleterious effects of capitalism on natural ecosystems, the modern conception of 'immortality' in Nietzsche's thought, Lacan's provocative interpretation of capitalist discourse, the current status of the humanities in universities, individual autonomy, the meaning of 'identification', global 'terrorism', and Plato's philosophical self-subversion. The second part gathers together perspectives on the arts and society, with the author arguing that reflections on cinema, architecture and music never isolate these arts from social concerns, but demonstrate their interconnectedness. (shrink)

The essays brought together in this volume are written from the dual perspectives of philosophy and psychoanalytic theory.