Combining philosophical and political analysis, this study offers a comprehensive reassessment of Castoriadis' contribution to critical theory in and through his critical confrontation with both the crisis of the traditional Left and the crisis of modern capitalist societies. The key concepts of 'crisis' and 'critique' are considered throughout the text and Castoriadis' ideas are situated in a critical debate with other radical thinkers, such as Lefort, Pannekoek, Arendt, Althusser, Axelos, Papaioannou and Marx. The study supplies an extensive analysis and explores (...) the contemporary relevance of Castoriadis' views regarding the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the events of May 1968 in France. It argues for a re-radicalization of his thought in light of the current capitalist crisis and seeks to trace his radical alternative to crisis by critically examining and further elaborating his positions with respect to socialism, autonomy and revolution. (shrink)

In the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created and implemented from November 2020 to February 2021 a monthly educational pilot program of philosophical management of stress based on Science, Humanism and Epicurean Pragmatism, which was offered to employees of 26 municipalities in the Prefecture of Attica, Greece. The program named “Philosophical Distress Management Operation System” (Philo.Di.M.O.S.) is novel and unique in its kind, as it combines a certain Greek philosophical tradition (Epicurean) that concurs with modern scientific knowledge. The (...) program was designed to be implemented in a period of crisis; therefore, it used a fast-paced, easy to learn and practice philosophical approach to stress management, based on cognitive psychotherapy. The philosophical approach to stress management has the advantage that it can be offered to most people, regardless of age and educational level. The pilot program was effective in achieving its objectives, shown by statistical comparisons of the trainees’ responses to anonymous questionnaires before and after the month-long training. The successful Philo.Di.M.O.S. program, thus, based on a solid scientific and philosophical basis, offers a paradigm of stress management during crises and could be useful in Greece and internationally. (shrink)

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, since the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: in three studies (N=607) the experienced event timings are determined by causality in real-time. Adult observers viewed a simple three-item sequence ACB, which is typically remembered (...) as ABC (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016), in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by post-perceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades. (shrink)

This book offers the first comprehensive assessment of Heidegger’s account of affective phenomena. Affective phenomena play a significant role in Heidegger’s philosophy — his analyses of mood significantly influenced diverse fields of research such as existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, theology and cultural studies. Despite this, no single collection of essays has been exclusively dedicated to this theme. Comprising twelve innovative essays by leading Heidegger scholars, this volume skilfully explores the role that not only Angst plays in Heidegger’s work, but also love (...) and boredom. Exploring the nature of affective phenomena in Heidegger, as well as the role they play in wider philosophical debates, the volume is a valuable addition to Heideggerian scholarship and beyond, enriching current debates across disciplines on the nature of human agency. (shrink)

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

In his 1988 University Lecture in Religion at Arizona State University, Josef van Ess argued for a widespread concept of a “compact” God in early Islam. The notion is expressed by ṣamad in Sura 112.2, an enigmatic word, which “in the first half of the second Islamic century … was understood as meaning ‘massive, compact.’” There is Islamic evidence for this, van Ess argued: “The best testimony, however, comes from outside Islam: Theodore Abū Qurra, bishop of Ḥarrān in Upper Mesopotamia (...) , translated ṣamad into Greek as sphyropēktos, a quite unusual word meaning something like ‘hammered together, closely united.’ Nicetas of Byzantium later on used holosphyros instead, ‘entirely chased in metal.’” Those familiar with the negative reception of these Byzantine translations of ṣamad by several scholars will undoubtedly be surprised by van Ess's statement, which considers the translations as trustworthy testimony. When John Meyendorff had earlier wondered tentatively whether some Byzantine interpretations of Islamic doctrine, including God sphyropēktos or holosphyros, could “in fact come from some forms of popular Arab religion—distinct, of course, from orthodox Islam—which were known to the Byzantines,” his thought was called “provocative.” Scholars translate sphyropēktos as “beaten solid into a ball” or “solid ” and holosphyros as “of hammer-beaten metal” , “made of solid, hammer-beaten metal” , “impenetrable” , or “made of solid metal beaten to a spherical shape” . They are often inclined to assume that the Greek words represent “a clumsy translation” , “a blatant, derogatory mistranslation of the divine epithet ṣamad” , “the result of a biased attitude and wrong interpretation of the Qur՚anic proclamation of Allah” , or “one of the stock examples in Christian polemics against Islam” or that they were “probably originally chosen for polemical reasons, to claim that Muslims believe in a material, corporeal God” . Perhaps under the impression of these views, in his recent translation of Theodore Abū Qurrah, John C. Lamoreaux, instead of sphyropēktos, adopts a variant reading, steiropēktos , meaning “barren-built.”. (shrink)

This article presents the unpublished Byzantine lead seals from the archaeological collection of Mystras which now are stored in the depots of the Museum of Mystras.The first seal names a Michael Barys . Probably he was bishop of Helos, known from another seal with metrical inscription which has not been fully read until now. – The second is a seal of an imperial protospatharios and tourmarches Spartaron Ioannes . This military unit is attested by this seal and other three parallel (...) pieces from the collection of Dumbarton Oaks. The name Spartaron and the fact that this seal was found in Sparta can be taken as evidence for the existence of a military unit which recalls the capabilities and fighting prowess of the Ancient Spartans. – The third lead seal mentions a vestarches and judge of the Velum, of Peloponnesos and Hellas Petros Serblias. It describes an unknown stadium of the career of Petros Serblias, a person already known from other sources.At the end four metallic plates are presented, found near to the Upper Gate of the castle of Mystras, which are caps for bottles of theriaca, a well known antiseptic medicine from the apothecary of Due Mori in Venice .Two of the seals were found in a recently unearthed Byzantine olive-press in a quarter of Byzantine Sparta where the city was expanded in the time between the tenth and twelfth century. (shrink)

Abstract Although expressivist theories have been applied to many normative discourses (moral, rationality, knowledge, etc.), the normative discourse of epistemic justification has been somewhat neglected by expressivists. In this paper, I aspire to both remedy this unfortunate situation and introduce a novel version of expressivist theory: Habits-Expressivism. To pave the way for habits-expressivism, I turn to Allan Gibbard's (1990, 2003, 2008) seminal work on expressivism. I first examine Gibbard's (2003, 2008) late plan-reliance expressivism and argue that it faces certain problems (...) when applied to epistemic justification discourse. As a response to these problems, I go on to introduce habits-expressivism and argue that not only does it avoid the identified problems for plan-reliance-expressivism, but it also captures the basic attractions of both plan-reliance expressivism and Gibbard's (1990) early theory of norm-expressivism. (shrink)

An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.

The objective of this paper is to articulate a distinction between habit and bodily skill as different ways of acting without deliberation. I start by elaborating on a distinction between habit and skill as different kinds of dispositions. Then I argue that this distinction has direct implications for the varieties of automaticity exhibited in habitual and skilful bodily acts. The argument suggests that paying close attention to the metaphysics of agency can help to articulate more precisely questions regarding the varieties (...) of automaticity exhibited in overt action. (shrink)

Metaepistemology Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about first-order epistemological questions. It inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, and beyond. So, if as traditionally conceived, epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. … Continue reading Metaepistemology →.

Skeptical invariantism does not account for the intuitive connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning and this constitutes a significant problem for the position because it does not save corresponding epistemic appearances (cf. Hawthorne (2004:131-5)). Moreover, it is an attraction of fallibilist over infallibilist-skeptical views that they can easily account for the epistemic appearances about the connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning (cf. Williamson (2000:249-255)). Call this argument ‘the argument from the knowledge norm’. I motivate and develop a Humean, (...) pragmatist strategy for a skeptical response to ‘the argument from the knowledge norm’. Afterwards I outline a ‘toy’ version of pragmatic skepticism that can implement the strategy and save our everyday practice of assertion and practical reasoning. To this effect, I distinguish between assertibility conditions and truth conditions for ‘know’ and suggest that while assertibility conditions are pragmatic conditions sensitive to practical exigencies, truth conditions are semantic conditions sensitive only to truth. I briefly respond to three objections and conclude that pragmatic skepticism is resourceful enough to save our everyday practice of (fallibilist) assertion and practical reasoning and, hence, pay some due respect to corresponding epistemic appearances. (shrink)

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how (...) the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected. (shrink)

With contributions from a number of pioneering researchers in the field, this collection is aimed not only at researchers and scientists in nonlinear dynamics but also at a broader audience interested in understanding and exploring how modern chaos theory has developed since the days of Poincaré. This book was motivated by and is an outcome of the CHAOS 2015 meeting held at the Henri Poincaré Institute in Paris, which provided a perfect opportunity to gain inspiration and discuss new perspectives on (...) the history, development and modern aspects of chaos theory. Henri Poincaré is remembered as a great mind in mathematics, physics and astronomy. His works, well beyond their rigorous mathematical and analytical style, are known for their deep insights into science and research in general, and the philosophy of science in particular. The Poincaré conjecture (only proved in 2006) along with his work on the three-body problem are considered to be the foundation of modern chaos theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose that economic sustainability is seen in terms of (inter-temporal and inter-national) value creation. We claim that value appropriation (or capture), can become a constraint to economic sustainability. We propose that for sustainable value creation to be fostered, corporate governance needs to be aligned to public and supra-national governance. In order to achieve this, a hierarchically layered set of ‘agencies’, needs to be diagnosed and the issue of incentive alignment addressed. Enlightened self-interest, pluralism and diversity, as (...) well as a representative supra-national organisation for world-wide economic sustainability can serve as a new, more ‘ethically correct’ governance for economic sustainability, but not a panacea. (shrink)

Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ A new science of religion, Routledge, New York, 2012; Sloan, McKenny, Eggelson Darwin in the 21st century: nature, humanity, and God, University Press, Notre Dame, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic norm. (...) The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling ‘companions in guilt arguments’. Finally, I consider ‘the core reductionist objection’ to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized. (shrink)

The Dutch Reformed Church had a strong missionary DNA since the planting of the church. This missionary focus and fervour, however, ebbed and flowed during the history of the church. Saayman described that the mission upsurges in the DRC in four waves or 'periods of extraordinary mission endeavour'. The current research aimed to develop this theory through a literature study on the sociopolitical context and the developments in the ecclesiology and missiology of the DRC since the planting of the church (...) up to 2013. The research found strong evidence to define a fifth wave. The fifth wave was influenced by contextual changes and loss of influence and money by the DRC. Furthermore, the growth in the church's missional identity can be seen in the following aspects: the influence of theologians like Lesslie Newbigin and David Bosch; a belief that mission is not something the church does but something the church is; a shift from a Christocentric theology to a Trinitarian theology; a holistic view of salvation; a commitment to the local context of the congregation and a focus on bringing healing to their local communities; and lastly, the success of the Gestuurde Gemeentes network and, more recently, the Mission Shaped Ministry training. (shrink)

Conceiving the media as something massive, solid, rigid, unilateral, opposing agents and viewers, makes less and less sense in view of the development of the internet. However the analysis of the mechanism known as RSS Syndication shows that it is the very notion of the media which must be questioned. If it is better to “become” the media than to “hate” it, as the slogan for alternative practices invites us to do, we are clearly led to ask : what media (...) ? RSS Syndication allows us to transform information into practices of permanent production of subjectivity. Circulating automatically from blogs to blogs, from sites to sites, constantly renewed, archived, selected, personalized, enriched, information becomes the smooth fuel that feeds the individuals and the communities which use it. This article discusses the history and future becomings of such innovations. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activity present a difficult case for the ‘standard story’ of action. They are things intentionally done, but they do not seem to be suitably related to mental states. I suggest that once manifestations of habit are properly distinguished from exercises of skills and other kinds of spontaneous acts, we can see that habit raises a distinctive sort of problem. I examine certain responses that have (...) been given, as well as responses that could be given on behalf of the standard story to the problems presented by habitual activity. These responses rely on the idea of a kind of intention that does not ensue from conscious thought or deliberation. I raise three different objections to this line of response. The conclusion is that habit explains aspects of human behavior that cannot be accounted by ascribing intentions of any kind. (shrink)

I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...) achieve this much because it distinguishes between two distinct but closely interrelated (sub)concepts of (propositional) knowledge, fallible-but-safe knowledge and infallible-and-sensitive knowledge, and explains how the pragmatics and the semantics of knowledge discourse operate at the interface of these two (sub)concepts of knowledge. I conclude that BSI is a novel theory of knowledge discourse that merits serious investigation. (shrink)

Bill Pollard has recently developed an account of habits of action, endeavoring to rehabilitate the traditional notion of habit in a way that can be used to address current philosophical concerns. I argue that Pollard’s account has important shortcomings. The account is intended to apply indiscriminately to both habitual and skilled acts, but this overlooks crucial distinctions. Moreover, Pollard’s account fails to do justice to the various ways in which the idea of habit figures in the explanation and assessment of (...) action. These shortcomings are a consequence of certain assumptions Pollard shares with the accounts of mind and action he sets to criticize. As long as these assumptions are left intact, the potential of dispositional notions such as habit and skill to contribute to contemporary debates will not be realized. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION. Porphyry the Philosopher The most distinguished disciple of Plotinus, his editor and close friend, was without doubt Porphyry. ...

Cuneo and Shafer-Landau have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. In critique, Killoren :165–173, 2016) has revisited the old skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question and argued that the moral fixed (...) points give us no reason to care about morality and, therefore, they are normatively irrelevant. He concluded that this is a counterintuitive implication that undermines the proposal. In this paper, I develop a rejoinder to Killoren’s argument that explains why, at least from the perspective of the moral fixed points framework, if the moral fixed points exist, they are necessarily normatively relevant for rational agents. I supplement this explanation with an explanation of why it might prima facie appear that moral fixed points are not normatively relevant, although ultima facie they are relevant. The supplementary explanation explains prima facie normative irrelevance as the upshot of failures of rational agency. I conclude that the moral fixed points, can, in principle, offer an interesting response to the skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question’. (shrink)

The article focuses on Burke’s engagement with India and the Impeachment of Warren Hastings. It attempts to trace the way in which Burke, in his rhetoric on India, uses the sentimentalist vocabulary of the Scottish Enlightenment and, more particularly, the concept of sympathy. Burke, it is suggested, passes from a Humean to a Smithian understanding of sympathy, giving however, at every stage of this development, his own turn and character to the concept. Overall, Burke’s writings on India reveal quite advanced (...) for his time political reflexes and oblige us to reconsider the stereotypic image of Burke as an icon of conservatism. (shrink)

The article sets the most eminent defender of the French Revolution, Immanuel Kant, against its most eminent critic, Edmund Burke, articulating their radically different stance toward the French Revolution. Specifically, this juxtaposition is attempted through the concept of enthusiasm; a psychological state of intense excitement, which can refer to both actors and spectators, to both the motivation of someone, acquiring thus a practical significance, or to their distanced contemplation, thereby acquiring the character of aesthetic appreciation. Using the concept of enthusiasm, (...) Ι aspire to bring out Kant’s and Burke’s radically different approaches to society as well as its history and prospects of progress, ultimately suggesting that enthusiasm can provide a vantage point for the dialogue between the enlightenment and counter-enlightenment theses. (shrink)