This collection of essays offers multifaceted explorations of animal encounters in a range of philosophical, cultural, literary, and historical contexts. Exploring Animal Encounters encourages us to think about the richness and complexity of animal lives and human-animal relations, foregrounding the intricate roles nonhuman creatures play in the always already more-than-human sphere of ethics and politics. In this way, the essays in this volume can be understood as a contribution to alternative imaginings of interspecies coexistence in a time in which the (...) issue of human relations with earth and earth others has come to the fore with unprecedented force and severity. (shrink)

This volume analyses ancient and medieval theories of intentionality in various contexts: perception, imagination, and intellectual thinking.

This book presents fresh insights into analogue quantum simulation. It argues that these simulations are a new instrument of science. They require a bespoke philosophical analysis, sensitive to both the similarities to and the differences with conventional scientific practices such as analogical argument, experimentation, and classical simulation. -/- The analysis situates the various forms of analogue quantum simulation on the methodological map of modern science. In doing so, it clarifies the functions that analogue quantum simulation serves in scientific practice. To (...) this end, the authors introduce a number of important terminological distinctions. They establish that analogue quantum ‘computation' and ‘emulation' are distinct scientific practices and lead to distinct forms of scientific understanding. The authors also demonstrate the normative value of the computation vs. emulation distinction at both an epistemic and a pragmatic level. -/- The volume features a range of detailed case studies focusing on: i) cold atom computation of many-body localisation and the Higgs mode; ii) photonic emulation of quantum effects in biological systems; and iii) emulation of Hawking radiation in dispersive optical media. Overall, readers will discover a normative framework to isolate and support the goals of scientists undertaking analogue quantum simulation and emulation. This framework will prove useful to both working scientists and philosophers of science interested in cutting-edge scientific practice. (shrink)

This study illuminates how a cross-sector social partnership legitimizes itself toward multiple internal and external stakeholders. Within a single-case study design, we collected retrospective and real time data on the partnership between Deutsche Post DHL and The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Within this partnership, Deutsche Post DHL provides corporate volunteers that support disaster response after natural disasters on a pro bono basis. The main objects that needed legitimacy as well as the audiences from which legitimacy (...) was mainly sought changed over time. In addition, we identified legitimation work as occurring across objects, audiences, and time. Thus, we introduce legitimation work as the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of legitimacy. These findings contribute to micro-level considerations within institutional theory which view legitimacy as socially constructed between legitimacy seeker and conferrer. Hence, we add another perspective on legitimation to the previously existing conceptualizations of legitimacy as a deterministic consequence of institutionalization. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ongoing debate over the relation between belief and credence. A proposal is made to reverse the currently predominant order of analysis, by taking belief as conceptually basic and credence as the phenomenon to be clarified. In brief, the proposal is to explicate an agent’s credence in a proposition P as the agent’s tendency toward believing P. Platitudinous as this reduction may seem, it runs counter to all of the major positions in the debate, including the Threshold (...) View, the Certainty View as conventionally understood, Dualism, Eliminativism, as well as Credence Primitivism. Section 1 gives an overview on the current state of the debate. Section 2 considers unsuccessful predecessors of the proposed belief-first approach to credence. Section 3 motivates and lays out the basics of a conceptual framework for thinking about doxastic states that characterizes such states in terms of two formally independent dimensions, one pertaining to the agent’s tendency toward believing P, the other to the level of resilience with which the agent manifests that tendency. Against this backdrop, it is argued in Sect. 4 that the present reduction satisfies a set of standard, theoretically neutral criteria of adequacy for theories of credence, at least once they are purged of a quite common conflation of tendency and resilience. Section 5 argues against all of the above competing accounts. (shrink)

Agent-based modeling has become a common and well-established tool in the social sciences and certain of the humanities. Here, we aim to provide an overview of the different modeling approaches in current use. Our discussion unfolds in two parts: we first classify different aspects of the model-building process and identify a number of characteristics shared by most agent-based models in the humanities and social sciences; then we map relevant differences between the various modeling approaches. We classify these into different dimensions (...) including the type of target systems addressed, the intended modeling goals, and the models’ degree of abstraction. Along the way, we provide reference to related debates in contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...) new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology. (shrink)

This paper discusses a scenario borrowed from Williamson (2000) and repurposes it to argue for the possibility of conflict between two prima facie categorical norms of epistemic rationality: the norm to respect one’s evidence and the norm to be coherent. It is argued, pace Williamson, that in the conflict defining the scenario, the evidence norm overrides the coherence norm; that a rational agent with our evidence would lack evidence about some of their own credences; and that for agents whose evidence (...) is limited in this way, incoherence fails to entail irrationality. The above possibility claim has also been defended by Worsnip (2018), albeit on a quite different premise set and in conjunction with a coherence-centered account of epistemic rationality that issues predictions incompatible with those licensed by the evidence-centered account recommended here, as illustrated towards the end of the paper. (shrink)

This paper examines Elisabeth of Bohemia’s critique of Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness. According to this conception, we can all become happy because we can all make full use of our rational faculties and constantly follow our best judgments. Happiness is nothing but an “internal satisfaction” that arises when we act in accordance with these judgments. Elisabeth challenges this conception by pointing out that it is far too optimistic and that it neglects what is external to our own mind. Quite (...) often, we cannot make full use of our rational faculties because we are in the grip of passions and diseases or because we are under time pressure and can neither make the best decisions nor foresee their consequences. The paper focuses on these two objections, arguing that Elisabeth replaces Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness with a more complex conception that takes both internal and external factors into account. On her view, not only the right use of our rational faculties but also the right conditions for using them are required for obtaining happiness. In defending this view, Elisabeth presents an alternative to Descartes’ position and should therefore be seen as an original thinker engaging in a philosophical debate. (shrink)

Dass das Verständnis von und die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit argumentativen Zusammenhängen für den Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht von besonderer Bedeutung ist, ist unumstritten. Ebenso unumstritten ist es, dass es sich bei der schulischen Vermittlung von Argumentationskompetenzen um keinen Selbstzweck handelt, sondern dass Lernende vor dem Hintergrund der erworbenen Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse zu einer fundierten Meinungsbildung befähigt werden sollen. In diesem Artikel argumentiere ich vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Ergebnisse der erkenntnistheoretischen Forschung dafür, dass das soeben skizzierte Bild jedoch einer grundlegenden Ergänzung bedarf, (...) da im spezifischen Kontext des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts nicht die Bildung, sondern vielmehr die Aufgabe eines eigenen Urteils das epistemisch wünschenswerte Ergebnis darstellt. (shrink)

What kind of entities are faculties? How are they related to the soul and to the entire living being? How can they be classified? And in what sense are they responsible for a large variety of activities? This chapter examines these questions, which were extensively discussed by scholastic authors, and focuses on the metaphysical models established by William of Auvergne, Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suárez. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. While some authors (e.g. (...) Ockham) took the faculties to be mere ways of acting of the soul, others (e.g. Suárez) conceived of them as distinct entities with their own power. The latter theory gave rise to a new model of the soul—a model that presented it as a complex entity with many distinct causes. (shrink)

One of the important lessons to take away from Rohit Parikh’s impressive body of work is that logicians and computer scientists have much to gain by focusing their attention on the intricacies of political campaigns. Drawing on recent work developing a theory of expressive voting, we study the dynamics of voters’ opinions during an election. In this paper, we develop a model in which the relative importance of the different issues that concern a voter may change either in response to (...) candidates’ statements during a campaign or due to unforeseen events. We study how changes in a voter?s attention to the issues influence voting behavior under voting systems such as plurality rule and approval voting. We argue that it can be worthwhile for candidates to reshape public focus, but that doing so can be a complex and risky activity. (shrink)

When it comes to political, religious or ethical issues, many people consider a tolerant “live and let live”-attitude to be the best reaction to disagreement. However, the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement within social epistemology gave rise to certain worries about the epistemic rationality of tolerance. Setting aside those already extensively discussed worries, I would like to focus on the instrumental rationality of a tolerant attitude with respect to our epistemic goals.

In diesem Buch setzen sich zehn Wissenschaftler und Autoren aus verschiedenen Disziplinen mit dem unfaßbaren Thema Glück auseinander. Weit davon entfernt, Glücksratgeber zu sein, hinterfragen die hier versammelten Autoren verschiedene Glücksdefinitionen: Philosophisch gesehen findet sich das Glück zum Beispiel im «guten Leben». Wer der schwierigen Frage, was ein gutes Leben sei, aus dem Weg gehen will, der sucht das Glück vielleicht lieber in konkreten Dingen, wie Geld, Sport, Drogen, Musik, Reisen oder Lesen. Neben dem individuellen Glück werden auch große, kulturelle (...) Glücksbeschaffer besprochen, denn Religion, Ideologie und Magie wollen ebenfalls das Glück herbeibringen - oder sie versprechen es zumindest. Im Licht der unterschiedlichen Methoden und Fragestellungen treffen in diesem Band verschiedene Facetten der zutiefst menschlichen Suche nach dem Glück aufeinander. Aus der Summe der Perspektiven eröffnet sich ein fragmentarisches Panorama, welches auf eindrucksvolle Weise die Größe des gesuchten Gefühles offenbart. (shrink)

In eukaryotes, the messenger RNA (mRNA), the blueprint of a protein‐coding gene, is processed and packaged into a messenger ribonucleoprotein particle (mRNP) by mRNA‐binding proteins in the nucleus. The steps of mRNP formation – transcription, processing, packaging, and the orchestrated release of the export‐competent mRNP from the site of transcription for nuclear mRNA export – are tightly coupled to ensure a highly efficient and regulated process. The importance of highly accurate nuclear mRNP formation is illustrated by the fact that mutations (...) in components of this pathway lead to cellular inviability or to severe diseases in metazoans. We hypothesize that efficient mRNP formation is realized by a molecular mRNP packaging station, which is built by several recruitment platforms and coordinates the individual steps of mRNP formation. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for (...) goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics. (shrink)

Insects reevaluated as archives foreground possible sites of multidisciplinary research, with multifaceted potential for the history of science. With different disciplinary approaches to the study of small animals and the production of collections, the history of science, archaeology, environmental history, and natural history are brought into conversation in this forum on “Collection Ecologies.” This exchange about collections as a web of relationships entailing regimes of value, epistemes of logistics, and bureaucratic and scientific practices explores how multidisciplinary knowledge of “natural” bodies (...) can be formed around insect collections. (shrink)

Consider where κ is an uncountable regular cardinal. By a result of Shelah's we have for almost all witnessing this. Here we consider the question if there could be a similar result for. We will discuss some basic facts implying that this cannot hold in general. We will use these facts to construct an interesting example of a pseudo Prikry forcing, answering a question of Sinapova.

In the past several years, observational entropy has been developed as both a quantum generalization of Boltzmann entropy, and as a rather general framework to encompass classical and quantum equilibrium and non-equilibrium coarse-grained entropy. In this paper we review the construction, interpretation, most important properties, and some applications of this framework. The treatment is self-contained and relatively pedagogical, aimed at a broad class of researchers.

Like many philosophers in the scholastic tradition, Suárez claims that we cannot cognize anything unless we use a cognitive device, a so-called intelligible species. But how can we produce such a device? And what kind of cognition does it make possible? This chapter examines these questions, paying particular attention to Suárez’s rejection of traditional theories that explained the production of intelligible species by referring to efficient causation. On his view, there can only be a relation of occasional causation: the existence (...) of sensory images is simply an occasion for the intellect to produce intelligible species. This chapter first analyzes this type of causation and then looks at the function of the species. It argues that species are inner representations that make particular things cognitively present. In presenting this view, Suárez breaks with a long tradition that took species to be the product of a process of assimilation of universal forms and paves the way for early modern theories of representation. (shrink)

The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...) model transformations continuous with respect to the Stone topology and present results on the recurrent behavior of said maps. (shrink)

We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker, omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation (...) underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the “mental component” of knowledge. (shrink)

In his Tractatus de secundi intentionibus Hervaeus Natalis claims that an intention, taken in the strict sense, is not a mental entity but a thing qua cognized thing having « objective existence ». Peter Aureol agrees with this thesis, but he denies that one needs to introduce, in addition to this « concrete intention », an « abstract intention ». This article gives a preliminary edition of Aureol’s critique, along with a brief analysis of the controversial issues in the Aureol-Hervaeus (...) debate. (shrink)

This paper provides the first systematic philosophical analysis of an increasingly important part of modern scientific practice: analogue quantum simulation. We introduce the distinction between `simulation' and `emulation' as applied in the context of two case studies. Based upon this distinction, and building upon ideas from the recent philosophical literature on scientific understanding, we provide a normative framework to isolate and support the goals of scientists undertaking analogue quantum simulation and emulation. We expect our framework to be useful to both (...) working scientists and philosophers of science interested in cutting-edge scientific practice. (shrink)

Student relativism is a widespread phenomenon in philosophy classes. While the exact nature of student relativism is controversially discussed, many authors agree on two points: First, it is widely agreed that SR is a rather problematic phenomenon, because it potentially undermines the very purpose of doing philosophy—if there is no objective truth, arguing seems to be pointless. Second, it is widely agreed that there will be some close connection between SR and a tolerant attitude towards conflicting opinions. In this paper, (...) I will argue that if these two assumptions are true, then discussing some basic philosophical insights about the concept of tolerance with students will be a promising new strategy of dealing with SR. (shrink)

Toleranz – eine Haltung, die in westlichen Gesellschaften wie kaum eine andere mit Nachdruck gefordert und mit Vehemenz verteidigt wird. Insbesondere eine tolerante Haltung gegenüber fremden Ansichten, Standpunkten und Überzeugungen wird von vielen als unverzichtbare Bedingung für das Gelingen eines demokratischen Miteinanders angesehen. Gleichzeitig wird kontrovers diskutiert, wo eigentlich die Grenzen einer toleranten Pluralität verschiedener Meinungen gezogen werden sollen. Welche Ansichten sind noch tolerabel, und welche nicht? Mit Blick auf aktuelle gesellschaftliche Diskurse und vor dem Hintergrund umfassender Kenntnisse der philosophischen (...) Toleranzforschung überprüft Dominik Balg kontrovers diskutierte Minderheitenpositionen auf ihre Tolerierbarkeit und entwickelt vor diesem Hintergrund einen klaren Kriterienkatalog, mit Hilfe dessen sich die Grenzen einer toleranten Haltung sinnvoll ziehen lassen. Darüber hinaus widmet er sich der Frage, was eigentlich jenseits unserer Toleranzgrenzen liegen sollte und wie man verantwortungsvoll mit Positionen umgehen kann, die nicht mehr tolerabel sind. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungJeder extrahierte Zahn ist primär Eigentum des betreffenden Patienten und unterliegt dessen autonomiebasiertem Selbstbestimmungsrecht. Diesem weitgehend unstrittigen Sachverhalt steht die praktische Notwendigkeit gegenüber, extrahierte Zähne für Forschung und Lehre bereitzustellen. So ist z. B. die Erprobung neuer Wurzelfüllmaterialien und -techniken ohne den Einsatz extrahierter Zähne ebenso wenig denkbar wie eine zahnbezogene praktische Ausbildung angehender Zahnärzte im Rahmen des universitären Studiums. In jüngster Zeit wurde vermehrt Kritik an der konventionellen Praxis der Rekrutierung und Nutzung extrahierter Zähne geübt. Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet (...) sich der vorliegende Beitrag der Frage nach den ethischen und rechtlichen Voraussetzungen für die Verwendung extrahierter Zähne in Lehre und Forschung. Damit verbunden sind die Fragen nach 1) der Indikationsstellung zur Extraktion, 2) dem Umgang mit Kommerzialisierungsgefahren und äußerem Druck, 3) dem geeigneten Zeitpunkt der Aufklärung, 4) der Reichweite der Aufklärungspflicht und 5) Art und Umfang der Dokumentation. Der Beitrag fußt auf einer ethisch-rechtlichen Analyse der vorgenannten Problemkreise unter Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen rechtlichen Bestimmungen und der verfügbaren Fachliteratur und führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Rekrutierung und Nutzung extrahierter Zähne unter bestimmten, klar definierten Rahmenbedingungen ethisch und rechtlich zulässig ist. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung. Seit vielen Jahren liegt die Sektionsrate in Deutschland deutlich unter dem Niveau anderer europäischer Staaten. Wenngleich Skeptiker und Gegner der inneren Leichenschau ihren Standpunkt mit dem allgemeinen Hinweis auf sittlich-religiöse Bedenken zu untermauern suchen, lassen sich – gerade unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten – zahlreiche Argumente für eine Erhöhung der Sektionsfrequenz ausmachen. Letztere betreffen den Verstorbenen ebenso wie die Angehörigen, weitere an der inneren Leichenschau beteiligte Personen und die Gesundheitsfürsorge als Ganzes. Weder die Anschauungen der christlichen Religion noch das vielzitierte allgemeine (...) Pietätsempfinden stehen einer Leichenöffnung entgegen. Die vergleichsweise geringe Akzeptanz der inneren Leichenschau in der Bevölkerung ist nicht zuletzt auf eine mangelnde Aufklärung und eine unbefriedigende Öffentlichkeitsarbeit zurückzuführen. Eine unsachliche Berichterstattung in einem Teil der Medien ist hierbei ebenso geltend zu machen wie das mangelnde Engagement mancher Ärzte und Amtsrichter. Hinzu kommen Erschwernisse von seiten des Gesetzgebers, der den Regelungen zur Entstehung und Geburt menschlichen Lebens seit Jahren einen größeren Stellenwert einräumt als bestehenden Problemen im Zusammenhang mit Sterben und Tod. (shrink)

Ein Topos in institutionellen Stellungnahmen zu „Genome Editing am Menschen“ ist die Forderung nach einem Moratorium. Dieses soll einerseits dazu dienen, zu einer angemessenen Risikoabklärung zu gelangen, und andererseits einer gesellschaftlichen und ethischen Diskussion hinreichend Raum zu geben, um zu entscheiden, ob die vom Moratorium betroffenen Eingriffe überhaupt grundsätzlich erwünscht sind. Dabei scheint das Moratorium eine kompromisshafte Lösung zu sein, auf die sich die Mitglieder in weltanschaulich pluralen Ethikgremien verständigen können. Die Analyse der zu Genome Editing in den Jahren 2015 (...) bis 2018 verfassten Stellungnahmen zeigt jedoch ein deutlich komplexeres Bild: Was als konsensuale Kompromissformel erscheint, stellt sich als vielfach konflikthaftes Lösungsmodell dar. Umstritten ist in den unterschiedlichen Moratoriumsmodellen der Umfang (was alles ist vom Moratorium betroffen?), die Dauer (gibt es ein konkretes Datum, bis zu dem das Moratorium gilt?), der Zweck (dient es bloß der Risikoabschätzung oder auch der ethischen und/oder gesamtgesellschaftlichen Diskussion?) und die Frage, was für eine Maßnahme am Ende des Moratoriums getroffen werden soll. Zudem ist zwischen impliziten und expliziten Moratorien zu unterscheiden und zu untersuchen, was mit dem Moratoriumsvorschlag jeweils nicht verursacht werden soll (zum Beispiel die Grundlagenforschung einschränken). Am Ende der ethischen Analyse zeigt sich, dass mit klarer bestimmten Moratoriumsforderungen ein stärkeres Bewusstsein des Aufschub-Charakters dieser spezifischen Empfehlung einhergeht. So lässt sich auch das Ethos der Verantwortlichkeit – gegenüber jetzt Lebenden sowie künftigen Generationen – besser realisieren. (shrink)

The article examines the relation between correspondence and convergence in Charles S. Peirce’s theory of truth. An analysis of the context in which the pragmatic concept of truth was introduced, as well as the logical structure of Peirce’s definition, support the claim that Peirce’s position should be understood as a reform of the classical concept of truth rather than its rejection. In particular, the question of the nominalist and realist interpretation of classical and non-classical accounts of truth is addressed, as (...) well as a critique of the proposal to reconcile the actualist and counterfactual interpretation of the convergence condition for truth. (shrink)

What am I thinking about? John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on intentional objects.

We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker, omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation (...) underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the “mental component” of knowledge. (shrink)