This paper provides new tools for philosophical argument analysis and fresh empirical foundations for ‘critical’ ordinary language philosophy. Language comprehension routinely involves stereotypical inferences with contextual defeaters. J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia first mooted the idea that contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from verbal case-descriptions drive some philosophical paradoxes; these engender philosophical problems that can be resolved by exposing the underlying fallacies. We build on psycholinguistic research on salience effects to explain when and why even perfectly competent speakers cannot help making (...) stereotypical inferences which are contextually inappropriate. We analyse a classical paradox about perception, suggest it relies on contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences from appearance-verbs, and show that the conditions we identified as leading to contextually inappropriate stereotypical inferences are met in formulations of the paradox. Three experiments use a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to document the predicted inappropriate inferences, in English, German, and Japanese. The cross-linguistic study allows us to assess the wider relevance of the proposed analysis. Our findings open up new perspectives for ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy. (shrink)

What are consequential world problems? As “grand societal challenges”, one might define them as problems that affect a large number of people, perhaps even the entire planet, including problems such as climate change, distributive justice, world peace, world nutrition, clean air and clean water, access to education, and many more. The “Sustainable Development Goals”, compiled by the United Nations, represent a collection of such global problems. From my point of view, these problems can be seen as complex. Such complex problems (...) are characterized by the complexity, connectivity, dynamics, intransparency, and polytely of their underlying systems. These attributes require special competencies for dealing with the uncertainties of the given domains, e.g., critical thinking. My position is that it is not IQ, but complex problem-solving competencies for dealing with complex and dynamic situations, that is important for handling consequential global problems. These problems require system competencies, i.e., competencies that go beyond analytical intelligence, and comprise systems understanding as well as systems control. Complex problem-solving is more than analytic intelligence. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1..

The work of joachim jungius on the logic of relations was not as original as some authors have thought, But he did make it clear that relational inferences should be distinguished from categorical inferences; and he was the first to recognize the argument 'a rectis ad obliqua', An example of which is 'all circles are figures, Therefore whoever draws a circle draws a figure'.

According to Sternberg (Transformational giftedness. In T. L. Cross & P. Olszewski-Kubilius (Eds.), Conceptual frameworks for giftedness and talent development (pp. 203–234). Prufrock Press, 2020; Transformational vs. transactional deployment of intelligence. Journal of Intelligence, 9(15), 2021), transformationally gifted children are those who view to make a positive, meaningful, and enduring difference to the world. To reach their goal, they need competencies to deal with the complexities of the twenty-first century. This means: they must understand the features of complex problems to (...) develop solutions for them. What they need is a kind of critical thinking paired with systems competency, i.e., the ability to construct mental models of abstract systems, to form and test hypotheses about these systems, and to develop strategies for system identification and successful control of such systems. Also, a strong emphasis on values is needed. (shrink)

In recent work, E. J. Lowe presents an essence-based account of our knowledge of metaphysical modality that he claims to be superior to its main competitors. I argue that knowledge of essences alone, without knowledge of a suitable bridge principle, is insufficient for knowing that something is metaphysically necessary or metaphysically possible. Yet given Lowe's other theoretical commitments, he cannot account for our knowledge of the needed bridge principle, and so his essence-based modal epistemology remains incomplete. In addition to that, (...) Lowe's account implies a psychologically unrealistic reconstruction of how we ordinarily acquire knowledge of metaphysical modalities. The discussion of Lowe's suggestive essence-based account is also intended as a case study that illustrates a more general problem in the epistemology of modality: the great difficulty of explaining our modal knowledge in terms of a single overtly nonmodal kind of knowledge. The failure of Lowe's account suggests that such a sweeping reductive explanation of our modal knowledge might simply not be available. This should be good news for those philosophers who champion less reductive or more pluralistic accounts of our modal knowledge. (shrink)

The paper attempts to give an account of the fallibility of medical judgments without recourse to the incompleteness of scientific knowledge. It is argued that because of the inexactness of observations and thus the existence of borderline cases any theory applied for explanation and predicition will produce some false results. This state of affairs is independent of the nature of a theory, i.e., it applies both for non-probabilistic and for probabilistic theories. Some epistemological issues and consequences with regard to a (...) better understanding of clinical reasoning are discussed and the view is compared with the theory of medical fallibility of Gorovitz and MacIntyre.1. (shrink)

English title: Józef Tischner’s Phenomenology of Boundary Experience. Author of the paper distinguishes four paradigms of phenomenological analysis one can indicate in Tischner’s philosophical writing. Each of these paradigms captures the issue of the genuine source of phenomenological experience. This genuine source can be provided with: transcendental ‘I’, axiological ‘I’, Dasein, or the relationship to another man. By developing the latter, i.e. the paradigm based on the experience of meeting (dialogue), Tischner makes the foundations for his Philosophy of Drama (in (...) Polish: Filozofia dramatu) which should be interpreted, as Piecuch argues, in terms of the possible ways to conduct phenomenological analysis. The peculiarity of this way is that it aims at grasping various aspects of the border experience in which a man experiences the limits of one’s own thinking, activity and sensing. (shrink)

The old controversy between Legal Positivism and Natural Justice turns out to be fruitless, if we comprehend law as a phenomenon of culture. Then, law is neither mere will nor mere reason. Law, as it is understood in the Western tradition, is rather a contingent system of rules which guides decisions (politics, on the other hand, are guided by aims). Culture, as it is conceived since the age of Enlightenment, can be described as “what results from autonomy”. Law being a (...) valuable phenomenon of culture (Kulturgut), two questions arise. (1) Is there any need for law? It depends on society’s demand for liberty. (2) What does the law need? Law requires autonomy, i.e., the right to enjoy its own culture.Resumen:La antigua controversia entre el positivismo jurídico y la justicia natural resulta estéril si comprendemos al derecho como un fenómeno de la cultura. Consecuentemente, el derecho no es mera voluntad, ni tampoco razón pura. El derecho, como se entiende en la tradición occidental, es más bien un sistema contingente de reglas para la decisión (la política, en cambio, se guía por objetivos). La cultura, tal como es concebida des- de la época de la Ilustración, puede describirse como “aquello que es resultado de la autonomía”. Como el derecho es un fenómeno valioso de la cultura (Kulturgut), entonces se plantean dos cuestiones: (1) ¿Hay necesidad del derecho? Ello depende de la demanda de libertad que tenga la sociedad. (2) ¿Qué necesita el derecho? El derecho requiere autonomía, es decir, el derecho a disfrutar de su propia cultura. (shrink)

The old controversy between Legal Positivism and Natural Justice turns out to be fruitless, if we comprehend law as a phenomenon of culture. Then, law is neither mere will nor mere reason. Law, as we understand it in the occidental tradition, is rather a contingent system of rules which guides decisions (politics, on the other hand, are guided by aims). Culture, as it is conceived since the age of Enlightenment, can be described as „what results from autonomy“. Law being a (...) valuable phenomenon of culture (Kulturgut), two questions arise. (1) Is there any need for law? It depends on the society’s demand for liberty. (2) What does the law need? Law requires autonomy, i. e. the right to enjoy its own culture. (shrink)

v. A. -- v. B. -- v. C/D. -- v. E/F. -- v. G. -- v. H. (2 pts.) -- v. IJK. -- v. Kant . (2 pts.) -- v. L. -- v. M. (2 pts.) -- v. N/O. -- v. P/Q. (2 pts.).

The group selection controversy largely focuses on altruism (e.g., Wilson 1983; Lloyd 2001; Shavit 2004; Okasha 2006, 173ff; Borrello 2010; Leigh 2010; Rosas 2010; Hamilton and Dimond in press). Multilevel selection theory is a resolution of this controversy. Whereas kin selection partitions inclusive fitness into direct and indirect components (via influencing the replication of copies of genes in other individuals), multilevel selection considers within-group and between-group components of fitness (Gardner et al. 2011; Lion et al. 2011). Two scenarios of multilevel (...) selection are often distinguished (Damuth and Heisler 1988; Okasha 2006; Pigliucci 2010): (1) group structure only divides individual fitnesses into within- and between-group components (MLS1); and, (2) groups get their own component of fitness and also, in most definitions, a group-level adaptation (MLS2). (shrink)

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by stochastic electrodynamics, a (...) branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write-read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write-read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions. (shrink)

Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. (...) But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. (shrink)

Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a (...) short presentation of Carnap''s theory it is then shown that this theory cannot claim validity for arbitrary random processes. It is suggested that the theory be only applied to binomial and multinomial experiments. By application of de Finetti''s theorem Carnap''s inductive probabilities are interpreted as consecutive probabilities of the Bayesian kind. Through the introduction of a new axiom the decision parameter can be determined even if no a priori knowledge is given. Finally, it is demonstrated that the fundamental problem of Wald''s decision theory, i.e., the determination of a plausible criterion where no a priori knowledge is available, can be solved for the cases of binomial and multinomial experiments. (shrink)

During the last thirty years, both the mechanism and the vitalism has undergone remarkable changes. While the former, persisting in the strictly mechanistic thesis, has grown independent of its ancient antiteleological attitude, the latter, overcome as the doctrine of “entelechy”, has turned out fruitful owing to its other component, i.e. to the idea of autonomy of life. To-day, then, the contention takes place between two totally different points of view, between “machinism” and “autonomism”. Both interpretations of life are equally theories, (...) and not descriptions of pure facts; both are, also, metaphysical thesis.Le mécanisme ainsi que le vitalisme a subi des changements remarquables pendant les trente années dernières. Alors que le premier, tout en restant fidèle à la thèse strictement „mécaniste”, est devenu indépendant de son attitude antifinaliste d'autrefois, le vitalisme, surmonté en tant que la doctrine sur l'entélechie, s'est montré fructueux par son autre composante, c'est-à-dire, par l'idée de l'autonomie de la vie. Ainsi, c'est le „machinisme” et l'„autonomisme”, revÊtu du holisme, qui sont en dispute aujourd'hui. Toutes les deux interprétations de la vie sont également des théories, et non pas des pures descriptions de faits; elles sont aussi, toutes deux des thèses métaphysiques. (shrink)

In social dilemmas, expectations of reciprocity can lead to fully determined cooperation concurrent with the illusion of choice. The choice of the dominant alternative (i.e., defection) may be construed as being free and rational, but only at the cost of being incompatible with a behavioral science claiming to be deterministic.

Die literarische Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute vor allem über Filme bekannt. Tatsächlich hat Hollywood diese Figur, die auf Englisch mad scientist genannt wird, seit seinen Gründungstagen mit zahlreichen Filmen zu einem eigenen Genre entwickelt: Ein älterer Mann mit zerzaustem Haar, Laborkittel und Brille arbeitet besessen und einsam in seinem Labor an einer großen Erfindung, mit der er die ganze Welt verändern will. Typischerweise ist dieser Wissenschaftler entweder gutwillig und naiv, nur naiv oder skrupellos. Ist er gutwillig und naiv, (...) dann will er die Welt retten oder zum Besseren wenden; doch in seiner Besessenheit und Engstirnigkeit verkennt er die Welt und die große Erfindung entgleist ihm und wird zu einer Bedrohung der Welt, bis am Ende ein guter Held die Gefahr bannt und die Welt rettet. Falls er nur naiv ist, dann entreißt ein Böser ihm die Erfindung im entscheidenen Moment, um die Welt zu bedrohen, bis am Ende der Gute die Sache wieder ins Reine bringt. Ist er hingegen skrupelos, dann treibt ihn seine Besessenheit dazu, immer größere Opfer für sein Werk zu erbringen, nicht nur, indem er sich selber gesundheitlich und finanziell aufreibt, sondern auch, indem er die Gesundheit und das Leben von Unbeteiligten aufs Spiel setzt. Treibt er dies zu weit, ohne rechtzeitig Reue zu zeigen, dann muss er am Ende um der Gerechtigkeit willen sterben, in der Regel als Opfer seiner eigenen besessenen Forschertaten. Die Figur des verrückten Wissenschaftlers ist heute so einschlägig, dass sie das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft in der westlichen Welt entscheidend mitgeprägt hat. Das ärgert natürlich die Wissenschaftler, die darum heftigst auf Hollywood schimpfen. Doch Hollywood hat nur aufgegriffen, stereotypisch vereinfacht und bilderreich ausgemalt, was Schriftsteller des 19. Jahrhunderts in fast allen westlichen Ländern in Form von Romanen, Theaterstücken, Kurzgeschichten und Gedichten vorgebildet haben. Denn der verrückte Wissenschaftler ist tatsächlich eine literarische Erfindung des 19.. (shrink)

German literature played an important role in Kierkegaard's reading, and he often relates to German authors in his writings, especially to those of the period between 1770 and 1830. Against the background of German Romanticism, he deals with Romantic irony in the second part of The Concept of Irony. His harsh verdict on famous German writers like Friedrich Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck in his master's thesis is in some cases relativized by a more balanced appreciation in other writings. Some German (...) authors like Georg Christoph Lichtenberg and Jean Paul served as stylistic models, while others like Gotthold Ephraim Lessing offered valuable inspirations for his thinking. One of the most frequently cited poets is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who appears in Kierkegaard's writings throughout all his working periods and is dealt with in a very comprehensive manner. (shrink)

One of the main challenges in consciousness research is widely known as the hard problem of consciousness. In order to tackle this problem, I utilize an approach from theoretical physics, called stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which goes one step beyond quantum theory and sheds new light on the reality behind matter. According to this approach, matter is a resonant oscillator that is orchestrated by an all-pervasive stochastic radiation field, called zero-point field (ZPF). The properties of matter are not intrinsic but acquired (...) by dynamic interaction with the ZPF, which in turn picks up information about the material system as soon as an ordered state, i.e., a stable attractor, is reached. I point out that these principles apply also to macroscopic biological systems. From this perspective, long-range correlations in the brain, such as neural gamma synchrony, can be interpreted in terms of order phenomena induced and stabilized by the ZPF, suggesting that every attractor in the brain goes along with an information state in the ZPF. In order to build the bridge to consciousness, I employ additional input from Eastern philosophy. From a comparison between SED and Eastern philosophy I draw the conclusion that the ZPF is an appropriate candidate for the substrate of consciousness, implying that information states in the ZPF are associated with conscious states. On this basis I develop a conceptual framework for consciousness that is fully consistent with physics, neurophysiology, and Eastern philosophy. I argue that this conceptual framework has many interesting features and opens a door to a theory of consciousness. Particularly, it solves the problem of how matter and consciousness communicate in a causally closed functional chain, it gives a physical grounding to existing approaches regarding the connection between consciousness and information, and it gives clear direction to future models and experiments. (shrink)

The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there (...) must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference. (shrink)

The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there (...) must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference. (shrink)

The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there (...) must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference. (shrink)

This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as for Proclus, the muthos (...) appears as being a simple particular case of logos, and even that the logos itself is only a particular case of muthos. (shrink)

This contribution resumes the main conclusions of a common work of philosophical comparatism between the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, which is based on the examination of their respective reception of the traditional metaphysical use of anciant myths. This article consists in the examination of two important “definitions” of myth collected in the Enneads of Plotinus and Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic. On the basis of these analyses, it is possible to assert that, for Plotinus as for Proclus, the muthos (...) appears as being a simple particular case of logos, and even that the logos itself is only a particular case of muthos. (shrink)