This paper explores the practice of explanation by status, in which a truth with a certain status is supposed to be explained by its having that status. It first investigates whether such explanations are possible. Having found existing accounts of the practice wanting, it then argues for a novel account of explanation by status as empty-base explanation. The latter notion captures a certain limiting case of ordinary explanation so that according to the (...) empty-base account, explanation by status can be fruitfully understood as a corresponding limiting case of ordinary explanation. One way in which the empty-base account is argued to be superior to other treatments of explanation by status is that it allows for a principled assessment of the possibility of particular kinds of explanation by status. Thus, one result of the present discussion is that explanation by essential status and status as a law are possible, while explanation by merely necessary status is not. (shrink)

What is the explanatory role of ‘status-truths’ such as essence-truths, necessity-truths and law-truths? A plausible principle, suggested by various authors, is Ground by Status, according to which status truths ground their prejacents. For instance, if it is essential to a that p, then this grounds the fact that p. But Ground by Status faces a forceful objection: it is inconsistent with widely accepted principles regarding the logic of grounding (Glazier in Philos Stud 174(11):2871–2889, 2017a, Synthese 174(198):1409–1424, (...) 2017b; Kappes in Synthese 199(1–2):2575–2595, 2020, Philos Stud 178(4):1267–1284, 2021). I defend Ground by Status against this objection. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Act Regarding the Promotion of the Appropriate Supply of Hematopoietic Stem Cells for Transplant regulates only how public banks store and provide umbilical cord blood for research or transplantation. Japan had no laws to regulate how the private banks manage the procedures, harvesting, preparation, and storage of such blood. As a result, the status of UCB distribution remains unknown. We conducted a survey to investigate the current status of UCB storage and provision to private biobanks by Japanese (...) institutions that handle childbirth.MethodsQuestionnaire forms were mailed to 3,277 facilities handling childbirth that were registered in the Japan Council for Quality Health Care website.ResultsOf the 1,192 institutions handling childbirth that participated in the survey, 34.4% responded that they currently provide UCB to private biobanks, while 16.1% of facilities did so in the past. Moreover, some institutions currently provide or formerly provided UCB to medical treatment facilities, research institutions, companies, or overseas treatment facilities, research institutions, or companies. A certain number of institutions handling childbirth did not even provide explanations or obtain consent when the UCB was harvested from private bank users.ConclusionsThis is the first study to determine the status of UCB provision to private banks by Japanese institutions handling childbirth. Future studies will need to examine in detail how institutions handling childbirth provide explanations to private bank users and UCB providers as well as how these institutions obtain consent. (shrink)

This paper explores a novel notion of self-explanation that combines ideas from two sources: the tripartite account of explanation, according to which a proposition can help explain another either in the capacity of a reason why the latter obtains or in the capacity of an explanatory link, and the notion of an empty-base explanation, which generalizes the ideas of explanation by zero-grounding and explanation by status. After having introduced these ideas and the novel notion (...) of self-explanation, I argue that the latter has the potential to resist extant arguments against the possibility of self-explanation. In the remainder of the paper, I discuss candidates for such self-explanatory propositions and suggest possible applications for Humeanism about laws of nature, the debate on the grounds of ground, the rationalist tradition, and philosophical theology. (shrink)

Network neuroscience represents the brain as a collection of regions and inter-regional connections. Given its ability to formalize systems-level models, network neuroscience has generated unique explanations of neural function and behavior. The mechanistic status of these explanations and how they can contribute to and fit within the field of neuroscience as a whole has received careful treatment from philosophers. However, these philosophical contributions have not yet reached many neuroscientists. Here we complement formal philosophical efforts by providing an applied perspective (...) from and for neuroscientists. We discuss the mechanistic status of the explanations offered by network neuroscience and how they contribute to, enhance, and interdigitate with other types of explanations in neuroscience. In doing so, we rely on philosophical work concerning the role of causality, scale, and mechanisms in scientific explanations. In particular, we make the distinction between an explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation, and we argue for a scale-free nature of mechanistic explanations. In the course of these discussions, we hope to provide a useful applied framework in which network neuroscience explanations can be exercised across scales and combined with other fields of neuroscience to gain deeper insights into the brain and behavior. (shrink)

This chapter examines the status of inference to the best explanation in naturalistic metaphysics. The methodology of inference to the best explanation in metaphysics is studied from the perspective of contemporary views on scientific explanation and explanatory inferences in the history and philosophy of science. This reveals serious shortcomings in prevalent attempts to vindicate metaphysical "explanationism" by reference to similarities between science and naturalistic metaphysics. This critique is brought out by considering a common gambit of methodological (...) unity: (1) Both metaphysics and science employ inference to the best explanation. (2) One has no reason to think that if explanationism is truth-conducive in science, it is not so in metaphysics. (3) One has a positive reason to think that if explanationism is truth-conducive in science, it is also so in metaphysics. (shrink)

Can religious premises ever be cited legitimately in explanations of matters of fact? Scientific practice is generally regarded as the source of our explanatory paradigms and the final arbiter of matters of fact, and is so constituted that it could never endorse such explanations. Neither would they be sanctioned by the non-cognitive reconstructions of religious discourse currently fashionable. I argue: Some scientific constraints on explanations, such as consistency, testability, and corrigibility, are generally legitimate in non-scientific contexts. Other cognitive values, such (...) as clarity and simplicity, though not constraints, still have adequate credentials to serve globally in the evaluation of theories and explanations. In addition to these, science employs overtly ideological constraints on explanation, plus a number of parochial values, including control, replicability, and skepticism. These serve to circumscribe the range of acceptable explanations more narrowly than reasonable standards of rationality would necessitate. In particular, they are responsible for precluding religious explanations unnecessarily. ;Finally, one can reconstruct from religious contexts a system of cognitive values with broad application that takes exception to scientific norms pertaining to the status of teleological explanations, the ranking of outstanding problem areas in importance, the usefulness of anecdotal material, and the appropriateness of pragmatic conceptions of truth. The additional explanations this value structure sanctions will be less secure than scientific explanations generally, and somewhat idiosyncratic. They may be appropriate when no scientific explanations are possible or available, or if the religious explanation is teleological and the scientific explanation is not. Near-death experiences represent a major potential source of religious explanations, although one in great need of development. More generally, our ability to give religious explanations is hampered by inadequate theoretical articulations of the concept of God. (shrink)

Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that explanation and categorization are intimately related. This paper explores the hypothesis that explanations can help structure conceptual representations, and thereby influence the relative importance of features in categorization decisions. In particular, features may be differentially important depending on the role they play in explaining other features or aspects of category membership. Two experiments manipulate whether a feature is explained mechanistically, by appeal to proximate causes, or functionally, by appeal to a function or (...) goal. Explanation type has a significant impact on the relative importance of features in subsequent categorization judgments, with functional explanations reversing previously documented effects of [”]causal status’. The findings suggest that a feature’s explanatory importance can impact categorization, and that explanatory relationships, in addition to causal relationships, are critical to understanding conceptual representation. (shrink)

Theory of illness causation is an important issue in all biomedical sciences, and solid etiological explanations are needed in order to develop therapeutic approaches in medicine and preventive interventions in public health. Until now, the literature about the theoretical underpinnings of illness causation research has been scarce and fragmented, and lacking a convenient summary. This interdisciplinary book provides a convenient and accessible distillation of the current status of research into this developing field, and adds a personal flavor to the (...) discussion by proposing the etiological stance as a comprehensive approach to identify modifiable causes of illness. (shrink)

I argued in Karl Marx's Theory of History that the central claims of historical materialism are functional explanations, and I said that functional explanations are consequence explanations, ones, that is, in which something is explained by its propensity to have a certain kind of effect. I also claimed that the theory of chance variation and natural selection sustains functional explanations, and hence consequence explanations, of organismic equipment. In Section I I defend the thesis that historical materialism offers functional or consequence (...) explanations, and I reject Jon Elster's contention that game theory can, and should, assume a central role in the Marxist theory of society. In Section II I contrast functional and consequence explanation, thereby revising the position of Karl Marx's Theory of History, and I question whether evolutionary biology supports functional explanations. Section III is a critique of Elster's views on functional explanation, and Sections IV and V defend consequence explanation against metaphysical and epistemological doubts. A concluding section summarizes my present understanding of the status of historical materialist explanations. (shrink)

It is often argued that biological generalizations have a distinctive and special status by comparison with the generalizations of other natural sciences, such as that biological generalizations are riddled with exceptions defying systematic and simple treatment. This special status of biology is used as a premise in arguments that posit a deprived explanatory, nomological, or methodological status in the biological sciences. I will discuss the traditional and still almost universally held idea that the biological sciences cannot deal (...) with exceptions and application conditions of their generalizations with their own distinctive and proprietary explanantia, but need the help of lower-level sciences to carry out this task. The idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions is connected to the idea that the biological sciences need lower-level sciences to better themselves and to the idea that biological sciences cannot provide reliable and extrapolatable results or explanations by themselves. I present counterexamples to the idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions in biology. I also discuss and refute more general arguments why the idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions has been held to hold in the special sciences, such as the screening-off and openness arguments. This suggest that there might be nothing special about the biological sciences vis-à-vis the more fundamental natural sciences, such as physics insofar as explanations of exceptions are concerned, and that the biological sciences can provide reliable and extrapolatable results or explanations by themselves. (shrink)

Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. In this paper, I challenge a key feature of that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; changes the (...) explanatory role of causal factors with small effect; and undermines Strevens’ titular explanatory virtue, depth. This results in greater coherence with explanatory practice and accords with the emphasis that Strevens places on explanatory patterns. Ultimately, my suggestion preserves a tight connection between explanation and the creation of understanding by taking into account explanations’ role in communication. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to experimentally investigate whether folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. In particular, are people more likely to classify speech acts as explanations when they cause understanding in their recipient? The empirical evidence that we present suggests this is so. Using the side-effect effect as a marker of mental state ascriptions, we argue that lay judgments of explanatory status are mediated by judgments of a speaker’s and/or audience’s mental states. First, we show that (...) attributions of both understanding and explanation exhibit a side-effect effect. Next, we show that when the speaker’s and audience’s level of understanding is stipulated, the explanation side-effect effect goes away entirely. These results not only extend the side-effect effect to attributions of understanding, they also suggest that attributions of explanation exhibit a side-effect effect because they depend upon attributions of understanding, supporting the idea that folk conceptions of explanation are psychologistic. (shrink)

The 6th Consensus Statement on Concussion in Sport is authored by the Concussion in Sport Group (CiSG) and intends to provide evidence-based recommendations on concussion management for the welfare of sports participants. However, the authors of the Consensus Statement have declared many competing links to third-party groups. While the declaration of an author’s competing interests is now a widely accepted practice within academic publishing aimed at greater transparency and research integrity, it is not a measure to remove the potential influence (...) of third-party links. In the case of the Consensus Statement, this leaves uncertainty about how the potential sources of third-party bias declared by individual members of the CiSG may have influenced the CiSG’s interpretation of the existing state of evidence on concussion management and impacted the content of the recommendations contained with the Consensus Statement. Openly declaring third-party links falls short of securing trustworthiness in the Consensus Statement recommendations since it leaves end-users of the Consensus Statement with the task of interpreting the impact(s) of these competing interests with little information to guide them. This is because the authors themselves offer neither explanation nor guidance concerning potential bias arising from the competing interests that they have declared, which impinges upon the ability of readers to evaluate the trustworthiness of the content. The status quo could be improved by excluding researchers who have conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, if authors with competing interests are permitted to be part of the CiSG (as is the status quo), then I propose a novel option for increasing transparency that would require authors of the Consensus Statements to provide a reflexive explanation, not simply a declaration, of their competing interests. (shrink)

This chapter explores the status of Wittgenstein's methodological remarks about the role of explanation. In §109 Wittgenstein provides one of his most extensive reflections on methodology. In many cases, scientific explanation works by hypothesizing entities whose behavior explains the behavior of familiar things. In hypothesizing entities whose behavior explains the behavior of familiar entities, the scientific explanation is metaphysically promiscuous. The metaphysical promiscuity of explanations that try to ape the scientific variety is signaled in the idea (...) of the “super” order. The claim on offer in §109 is that philosophy only offers insightful descriptions. The sense of fit is the subject's sense that one's own experience has a shape or form in which things occupy a place in which they belong. The idea of the investigations is suggested as an aesthetic project. It leaves space to endorse the idea of primitive normativity, that is, the sense of fit. (shrink)

This book develops and applies a novel kind of explanation: Empty-Base Explanation. While ordinary explanations have a tripartite structure involving an explanandum, a base of reasons why the explanandum obtains, and a link that connects the reasons to the explanandum, this book argues that there are explanations whose corresponding set of reasons is empty. This novel idea is located in the theoretical background of several fundamental philosophical issues. For example, it provides a convincing kind of ultimate or final (...) explanation that completely and conclusively explains a phenomenon without involving other phenomena for which further explanations could be demanded. -/- The possibility and fruitfulness of empty-base explanation is defended by general considerations from the theory of explanation, as well as concrete applications to (1) the practice of explanation by status, (2) the explanation of logical theorems, causal connections, and laws of nature, (3) self-explanation, (4) the use of IBE in metaphysics, (5) the notion of zero-ground (which it provides with a solid theoretical footing), and (6) ultimate explanation and its application to philosophical cosmology, the debate about the PSR, and the question of why there is anything at all. (shrink)

Explanatory contrastivists hold that we often explain phenomena of the form p rather than q. In this paper, I present a new, social‐epistemological model of contrastive explanation—accountabilism. Specifically, my view is inspired by social‐scientific research that treats explanations fundamentally as accounts; that is, communicative actions that restore one's social status when charged with questionable behaviour. After developing this model, I show how accountabilism provides a more comprehensive model of contrastive explanation than the causal models of contrastive (...) class='Hi'>explanation that are currently en vogue. (shrink)

The very idea of narrative explanation invites two objections: a methodological objection, stating that narrative structure is too far from the form of a scientific explanation to count as an explanation, and a metaphysical objection, stating that narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. Both of these objections, however, are illfounded. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by revealing their motivating (...) presupposition: the plausibility of an exclusivist explication of explanation which appeals either to the unity-of-method thesis or some implicit notion of analytic equivalence, both problematic philosophical doctrines. The metaphysical objection fails with the rejection of the idea, in Mink's phrase, of an "untold story." The argument against history as an "untold story" develops from Danto's image of an Ideal Chronicler recording ideal events. A consequence of rejecting this view is that it no longer makes sense to speak of historical narratives as true or false. However, this failure engenders no special problem for assessing the objectivity or explanatory utility of narratives qua explanations. (shrink)

This thesis looks at explanation in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and in religious reflection. Although these fields differ radically in the objects studied and the methods employed, they do evidence certain formal commonalities when one inquires into the nature of the explanatory endeavor as it is manifested in each. By exploring the links between explanations and the various contexts or disciplines in which they occur, I attempt to provide a general framework for speaking of rational explanations in (...) these diverse areas. ;In an opening chapter I consider several alternatives regarding the epistemic status of religious explanations, focusing finally on the model of "intersubjective explanation." Contemporary defenses of intersubjective religious explanation are placed within the context of the broader faith/reason debate, and a quick survey is made of recent advocates of this position. I then turn to the methodology dispute in the philosophy of the natural sciences . My aim is to mediate between purely formal analyses of explanatory structure and the more recent emphasis on contextual and pragmatic factors. ;In the social sciences, many have argued, explanation is subordinate to intuitive understanding. After tracing the explanation versus understanding debate from Dilthey to the present, I present the recent work of Jurgen Habermas as a case study in the problems of social scientific rationality. Explanations in the social sciences are rational reconstructions of human meaning contexts, and "Verstehen" is required as a precondition for material adequacy. Such explanations are linked to the individual or communal effort to "make sense" of, or bring coherence into, subjective and intersubjective "worlds." ;After an excursus on philosophical explanations and the problem of philosophical rationality, I attempt a brief phenomenology of religious beliefs as explanations. As in the social sphere, religious explanations represent the believer's attempt to "make sense" of her experience in light of a given religious tradition. Although the comprehensive nature of religious explanations makes comparisons difficult--in the limit case they verge on ineffability--the concepts of meaning and coherence allow us to speak of the rationality of religious belief without total equivocation. ;The final chapter turns to the study and evaluation of religious explanations as they occur in the discipline of theology. Under the rubric "theology as a science," I defend theology's dual status as an academic discipline and as believing reflection in the service of the religious community. Through vitally concerned with the truth of its assertions, theology also shares the goals of coherence and intersubjective criticizability with its scientific counterparts. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, (...) for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to paraphrase, using the terminological framework of the idealisational theory of science, the issue of the accuracy of explanation. Chris Lorenz, describing the “theoretical historical debate” on the status of scientific laws, mentioned the standpoint of Nancy Cartwright. According to him, this post-positivistic approach introduced new perspectives on understanding lawfulness. The purpose of this paper is to present assumptions of another post-positivistic approach to science, namely an idealizational theory of science and to (...) paraphrase in the terminological framework of this approach some problems posed by Lorenz like the issue of accuracy of explanation. In this paper Hempel’s explanatory sketch is paraphrased using the terminological framework of the idealisational model of science which provides a solution to the problem of the accuracy of explanation posed by Lorenz. (shrink)

To explain why students learn effectively by teaching, explaining to others in particular, Koh and colleagues advanced the retrieval practice hypothesis, which attributes the learning benefits entirely to the effect of practicing retrieval, that is, effortfully recalling to-be-taught information for the provision of instructional explanations. After delineating the rationale behind the retrieval practice hypothesis, the current situation of research, and the limitations of the existing approach, this paper proposes three tests for the evaluation of the hypothesis that address whether explaining (...) to others after initial studying surpasses restudying in learning performance, whether the amount of effort to retrieve to-be-taught information from memory moderates the learning effects of explaining to others, and whether the degree of elaboration during retrieval practice positively predicts the outcomes of learning by merely recalling to-be-taught information. Evidence is examined regarding whether each test is passed, and future directions for research on the retrieval practice hypothesis are discussed. (shrink)

The status of population genetics has become hotly debated among biologists and philosophers of biology. Many seem to view population genetics as relatively unchanged since the Modern Synthesis and have argued that subjects such as development were left out of the Synthesis. Some have called for an extended evolutionary synthesis or for recognizing the insignificance of population genetics. Yet others such as Michael Lynch have defended population genetics, declaring "nothing in evolution makes sense except in the light of population (...) genetics" (a twist on Dobzhansky's famous slogan that "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution"). Missing from this discussion is the use of population genetics to shed light on ecology and vice versa, beginning in the 1940s and continuing until the present day. I highlight some of that history through an overview of traditions such as ecological genetics and population biology, followed by a slightly more in-depth look at a contemporary study of the endangered California Tiger Salamander. I argue that population genetics is a powerful and useful tool that continues to be used and modified, even if it isn't required for all evolutionary explanations or doesn't incorporate all the causal factors of evolution. (shrink)

On the Cratylus dialogue, much has been written. However, is it possible to say that the beauty and the intelligence of that Platonic dialogue has been fully explained and justified? First of all, the Cratylus continues to be considered a work that is not fully successful artistically: its very long etimological review has yet to find an explanation that justifies, from a dramatic point of view, such an excessively prolix section. Secondly, the Cratylus is a dialogue that is doctrinally (...) empty. Plato seems to have dedicated an entire work to the issue of the theory of names, only to demonstrate in the end that considering such a question is not in fact useful to the understanding of the truth; to understand the truth, one must look not to language but to the things themselves. This article, other than indicating the status questionis regarding the Cratylus, suggests a new approach which will resolve both the issues raised above. It intends to demonstrate that to formulate an interpretation worthy of Plato from both the speculative and dramatic points of view, one must undertake an ontological and mystagogical reading of the Cratylus, an approach not yet made. The ontological reading complements the anti-ideological interpretations already developed by a number of scholars; the mystagogical reading is explicitly alternative to the esoteric interpretation of the dialogue proposed by Szlezák, the authoritative representative of the Tubingen School. (shrink)

Taxonomists in biology have traditionally been concerned to delimit and classify actual biological forms or kinds. But not all useful classification schemes are of actualised forms. This paper focuses on the need to delimit and classify non‐actual forms when offering contrastive explanations in evolutionary biology. Such a classification scheme sorts actual and non‐actual forms according to their modal status. Such a sorting has been offered by theoretical morphologists, but these efforts have paid insufficient attention to the metaphysics of modality. (...) Contemporary approaches to the metaphysics and epistemology of modality are also found wanting. The paper ends by arguing that the needed intellectual resources are to be found in the imaginative use of Aristotle. (shrink)

Taxonomists in biology have traditionally been concerned to delimit and classify actual (or previously actual) biological forms orkinds. But not all useful classification schemes are of actualisedforms. This paper focuses on the need to delimit and classifynon‐actual forms when offering contrastive explanations in evolutionary biology. Such a classification scheme sorts actual and nonfactual forms according to their modal status. Such a sorting has been offered by theoretical morphologists, but these efforts havepaid insufficient attention to the metaphysics of modality. Contemporary (...) approaches to the metaphysics and epistemology of modalityare also found wanting. The paper ends by arguing that the needed intellectual resources are to be found in the imaginative use of Aristotle. (shrink)

Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non- objectionably circular. We aim to carve out (...) some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others. (shrink)

In this paper I examine two aspects of Hempel’s covering-law models of explanation. These are (i) nomic subsumption and (ii) explication by models. Nomic subsumption is the idea that to explain a fact is to show how it falls under some appropriate law. This conception of explanation Hempel explicates using a pair of models, where, in this context, a model is a template or pattern such that if something fits it, then that thing is an explanation. A (...) range of well-known counter-examples to Hempel’s models has led his successors to seek alternatives. Problems with limited amendments have encouraged some theorists of explanation to abandon nomic subsumption. So, in particular, causal components have come to be regarded as essential, even though Hempel had intended his model to capture causal explanation as well.1 Here I want to examine the prospects for retaining nomic subsumption by rejecting the other feature of Hempel’s approach – explication by models. An examination of the counter-examples will suggest that it is a mistake to imagine that a limited quantity of information about laws and antecedent conditions will be able to provide an actual explanation – other information, about explanations, may be relevant. This in turn leads me to examine what I shall call structural approaches. They are structural because the status of something as an explanation depends on its fitting into a structure of explanations. There are two structural approaches I shall examine. One is holistic – it proposes that we consider explanation hand-in-hand with the concept of law. This account of explanation inherits its holistic nature from the holistic (or sys- tematic) character of laws of nature. The second supervenience view I shall consider is not global as the holistic approach is. Instead it concentrates on the ‘vertical’ structure of explanations, whereby the existence of a nomic explanation at one level reflects explanations on lower levels on which it supervenes. These structural approaches were first proposed in Bird Synthese 120: 1–18, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.. (shrink)

There is a vast amount of evidence across countries that the use of health care services (including hospitalizations, physician services, and clinical preventive services) is positively associated with income, education and other markers of socioeconomic position. In some analyses, lower socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with greater physician and hospital use, although it appears that these findings are primarily driven by higher rates of poor health status or medical need in socioeconomically disadvantaged populations. Three general sets of explanations (...) have been investigated to explain SES differences in health care use: (1) financial access or affordability differences (e.g. the poor use fewer services because they have fewer financial means); (2) knowledge, attitudinal and cultural differences in seeking care (e.g. the poor use fewer services because they value and/or understand the benefits of health care less than other people); and (3) health care system factors (e.g. the poor use fewer services because of ways in which the health care system is organized). The empirical evidence from a number of countries suggests that health care system variables, especially non-financial components of access, offer the greatest explanatory power regarding SES differences in utilization. The policy implications of such findings are important, for they suggests that providing universal coverage or offering free health services to the poor is not a panacea for reducing social inequalities in health care utilization. Research across countries also suggests that, although SES differences in the use of health care services may contribute to some portion of observed SES disparities in health status, the contribution here is likely to be small. Social inequalities in health status are driven by myriad factors other than access to and use of personal health services. (shrink)

Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a justified belief on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing (...) that imaginings manifest an epistemic status: they are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. This epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs, and they accrue this status in virtue of being based on evidence. Thus, imaginings are best understood as justified justifiers. I argue for this view by way of showing how it offers a satisfying explanation of certain key features of imaginative justification that would otherwise be puzzling. I also argue that imaginings exhibit a number of markers of the basing relation, which further motivates the view that imaginings can be based on evidence. The arguments in this paper have theoretically fruitful implications not only for the epistemology of imagination, but for accounts of reasoning and epistemic normativity more generally. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument against the A-Theory of time. Briefly, I shall contend that the A-Theorist has no explanation for why the present moment in particular has the metaphysical privilege she accords it, and that this puts the theory at a disadvantage. In what follows, I shall begin by presenting this argument. I will follow that with some potential explanations for why the present moment is privileged and reasons militating against them, in addition to some other possible objections (...) to my argument and my responses to them. The conclusion will be that the A-Theorist fails to provide either an obvious or a theoretical explanation of the present time’s privileged status and is thereby at a theoretical disadvantage to theories that do not posit a metaphysically privileged present time. Topics covered include the purported analogy between times and worlds, the possibility that times are individuated by what is true at them, and the semantic status of titles for date-times. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to discuss the nature of social phenomena, and to determine the appropriate way to explain them. Many of the contentions advanced rest largely upon the fact that social phenomena can be investigated only by methods which respect their distinctive character and status as social phenomena. In chapter I it is argued that the most important difference between the social and the natural sciences is that the former have to employ intentional criteria to identify (...) their explananda-phenomena. Because human and societal phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, the type of causation which prevails in the social realm is fundamentally different from that which prevails in the physical. In chapter II the claim of Popper and Hayek that the task of the social sciences is to trace the unintended consequences of human actions is critically examined. Two examples of economic explanation are given in order to show the importance of unintended consequences, and to illustrate the general form explanations of social phenomena should adopt. In chapter III the contention that the social sciences deal with inherently complex phenomena is examined and defended, and the main implications of this contention for social analysis are drawn. The extent to which social phenomena are in principle predictable is discussed. In chapter IV the structural properties of formal scientific theories are briefly characterised, and then Friedman's famous argument on the testability of economic theories is analysed and rejected. The role within a scientific theory of statements formulated with reference to idealisations of the phenomena being studied, and the role within a social explanation of the 'principle of rationality', are discussed. In chapter V the central questions behind the methodological individualism/methodological holism controversy are brought to light. Provided that methodological individualism is not construed as a reductionist or mechanistic principle, it can successfully avoid the main objections of its detractors. It is argued that the method of functional analysis in sociology is consistent with methodological individualism. Finally, it is claimed that the principle of methodological individualism does indeed recommend the appropriate way to explain societal phenomena. In chapter VI, the various strands of thought running through the five preceding chapters are drawn together in a brief summary of the most important points raised by this thesis. (shrink)

The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn't have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no metaphysical gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap (...) in the sciences entails a metaphysical gap. The explanatory gap exists, they say, because there are two fundamental properties in the world that do not reduce to one another: Phenomenal and physical. This position is also known as 'property dualism'. A famous argument, formulated and defended at great length by David Chalmers, uses conceptual tools to argue for a metaphysical gap. When we just look at what the notion of phenomenal consciousness implies, we will find that it doesn't rule out that there could be entities functionally and physically identical to us but without phenomenal consciousness. A couple of further argumentative steps can get us from here to the conclusion that laying down the physical facts of our world does not necessitate phenomenal consciousness. I argue that this argument is compelling but that accepting the conclusion doesn't have the implication that science cannot discover what consciousness is. I begin by outlining and assessing a number of different positions philosophers and scientists have recently defended regarding the link between neurological systems and consciousness, I then argue that even if property dualism is true, that doesn't necessarily prevent the sciences from discovering what constitutes consciousness. That is, there may be no explanatory gap even if there is a metaphysical gap. (shrink)

I begin by reviewing some recent work on the status of the geodesic principle in general relativity and the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. I then turn to the question of whether either of these theories might be said to ``explain'' inertial motion. I argue that there is a sense in which both theories may be understood to explain inertial motion, but that the sense of ``explain'' is rather different from what one might have expected. This sense of (...) class='Hi'>explanation is connected with a view of theories---I call it the ``puzzleball view''---on which the foundations of a physical theory are best understood as a network of mutually interdependent principles and assumptions. (shrink)

In this chapter, we investigate whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. We argue that addressing this question requires engaging, at least, with three principal issues that have conceptual, empirical, and normative dimensions. First, it must be established whether current measures of psychopathy individuate a unitary class of individuals. By this we mean that persons classifed as psychopaths should share some relevant similarities that support explanation, prediction, and treatment. Second, it must be proven that psychopathy harms the person who has (...) it. Third, it must be established that the harm associated with psychopathy is relevant for the ascription of disorder status. Regarding this latter issue, we argue that psychopathy should be considered a disorder if its harmfulness derives from certain incapacities or limited capacities. These incapacities should affect basic competences that are justifably required for conducting a preferable type of life. Within this framework, we tentatively advance the hypothesis that some normatively justifed conclusions and empirical evidence about psychopathy, that needs nonetheless to be further investigated, might support the claim that people with psychopathy have a mental disorder. (shrink)

In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly note that G.A. Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is explanatory. This observation raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative deliberations? The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question. Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen’s thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. As (...) a result, the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason. With this interpretation in hand, I then proceed to argue that Lea Ypi’s and Robert Jubb’s recent criticisms fail to undermine Cohen’s thesis, and that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, are especially helpful for purposes of deliberation in circumstances characterized by changing and changeable feasibility constraints. (shrink)

Several important analyses of the structure of evolutionary explanation have explicitly or implicitly required that historical laws be among the explanans statements. The required historical laws take the form of a generalization which relates some property or event to a developmental sequence of properties or events. The thesis of this paper is that historical laws of this kind are precluded by modern biological theory and, hence, analysis of evolutionary explanation within modern biology that require such laws are defective.

Although mathematical descriptions of the dynamics of system are widely employed in the physical sciences, they are employed infrequently in the biological sciences. The explanation for this usually appeals to the complexity of biological systems. I contend that quite the opposite is true and that such descriptions, in fact, enable complexity to be tamed. Moreover, in those areas in which mathematical descriptions have been used in the biological sciences, they provide a powerful vehicle for expanding our understanding of the (...) systems through an exploration of the mathematical models. Such investigations yield surprising information about the dynamics of the system some of which cannot be discovered through empirical investigation alone. (shrink)

The scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah, who are united in the view that sin will not nullify faith and other good deeds, dissented from opinion on the status of the deeds of the person who converted to Islam after his apostasy, in the first Muslim period. In general, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs argued that those deeds would be in vain with direct apostasy, while Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs also stipulated death for this purpose, and claimed that a person's previous deeds would not be lost with apostasy (...) alone. Comprehensive interpretations on this issue have found a place for itself mostly in tafsir rather than disciplines such as kalam, fiqh and usûl. Here, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs grounds on verse 5/5 of the Surah al-Ma’idah, which only mentions that deeds will be in vain through apostasy; Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs is based on verse 2/217 of Surah al-Baqarah, which connects this futility to death as apostasy. The parties made different inferences against each other over the relevant verses and gave various answers. The most fundamental point of disagreement among these was the question of whether the first verse, which is muṭlaq in terms of usūl, should be attributed to the second verse, which is in the position of muqayyad. While Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs objected to this process with the thought that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad were not met in the relevant verses, Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, which took a more flexible stance on this issue, approved this attributing process within the framework of the conditions and accordingly reached their relevant views. When the parties evaluated the relevant verses, they made their explanations mostly in the explanation of the 2/217 verse of the Surah Baqarah, which is prior to the arrangement and is in the position of a muqayyad. Since Shāfiʽī/Ash'arī scholars are already based on the relevant verse, it is quite understandable that the place where they examine the subject is the interpretation of this divine word. Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, on the other hand, examined the issue here in order to respond to the meaning attributed to the verse by Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs. Shafi'i/Ash'aris based their judgments on one of the two verses, Surah Baqara, 2/217, as a requirement of attributing mutlaq to the muqayyad, and in fact, accepted a single verse as a criterion. On the other hand, Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, made separate judgments from both of them, claiming that the conditions for attributing muṭlaq to the muqayyad, were not fulfilled in the two related verses. In this context, they concluded from the first verse that death as apostasy necessitates eternal disappointment, and from the second verse, apostasy absolutely wastes deeds. Here, the most typical result of the separation between the two sects emerges as to whether a person will repeat the pilgrimage, for example, he performed while he was a Muslim when he returns to Islam after apostasy. While the Shāfiʽī/Ash'arīs, who thought that deeds will be wasted only by death due to apostasy, did not consider it necessary to go on pilgrimage again, while Ḥanafī/Māturīdīs, who thought that deeds will be lost directly with apostasy even if death does not occur, held the person responsible for pilgrimage. In this study, it will be tried to explain the basic intellectual framework of the view advocated by the parties and the background of what kind of criticism they brought to their opponents. (shrink)

There is a great deal of interest in the relation between the status of women and fertility—by humanists, academics and policy-makers concerned with bringing about fertility declines. The three aspects of women's status most frequently linked to fertility are their education, employment and type of husband-wife interaction. Research to date has not given us a clear and consistent explanation of these relationships and has not confirmed causality. The effects of these three factors on fertility vary considerably across (...) national boundaries and even within different sectors of the same society. Some of the assumptions held by both researchers and policymakers must be re-thought in the interests of more useful future research and of sounder policy. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation. We outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all ; argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule ; sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be ; show how (...) that account avoids the critics ' complaints and leaves IBE an important role ; and sketch how our account can clarify debates over IBE in arguments for scientific realism. (shrink)

This article contributes to the nascent field of Cognitive Sociolinguistics. In particular, we are interested in how usage-based cognitive linguistics and variationist sociolinguistics may enrich each other. We first discuss some of the ways in which variationist insights have led cognitive linguists such as Gries (e.g. Multifactorial analysis in corpus linguistics: A study of particle placement, Continuum, 2003) and Grondelaers et al. (e.g. National variation in the use of er “there”. Regional and diachronic constraints on cognitive explanations, Mouton de Gruyter, (...) 2008) to pay attention to language-external factors (such as medium, region, and register), thereby greatly enhancing the description and understanding of certain grammatical phenomena. The focus then shifts to cognitive linguistic work (by Hollmann and Siewierska, English Language and Linguistics 11: 407–424, 2007 and Clark and Trousdale, English Language and Linguistics 13: 33–55, 2009) which has implications for sociolinguistic theory. The two usage-based concepts that have proved especially relevant in this connection are frequency effects and schemas. The article explores and illustrates the role of these two factors in relation to linguistic variation by means of a new case study on definite article reduction (DAR) in Lancashire dialect, a variety spoken in the North West of England. A twofold conclusion is drawn: first, a symbiotic relation between cognitive and sociolinguistics seems possible, but second, in order for this relation to be truly mutually beneficial variationists should get involved in the Cognitive Sociolinguistic enterprise much more than is currently the case. (shrink)

Late ancient Platonists discuss two theories in which geometric entities xplain natural phenomena : the regular polyhedra of geometric atomism and the ccentrics and epicycles of astronomy. Simplicius explicitly compares the status of the first to the hypotheses of the astronomers. The point of omparison is the fallibility of both theories, not the reality of the entities postulated. Simplicius has strong realist commitments as far as astronomy is concerned. Syrianus and Proclus, too, do not consider the polyhedra as devoid (...) of physical reality. Proclus rejects epicycles and eccentrics, but accepts the reality of material homocentric spheres, moved by their own souls. The spheres move the astral objects contained in them, which, however, add motions caused by their own souls. The epicyclical and eccentric hypotheses are useful, as they help us to understand the complex motions resulting from the interplay of spherical motions and volitional motions of the planets. Yet astral souls do not think in accordance with human theoretical constructs, but rather grasp the complex patterns of their motions directly. Our understanding of astronomy depends upon our own cognition of intelligible patterns and their mathematical images. (shrink)

How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many—if any—ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change—called an intervention—that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to manipulate (...) or control their effects. I apply the account to ecological generalizations to show that invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory relevance provides interesting interpretations for the explanatory status of many ecological generalizations. Thus, I argue that there could be causal explanations in ecology by generalizations that are not, in a strict sense, laws. I also address the issue of mechanistic explanations in ecology by arguing that invariance and modularity constitute such explanations. (shrink)

The principle of least action (PLA) has often been cited as a counterexample to the dominant mode of causal explanation in physics. In particular, PLA seems to involve an appeal to final causes or some other teleological ideology. However, Ben-Menahem (Causation in science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018) argues that such implications no longer apply given that PLA can be recovered as limiting case from quantum theory. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical implications of PLA-based explanations are (...) not undermined by its status as derivative. However, I contend that PLA functions as a diachronic constraint that licenses explanations by constraint (Lange, Because without cause: non-casual explanations in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). PLA-based explanations, on this account, are non-causal but also differ from familiar cases of teleological explanations in several respects. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the changes in the status of rationality in the field of the New Rhetoric – the most influential direction in the modern theory of argumentation, which appeared in the 1960s with the scientific works of C. Perelman – L. Olbrechts – Titeka and S. Toulmin. The thesis presented is that the practices of contemporary public discourse find their most logical and comprehensive theoretical explanation in the teachings of the New Rhetoric, which change the (...) traditional status of rationality and transform it into a logic of practical philosophy. The novelties are ascertained by tracking the dynamics in the understanding of the main categories of argumentation – evidence, argumentation, deductive validity, evaluation criteria, arguments, facts, assumptions, values, consent. Perelman’s model of rational argumentation outlines the transition from logical to communicative rationality, which introduces the factors of contextuality and functionality; affirms the validity of a communicative reasonableness in which the mechanisms of thought are synchronized with the processes of language; introduces practical reasoning, which functions as a strategic interaction between logical thinking, imagination, and language. (shrink)

Recent work in the methodology of connectionist explanation has I'ocrrsccl on the notion of levels of explanation. Specific issucs in conncctionisrn hcrc intersect with rvider areas of debate in the philosophy of psychology and thc philosophy of science generally. The issues I raise in this chapter, then, are not unique to cognitive science; but they arise in new and important contexts when connectionism is taken seriously as a model of cognition. The general questions are the relation between levels (...) and the status of levels which have no obvious relation to others. In speaking of levels, what is the connection, if there is one, between explanation and ontology? Which, if any, conccpt of reduction is applicable to connectionist systems? What kind of legitinrtcy can the constructs of common sense psychology, or of that vclsion ol intentional realism represented by classical symbol-systems n I, hirvc irr ir full-scale connectionist theory of mind? (shrink)

This paper examines the status of explanation in the natural sciences and ethics by focusing on the important role of empirical evidence and theoretical properties. As a means of exploring these issues, the debate between Nicholas Sturgeon and Gilbert Harman will serve as a central point in the discussion, since Sturgeon has provided several arguments against Harman's attempt to draw a distinction between scientific and moral explanation. Specifically, Sturgeon holds that the special function of observation and testing, (...) which we commonly believe to be relevant only in science, can be applied to moral cases with equal justification. Overall, Sturgeon's arguments will be exposed as deficient in several respects, which is an aspect of this debate often overlooked. (shrink)