We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)
Jorge Luis Borges is working for decades now on the execution of the nightmare. Perhaps his most celebrated instance is "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius ". It would take much work to sift the fabricated references in Borges' works from the ones deliberately misread from the over-emphasis on an author's casual remark, etc.
BORGES, Angela Cristina. Tambores do sertão, diferença colonial e interculturalidade: entreliçamento entre Umbanda/Quimbanda e Candomblé Angola no Norte de Minas Gerais. 2016. Tese - Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciência da Religião, Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo.
The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...) starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory. (shrink)
Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.
Peirce’s system of sixty-six classes as represented in the Signtree visual model is considered in order to show the strong relation between experience and cognition in semiotics. In this Signtree model we find twenty-four different classes of sinsign, in which we can observe signs of experience, and thirty-six classes of legisign, in which we find general types or laws. Sinsigns and legisigns are predominant in the system of sixty-six classes and they are closely related. Ordinary experiences are used to illustrate (...) the relations and dependencies among these classes and show how a set of experiences may lead to a certain set of cognitions. They also point out one way to use the Signtree to conduct a semiotic analysis. (shrink)
Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...) is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge. (shrink)
This is a reply to John N. Williams’ paper “Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge'” (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams’ paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of this new twist.
De acordo com Jennifer Lackey, deve-se asserir que p somente se é razoável acreditar que p e se alguém asseriu que p, afirmaria que p pelo menos em parte porque é razoável acreditar que p. Como dados para essa norma de asserção, Lackey apela à intuição de que, nos casos de afirmação altruísta, os agentes afirmam com propriedade epistêmica algo que não acreditam. Se essa norma de afirmação fosse verdadeira, então ela explicaria por que as afirmações altruístas são epistemicamente apropriadas. (...) Neste trabalho, oferecemos uma reductio ad absurdum desse ponto de vista. O resultado é que os asserções altruístas não são epistemicamente apropriados. (shrink)
A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is (...) justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood. (shrink)
Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...) Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent. (shrink)
In this paper, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and if human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork and the Critical of Practical Reason is without any doubt “yes”, but Kant is ambiguous in the Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: (...) moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self . I examine moral feeling and love of human beings, trying to figure out whether or not they are necessary sensible pre- conditions to moral actions. (shrink)
Ao longo das últimas duas décadas, a amplamente repercutida proposta teórica desenvolvida por Axel Honneth sugere um modelo de racionalidade que, contudo, permanece em larga medida ainda implícito. No presente artigo, proponho que a abordagem de Honneth sugere o que podemos entender como uma virada afetiva na teoria crítica. Para tanto, desdobro minha exposição em quatro passos. Primeiramente, apresento como a categoria do reconhecimento, a partir do sentido adotado por Honneth de uma “transcendência-imanência” da teoria social, mostra-se como uma crítica (...) aos padrões de racionalidade. Isto é, como este sentido constitui-se a partir dos limites de articulação comunicativas do sofrimento, em um particular entrecruzamento entre padrões de racionalidade e patologias sociais. Em um segundo passo, discuto como uma abordagem do vínculo entre afetos e teoria social é desdobrado em Luta por Reconhecimento, e, em seguida, como ela se distingue do sentido de conteúdos afetivos das práxis sociais em O Direito da liberdade. Se, em Luta por reconhecimento, uma concepção de afetos parece ser mais clara a partir do vínculo desenvolvido entre teoria social e teoria da subjetividade, procurarei mostrar que em O direito da liberdade esse conteúdo afetivo se apresenta de uma maneira mais plausível no âmbito de uma teoria das instituições, dissociada de fortes premissas antropológicas. Concluo mencionando de forma ainda programática como o potencial de crítica e conflito, presente nas intuições originais de Honneth, poderia se manter na análise do conteúdo afetivo da práxis social. Palavras-chave: Reconhecimento. Afetos. Instituições. Teoria crítica. Axel Honneth. (shrink)
Relativism has usually been presented as linked to the limits of translation and understanding. The Principle of Charity was developed to decide the reference of words or the best translation of a sentence. However, the principle has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, as a pragmatic maxim that guides the interpreter generally; or a transcendental one, as an a priori, necessary condition for someone to be understood. In this paper I will focus on the latter (...) approach, taking Donald Davidson's arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the Principle of Charity as a representative case. Although different versions of the principle can be found in Davidson's writings, and some of them would seem flexible enough to give an account of how interpreter and speaker have different beliefs, all of these versions put understanding and intelligibility at risk. The reason is that the Principle of Charity has a wide scope: to conceive a person as rational, as having beliefs and desires, or as saying something, we have to interpret his/her utterances as revealing a set of beliefs consistent and true, and that maxim is applied to the whole system of sentences. So charity is necessary, we cannot choose it and if we spell out the Principle of Charity in sociological or psychological terms, that is, in empirical terms, we are changing the subject. The transcendental character of the principle has received criticism from various authors who understand it in a naturalistic way. I will conclude that an empirical description of how we use the Principle of Charity when we interpret a speaker's utterance would show the psychological and sociological relevance of relativism. (shrink)
In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing (...) that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations. (shrink)
Este artigo objetivou investigar a síndrome de burnout em estudantes de um curso técnico de enfermagem. Procurou identificar também a existência de associação entre variáveis demográficas e escolares e fatores de estresse numa amostra de 255 estudantes. Como instrumentos de pesquisa foi utilizado um..
Peirce’s classes of signs are instruments of inquiry, and, as such, they have an effective analytical power. We can find in Peirce’s texts four systems of sign classes that vary from having 3 to 66 classes. The system of 66 classes brings up the idea that to better represent a sign process, it would be necessary to consider an aspect of the sign before considering the relation that involves that aspect. However, if one observes the trichotomies in the system of (...) 10 sign classes, this method, which seems very reasonable, cannot be applied, for before considering the sign-object and the sign-interpretant relation, Peirce only proposes the examination of the sign itself. Considering the development of Peirce’s semiotics, I propose to look back to the system of 10 classes and add to it the trichotomies that will allow the consideration of every aspect of a relation in itself before examining it within the relation. This process brings up a system of 21 classes of signs, which will be suggested as an instrument of inquiry. The aim of this paper is not only to deduce the system of 21 classes, but also to allow the reader to understand how each class represents a step in a semiotic inquiry. With that in mind, I will work on an example of how to proceed with a semiotic analysis using the system of 21 classes. (shrink)
Kant has often been criticized for holding a very negative vision of women, according to which they are less rational and less morally valuable than men. In this paper, I shall argue quite the opposite. I will show that, in spite of some minor pejorative comments, Kant held that women fit better the ideal of a moral person than men. This is due to some qualities of the female sex, mainly the women capacity for self-control and the capacity for having (...) moral feelings like sympathy and compassion. Moreover, women show their master of emotions and passions when they are able to use their emotional sensitivity and self-control to master thefeelings and passions of men. (shrink)
Este artigo tem como objetivo refletir sobre as modificações cognitivas e identitárias nos/dos sujeitos da sociedade digital – denominados aqui de sujeitos imersivos, no sentido proposto por Lucia Santaella. Para tanto, considera-se a hipótese de que a compreensão de conceitos como ciberespaço, cibercultura e virtualização exige, antecipadamente, o resgate do sentido de termos como virtual, real, realidade e atualidade. O marco teórico destaca principalmente os argumentos apresentados por Pierre Lévy e Giles Deleuze. Parte-se do questionamento da fronteira entre mente e (...) corpo, entre real e virtual. Posteriormente, são identificadas algumas mudanças provocadas pela virtualização e seus efeitos nos espaços escolares. Os procedimentos metodológicos são demarcados pela abordagem qualitativa com amparo na pesquisa bibliográfica. Os resultados indicam a emergência de um novo sujeito de aprendizagem com processos cognitivos distintos e novas demandas sociais. Estas condições impõem um redimensionamento dos saberes e atitudes dos professores e dos especialistas em educação. Os apontamentos finais sugerem a necessidade de intensificação dos estudos acerca da virtualização da sociedade contemporânea a fim de compreender as características identitárias dos sujeitos imersivos. Palavras-chave : Virtual e real. Virtualização. Ciberespaço e cibercultura. Modificações cognitivas e identitárias. (shrink)