Některá „opravná“ hnutí dneška uvažují o možnosti vrátit se k původní lidské instinktivitě. Chtějí se tím vymanit ze současné kultury, kterou chápou jako člověka traumatizující. Toto úsilí je možné podrobit kritice pomocí teorie současné nesoučasnosti, teorie plastické a elastické fáze evoluce a teorie koevoluce genů a kultury. Můžeme tak stanovit „elastické synchronie“ v nás (např. pomocí teorie axiální transformace či teorie procesu civilizace), které chápeme jako ustanovené určitou somatizací kulturní evoluce, a „elastické synchronie“ vně nás, které mají povahu kulturních institucí. (...) Napětí mezi lidskou „přirozeností“ a kulturou je tak vždy nutné interpretovat ve smyslu vzájemného působení těchto dvou druhů elastických synchronií. Koncepce „elastické synchronie“ je propojena s obecnou sémiotickou (triadické pojetí znaku) a biosémiotickou teorií. Jsou zvažovány různé způsoby dědičné fixace (somatizace) výsledků kulturního vývoje (koevoluce genů a kultury; vliv kultury na selekci genů; epigenetická fixace; vtištění v raných fázích postnatální ontogeneze) a způsoby jejich sociokulturní institucionalizace. Pojednávají se noetické, sociálně ontologické a individuálně psychologické důsledky takto vzniklých elastických synchronií. Je rozlišen radikální a zmírněný kulturní konstruktivismus. Autor při tom vychází z nominalistického stanoviska. (shrink)

In recent debates in moral psychology and literary Darwinism, several authors suggested that narrative art plays a significant role in the process of the social learning of moral norms, functioning as storage of locally salient moral information. However, an integrative view, which would help explain the inner workings of this morally educative function of narrative art, is still lacking. This paper provides such a unifying theoretical account by bringing together insights from moral psychology, educational sciences, cognitive/evolutionary narratology, and cultural evolution. (...) A study of contemporary American rap music is included to showcase the benefits of this integrative approach in the context of one particular type of narrative art. (shrink)

Cílem článku je prozkoumat otázku po epistemickém statusu morálních intuic. Empirické výzkumy na poli morální psychologie ukazují, že intuice hojně využíváme při morálním hodnocení. Spoléháme se na ně však i jako morální filosofové při testování našich teorií – má-li některá normativní teorie proti-intuitivní důsledky, chápeme to jako její vadu a vice versa. V článku se snažím zodpovědět otázku, zda je taková praxe odvolávání se na morální intuice jako na evidenci ospravedlnitelná – je morální intuice spolehlivým epistemickým kanálem? Nejprve se budu (...) opírat o příbuznou debatu zaměřenou na epistemické intuice, představím tzv. restrikcionistickou výzvu a vysvětlím, z jakého důvodu se zaměřuji na morální intuice. V následující sekci předložím dle mého názoru nejsilnější linii útoku na epistemickou spolehlivost morálních intuic – argument z intuitivní nestability. Dříve jsme nevycházeli z úžasu nad zprávami o masivních rozdílech mezi námi Zápaďany a obyvateli exotických krajin, kterými nás ze svých terénních výzkumů zásobovali etnografové a antropologové. Dnes to jsou především morální psychologové a experimentální filosofové, kteří nás udivují ještě více odhalováním značné variability v intuicích – tentokrát však nejen mezi civilizovanými a domorodými lidmi, nýbrž i v srdci naší vlastní kultury. V další části tak předložím jednoduchou typologii intuitivní nestability a představím v současnosti již značně rozsáhlý soubor dat, který dokumentuje právě tuto neblahou vlastnost morálních intuic. Na jejich základě pak ve finální sekci dospěji k závěru, že morální intuice nejsou schopné dostát epistemickým nárokům, které klademe na jiné informační zdroje (např. smyslové vnímání), a jako takové nemohou sehrávat svou domnělou evidenční roli. V úplném závěru předložím předběžné poznámky týkající se možnosti využívat morálních intuic spíše jako zdroje motivace a za tím účelem navrhnu obrátit filosofickou praxi testování normativních teorií naruby. (shrink)

Cílem článku je prozkoumat otázku po epistemickém statusu morálních intuic. Empirické výzkumy na poli morální psychologie ukazují, že intuice hojně využíváme při morálním hodnocení. Spoléháme se na ně však i jako morální filosofové při testování našich teorií – má-li některá normativní teorie proti-intuitivní důsledky, chápeme to jako její vadu a vice versa. V článku se snažím zodpovědět otázku, zda je taková praxe odvolávání se na morální intuice jako na evidenci ospravedlnitelná – je morální intuice spolehlivým epistemickým kanálem? Nejprve se budu (...) opírat o příbuznou debatu zaměřenou na epistemické intuice, představím tzv. restrikcionistickou výzvu a vysvětlím, z jakého důvodu se zaměřuji na morální intuice. V následující sekci předložím dle mého názoru nejsilnější linii útoku na epistemickou spolehlivost morálních intuic – argument z intuitivní nestability. Dříve jsme nevycházeli z úžasu nad zprávami o masivních rozdílech mezi námi Zápaďany a obyvateli exotických krajin, kterými nás ze svých terénních výzkumů zásobovali etnografové a antropologové. Dnes to jsou především morální psychologové a experimentální filosofové, kteří nás udivují ještě více odhalováním značné variability v intuicích – tentokrát však nejen mezi civilizovanými a domorodými lidmi, nýbrž i v srdci naší vlastní kultury. V další části tak předložím jednoduchou typologii intuitivní nestability a představím v současnosti již značně rozsáhlý soubor dat, který dokumentuje právě tuto neblahou vlastnost morálních intuic. Na jejich základě pak ve finální sekci dospěji k závěru, že morální intuice nejsou schopné dostát epistemickým nárokům, které klademe na jiné informační zdroje (např. smyslové vnímání), a jako takové nemohou sehrávat svou domnělou evidenční roli. V úplném závěru předložím předběžné poznámky týkající se možnosti využívat morálních intuic spíše jako zdroje motivace a za tím účelem navrhnu obrátit filosofickou praxi testování normativních teorií naruby. (shrink)

Masaryk’s philosophical approach to reality is largely characterised by its orientation towards the positivism of Auguste Comte, which Masaryk sought to offset with the psychologism of J. S. Mill. The combination of these positivist approaches became the positive starting point for Masaryk’s ethics. But that was not the only influence on his ethics. Masaryk’s German translation of Hume’s book, titled Eine Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral von David Hume (1883), reveals that the main stimuli that shaped Masaryk’s ideas about (...) ethics came from David Hume. Although the need for scientific evidence became a fundamental principle of Masaryk’s thought, the need to objectively anchor ethics in rational theism necessitated in this area a departure from his positivist outlook. Masaryk’s lectures on practical philosophy attest to this fact. The reason for his departure from a positivist stance was due to the metaphysical nature of his concept of psychology. (shrink)

Neither in theory nor in practice does there exist a single model of decision making. It is very difficult to identify a model, or models, which would be most useful during and after a disaster. Within the disaster timeframe (a difficult and complex situation), specific moral dilemmas arise. All the decision making theories tend to be associated with different assumptions about human nature, the quality of the decisions made and the manner in which they are made. Different assumptions may result (...) in different tools being used and subsequently different consequences. The paper will provide a general introduction to the ethical decision making model, and will suggest two ways in which decisions in ethics might be made. The paper will try to deepen the discussion, and suggest answers to questions such as which type of ethical decision making is better in a specific situation such as a disaster? Is there any need to use a different decision making model (from an ethical point of view) in a disaster than in another event? Nonetheless, the article does not provide explicit solutions to these questions, since providing them would require further investigation than is the aim of this paper. (shrink)

The development of early childhood care, education, and development programs in Indonesia suggests unexpected linkages between democratization, empowerment, and neoliberal policy regimes. Despite the shift to grassroots organizing and to empowerment as a goal of development, in Indonesia there is tremendous continuity in the use of women's work to provide social welfare at the community level. Ethnographic research illuminates the impact on women's work and their own interpretation of programs to empower children.

According to metaphysical coherentism, grounding relations form an interconnected system in which things ground each other and nothing is ungrounded. This potentially viable view’s logical territory remains largely unexplored. In this paper, I describe that territory by articulating four varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I do not argue for any variety in particular. Rather, I aim to show that not all issues which might be raised against coherentism will be equally problematic for all the versions of that view, which features far (...) more nuance and diversity than is typically ascribed to it. (shrink)

This paper considers whether Marx's views about communism change significantly during his lifetime. According to the ‘standard story’, as Marx got older he dropped the vision of self-realization in labour that he spoke of in his early writings, and adopted a more pessimistic account of labour, where real freedom is achieved outside the working-day, in leisure. Other commentators, however, have argued that there is no pessimistic shift in Marx's thought on this matter. This paper offers a different reading of this (...) debate. It argues that there are two visions of the good life in Marx. However, it suggests that these two visions cannot be understood in terms of a simple shift between a ‘young’ and ‘mature’ Marx. Rather, it claims that Marx moves between these two visions throughout his writings. In this way, it suggests that Marx's intellectual development on this issue is best understood as an oscillation rather than a shift. Once this interpretive claim is advanced, the paper then moves on to consider some potential causes and implications of Marx's life-long oscillation between two different conceptions of the good life. (shrink)

Der Band enthält Beiträge von Medizinern, Juristen, Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern aus Estland, Polen, den Niederlanden und Deutschland zu Themen der Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin. Diese Beiträge sind im Rahmen des «Arbeitskreises für Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie der Medizin in Ostmitteleuropa» entstanden, der auf einer Kooperationsvereinbarung des Interdisziplinären Zentrums für Ethik der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) und des Instituts für Geschichte und Ethik der Medizin der Universität Halle-Wittenberg beruht. Sie befassen sich u. a. mit der Gesundheitsreform in Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn, (...) mit ethischen Problemen bei Abtreibung, HIV-Infektion, Drogenkonsum, Sterbehilfe und Gentechnik sowie dem Theorie-Praxis-Verhältnis in der Medizin. (shrink)

This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutical theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorisation of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutical practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s (...) critical arguments against objectivist interpretations of the body; particularly, his analyses demonstrate that norms of optimal corporeal functioning are highly individual and variable in time and thus do not directly depend on generic physiological structures. In practice, objectively measurable physical deviations rarely correspond to specific subjective difficulties and, similarly, patients’ reflective insights into their own motor deficiencies do not necessarily produce meaningful motor improvements. Physiotherapeutical procedures can be understood neither as mechanical manipulations of patients’ machine-like bodies by experts nor as a process of such manipulation by way of instructing patients’ explicit conscious awareness. Rather, physiotherapeutical practice and theory can benefit from the philosophical interpretation of motor disorders as modifications of bodily intentionality. Consequently, motor performances addressed in physiotherapy are interpreted as relational features of a living organism coupled with its environment, and motor disorders are approached as failures to optimally manage the motor requirements of a given situation owing to a relative loss of the capacity to structure one’s relation with their environment through motor action. Building on this, we argue that the process of physiotherapy is most effective when understood as a bodily interaction to guide patients towards discovering better ways of grasping a situation as meaningful through bodily postures and movements. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does (...) not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former. (shrink)

У статті робиться спроба теоретичного аналізу специфіки механізму формування традицій як емоційно забарвленої уяви про об’єкт, яка може виникати спонтанно або цілеспрямовано під впливом засобів інформації, реклами чи пропаганди, формуючи своєрідний міф з певною системою координат. Аналізується традиція, як певний зв’язок між старим і новим змістом, котрий створює вигляд безперервності існування соціуму. Традиція розглядається як сучасний погляд на минуле. Виходячи з цього процес відтворення традицій – це не відновлення історичної правди, а процес міфотворення образу минулого сьогодні, націленого в майбутнє, де (...) для міфу минулого на перший план виходить майбутнє. Традиція тільки відштовхується від минулого і формує свою віртуальну історію. Процес формування нового бачення історичного процесу розглядається як процес міфотворення традицій, який відбувається весь час, постійно задовольняючи мінливі інтереси суспільства. Розкривається механізм формування іміджу як соціокультурної матриці певної події або об’єкту, де на перший план виходять соціокультурні конотації з використанням процесу міфотворення традицій. (shrink)

Marx’s vision of unalienated production is often thought to be subject to decisive objections. This article argues that these objections rely on a misinterpretation of Marx’s position. It provides a new interpretation of Marx’s vision of unalienated production. Unlike another well-known account, it suggests that unalienated production involves realizing oneself through providing others with the goods and services they need for their self-realization. It argues that this view is appealing and that it offers a more successful response to objections than (...) previous interpretations. In doing so, it hopes to put Marx’s concern with alienation and nonalienation back on the table. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...) of the brain-injured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann’s syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider’s sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations, I argue that “higher-order” cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider’s intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann’s syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process. (shrink)

Dealing with conflicts seems to be a great challenge in society today. But not only in society. Higher education displays an air of resoluteness with certainty and security that disguises the conflicts and the fear of conflicts in a substantial number of subjects. If not in a state of denial, higher education avoids taking up conflicts over issues, for learning. The detailed investigation of Tagore’s pedagogical writings, with a focus on the importance of conflicts in education, reveals a genuine embrace (...) of conflicts for education. Conflicts are natural and necessary for the development and change of both the individual and society and the start of a ‘creative imagination’ to solve the problems we face in life. Contradictions in conflicts are not incompatible incongruities that are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive, but to the contrary, in need of each other. Contradictions do not represent different worlds but are substantial parts of one world: together they form a unity. Conflicting forces are necessary to create harmony. Creativity, imagination, love, art, and critical encounters are key elements in Tagore’s practical education aimed at finding similarities among people instead of emphasizing differences. Relations between people over the Identity of people. In other words, we need conflicts to become creative and imaginative human beings. The paper continues discussing conceptual and practical issues that seem necessary to get the teaching of conflicts in education off the ground. On the conceptual level, in particular our dealing with uncertainty and fear, the valuation of conflict and the need for uncertainty-researching education. On a practical level, I propose a certain teaching model, a supportive curriculum, a way of choosing genuine conflicts for education and finally, I argue for specific support and education of teachers, acknowledging the vital role teachers play in delivering the education that we need. (shrink)

'What is real?' has been one of the key questions of philosophy since its beginning in antiquity. But it is not just a question that philosophers ask. This Very Short Introduction discusses what reality is by looking at a variety of arguments, theories, and thought-experiments from philosophy, physics, and cognitive science.

This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis’ book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis’ main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment (...) on Tallis’ interpretation of several more loosely associated topics from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, I reconsider Tallis’ account of intentionality as a factor that opens a distance between the cognizer and the world. Whereas Tallis emphasizes that agency requisitions aspects of the world to achieve its goals, I point out that agency does not determine the meaning of things unidirectionally and independently of all context. A self-controlled agency is provisionally reached through a process of ‘deindexicalization’ of our passive intentional capacities, that is, by creating and maintaining new, different worldly contexts. Subsequently, I analyze Tallis’ description of our intentional relation to spatiotemporally distant possibilities. In my view, Tallis underestimates the extent to which our intentional relation to possibilities is pre-reflexive and pre-predicative and hence independent of propositional attitudes. Finally, I consider Tallis’ interpretation of nature and show that it is deeply influenced by the sciences of nature. In contrast, I argue that agency can be properly described only if we understand it as an intervention in a lifeworld already imbued with sense, not merely a physical or material nature. (shrink)

Terugblik van de bekende psychiater op zijn ontwikkeling als sannyasin.

The volume deals with _historical ontology_ from several angles: _the historicity of understanding_ (Françoise Dastur, Arbogast Schmitt, Samuel Weber), _the limits of making_ (Emil Angehrn, Nicholas Davey, Jan-Ivar Lindén) and _the future of memory_ (Jayne Svenungsson, Christoph Türcke, Bernhard Waldenfels).

The Czech philosopher Jan Patocka (1907-1977), who studied with Husserl and Heidegger, is widely recognized as the most influential thinker to come from postwar Eastern Europe. Refusing to join the Communist party after World War II, he was banned from academia and publication for the rest of his life, except for a brief time following the liberalizations of the Prague spring of 1968. Joining Vaclav Havel and Jiri Hajek as a spokesman for the Chart 77 human-rights declaration of 1977, Patocka (...) was harassed by authorities, arrested, and finally died of a heart attack during prolonged interrogation. Plato and Europe, arguably Patocka’s most important book, consists of a series of lectures delivered in the homes of friends after his last banishment from the academy just three years before his death. Here, he presents his most mature ideas about the history of Western philosophy, arguing that the idea of the care of the soul is fundamental to the philosophical tradition beginning with the Greeks. Explaining how the care of the soul is elaborated as the problem of how human beings may make their world one of truth and justice, Patocka develops this thesis through a treatment of Plato, Democritus, and Aristotle, showing how considerations about the soul are of central importance in their writings. He demonstrates in vivid fashion how this idea forms the spiritual heritage of Europe. (shrink)

Overzicht van ideeën en opvattingen m.b.t. het begrip tijd, vanuit diverseinvalshoeken.

Though this moderately-priced anthology dates back to 1983, its lively articles are as relevant as ever. Topics covered include suicide, euthanasia, war, punishment,world hunger, abortion, sexual relations, equality, affirmative action, and future generations.

Review of Martijn Konings Capital and Time: For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Popular spiritual writer and teacher Jan Frazier shows how to move from emotional and mental turmoil to quiet joy and happiness inThe Freedom of Being: At Ease with What Is. Frazier, the author of the bestsellingWhen Fear Falls Away: The ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739J. A. CoverKenneth Clatterbaugh. The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy: 1637–1739. New York and London: Routledge, 1999. Pp. xi + 239. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $21.00.Over the scholastics and earliest moderns, Hume had an advantage of hindsight in declaring that "There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus'd more disputes both among ancients and modern (...) philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects" (Treatise I.iii.14). Between the scholastics and Hume fell (i) Descartes, (ii) classical mechanists such as Hobbes and Gassendi, (iii) the Cartesians Le Grand and Malebranche, (iv) the explanatory rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz, (v) later experimental mechanists such as Boyle, Rohault and Newton, and (vi) the so-called empiricists Locke and Berkeley. This book presents an accessible and admirably broad overview of the modern debate about causation, without sacrificing serious attention to textual details. With two chapters on (i) and one apiece on (ii) - (vi), Clatterbaugh earns for himself and his reader a helpfully synoptic picture of philosophical shifts in the causation debate in the hundred years separating Descartes' Discourse and Hume's Treatise. By the end of the (modern) day, (1) the four-fold causes of Aristotelian-Scholasticism have given way to efficient causation alone; (2) no pre-existing forms in efficient causes are to be found, nor indeed any substantial active powers whatever; (3) there is no deep sense in which causes communicate reality to effects; (4) necessary connection has gone by the board; (5) divine causation has no place in a natural philosophy of causation. No surprises there, but Clatterbaugh's effort reminds us afresh of the varied and torturous routes to such shifts, helping advanced students better (or newly) appreciate them in the comfortable space of 200 pages.Of those pages, a third are devoted to Descartes and the Cartesians. That's not inappropriate, given the importance and difficulty of Descartes's response to Aristotelian-Scholastic accounts of causation, and its influence on occasionalist sentiments on the Continent. The tenor and value of this book may be illustrated by reflecting on the first of these—a rich and frustrating business, both in Descartes's texts and in Clatterbaugh's book. Suppose we grant Descartes the back of his hand to substantial forms and active formal causes as at best "unexplanatory" (counseling Regius): his "at-least-as-much-reality-in-the-cause-as-in-the-effect" principle might be treated as the basis of "an alternative" metaphysical account of causation (19-32). Well, it might be so-treated: but three versions of the principle later, the reader will be excused for judging it little more than a necessary condition for some event-pair x,y counting as a cause-effect pair. If the scholastic appeal to active forms is unexplanatory, then Descartes's [End Page 600] principle—which isn't Descartes's principle at all but a scholastic commonplace—can scarcely fill the explanatory gap. Glossed as a predictable consequence of some strong form of influxus physicus, it is embarrassed by Foucher's objection (that mind bears no likeness to body) and by the weight of texts urging that accidents are individual to their bearers. Having offered us no deep metaphysical story about what in the world answers to 'vis,' Descartes is at best a bungling "interactionist" (here appropriating Clatterbaugh's word for someone whose apparent talk of secondary causes we are asked to respect as expressing a strict and considered philosophical commitment). One can only side with Voetius in reckoning Descartes's replacement of forms by purely quantitative, mechanical principles of motion as expressing a mere "disposition of the movable to move... not an activity of an efficient cause, but merely a necessary condition and a causa sine qua non" (my emphasis: Selectarum Disputationum I [1648-59], 873). Descartes has no deep theory about the nature of causation.Is that too harsh? Had this book a different target, one could fairly complain that the author too infrequently steps away from the texts and commentators to offer and defend a... (shrink)

The focus of this dissertation is the debate over classification and species realism/anti-realism in the new science of mechanism. I argue that Michael Ayers's Interpretation of Robert Boyle as a Lockean on species is incorrect. Boyle is more realist than Locke, indeed, Boyle's theory of classification was more similar to Leibniz's than to Locke's. This realist account of Boyle helps to diagnose an important connection between Leibniz and Boyle, and show Locke as a much more novel philosopher of science. ;I (...) then argue that this account of Boyle's realism reveals a new argument strain in Leibniz that allows him a better reply against Locke's species anti-realism. I thus argue against Susana Goodin's view that Leibniz's reply to Locke's anti-realist arguments in the New Essays are stronger than they appear to be. According to Goodin, Leibniz cannot refute Locke without either changing the subject or appealing to his own deep metaphysics. I argue that Leibniz can reply in a dialectically adequate, non-question begging way to Locke's argument without appealing to anything deeper than the science of mechanism. ;Finally, I show that, contra Ayers, one of Locke's motivations for his anti-realism stems from his theological heterodoxy, not from the corpuscularian hypothesis. This theological strain appears most strikingly within the context of the debate over the status of persons and the human species. In the Essay, Locke denies each of Leibniz's orthodox theses regarding the human species. Locke's denials of the orthodox theses appear to be motivated by his heterodox theological commitments. (shrink)