According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well- known biases of (...) judgment and decision-making among expert ethicists and laypeople. We found that even expert ethicists are affected by some of these biases, but also that they enjoy a slight advantage over laypeople in some cases. We discuss the implications of these results for the expertise defence, and conclude that they still do not support the defence as it is typically presented in (moral) philosophy. (shrink)

Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay (...) intuitions; second, that expert intuitions are superior to lay intuitions; and third, that expert intuitions accord with the relevant philosophical consensus. At present, there is only little experimental evidence that bears on these issues. To advance the debate, we conducted two new experiments on intuitions about knowledge with experts and lay people. Our results suggest that the intuitions of epistemological experts are superior in some respects, but they also pose an unexpected challenge to the expertise defense. Most strikingly, we found that even epistemological experts tend to ascribe knowledge in fake-barn-style cases. This suggests that philosophy, as a discipline, might fail to adequately map the intuitions of its expert practitioners onto a disciplinary consensus. (shrink)

We investigate the impact of informal arguments on judgments about thought experiment cases in light of Deutsch and Cappelen’s mischaracterization view, which claims that philosophers’ case judgments are primarily based on arguments and not intuitions. If arguments had no influence on case judgments, this would seriously challenge whether they are, or should be, based on arguments at all—and not on other cognitive sources instead, such as intuition. In Experiment 1, we replicated Wysocki’s (Rev Philos Psychol 8(2):477–499, 2017) pioneering study on (...) a Gettier-style case, and we confirmed that the informal arguments used by him had no significant effect. However, we also included an improved argument for ascribing knowledge, which did have a significant effect even in Wysocki’s original design. We therefore followed up with Experiment 2 on three Gettier-style cases, where we used a more natural dialogical format for presenting both case descriptions and informal arguments. Overall, we found a clear impact of prima facie good pro and con arguments on case judgments. The issue of argument impact is thus no obstacle to arguing about thought experiments. (shrink)

Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...) that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a general constraint on theories of knowledge that we call ‘normalism’. Normalism is a view about the epistemic threshold that separates knowledge from mere true belief; its basic claim is that one knows only if one has at least a normal amount of epistemic support for one’s belief. We argue that something like normalism is required to do full justice to the normative role of knowledge in many key everyday practices, such as assertion, inquiry, and (...) testimony. The view of normality we employ to flesh out this claim is inspired by experimental work on the folk notion of normality, which suggests that folk judgments of what is ‘normal’ are based upon both statistical averages as well as normative ideals within the relevant target domain. Adopting this notion of normality to set the threshold for knowledge results in a view upon which knowledge is routinely available on an everyday basis without being a merely trivial achievement. We explore several interesting consequences of this view, including the implication that the threshold for knowing may change as, e.g., the ease of availability of information in an epistemic community changes over time. The result is a ‘shifty’ view of knowledge which nonetheless retains more stability than standard contextualist or pragmatic encroachment approaches. (shrink)

This chapter proceeds from the standard picture of the relation between intuitions and experimental philosophy: the alleged evidential role of intuitions about hypothetical cases, and experimental philosophy’s challenge to these judgments, based on their variation with philosophically irrelevant factors. I will survey some of the main defenses of this standard picture against the x-phi challenge, most of which fail. Concerning the most popular defense, the expertise defense, I will draw the bleak conclusion that intuitive expertise of the envisaged kind is (...) largely a myth. Next, I will consider the mischaracterization objection, which has mainly been developed by Deutsch and Cappelen on the basis of textual evidence: that philosophers do not appeal to intuitions as evidence for their case judgments, but instead argue for them. This would render the x-phi challenge mostly irrelevant, due to its focus on intuitions about hypothetical cases. I will then consider a few instructive replies to the mischaracterization objection, which are all unconvincing on further inspection. Finally, I will discuss some potential normative consequences of the mischaracterization objection, and I will argue that it recommends a shift away from the excessive focus on intuitions about cases in metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy, towards more work on the role of argumentation in the method of cases. More speculatively, I claim that philosophers should always argue for their case judgments, even if they have strong intuitions about them, because an argument-based methodology would be more transparent and philosophically fruitful than one that mainly relies on intuition. (shrink)

Despite the progress made in studying the observable exteriors of conscious processes, which are reflected in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), there are still no satisfactory answers to two closely related core questions. These are the question of the origin of the subjective, phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and the question of the causal mechanisms underlying the generation of specific phenomenal states. In this article, we address these questions using a novel variant of cosmopsychism, a holistic form of panpsychism relying (...) on the central idea that the universe is imbued with a ubiquitous field of consciousness (UFC). This field is understood as a foundational dual-aspect component of the cosmos, the extrinsic appearance of which is physical in nature and the intrinsic manifestation of which is phenomenological in nature. We argue that this approach brings a new perspective into play, according to which the organizational characteristics of the NCC are indicative of the brain’s interaction with and modulation of the UFC. Key insights from modern physics suggest that the modulation mechanism is identical with the fundamental mechanism underlying quantum systems, resulting in the conclusion that a coherently oscillating neural cell assembly acquires phenomenal properties by tapping into the universal pool of phenomenal nuances predetermined by the UFC, or more specifically, by entering into a temporary liaison with the UFC and extracting a subset of phenomenal tones from the phenomenal color palette inherent in the basic structure of the UFC. This hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. (shrink)

This article presents a new interpretation of the consciousness-related neuroscientific findings using the framework of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a branch of physics that sheds light on the basic principles underlying quantum systems. It is propounded that SED supplemented by two well-founded hypotheses leads to a satisfying explanation of the neural correlates of consciousness. The theoretical framework thus defined is based on the notion that all conceivable shades of phenomenal awareness are woven into the frequency spectrum of a universal background field, (...) called zero-point field (ZPF), implying that the fundamental mechanism underlying conscious systems rests upon the access to information available in the ZPF. The body of evidence can be interpreted such that in the extroverted, stimulus-oriented operating mode the brain produces streams of consciousness by periodically writing persistent information states into the ZPF (theta cycle). In the introspective operating mode, which goes along with activations of the default mode network, the brain is receptive to the flow of ZPF information states that constitutes the record of conscious experiences, suggesting that the sense of self and the retrieval of memories is accomplished by periodically reading (filtering) persistent information states from the ZPF (alpha cycle). Moreover, the data support the conclusion that meditative practices and psychedelics detune the filter, thus preventing the instantiation of self-referential conscious states, which leads to the dissolution of the ego. Instead, the brain taps into a wider spectrum of ZPF modes and, hence, gains access to an extended phenomenal color palette, resulting in expanded consciousness. (shrink)

Mémoire de Mons. Lange contre cette philosophie -- Réponse préliminaire d'un auteur anonimeà ce mémoire -- Sommaire de la réponse de Mr. Wolf mȩme avec un avis au lecteur de l'histoire de ce nouveau différend.

Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl’s early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book’s general argument, and which I call Husserl’s Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to (...) be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book’s opening chapter, and which I call Husserl’s German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science’s positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl’s early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced. (shrink)

The goal of this work is to compile the basic components for the construction of an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness that meets the standards of a fundamental theory. An essential cornerstone of the conceptual framework is the vacuum state of quantum electrodynamics which, contrary to the classical notion of the vacuum, can be viewed as a vibrant ocean of energy, termed zero-point field (ZPF). Being the fundamental substrate mediating the electromagnetic force, the ubiquitous ZPF constitutes the ultimate bedrock of (...) all electromagnetic phenomena. In particular, resonant interaction with the ZPF is critical for understanding rapidly forming, long-range coherent activity patterns that are characteristic of brain dynamics. Assuming that the entire phenomenal color palette is rooted in the vibrational spectrum of the ZPF and that each normal mode of the ZPF is associated with an elementary shade of consciousness, it stands to reason that conscious states are caused by the coupling of the brain to a particular set of normal modes selectively filtered from the full frequency spectrum of the ZPF. From this perspective, the brain is postulated to function as a resonant oscillator that couples to a specific range of ZPF modes, using these modes as a keyboard for the composition of an enormous variety of phenomenal states. Theoretical considerations suggest that the brain-ZPF interface is controlled by altering the concentrations of neurotransmitters, placing the detailed study of the neurotransmitter-ZPF interaction at the center of future research activities. (shrink)

The main goal of this article consists in addressing two fundamental issues of consciousness research and cognitive science, namely, the question of why declarative memory functions are inextricably linked with phenomenal awareness and the question of the physical basis of memory traces. The presented approach proposes that high-level cognitive processes involving consciousness employ a universal mechanism by means of which they access and modulate an omnipresent background field that is identified with the zero-point field (ZPF) specified by stochastic electrodynamics, a (...) branch of physics that deals with the universal principles underlying quantum systems. In addition to its known physical properties and memory capacities, the ZPF is hypothesized to be an immanently sentient medium. It is propounded that linking up to a particular field mode of the ZPF activates a particular phenomenal nuance, implying that the phase-locked coupling of a set of field modes, i.e., the formation of a so-called ZPF information state, constitutes an appropriate mechanism for the amalgamation of elementary shades of consciousness into a complex state of consciousness. Since quantum systems rest exactly on this mechanism, conscious memory processes in the brain are expected to differ from unconscious processes by the presence of the typical features of many-body quantum systems, particularly long-range coherence and attractor formation, which is supported by a huge body of empirical evidence. On this basis, the conceptual framework set out in this article paves the way for a new understanding of the brain as a write-read head interacting with the ZPF, leading to self-consistent interpretations of the neural correlates of memory formation and memory retrieval and explaining why these memory processes are closely intertwined with phenomenal awareness. In particular, the neural correlates suggest that the brain produces consciously perceived memory traces by writing sequences of information states into the ZPF and retrieves consciously experienced memory traces by reading sequences of information states from the ZPF. Using these theoretical foundations, altered states of consciousness and memory disorders can be traced back to impairments of the ZPF write-read mechanism. The mechanism should reveal itself through characteristic photon emissions, resulting in testable predictions. (shrink)

Das Forschungsfeld der Synthetischen Biologie lässt sich als eine Fortentwicklung der Gentechnik verstehen, bei der in besonderer Weise ingenieurwissenschaftliche Methoden und Paradigmen zum Tragen kommen. Die Synthetische Biologie profitiert dabei von den Fortschritten der Gensequenzierungs- und DNA-Synthesetechnologien und von neuen Verfahren des Genome Editing. DNA-Sequenzen bis hin zu ganzen Genomen einzelliger Organismen können rekombiniert und vollständig synthetisiert werden und die entsprechenden intra- und interzellulären Prozesse können zielgerichtet verändert werden. Mit dieser im Vergleich zur klassischen Gentechnik erhöhten Eingriffstiefe verbindet sich in (...) der Synthetischen Biologie das ingenieurwissenschaftlich geprägte Ideal, DNA-Sequenzen modularisiert und standardisiert zu beschreiben, so dass sie als BioBricks je nach intendiertem Anwendungszweck des zu verändernden Organismus frei miteinander kombiniert – ›zusammengesteckt‹ – werden können. (shrink)

In this article, I present a novel approach to the scientific understanding of consciousness. It is based on the hypothesis that the full range of phenomenal qualities is built into the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous background field and proceeds on the assumption that conscious systems employ a universal mechanism by means of which they are able to extract phenomenal nuances selectively from this field. I set forth that in the form of the zero-point field (ZPF) physics can offer a (...) promising candidate that is qualified for playing the dual role as both the carrier of energy and consciousness. The appropriate mechanism, which rests upon the principle of dynamical coupling of ZPF modes, is a unique feature of quantum systems, suggesting that the dividing line between conscious and non-conscious systems is defined by the differentiation between quantum systems and classical systems. The presence of this mechanism in the brain is supported by the neurophysiological body of evidence, leading to a consistent explanation of the dynamical properties of the neural correlates of consciousness. Building on these findings, I lay the foundations for the conceptually coherent integration of consciousness into the physical worldview, derive an indicator for the quantity of consciousness of a given system, and outline the further steps toward a theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Juros, H. Die "Objektschwäche" der Moraltheologie.--Nossol, A. Christsein als radikale Proexistenz.--Styczen', T. Personaler Glaube im Spannungsfeld von religiöser Autorität und Gewissensautonomie.--Piegsa, J. Die "Sache Jesu" und die Reformmarxisten.--Szostek, A. Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion über den Utilitarismus.--Pryszmont, J. Die Wiederherstellung der gefallenen menschlichen Natur.--Theiner, J. Gedanken zur Sündenlehre Abaelards in seinem Werk "Ethica seu Scito teipsum".--Sikorski, T. Die Aporie des gemeinschaftlichen Lebens.--Kleber, K.-H. Der Christ und die Armut.--Wojtyła, K. Die menschliche Person im Kontext der ehelichen Hingabe und Elternschaft.--Tischner, J. Überlegungen zur Arbeitsethik.--Zeimentz, (...) H. Toleranz-Freiheit-Wahrheit. (shrink)

Empirical evidence indicates that conscious states, distinguished by the presence of phenomenal qualities, are closely linked to synchronized neural activity patterns whose dynamical characteristics can be attributed to self-organized criticality and phase transitions. These findings imply that insight into the mechanism by which the brain controls phase transitions will provide a deeper understanding of the fundamental mechanism by which the brain manages to transcend the threshold of consciousness. This article aims to show that the initiation of phase transitions and the (...) formation of synchronized activity patterns is due to the coupling of the brain to the zero-point field (ZPF), which plays a central role in quantum electrodynamics (QED). The ZPF stands for the presence of ubiquitous vacuum fluctuations of the electromagnetic field, represented by a spectrum of normal modes. With reference to QED-based model calculations, the details of the coupling mechanism are revealed, suggesting that critical brain dynamics is governed by the resonant interaction of the ZPF with the most abundant neurotransmitter glutamate. The pyramidal neurons in the cortical microcolumns turn out to be ideally suited to control this interaction. A direct consequence of resonant glutamate-ZPF coupling is the amplification of specific ZPF modes, which leads us to conclude that the ZPF is the key to the understanding of consciousness and that the distinctive feature of neurophysiological processes associated with conscious experience consists in modulating the ZPF. Postulating that the ZPF is an inherently sentient field and assuming that the spectrum of phenomenal qualities is represented by the normal modes of the ZPF, the significance of resonant glutamate-ZPF interaction for the formation of conscious states becomes apparent in that the amplification of specific ZPF modes is inextricably linked with the excitation of specific phenomenal qualities. This theory of consciousness, according to which phenomenal states arise through resonant amplification of zero-point modes, is given the acronym TRAZE. An experimental setup is specified that can be used to test a corollary of the theory, namely, the prediction that normally occurring conscious perceptions are absent under experimental conditions in which resonant glutamate-ZPF coupling is disrupted. (shrink)

This article presents and discusses different kinds of data documents, including data sets, data studies, data papers and data journals. It provides descriptive and bibliometric data on different kinds of data documents and discusses the theoretical and philosophical problems by classifying documents according to the DIKW model (data documents, information documents, knowl­edge documents and wisdom documents). Data documents are, on the one hand, an established category today, even with its own data citation index (DCI). On the other hand, data documents (...) have blurred boundaries in relation to other kinds of documents and seem sometimes to be understood from the problematic philosophical assumption that a datum can be understood as “a single, fixed truth, valid for everyone, everywhere, at all times”. (shrink)

On retrace rapidement comment la molécule a pris son indépendance grâce notamment à l’invention du microscope à effet tunnel. Depuis le milieu des années 1970, son identité a changé : d’un quelconque indiscernable parmi une multitude (par exemple dans un nanomatériau) à une seule devant embarquer une petite unité de calcul ou délivrer une puissance motrice. Avec des molécule-machines complexes fonctionnant chacune indépendamment, on espère également taquiner la physique quantique autrement qu’en utilisant quelques photons ou un seul atome dans une (...) cavité froide. (shrink)

What we mean when we use the word ‘nature’ critically affects design culture. Since nature has many different interpretations, the following lexicon is not intended to be an exhaustive exploration of the word’s etymology or usage by designers. Instead, I offer ten archetypical perspectives of nature that can help designers and non-designers alike clarify the different, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting ways in which we understand the fundamental relationships between humans and our environment.

To approach the creation of artificial conscious systems systematically and to obtain certainty about the presence of phenomenal qualities (qualia) in these systems, we must first decipher the fundamental mechanism behind conscious processes. In achieving this goal, the conventional physicalist position exhibits obvious shortcomings in that it provides neither a plausible mechanism for the generation of qualia nor tangible demarcation criteria for conscious systems. Therefore, to remedy the deficiencies of the standard physicalist approach, a new theory for the understanding of (...) consciousness has been formulated. The aim of the paper is to present the cornerstones of this theory, to outline the conditions for conscious systems derived from the theory, and to address the implications of these conditions for the creation of robots that transcend the threshold of phenomenal awareness. In short, the theory is based on the proposition that the universe is permeated by a ubiquitous field of consciousness that can be equated with the zero-point field (ZPF) of quantum electrodynamics (QED). The ZPF, which is characterized by a spectrum of field modes, plays a crucial role in the edifice of modern physics. QED-based model calculations on cortical dynamics and empirical findings on the neural correlates of consciousness suggest that a physical system can only generate conscious states if it is capable of establishing resonant coupling to the ZPF, resulting in the amplification of selected field modes and the activation of the phenomenal qualities that are assumed to be associated with these modes. Thus, scientifically sound considerations support the conclusion that the crucial condition for generating conscious states lies in a system's capacity to tap into the phenomenal color palette inherent in the ZPF. (shrink)

In 1929 Wittgenstein left Vienna for Cambridge, and Waismann grew into the role of spokesman for his absent hero. The story of his relation with the man so greatly esteemed by his much-admired mentor Schlick contains dramatic elements: there were moments of friction and of coldness, announcements of withdrawal from a shared project, accusations of plagiarism or, at least, insuffi cient acknowledgement. What we know of this story has been told by Brian McGuinness and Gordon Baker. If one wishes to (...) gauge the extent to which Waismann succeeded in fulfi lling his task as spokesman for Wittgenstein, one must start from the basic fact that between 1929 and 1936 the two men collaborated, trying to realize the common plan of producing a systematic exposition of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. (shrink)

A novel approach to the scientific understanding of phenomenal awareness is presented that accepts consciousness as ontologically fundamental and is based on the hypothesis that the whole range of phenomenal nuances is inherent in the frequency spectrum of a ubiquitous field of consciousness. Pursuing this idea, it is postulated that the brain employs a universal interaction mechanism through which it taps into this field, thereby acquiring phenomenal qualities. I argue that the edifice of modern physics can not only offer a (...) promising candidate for the field of consciousness, consisting in the zero-point field (ZPF), but also an appropriate interaction mechanism. What is more, the empirical body of evidence supports the conclusion that conscious processes make use of exactly this mechanism. More specifically, the neural correlates of consciousness suggest that in the stimulus-oriented operating mode the brain produces streams of consciousness by periodically writing information states into the ZPF, while in the stimulus-independent operating mode the brain is receptive to previously generated ZPF information states that constitute the repository of conscious experiences, implying that self-referential conscious states are retrieved by periodically reading information states from the ZPF. Beyond its explanatory power the presented approach opens up new horizons for the future research strategy. (shrink)

The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there (...) must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference. (shrink)

The question of who or what the happy man mentioned in Wittgenstein's Tractatus really is leads to a discussion of connected issues, e.g. the question of the Schopenhauerian origins of certain key notions of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, the import of the concept of a world-soul, the topic of solipsism, and the puzzling question of what is involved in the self's identification with the world.

Aus psychoanalytischer Sicht wird die therapeutische Haltung in der Beziehungsarbeit mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen beschrieben. Eine solche psychodynamische Haltung ist nicht nur in der Praxis des Psychoanalytikers hilfreich, sondern bewährt sich auch in der Akutstation einer psychiatrischen Klinik, in der sozialen Rehabilitation oder bei der Psychopharmakologie. Im ersten Teil wird die Arbeit in und an der therapeutischen Beziehung als Ausgangspunkt gewählt und die für die Autoren maßgebliche Haltung anhand der beiden Begriffe Engagement und Respekt dargestellt. Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird (...) im zweiten Teil darauf hingewiesen, dass eine Therapie – nicht nur, aber auch mit psychotisch erlebenden Menschen – eine Gratwanderung zwischen beiden Dimensionen sein kann. Im dritten Teil schließlich werden die ersten beiden Teile von der Mitautorin, die psychose- und psychiatrieerfahren ist, kommentiert. (shrink)

Religion und Psychoanalyse befassen sich in je spezifischer, aber vergleichbarer Weise mit Unverfügbarem, für das in der Religion die Transzendenz, in der Psychoanalyse die unbewusste Erfahrung steht. Ein Vergleich der Zugangsweisen setzt eine wechselseitige wissenschaftliche Achtung voraus; nur ein interdisziplinäres Gespräch auf Augenhöhe kann fruchtbar werden. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die These vertreten, dass es eine gemeinsame Aufgabe von Religion und Psychoanalyse sein kann, die Sensibilität für Unverfügbarkeiten zu bewahren und zu bedenken. Dann wird Zukunft als Chance des Neuen (...) möglich, während ein vorschnelles Verfügbarmachenwollen des Unverfügbaren den Zukunftsbezug einengt und zum Autoritarismus tendiert. (shrink)

Die psychoanalytische Debatte um unrepräsentierte psychische Zustände und die Grenzen der Behandelbarkeit schwerer seelischer Leiden ist theoretisch ebenso wie klinisch für die Psychoanalyse der Gegenwart zentral. Theoretisch gehaltvoll ist sie, weil das Verhältnis von verbalsprachlichen und infralinguistischen »Einschreibungen« sowie zwischen intrapsychischer und interpersonaler Erfahrung neu zu klären ist und einige enorm heterogen verwendete psychoanalytische Kernbegriffe zur Repräsentation neu zu sichten und voneinander abzugrenzen sind. Klinisch entscheidet sich an diesen Fragen, welche Leiden der psychoanalytischen Therapie zugänglich sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit will (...) einen sowohl theoretisch wie klinisch relevanten Beitrag zur Diskussion leisten. Sie geht aus von Sigmund Freuds Konzepten zu den unbewussten Vorstellungen, aus deren Perspektive die weiterführenden Gedanken neu gelesen und überprüft werden. Dabei stehen die Modelle von Green, Levine, Botella & Botella und Kristeva im Mittelpunkt. Sie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass es vorschnell ist, infralinguistische oder semiotische Erfahrungsschichten als »nicht repräsentiert« einzustufen. Vielmehr sollen die verschiedenen Darstellungsformen seelischer Zustände gewürdigt und aufeinander bezogen werden, die schließlich sprachlicher Repräsentation und so der Behandlung geöffnet werden. Ein ausführlicher Fallbericht und Hinweise auf die Behandlungsdynamik der Anorexia nervosa erläutern beispielhaft, wie das in der Kur gelingen kann. (shrink)