Results for 'Luck Egalitarianism'

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  1. Hikers in Flip‐Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of Justice.Anca Gheaus - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):54-69.
    The article has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism. Therefore, there will be important extensional overlap, at the level of domestic justice, between luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and relationship between the two rival views. Second, (...)
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  2. Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time.Patrick Tomlin - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
    The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., (...)
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  3. In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2005 - Res Publica 11 (1):1-10.
    This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Anderson's recent critique of the position she terms luck egalitarianism. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Anderson's arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults (...)
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  4. Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism.Ryan Long - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):107-130.
    Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. (...)
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  5. Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard.Gerald Lang - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):317-338.
    In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by Elizabeth Anderson, Jonathan Wolff, and others.
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  6. Against Institutional Luck Egalitarianism.Rekha Nath - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-19.
    Kok-Chor Tan has recently defended a novel theory of egalitarian distributive justice, institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). On this theory, it is unjust for institutions to favor some individuals over others based on matters of luck. Tan takes his theory to preserve the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarianism while avoiding what he regards as absurd implications that face other versions of luck egalitarianism. Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to his theory, (...)
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  7.  34
    Luck Egalitarianism, Universal Health Care, and Non-Responsibility-Based Reasons for Responsibilization.Martin Marchman Andersen & Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (2):201-216.
    In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitarianism, given its focus on personal responsibility, can justify universal health care. In this paper we argue that, whether or not this is so, and in fact whether or not egalitarianism should be sensitive to responsibility at all, the question of personal responsibilization for health is not settled. This is the case because whether or not individuals are responsible for their own health condition is (...)
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  8. Review of Carl Knight, Luck Egalitarianism[REVIEW]Matthew Lister - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):127-30.
  9.  27
    Drinking in the Last Chance Saloon: Luck Egalitarianism, Alcohol Consumption, and the Organ Transplant Waiting List.Andreas Albertsen - 2016 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 19 (2):325-338.
    The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...)
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  10. Axel Gosseries.Cosmopolitan Luck Egalitarianism - 2007 - In Daniel M. Weinstock (ed.), Global Justice, Global Institutions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 279.
     
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  11. Group Responsibility1.Luck Egalitarianism - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. pp. 98.
     
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  12. Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality.Gideon Elford - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It (...)
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  13. The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this (...)
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  14. Luck Egalitarianism.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  15. Beyond Sufficiency: G.A. Cohen's Community Constraint on Luck Egalitarianism.Benjamin D. King - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):215-232.
    G. A. Cohen conceptualizes socialism as luck egalitarianism constrained by a community principle. The latter mitigates certain inequalities to achieve a shared common life. This article explores the plausibility of the community constraint on inequality in light of two related problems. First, if it is voluntary, it fails as a response to “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism, as it would not guarantee imprudent people sufficient resources to avoid deprivation and to function as equal citizens in (...)
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  16. Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
    Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck (...)
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  17. Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.Richard J. Arneson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (2):339-349.
    In her recent, provocative essay “What Is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth Anderson argues against a common ideal of egalitarian justice that she calls “ luck egalitarianism” and in favor of an approach she calls “democratic equality.”1 According to the luck egalitarian, the aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people’s lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own. In (...)
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  18. Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2009 - Edinburgh University Press.
    How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified? One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as 'luck egalitarianism', has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is the first full length treatment of this significant development in contemporary political philosophy. (...)
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  19. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?Kristin Voigt - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):389-407.
    According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of (...)
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  20. A Framework for Luck Egalitarianism in Health and Healthcare.A. Albertsen & C. Knight - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2):165-169.
    Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address (...)
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  21. Luck Egalitarianism Interpretated and Defended.Richard J. Arneson - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):1-20.
    In recent years some moral philosophers and political theorists, who have come to be called “luck egalitarians,” have urged that the essence of social justice is the moral imperative to improve the condition of people who suffer from simple bad luck. Prominent theorists who have attracted the luck egalitarian label include Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and John Roemer.1 Larry Temkin should also be included in this group, as should Thomas Nagel at the time that he wrote (...)
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  22.  17
    Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which (...)
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  23.  42
    Luck Egalitarianism, Social Determinants and Public Health Initiatives.A. Albertsen - 2015 - Public Health Ethics 8 (1):42-49.
    People’s health is hugely affected by where they live, their occupational status and their socio-economic position. It has been widely argued that the presence of such social determinants in health provides good reasons to reject luck egalitarianism as a theory of distributive justice in health. The literature provides different reasons why this responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice should not be applied to health. The critiques submit that the social circumstances undermine or remove people’s responsibility for their health; responsibility (...)
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  24.  40
    What's So Egalitarian About Luck Egalitarianism?Shlomi Segall - 2015 - Ratio 28 (3):349-368.
    Luck egalitarians typically hold that it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. In this paper I want to address two complaints against standard luck egalitarianism that do not question responsibility-sensitivity. The first objection says that equality itself lacks inherent non-instrumental value, and so the luckist component ought to be attached to a different pattern, say prioritarianism. The second objection also endorses luckism but worries that (...) egalitarianism as conventionally formulated is committed in fact to neutralizing not just brute luck but also option luck. And this would mean, among other things, compensating unsuccessful gamblers, which is something many egalitarians find counterintuitive. My aim is to show that there is a way for luck egalitarianism to meet both criticisms; that it can maintain its egalitarian credentials while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of compensating unsuccessful gamblers. To do so, I propose, we ought to understand luck egalitarianism as resting on the disvalue of being arbitrarily worse off compared to others. In addition, I suggest, the badness of luck egalitarian inequality – that of arbitrary disadvantage – has both an inter-personal and an intra-personal dimension. (shrink)
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  25.  55
    Democratic Egalitarianism Versus Luck Egalitarianism: What Is at Stake?Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (1):117-134.
    This paper takes a fresh look at Elizabeth Anderson’s democratic egalitarianism and its relation to luck egalitarianism in the light of recent trends toward greater socioeconomic inequality. Anderson’s critique of luck egalitarianism and her alternative ideal of democratic equality are set out. It is then argued that the former is not very powerful, and that the latter is vulnerable to many of Anderson’s criticisms of luck egalitarianism. The paper also seeks to show that, (...)
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  26.  11
    Can Luck Egalitarianism Justify the Fact That Some Are Worse Off Than Others?Robert Huseby - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (3):259-269.
    According to luck egalitarianism it is bad or unjust if someone is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. This article argues that there is a tension in standard luck egalitarian theory between justifying absolute and comparative welfare levels. If a person responsibly acts in a way that brings her welfare level below that of others, this is justified according to the theory. However, even if we can say that the person's new (...)
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  27.  97
    Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality.Alexander Brown - 2005 - Ethical Perspectives 12 (3):293-340.
    The paper critically examines a series of objections to luck egalitarianism raised by Elizabeth Anderson in her essay “What is the Point of Equality?” According to Anderson, current egalitarian writing has come to be dominated by the distinction between choice and brute luck and that strict adherence to this distinction will mean treating some people in ways we have other egalitarian reasons not to want to treat them.A case is made for moving the debate on by adopting (...)
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  28.  43
    When Bad Things Happen to Good People: Luck Egalitarianism and Costly Rescues.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):93-112.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of (...)
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  29.  16
    Luck Egalitarianism as Providence.Shlomo Dov Rosen - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (3):301-325.
    Luck egalitarianism is an approach within current distributive justice theory which aims to focus redistributive efforts solely upon disadvantages that ensue from bad luck. This article considers how central assumptions and themes of both luck egalitarianism and its critics parallel those of providence theology and share some of their concerns. These relate to problems such as the basis of equality, the extent and nature of our knowledge, and of course, the paternalism that assessing people’s responsibility (...)
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  30. On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism.Martin E. Sandbu - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (3):283-312.
    Egalitarian thinkers have adopted Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between brute and option luck in their attempts to construct theories that better respect our intuitions about what it is that egalitarian justice should equalize. I argue that when there is no risk-free choice available, it is less straightforward than commonly assumed to draw this distinction in a way that makes brute-luck egalitarianism plausible. I propose an extension of the brute-luck–option-luck distinction to this more general case. The generalized (...)
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  31.  8
    Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity.Daniel Markovits - 2008 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (1):271-308.
    Luck egalitarianism — the theory that makes individual responsibility central to distributive justice, so that bad luck underwrites a more compelling case for redistribution than do the bad choices of the disadvantaged — has recently come under a sustained attack from critics who are deeply committed to the broader struggle for equality. These egalitarian critics object, first, that luck egalitarianism’s policy recommendations are often unappealing. Second, they add that luck egalitarianism neglects the deep (...)
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  32.  19
    Welfare Luck Egalitarianism and Expensive Tastes.Nils Holtug - 2015 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 2 (1):179-206.
    In his classic paper “Equality of What? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Ronald Dworkin argued that we should reject the notion that welfare is the currency of egalitarian justice. One reason is that this notion implies we should compensate individuals for expensive tastes they have deliberately cultivated. However, several egalitarians have objected that Dworkin conflates the resource/welfare and the luck/choice distinction. In particular, welfare luck egalitarianism implies that expensive tastes that are deliberately cultivated may not be compensable. (...)
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  33. Immigrants, Multiculturalism, and Expensive Cultural Tastes: Quong on Luck Egalitarianism and Cultural Minority Rights.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (2):176-192.
    Kymlicka has offered an influential luck egalitarian justification for a catalogue of polyethnic rights addressing cultural disadvantages of immigrant minorities. In response, Quong argues that while the items on the list are justified, in the light of the fact that the relevant disadvantages of immigrants result from their choice to immigrate, (i) these rights cannot be derived from luck egalitarianism and (ii) that this casts doubt on luck egalitarianism as a theory of cultural justice. As (...)
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  34.  35
    Luck-Egalitarianism: Faults and Collective Choice: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):151-173.
    A standard formulation of luck-egalitarianism says that ‘it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others [through no fault or choice of their own]’, where ‘fault or choice’ means substantive responsibility-generating fault or choice. This formulation is ambiguous: one ambiguity concerns the possible existence of a gap between what is true of each worse-off individual and what is true of the group of worse-off individuals, fault or choice-wise, the other (...)
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  35.  98
    The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
    Some critics of luck egalitarianism have suggested that its reference to responsibility leaves it either assuming metaphysical libertarianism or (in the inevitable absence of a resolution of the free will problem) practically impotent. This paper argues that luck egalitarianism need not fall into either trap. It may in fact be sensitive to the possibility that libertarianism is false, and would not be undermined were this the case. Here luck egalitarianism actually fares better than outcome (...)
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  36. Can Luck Egalitarianism Be Really Saved By Value Pluralism?Eugen Huzum - 2011 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia 2.
    In this paper I discuss a frequent reply to what is usually called ‘the harshness objection,’ or “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism. This objection has been used by Elizabeth Anderson to argue that luck egalitarianism is not, in any of its versions, an adequate interpretation of the ideal of social justice. According to the luck egalitarian reply discussed in this paper, luck egalitarianism can be saved from the harshness objection by value pluralism. (...)
     
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  37.  15
    Luck Egalitarianism and the Distributive Trilemma.Robert Huseby - 2019 - Social Theory and Practice 45 (1):1-19.
    It is generally acknowledged that most accounts of distributive justice face a trilemma pertaining to agents who are badly off, or risk becoming so, due to their own imprudent behavior: If we a) leave such agents to their own devices, some might perish, which is harsh. If we b) force such agents to buy insurance, for their own good, we act paternalistically. If we c) secure sufficiency for such agents by taxing everyone, we exploit the prudent. This paper discusses how (...)
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  38.  14
    Luck Egalitarianism and the Rights of Immigrants.Nils Holtug - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (2):127-143.
    This article considers the implications of luck egalitarianism for a range of issues relating to international, South-North migration. More specifically, the implications of luck egalitarianism for the question of whether receiving societies are justified in extending to immigrants a less comprehensive set of rights than that enjoyed by other members of society are considered. First, are voluntary migrants responsible for their migration in such a way that receiving societies are justified in extending to them a less (...)
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  39. Real-World Luck Egalitarianism.George Sher - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):218-232.
    Luck egalitarians maintain that inequalities are always unjust when they are due to luck, but are not always unjust when they are due to choices for which the parties are responsible. In this paper, I argue that the two halves of this formula do not fit neatly together, and that we arrive at one version of luck egalitarianism if we begin with the notion of luck and interpret responsible choice in terms of its absence, but (...)
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  40.  12
    Luck Egalitarianism and the Rights of Immigrants.Nils Holtug - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (4).
    This article considers the implications of luck egalitarianism for a range of issues relating to international, South-North migration. More specifically, the implications of luck egalitarianism for the question of whether receiving societies are justified in extending to immigrants a less comprehensive set of rights than that enjoyed by other members of society are considered. First, are voluntary migrants responsible for their migration in such a way that receiving societies are justified in extending to them a less (...)
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  41. Are New Genetic Technologies Unlucky for Luck Egalitarianism.David Hunter - 2012 - Ethical Perspectives 19 (1):33-54.
    New genetic technologies can not only be used to ‘cure’ many significant healthcare conditions, but at least potentially they can be used in ways that either change the user’s identity significantly and/or cause a different person to come into existence. It might be argued that these technologies present a challenge for Luck Egalitarians – the essence of this challenge being the claim that, given a commitment towards luck neutralisation, a Luck Egalitarian ought to be committed to equalisation (...)
     
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  42.  26
    Response From Luck and Vogel.S. J. Luck & E. K. Vogel - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):78-79.
  43.  89
    Rethinking Luck Egalitarianism and Unacceptable Inequalities.Richard Arneson - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (1):153-169.
    Luck egalitarianism is a social justice doctrine that holds that it is morally bad and unfair if some people are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The doctrine has attracted criticisms. G. A. Cohen has defended luck egalitarianism without conceding ground to its critics by affirming that some inequalities that egalitarian justice principles do not condemn are nonetheless incompatible with an antimarket ideal of community that we should accept and—subject to (...)
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  44.  22
    Karl Marx and Wilt Chamberlain, Or: Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Clean Path to Capitalism Argument.Paul Warren - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (4):453-473.
    This paper focuses on the claim that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with Marxian theory because it allows for the possibility of a ‘clean path’ to capitalism. It explores the nature and structure of the clean path argument generally and critically discusses luck egalitarian versions of the argument. It contends that the Marxian theory of exploitation can meet the challenge of the clean path to capitalism argument, that luck egalitarianism and the Marxian theory of exploitation are (...)
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  45.  17
    The Coherence of Luck Egalitarianism.Gideon Elford - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):617-626.
    One of the foremost egalitarian theories in recent years, luck egalitarianism, has recently been subjected to the charge that it is in fact incoherent. This charge is brought by David Miller who highlights two dimensions of luck egalitarianism: on the one hand a commitment to the justice of certain inequalities arising from responsible choices; on the other a commitment to injustice of brute inequalities. The putative incoherence emerges in cases where the inequalities that justice requires on (...)
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  46.  27
    How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?Gerald Lang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):698-722.
    Imagine a two-person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a (...)
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  47.  17
    When Bad Things Happen to Good People Luck Egalitarianism and Costly Rescues.Jens Damgaard Thaysen & Andreas Albertsen - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594-16666017.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of (...)
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  48.  17
    Can Luck Egalitarianism Serve as a Basis for Distributive Justice? A Critique of Kok-Chor Tan’s Institutional Luck Egalitarianism.Akira Inoue - 2016 - Law and Philosophy 35 (4):391-414.
    This paper examines whether Kok-Chor Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is successful as a pluralist luck egalitarian theory of justice and morality. In recent years, pluralist luck egalitarianism has become a salient theory of justice. Tan’s pluralist proposal for institutional luck egalitarianism is attractive because it seems to refute the metaphysical and practical challenges against luck egalitarianism. This paper demonstrates that, although Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is indeed a most sophisticated (...)
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  49.  83
    Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value. [REVIEW]Alex Voorhoeve - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain such departures from what is in each person’s prudential (...)
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  50. A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism.Kok-Chor Tan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):665-690.
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