Our perception of external features comprises, among others, functional and phenomenological levels. At the functional level, the perceiver’s mind processes external features according to its own causal- functional organization. At the phenomenological level, the perceiver has consciousness of external features. The question of this paper is: How do the functional and the phenomenological levels of perception relate to each other? The answer I propose is that functional states of specifically perceptual attention constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness (...) in a perceiver. -/- Widely studied within cognitive psychology, perceptual attention is still awaiting a thoroughgoing philosophical treatment. The paper presents and draws upon Anne Treisman’s feature-integration theory of attention (cf. A. Treisman & G. Gelade, “A Feature-Integration Theory of Attention,” Cognitive Psychology, 12, 1980. Pp. 97-136). According to this theory, attentional mechanisms are responsible for the binding of perceptual features into coherent and stable objects of perception. By itself, I will claim, the theory of feature integration does not allow a straightforward reduction of consciousness to the functional processing underlying it. However, on the basis of Treisman’s theory we can produce a methodological argument for endorsing the non-reductivist thesis that attentional states constitute the necessary basis for the arising of consciousness in a perceiver. The paper closes by presenting this argument, according to which the thesis is implied by a unified account of the common representational natures of attentional and conscious states. (shrink)

In §1 of this paper I will present the two criteria, which I will call respectively the coextensionality and the recognitional criteria of synonymy. An established tendency in the literature is to ascribe to Frege only the recognitional criterion, discounting the coextensionality criterion as inconsistent with some of his other views. My aim in the paper will be to contribute to the reversal of this tendency. First, I wish to show that the recognitional criterion is flawed in a way that (...) makes it unacceptable as a criterion of synonymy and that Frege was aware of this. I will argue, second, that in Frege’s writings a modified version of the coextensionality criterion finds better support than the recognitional criterion. And I will suggest, third, that although there is an inconsistency between some of Frege’s views and the coextensionality criterion, this inconsistency can be explained as a prominent feature of his philosophy, a tension inherent in his goals and views. Finally, in a brief appendix, I will focus on the way in which Frege applied the two criteria in the practice of linguistic analysis, and I will argue that, contrary to the accepted wisdom, within this practice the two criteria are compatible with each other. (shrink)

In this commentary, we discuss the nature of reversible and irreversible questions, that is, questions that may enable one to identify the nature of the source of their answers. We then introduce GPT-3, a third-generation, autoregressive language model that uses deep learning to produce human-like texts, and use the previous distinction to analyse it. We expand the analysis to present three tests based on mathematical, semantic, and ethical questions and show that GPT-3 is not designed to pass any of them. (...) This is a reminder that GPT-3 does not do what it is not supposed to do, and that any interpretation of GPT-3 as the beginning of the emergence of a general form of artificial intelligence is merely uninformed science fiction. We conclude by outlining some of the significant consequences of the industrialisation of automatic and cheap production of good, semantic artefacts. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe discursive analysis of criminal organizations’ family dynamics and ideological devices may provide important insights into the inner functioning of these groups. In this article, we describe and analyze a specific set of discursive strategies and the thematic narratives emerging from a TV interview with Giuseppe Riina, a member of Cosa Nostra and the son of one of the most important mafia bosses. Our analyses demonstrate the existence of recurring ideological devices such as reductionism, amoralism, familism, verticalism, normalism, victimism and (...) religious relativism. The results are discussed in light of previous research that examines how discursive strategies and narratives may represent powerful tools for understanding criminal organizations. Family-related discourses, in particular, reveal meanings, values and ideas that contribute to constructing criminal organizations’ internal structure, as well as their relationship with the external world. (shrink)

Lewis et al. (2011) attempted to restore the reputation of Samuel George Morton, a 19th century physician who reported on the skull sizes of different folk-races. Whereas Gould (1978) claimed that Morton’s conclusions were invalid because they reflected unconscious bias, Lewis et al. alleged that Morton’s findings were, in fact, supported, and Gould’s analysis biased. We take strong exception to Lewis et al.’s thesis that Morton was “right.” We maintain that Gould was right to reject Morton’s analysis as inappropriate and (...) misleading, but wrong to believe that a more appropriate analysis was available. Lewis et al. fail to recognize that there is, given the dataset available, no appropriate way to answer any of the plausibly interesting questions about the “populations” in question (which in many cases are not populations in any biologically meaningful sense). We challenge the premise shared by both Gould and Lewis et al. that Morton’s confused data can be used to draw any meaningful conclusions. This, we argue, reveals the importance of properly focusing on the questions asked, rather than more narrowly on the data gathered. (shrink)

17 lessons in the discipline of desire -- 18 lessons in the discipline of action -- 17 lessons in the discipline of assent.

Lewis et al. (2011) attempted to restore the reputation of Samuel George Morton, a 19th century physician who reported on the skull sizes of different folk-races. Whereas Gould (1978) claimed that Morton's conclusions were invalid because they reflected unconscious bias, Lewis et al. alleged that Morton's findings were, in fact, supported, and Gould's analysis biased. We take strong exception to Lewis et al.’s thesis that Morton was “right.” We maintain that Gould was right to reject Morton's analysis as inappropriate and (...) misleading, but wrong to believe that a more appropriate analysis was available. Lewis et al. fail to recognize that there is, given the dataset available, no appropriate way to answer any of the plausibly interesting questions about the “populations” in question (which in many cases are not populations in any biologically meaningful sense). We challenge the premise shared by both Gould and Lewis et al. that Morton's confused data can be used to draw any meaningful conclusions. This, we argue, reveals the importance of properly focusing on the questions asked, rather than more narrowly on the data gathered. (shrink)

Giovanni Jervis was a prominent figure in the Italian intellectual landscape of the last fifty years. A student of the philosopher-ethnologist Ernesto De Martino, the main focus of his research was on social psychiatry and psychology, the foundations of psychology, and the psychological aspects of social and political problems. This article explores his rethinking of the psychoanalytic criticism of the subject. I shall try to show that Jervis has given shape to the premises of a philosophical anthropology that originally aims (...) to fit aspects of de Martino’s phenomenological psychology of identity and the psychodynamic theme of defense mechanisms into the ontological framework of the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

We prove ExpTime-membership of the satisfiability problem for loosely ∀-guarded first-order formulas with a bounded number of variables and an unbounded number of constants. Guarded fragments with constants are interesting by themselves and because of their connection to hybrid logic.

Part One: The problems of modern hermeneutics of the Qur'ān: 1. What is hermeneutics? -- 2. The Qur'ān as event -- 3. Tafsīr and ta'wīl -- 4. Symbolism -- 5. Being and language -- 6. Literary hermeneutics -- 7. Structure and historicity -- 8. Scientific hermeneutics -- 9. The translation of the Qur'ān as hermeneutical exercise -- 10. Hermeneutics and praxis -- Conclusion -- Part two: The Qur'ān and phenomenology: 1. Introduction -- 2. A phenomenological path in the Qur'ān -- (...) Conclusion: From hermeneutics to praxis -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the change driven by ICTs. Such a change is often much more profound than an emphasis on information technology and society can capture, for not only does it bring about ethical and policy vacuums that call for a new understanding of ethics, politics and law, but it also "re-ontologizes reality", as propounded by Luciano Floridi's philosophy and ethics of information. The informational turn is transforming our understanding of (...) reality by challenging the conventional ways we have of thinking about our world and our identities in terms of stable and enduring structures and beliefs. The information age we inhabit brings to completion our self-understanding as informational systems that produce, process, and exchange information with other informational systems, in an environment that is itself made up of information. The present volume provides us with a better understanding of the normative nature and role of information, helping us to grasp the sense and extent to which informational resources serve as "constraining affordances" guiding our behaviours. It does so by delineating the background against which we build our beliefs about reality, make decisions, and behave, through our interactions with a multi-agent system that is increasingly dependent on ICTs. The book will be of interest to a vast audience, ranging from information technologists, ethicists, policy makers, social and legal scholars, and all those willing to embrace the following three tenets: we construct our world and ourselves informationally; by constructing our world and ourselves we thereby become aware of our limits; it is precisely these limits that make us become human beings. (shrink)

È possibile esporre e comprendere l’etica ebraica ‘stando su un piede solo’ ossia in poche e semplici formule? Non è piuttosto il giudaismo un cammino lungo e complesso, e dunque anzitutto halakhà, un insieme di norme tese a santificare la vita quotidiana e a rafforzare un’identità di popolo? Quali sono i nessi tra la sfera etica, di sua natura universale, e la sfera delle pratiche simbolico-rituali, che caratterizzano e rendono particolare lo stile di vita ebraico? Cosa dice poi il pensiero (...) rabbinico in merito all’etica del lavoro, o sulle attuali urgenze ecologiche, sull’esercizio del potere, sulla difesa dei diritti umani? In queste pagine la delicata questione del rapporto tra etica e halakhà viene indagata alla luce degli antichi dibattiti rabbinici fino alle discussioni contemporanee passando naturalmente attraverso la grande lezione etica di Maimonide. Uno studio affascinante e impegnativo, guidato dalla stella polare della giustizia, secondo il dettame della Torà: “La giustizia, la giustizia seguirai” (Deuteronomio 16,20). (shrink)

Si analizza lo stretto rapporto tra il diritto (in particolare, il linguaggio giuridico) e la comunicazione fin dall'antichità, segnatamente in relazione al concetto di legittimazione della sovranità; si esaminano alcuni aspetti metodologici comunicativi (in special modo informativi) e giuridici alla luce delle loro prospettive storiche ed economiche. Si presentano ed analizzano alcuni differenti orizzonti comunicativi, quali quelli propri delle scienze economiche e, nelle scienze giuridiche, quelli connessi alla struttura proposizionale e argomentativa del discorso giuridico, con particolare riferimento alle teorie dell'argomentazione (...) di R. Alexy e J. Habermas ed alla possibilità di delineare una procedura regolamentare per assicurarne il controllo di razionalità. La questione centrale affrontata è l'esigenza di conciliare le metodologie comunicative e i caratteri propri del diritto, senza snaturarne le rispettive funzioni. Uno dei nodi fondamentali è costituito dalle condizioni di accessibilità e partecipazione alla comunicazione e all’informazione giuridica, elementi socialmente critici, connessi all'attuazione del principio di eguaglianza in ogni ordinamento giuridico. La distanza tra l'esoterica sfera del linguaggio giuridico e la dimensione concreta dei suoi destinatari, in massima parte soggetti ai quali spesso non ne risulta comprensibile tanto la forma quanto il contenuto (ma non per questo meno coinvolti negli effetti provocati dall'applicazione del diritto), richiede la ricerca di soluzioni complesse ed articolate, non esauribili nella mera applicazione delle pur elaborate e raffinate metodologie comunicative, spesso attuabili senza particolari adattamenti in molti casi di interazione con altre discipline. Infine, si esaminano le ulteriori opportunità offerte dallo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie e dalla loro applicazione al diritto, riscontrandovi la medesima esigenza di appropriate valutazioni e variazioni per il loro adattamento alle particolarità della comunicazione giuridica. (shrink)

L'importanza del significante non deve far sì che questo sia interpretato come l'unica componente del linguaggio umano, sebbene ne sia una delle più elevate; pur intendendo la comunicazione umana come convenzionale, nel convenire occorre distinguere, tra convenzione essenziale e funzionale: è certo vero che solo nella prima, nel linguaggio come nel diritto, si potrà incontrare il significante, ma nella seconda sono concentrati i molteplici prodotti della prima, che si presentano come precipitati o cristallizzati a seguito di una reazione chimica, che (...) hanno perso sì la dimensione esistenziale, ma hanno conservato origine e natura umane. Così deve essere debitamente considerato anche il ruolo del senso già dato, del significato positivo dei vocaboli: in particolare, proprio nel linguaggio giuridico, politico ed economico, si è sempre manifestato il bisogno di uno specifico vocabolario, se non di un gergo, che risponda con maggior aderenza o efficacia alle esigenze delle argomentazioni trattate. Nel linguaggio giuridico ed economico si può riscontrare una certa omogeneità nelle società complesse contemporanee, una comune tendenza alla generazione (o forse degenerazione) di terminologie e fraseologie esoteriche che si spingono ben al di là delle logiche e necessarie esigenze di specializzazione, somigliando più a gerghi approssimativi (ad esempio il legalese, per gli anglofoni, assume sempre più la fisionomia di un vero e proprio slang) che ad appropriati e scientifici codici comunicativi. Un fenomeno comune a tali linguaggi è il frequente ricorso alle sigle, abbreviazioni o acronimi, il cui uso generalizzato conduce spesso ad effetti in contraddizione con la loro causa originaria: espedienti linguistici apparentemente coniati allo scopo di migliorare, velocizzare ed estendere la comprensione di termini e concetti complessi, al contrario, generano frequentemente confusione e misunderstanding al di fuori del loro specializzato e ristretto ambito di provenienza e, qualche volta, anche all’interno. Un'adeguata risposta alla proliferazione e diffusione di nuove e sommarie terminologie, abbreviazioni e slogan, che solo apparentemente arricchiscono il lessico, restringendo sempre più, al contrario, l'ambito della convenzione essenziale, potrebbe essere forse ottenuta solo attraverso il recupero della dimensione ontologica del linguaggio, mantenendone sì l'elevato grado di specializzazione, ma non rinunciando per questo alla ricchezza espressiva tanto dei vocaboli quanto della fraseologia. (shrink)

Si esaminano gli argomenti di Trasimaco (anche alla luce della posizione di Callicle) e, segnatamente, il rapporto tra la legge e il potere costituito: il raffronto con il pensiero di Carl Schmitt prende avvio dal nodo centrale del significato attribuito al νόμος. Si analizzano le argomentazione nei dialoghi platonici per ricostruire la concezione del νόμος e gli elementi che possono fornire risposte indirette alla questione posta da Trasimaco, al di là della ricerca della definizione del concetto di giustizia, con particolare (...) attenzione alla legge ed alle forme di governo. Si esamina la relazione tra le tesi sulla sovranità elaborate da Schmitt e le teorie sul potere rintracciabili nelle posizioni di Trasimaco e di Callicle in rapporto ai frammenti di Pindaro ed Eraclito. Considerata la centralità della relazione amico-nemico nel pensiero di Schmitt, posta a confronto con le posizioni platoniche, si esamina la distinzione tra la concezione della legge come atto cognitivo di scoperta della verità e la sua fondazione sul principio della decisione da parte di chi detenga il potere sovrano, punto di arrivo dello sviluppo delle tesi hobbesiane da parte di Schmitt. (shrink)

For Guizot, legal sovereignty is a divine, absolute prerogative precluded from mankind. The best possible form of government is that based upon a representative system, since such a system continuosly shifts the attibution of power from one subject to another. Guizot's analysis, which also denies the modern democratic principle of the sovereignty of the will of the people, examines certain aspects common to all representative systems, such as the relationship between the elected and the electorate and between the majority and (...) the minority, independently of the extension of suffrage. In particular, Guizot examines the relationship between public opinion and the common interest in an optic which is beyond his time and proves to be very appropriate today. He consideres the common interest to be a virtual and hypothetical component of the representative relationship, pre-eminent as regards the indications ascertained through the majority vote. (shrink)

The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: that such findings would cause the collapse (...) of all punitive practices; that, on the contrary, such findings would open the way to more humane forms of punishment, which would be justified on purely utilitarian grounds. We argue that these views are both wrong, since whereas a sound punitive system can be justified without any reference to moral responsibility, it will certainly not improve the humaneness of punishment. (shrink)

Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2020, Page 92-100.