O trabalho analisa as principais dificuldades na construção de parâmetros Tecnoéticos da atualidade. A hipótese aqui reside em determinar a constante que atravessa a Singularidade Tecnológica, a Convergência NBIC e a Inteligência Coletiva como variável integrativa e constitutiva da Tecnoética para fins de análise paradigmática sob a Teoria da Integridade de Dworkin. Assim, alicerçado no método lógico-dedutivo-dogmático, este artigo se baseia em incursões históricas e conceitos doutrinários para demonstrar a existência da constante em questão e, por fim, motivar sua adoção.

Plato's thought is as charming as the statues of Dedalus: it disappears into the meanders of the discourse, as soon as one proposes to establish with it a dominance relationship. The correct interpretation of Plato's thought demands the assumption of the Polis as the natural place from which it emerges, as the limitation which he proposes to surpass remounting to the Fysis and to the Being. In order to do it, it is important to catch its peculiar movement, starting from (...) the question about the being and visualizing the answer as the statement of its essence, i.e., of the eidos, and of its foundation, i.e., of Good as the proper name of Being. As it determines the being in its essence, the eidos is the measure of the whole adequacy, from the episteme to the Polis.O Pensamento de Platão tem o encanto das estátuas de Dédalo: esvai-se pelos meandros do discurso, tão logo se pretenda travar com ele uma relação de domínio. A sua correta interpretação exige que se assuma a Polis como o lugar natural no qual emerge, como a limitação que ele se propõe superar remontando à Fysis e ao Ser. Fazê-lo importa em captar o movimento que lhe é próprio, partindo da questão sobre o ente e visualizando a resposta como o enunciado de sua essência, isto é, do eidos, e de seu fundamento, isto é, do Bem como nome próprio do Ser. Determinando o ente em sua essência, o eidos é a medida de toda a adequação, da episteme à Polis. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

Highlights Merleau-Ponty’s interest in film and connects it to his aesthetic theory.

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological (...) view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

I argue that Wittgenstein’s engagement with Russell’s The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein’s criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I (...) argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell’s theory (a rule-following regression and the indeterminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell’s theory and in Wittgenstein’s own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Wittgenstein’s new method I show its relation to Russell’s philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida (...) originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with certain profane commemorations within the sacred or liturgical space. Besides Carnival, it focuses on the Festum asinorum, particularly the one celebrated in the town of Rouen, which comprised a magnificent procession, congregating the clergy and the people.Este texto trata de certas comemorações de caráter profano dentro do espaço sagrado ou litúrgico. Além do carnaval, enfoca-se a Festa do Asno, notadamente a celebrada na cidade de Rouen, que compreendia uma procissão com grande aparato, acompanhada pelo clero (...) e pelo povo. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que as interpretações "tradicional" e "resoluta" não livraram o "Tractatus" da aparente autoderrota paradoxal. Argumento que essas leituras apresentam apenas uma nova roupagem ao paradoxo. A leitura "tradicional" de Hacker acaba atribuindo uma conspiração metafísica ao "Tractatus", o que é incompatível com os objetivos do livro. A leitura "resoluta" de Diamond e Conant atribui a Wittgenstein uma conspiração autoral, o que contradiz suas opiniões sobre autoria e método. Com base nas dificuldades encontradas em (...) ambos os lados do debate atual, concluo este artigo propondo vários requisitos que a correta interpretação do "Tractatus" deve preencher. (shrink)

Though the target article is not without fertile suggestions, at least two problems limit its overall validity: (1) the extended gene-culture coevolutionary framework is not an alternative to standard evolutionary theory; (2) the proposed model does not explain how much time is necessary for selective pressure to determine the stabilization of a new aspect of the genotype.

In this paper, I pursue two main goals. The first is to raise three objections against Tom Roberts and Joel Krueger’s recent account of loneliness (2021). The second is to sketch an alternative, receptive account. Roberts and Krueger focus on loneliness conceived of as an occurrent emotion. According to their account, loneliness involves two components: (1) a pro-attitude (e.g., a desire) towards certain social goods and (2) an awareness that such goods “are missing and out of reach, either temporarily or (...) permanently” (p. 186). My first objection is that having a pair of pro-attitudes and cognitive states of the sort that Roberts and Krueger have in mind is neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to experience loneliness. The second is that Roberts and Krueger’s account has trouble accounting for the unpleasant phenomenology of loneliness. The third is that their account has trouble demarcating loneliness from other negative emotions that one may experience within romantic, friendship or social relationships. Next, I sketch my own account of loneliness. According to the receptive theory (Tappolet 2022) to which I adhere, emotions are receptive experiences that non-conceptually represent their intentional objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. Accordingly, I argue that loneliness consists in a receptive experience that represents the absence of certain relational goods as bad in a particular way. I draw a distinction between the intentional object and the intentional locus of loneliness, and clarify the role that some of the individual’s pro-attitudes play in loneliness. I also show how a receptive account can explain the phenomenology of loneliness and demarcate it from other emotion types, and offer an account of degrees of loneliness, which distinguishes between the intensity and the centrality of episodes of loneliness. (shrink)

Este artigo questiona a dimensão crítica da democracia analisada por Sheldon S. Wolin. A partir da década de 1980, o impulso de Wolin de diagnosticar as falhas da democracia americana ao conectar o liberalismo ao totalitarismo se manifesta de uma nova maneira. Ele observa que, no processo de lutar ostensiva- mente contra o totalitarismo durante a Guerra Fria, o próprio governo americano passou a incorporar uma forma totalizante de poder. Essa crítica culmina em seu diagnóstico de uma crise do século (...) XXI: a condição neoliberal de “totalitarismo invertido”. Aqui Wolin argumenta não apenas que o sistema político americano compartilha algumas características com o totalitarismo, mas também que está começando a constituir uma nova versão do totalitarismo emergindo de dentro, e não em reação ao liberalismo. Palavras-chave: Democracia. Totalitarismo. Liberalismo. (shrink)

Two different definitions of numerical identity occur in Aristotle's works, namely: (i) "A" and "B" are both names of one thing; (ii) A and B constitute unity. These definitions can be traced back respectively to the following theories of predication: (i)' the sentences whose subjects are accidents are actually ill-formed; (ii)' in some cases the accidents are not eliminable subjects. Since (i)' and (ii)' are irreparably inconsistent, the theory of identity is inconsistent too; in this paper are explored the consequences (...) of such an inconsistence, mainly as far as the fallacies depending both on combination and division and on accident are concerned. (shrink)

In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...) included within the class of happiness-constituting states. Second, I argue that a plausible theory of happiness should not include mood propensities, since their inclusion is either counterintuitive or unnecessary. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAfter the revolutionary storm, which had exported Jacobin democracy on the tips of its bayonets and after the epic deeds of the Napoleonic era, which, in the midst of remarkable contradictions, had asserted a number of principles and values of the French Revolution, the moderate or conservative liberal thinkers who wished for the introduction of a representative government and of personal freedom in France and in Italy were faced with the return of the old regime and with attempts of the (...) Restoration to eradicate the reforms of the previous period. The only way these thinkers could save or restore parliamentary institutions and civil rights was to link their efforts to the destinies of the ruling dynasties. In both countries, this move was fiercely opposed, especially by reactionary writers. Hence, this essay will deal with the structure and contours of a debate which set two alignments in opposition, from the time of the Congress of Vienna to the Revolutions of 1820-21 and hinged on the principle of monarchic legitimacy and on the foundations of political authority which, for the first time, were being openly questioned in the midst of the American and the French revolutions. (shrink)

Certamente Sto. Agostinho jamais se propôs a escrever um tratado sistemático de Ética, ainda que o opúsculo sobre os costumes da igreja cristã e dos maniqueus possa representar um projeto desta ordem. Todavia, há em sua obra todos os elementos de uma ética, desde que se veja nesta a face humana do Deus Unitrino, isto é, a expressão de sua participação na Trindade, nos termos de uma indissociável unidade que abrange desde os princípios do humano à sua sobreelevação, a perfazer-se (...) no amor que unifica e une. Eis por que um tratado à parte seria inexequível se colocado no registro da vontade qual instância estanque em relação à inteligência e à memória. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir o tratamento dos direitos humanos nos dois momentos de autoritarismo vividos no Brasil, na ditadura do Estado Novo e durante a ditadura militar. A partir de uma breve historicização do tratamento de questões relativas aos direitos fundamentais nas constituições de 1824 e 1891, demonstraremos como os regimes de exceção arquitetaram um conjunto jurídico que visava garantir a ação repressiva do Estado mantendo um conjunto significativo da população sob vigilância.

Este texto trata de certas comemorações de caráter profano dentro do espaço sagrado ou litúrgico. Além do carnaval, enfoca-se a Festa do Asno, notadamente a celebrada na cidade de Rouen, que compreendia uma procissão com grande aparato, acompanhada pelo clero e pelo povo.

The primary focus of this article is a reading of Venus Hottentot 2000, a performance-text that reperforms the hyperbolization of Black female sexuality. In using the corporeality of the Black body as a strategic site of postcolonial resignification, this performance is moreover an interrogation of the colonial gaze that has fetishized the Black body. In foregrounding Venus Hottentot 2000 as a point of departure for exploration, the article proceeds by delving broadly into the representational history of the ‘Hottentot’ female. Furthermore, (...) to facilitate an understanding of the constitutive power of the colonial gaze and the possibilities of subverting and displacing that gaze from that of a postcolonial diasporic aesthetic practice, the article frames the postcolonial feminist reading of Venus Hottentot 2000 via an investigation of the processes by which the ‘Hottentot’ female has been festishized and scopically objectified within colonial discourse - processes whereby the ‘Hottentot’ female became a signifier of Black female sexuality. The article concludes by reading this performance as an example of a postcolonial ‘cultural war of positioning’, which offers moreover a contemporary rescripting of Black subjectivity. (shrink)

What is the relation between virtue and wellbeing? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s wellbeing. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and wellbeing, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fitting emotions, that fitting emotions are constituents of fitting happiness, and that fitting (...) happiness is a constituent of wellbeing. What follows is that, under certain conditions, virtue disposes the individual to experience wellbeing-constituting states. We end with a discussion of two objections that may be raised against our proposal. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

In this paper, we review and connect the three essential conditions needed by the collapse model to achieve a complete and exact formulation, namely the theoretical, the experimental, and the ontological ones. These features correspond to the three parts of the paper. In any empirical science, the first two features are obviously connected but, as is well known, among the different formulations and interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, only collapse models, as the paper well illustrates with a richness of details, (...) have experimental consequences. Finally, we show that a clarification of the ontological intimations of collapse models is needed for at least three reasons: (1) to respond to the indispensable task of answering the question ’what are collapse models (and in general any physical theory) about?’; (2) to achieve a deeper understanding of their different formulations; (3) to enlarge the panorama of possible readings of a theory, which historically has often played a fundamental heuristic role. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...) is dictated by purely pragmatic reasons, we should abstain from bringing to bear pseudo-debates generated by the “tensed” or the “tenseless theories” of time on the question of understanding the philosophical implications of contemporary spacetime theories, or notions like becoming, change and persistence in time. (shrink)

The first comprehensive account of Platonism in Antiquity, from the foundation of Plato's Academy in the fourth century BC to Late Antiquity. Written in a clear language, the book shows that Platonism is philosophically engaging and very influential in the history of philosophy. Useful for both students and scholars.