This paper is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms, especially of his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution. It lays out a broadly sympathetic perspective through dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The aim is to launch the formal academic reception of that reconstruction (rethinking), which Thesleff cautiously and modestly presents as a “proposal” — his teaser to elicit (...) a reaction, positive or negative. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s ontology, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, or arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions. (shrink)

This book is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but that it provides the full intellectual apparatus (...) for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. (shrink)

Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, in a setting (...) as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interest places a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit of a mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The difference not only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of nature while leaving a viable way out. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

This is a defense of Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. As a defense, it is not a retraction of the original charges. As a critique, it is not more of the same op-position. In either capacity, it is not an afterthought. The charges were conceived from the outset with a specific solution in mind, which would have been too distracting to pursue in (...) the same article. This is that solution. It also highlights the problem. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, namely his principles of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. The underlying problem was, and still is, the model’s inherent universalism, which is built into the decision procedure through design specifications precluding relativism, yet only at the cost of limiting the relevant moral principles to generalities that are already widely accepted, thereby render-ing the procedure at best redundant and very likely vacuous as an ethical justification model. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of champi-oning a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that is too universalistic to permit such a bias and possibly also too universalistic to permit any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a dynamic justification model responsive to moral progress, as opposed to a static one indifferent to such progress and equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the universalistic design and any distinctive or controversial principles, including the ones Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress. (shrink)

In this study, the tahrîj method, which is used in answering contemporary Fiqh issues throughout the history of Fiqh, will be described and some sample fatwas given by the High Board of Religious Affairs based on this method will be analysed. Tahrîj is firstly to define the procedural and legal principles on which the singular views of a madhhab imam is based on, and then to determine the verdict of the issues in which an opinion from that imam is not (...) conveyed, according to the rules reached. Firstly the High Board of Religious Affairs will be introduced briefly highlighting issues such the effort put forward by the Board in the answering current fiqh issues, its contributions to the unity of fatwa and that it is a continuation of the Islamic Meşîhat-ı İslamiyye in the Ottoman Empire. Tahrîj, will be defined and its types, history, and its role in the development of fiqh and in solving current fiqh issues will be explained. Among the issues resolved by the High Board of Religious Affairs by applying the Tahrîj method or by making use of this method; commercial insurance, organ transplantation, gold-based lease certificate and the effect of injection/vaccine on fasting will be analysed. Given these exemplary fatwas, it will be tried to show that the method of Tahrîj is important today as it was in the past, both in terms of maintaining the consistency of fiqh and its contribution to the development of fiqh. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim ‘Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it’, which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, both on the error theorist’s side and those that claim that there (...) is a self-defeat problem. Upon clarification, we also raise scepticism to what exactly the nature of self-defeat is meant to be. (shrink)

This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing (...) on the text and focusing on the problem. No doubt, doing both is not only possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and further, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead. (shrink)

Michael H. Mitias argues that friendship is a central moral value constituting an integral part of the good life and therefore deserving a prominent place in ethical theory. He consequently calls upon ethicists to make immediate and decisive adjustments toward accommodating what he regards as a neglected organic relationship between friendship and morality. This is not a fanciful amendment to our standard conception of morality but a radical proposal grounded in a unifying vision to recapture the right way of doing (...) ethics. While the assessment is compelling, and the plea well-placed, neither has been fully understood in the scholarly reception of Mitias. This paper clarifies both. What sets it apart from other reactions to Mitias is a holistic approach drawing on literary considerations as well as philosophical ones. The combined aim is to demonstrate that Mitias is not seeking simply to restore friendship to its rightful place in normative ethical theory, which is indeed the full extent of his formal mission, but that he is seeking to do so specifically within virtue ethics. This interpretation rests on a broad engagement with Mitias’s publications beyond the recent treatise often taken understandably yet erroneously to be his only work on the subject. (shrink)

Corrective intervention in Plato's metaphysics replacing the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with a novel and revolutionary paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

In the report the parity of true and knowledge on the basis of reconsideration of communication of true opinion and knowledge, and also interpretation of the term "opinion" in Plato’s gnosiology is considered. Described Set of cognitive procedures of the subject of the knowledge in it, necessary for reception of knowledge from true, is comparable to functions and results of influence of criterion of true in cognitive process. The importance of these efforts of the subjectguarantees Plato and Aristotle theory of (...) knowledge against suspicions of poststructuralists and postmodernists in «decentralization, « death of «subject».Thus the author finds out not only discrepancy, but also the certain continuity of gnosiological ideas of postmodernism with the standard concept of knowledge, which basis were put in pawn by Plato. In opinion of the author, such comparative analysis allows to reconsider settled representations on communication of categories «true» and «knowledge», and also to narrow an empirical field of «false knowledge» due to introduction of the term «imaginary knowledge». The parity of trueproved in given clause and knowledge to some extent reflects metamorphosises of true which in postmodernism are designated as «game of true». In the report statements from Plato's works «Menon», «Teatet», «Timaeus», «Pir», and also from Hegel, Heidegger's works, Deleuze, Badiue, Denete and other philosophers are used. (shrink)

This study will examine how Dāvūd al-Qarṣī, an 18th-century Ottoman scholar, resolved the paradox between human freewill and God being the creator of everything in his work Risālâh fi’l-ikhtiyārāt al-juzʾiyyah wa’l-irādāt al-qalbiyyah. In addition, in this study, the critical edition and translation of the risālah will also be provided. The treatise which is the subject of the present study is a link in the series of works written under the title of human acts in the Islamic thought tradition regarding al-irādah (...) al-juzʾiyyah, afʿāl al-ʿibād, khalq al-aʿmāl, qaḍā, and qadar. This risālah is one of the rare examples prepared with the method of “mamzūj annotation (sharḥ)”, which is a method in which “text” and “annotation” are intertwined. Qarṣī examines in detail a total of seven views, four of which are famous (mashhūr) and three of which are non-famous, about voluntary acts. Qarṣī interprets the approaches and views of the non-famous sects and includes them in the famous sects and allocates approximately 4/3 of the work to these sects. In the final stage of the work, the author states that the view of Māturīdīs is parallel with the predecessor’s (Salaf) view of “Neither jabr nor tafwīḍ; rather, it is merely a situation between these two approaches.” Qarṣī, who was inspired by Athīrī Maḥmad Afandī (d. 1092/1681), says that voluntary acts come about by the sum of “two powers (qudrat)”, “two wishes (mashīʾat)” and “one taqwīn”. Also, according to this, the first four of them are proximate causes, while the attribute taqwīn is the influencing factor. Qarṣī acts from the meanings of the term action (fiʿl) and the “theory of state (ḥāl)” in order to prove that human beings are true agents (fāʿil) on the one hand and to protect God’s attribute of creation on the other. In fact, the concept of “state (ḥāl)”, used in understanding divine attributes and some ontological issues, was applied to acts by the Māturīdī mutakallim Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī (d. 747/1346). Thus, a doctrine of action was developed, and this doctrine was accepted and used by the later period Māturīdī mutakallims. With reference to Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa, Qarṣī tries to justify the issue based on the meanings of the the term action and the modes of existence of these meanings. He says that action has two implications; one of them is the “infinitive meaning” (al-maʿnā al-maṣdarī) and the other is “the thing that comes with this infinitive meaning (al-ḥāṣıl bi-maṣdar)”. The infinitive meaning of the act constitutes the “non-thing aspect” of the action, and the meaning of the action that is created with the infinitive indicates “the thing aspect” thereof. Thus, because the aspect of the action that is not existentand therefore not a thing is not subject to creation, the agency and responsibility of human beings are grounded. Similarly, Qarṣī maintains that the mashīʾat, which means will, qaṣd and al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah, was not created because its existence in humans is in the form of succession and it is of a state-like (ḥāl) existenceOn this account. Qarṣī manages to preserve both human freewill and the absolute creativity of God due to the non-existent and non-thing aspect of the act on the one hand, and will (irādah), mashīʾat and qaṣd not being subjected to creation on the other. (shrink)

The recent revival of the theme of hospitality in the humanities and social sciences reflects a shared concern with issues of belonging, identity and placement that arises out of the experience of globalized social life. In this context, migration — or spatial dislocation and relocation — is often equated with demands for hospitality. There is a need to engage more carefully with the ‘proximities’ that prompt acts of hospitality and inhospitality; to attend more closely to their spatial and temporal dimensions. (...) Is the stranger or the Other primarily one who is recognisably ‘out of place’? Or is there more to being estranged than moving from one territory to another? This brings us to the question of human finitude, and to the possibility of encounters with others that do not simply only occur in time or space, but are themselves generative of new times and spaces. (shrink)

This is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as a fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher, who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is not to glorify utilitarianism, in a full sweep, as the best normative ethical theory, or even to vindicate, on a more specific level, (...) Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is concerned only with Mill’s utilitarianism, and primarily with his proof of the principle of utility. The purpose is to show that Mill proceeds intelligibly and systematically in pursuing a well-defined project in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, and that he successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. (shrink)

This is a proposal for rethinking the main lines of Plato’s philosophy, including some of the conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Drawing on a new interpretive paradigm for Plato’s overall vision, the central focus is on the so-called Forms. Regarding the guiding paradigm, we propose replacing the dualism of a world of Forms separated from a world of particulars, with the monistic model of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality. Regarding the tools of (...) the trade, we distinguish between three constructs that have come, one and all, and largely indiscriminately, to be regarded as Forms: Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. This recalibration of what we know of Plato’s outlook, tools, and methods, together with a realignment of these with his general aims, will also help restore the philosopher’s emphasis on that which is good, a perspective often blurred in the structure of two worlds. (shrink)

Robert M. Adams (1979, 1987a, 1987b) defends a modified variant of the divine command theory (hereafter MDCT) to the effect that he proposes a moral argument for God’s existence driven in the form of practical reasoning with respect to rational moral agents’ beliefs in the adequacy of MDCT. For Adams, one’s commitment to MDCT as the most adequate theory legitimately provides her a practical reason for why she ought to believe in God’s existence which MDCT implies. In this paper, I (...) criticize the viability of Adams’ moral argument considering its argumentative structure and strategy. Adams’ strategy behind his moral argument, i.e. mediating theistic beliefs with deontic ones, seeks out a non-decisive medium that might be used to ubiquitously generate equally plausible arguments for/against God’s existence based on distinct sorts of allegedly adequate theories of some subject matter. Thus, his argument does not seem to distinctively ground God’s existence in comparison with a myriad of practical arguments which might follow the same argumentative strategy on the same practical grounds. More significantly, there seems to be coherent no way for Adams to disambiguate his argument on theoretical grounds. (shrink)

The divine command meta-ethics (hereafter, DCM) promote non-naturalist realism about the ontological status of moral properties while depending on this ontological status on a such-and-such divine being’s moral roles derived from some relevant divine characteristics. As DCM typically contends, our moral discourse depends on God’s commands and prohibitions to the effect that an action A is morally right if and only if God commands A. Robert M. Adams (1979, 1987a) offers a modification that explicates the dependency relation between a loving (...) God’s commands and moral properties on metaphysical grounds to the effect that some action A is morally right if and only if it is not logically but metaphysically necessary for a loving God to command A. In this paper, I discuss whether Adams’ modification stands for a cogent account of DCM in a few respects. Firstly, Adams fails to provide robust reasons for grounding moral realism so that his commitment to the reality of moral properties merely expresses a theoretically unwarranted assumption hinging on a presumptive case in our moral discourse. Particularly, his assumption on the pervasiveness of strongly held moral beliefs is unwarranted and it inherits a vague notion of certainty. Secondly, Adams' response to the Euthyphro dilemma does not satisfactorily sort out the concerns accompanying this dilemma, mainly because his response relies on a vague notion of divine love that allegedly necessitates God commanding morally permissible acts while this notion cannot be trivially reducible into a moral aspect. (shrink)

Sosyal medya, insanları alış veriş alışkanlıklarından yatırım kararlarına kadar birçok ticari niyetleri üzerinde yüksek etki düzeyi olduğu güncel birçok çalışmada araştırılmaya başlanmıştır ve bu ilişki ortaya konmuştur. Bu ilişki üzerine inşa edilerek geliştirilen güncel analiz yöntemleri yatırım araçlarının gelecek değerlerini tahmin ederek yatırım kararları almada bir destek mekanizması olarak kullanılması çok cazip bir konudur. Bu sebeple bu ilişki yatırımcı ve analistlerden akademisyenlere kadar güncel bir ilgi konusu olmuştur. Bu çalışmanın amacı da sosyal medya ile yatırım kararları arasındaki ilişkiyi metinsel ve (...) finansal analiz aracılığı ile görmeye çalışmaktır. Bu çalışmada Twitter üzerinden metin madenciliği ile veri çekilmiş ve sentiment(duygu) analizi ile yorumların olumlu ya da olumsuz olma durumu incelenmiştir. Sentiment analizinden elde edilen sayısal değerler ile güncel ve küresel bir yatırım aracı olan Bitcoin fiyatları arasındaki ilişkinin varlığını sorgulamak adına Granger Nedensellik analizi gibi finansal analizler kullanılmıştır. (shrink)

Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe (...) in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess. (shrink)

Belief in God is a steady epistemic state sustaining an ancient social institution. Not only is it still with us, it is still the same as it ever was. It rests on the same inspiration it did thousands of years ago, commanding the same attention with the same motivation. Deities come and go but the belief stays the same. That is the thesis of this paper. It is more specifically a study of classical Greek polytheism as a paradigm for our (...) longstanding relationship with religious social structures. The main methodological vehicle is a survey of Hesiodic theogony for insight into the monotheism(s) we have adopted in its place. The evidence and implications for meaningful continuity are explored largely through the Judeo-Christian tradition, though that choice is representative rather than exhaustive with respect to the present spectrum of religious affiliation. The overall aim is not to dispute the validity of any particular belief system, past or present, but to expose the prevailing ones as extensions of the abandoned ones originally embraced with the same passion exhibited today. The underlying conviction is that theological explanation and religious orientation are reciprocal parts of a collective work in progress mapping out our common initiative to make sense of the world. (shrink)

The attempt in this article is to reflect on the notion of hospitality, building on Derrida's engagement with the notion. In doing so, I visit some of the debates on cosmopolitanism, a term which, I believe, is sometimes used overenthusiastically, neglecting the negative implications it might carry. Besides, I observe the same uncritical stance towards the reception of Kant's notion of `universal hospitality', developed in his famous piece on `Perpetual Peace', a text that has been at the core of the (...) recent debates on cosmopolitanism. I revisit Kant's text to discuss the implications of his project. I distinguish between `the other' and `the stranger', and try to develop a politics and ethics of hospitality due to the stranger. I conclude with some implications of `not being home'. (shrink)

The attempt in this article is to reflect on the notion of hospitality, building on Derrida's engagement with the notion. In doing so, I visit some of the debates on cosmopolitanism, a term which, I believe, is sometimes used overenthusiastically, neglecting the negative implications it might carry. Besides, I observe the same uncritical stance towards the reception of Kant's notion of `universal hospitality', developed in his famous piece on `Perpetual Peace', a text that has been at the core of the (...) recent debates on cosmopolitanism. I revisit Kant's text to discuss the implications of his project. I distinguish between `the other' and `the stranger', and try to develop a politics and ethics of hospitality due to the stranger. I conclude with some implications of `not being home'. (shrink)

This is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. The aim is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have corresponding Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have corresponding things. Both questions have come up before. But the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive (...) to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers but also with better insight into the questions. (shrink)

Justice is an important concept in philosophy since ancient times and a key phenomenon in human life (in societies). First a judge at a court, two sides, their witnesses, Lawyer-A and Lawyer-B are considered in this quasi-essay inquiry. Then pointed out that, which lawyer better develops his/her arguments, his/her side will be advantageous. Reality conceals on the one side, truth (and rightness) stands on the other. However this will be risky in social life; it may be understood by an ordinary (...) man (or someone who doesn’t have a proper philosophical insight) as “who - obeying the rules- better diverts reality and shows that (s)he is right, his/her side wins.” Not only knowledge, but also philosophy itself loses prestige in such a tableau. Stemming from ‘Gettier-pictures,’ a “murderingevent” is presented thereafter. By help of pseudo-philosophers Prof. Truth, Prof. Reality and E.G. (“eyeglasser”) some perspectives related to “knowledge” and “knowing” are discussed while trying to analyze the mentioned event. At the end, (reflecting in the place of me) E.G. states some features (which are important for him) concerning knowledge. In this paper, ‘subject-dependency’ and internalizability (or better, interiorizability) of knowledge will be traced somehow; in addition to a search towards ‘relevant’, ‘valuable’, ‘illicit’, and ‘proper’ kinds. (shrink)

Kant maintains that the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification, is a good will. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind (...) of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act, good outcome, good attitude, good character, or good person. Nor is it even any more so than something as commonplace as a good laugh or a good cup of coffee. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, a good outcome is an outcome that is good, and so on with the other examples, not one of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This paper thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance. The objection is not that the good will might not turn out to be good after all, which is impossible by definition, designation, or stipulation, but that its goodness is axiomatic and derivative rather than intrinsic or fundamental. (shrink)

I have written this article as a modest response to some of the criticisms of the ‘event’ that is at the centre of Alain Badiou’s thought and is the most salient concept. By addressing Badiou’s con...

Osmanlının son dönemleri ve Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında değişik eğitim kurumlarında kelam ilmi dersleri veren Arapkirli Hüseyin Avni, Mâtürîdî gelenekten gelmesine rağmen Eş’ari geleneğin önemli bir kolu olan felsefî-kelamın da son dönem önemli temsilcilerindendir. Bu çalışmada Hüseyin Avni’nin bilgi anlayışı, kendi eserleri temel alınarak ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.Hüseyin Avni, yapılan birçok bilgi tanımını eleştirmiştir. Mâtürîdî’ye ait olan tanımın güzel bir tanım olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Kendisi ise bilgi ile ilgili bir tanım denemesi yapmamıştır. Daha ziyade felsefe kelam tartışmalarının ve birbirlerine karşı reddiyelerin gündeme getirildiği (...) tehâfüt geleneğine benzer bir bilgi tasnifi yapmaktadır.Bilginin kaynakları konusunda kelam geleneğine tam bir bağlılıkla bilginin kaynaklarının üç olduğunu belirtir. Bunların duyular, haber ve akıl olduğunu söyler. Bu kaynakların her birinin ayrı alanla ilgili bilgiler getirdiğini ve bu bilgilerin güvenilebilir kesin bilgiler olduğunu söyler. Duyuları tek tek ele alan Hüseyin Avni, kelamcıların kabul ettiği beş dış duyunun yanında İslam Filozoflarının kabul ettiği beş iç duyuya da yer vererek felsefî kelamın izlerini yansıtmaktadır. Haber konusuna özellikle de doğru haber konusuna değinerek resulün haberi ile daha ziyade hadisleri kastettiğini görmekteyiz. İlhamın sübjektif oluşu dolayısıyla kelamda delil olamayacağını belirtirken akıl hususunda hem kelamcıların hem de filozofların kabullerine yer vermektedir. (shrink)

Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake (...) of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The purpose of this paper is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to the Form of the good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff. (shrink)

Some of the outstanding masters of Kurdish historical schools (Medresê) are usually and rightly seen as belonging to the Aristotelian tradition. In this introductory study I briefly present some manuscripts of Kurdish glosses on Aristotelian logical texts, and show that the Aristotelian logical tradition, as inherited from early Islamic philosophers, also formed an important strand in Kurdish schools. Kurdish students' peculiar approach to Aristotelian logic affected the way in which Categories, De Interpretatione and Isagoge were studied in Kurdish schools from (...) the fifteenth century onwards. (shrink)

Mustafa Dikec reveals the aesthetic premises that underlie Hannah Arendt, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Ranciere's political thinking, and demonstrates how their politics depend on the construction and apprehension of worlds through spatial forms and distributions. Exploring these dimensions of the political, he argues that politics is about how perceive and relate to the world. Space is a form of appearance and a mode of actuality, and the disruption of such forms and modes is the sublime element in politics.

The effectiveness of a compliance management framework can be guaranteed only if the framework is based on sound conceptual and formal foundations. In particular, the formal language used in the CMF is able to expressively represent the specifications of normative requirements that impose constraints on various activities of a business process. However, if the language used lacks expressiveness and the modelling constructs proposed in the CMF are not able to properly represent different types of norms, it can significantly impede the (...) reliability of the compliance results produced by the CMF. This paper investigates whether existing CMFs are able to provide reasoning and modeling support for various types of normative requirements by evaluating the conceptual foundations of the modeling constructs that existing CMFs use to represent a specific type of norm. The evaluation results portray somewhat a bleak picture of the state-of-the-affairs when it comes to represent norms as none of the existing CMFs is able to provide a comprehensive reasoning and modeling support. Also, it points to the shortcomings of the CMFs and emphasises exigent need of new modeling languages with sound theoretical and formal foundations for representing legal norms. (shrink)

Reason and revelation are two important guides for humanity. People can find the right path only thanks to these two guides. Fatānah is the peak of functional intelligence, which is a special attribute given to prophets. At the same time, this attribute is the ability and competence to use reason in the best way. Needless to say, this attribute comes along with great values and privileges. This prophetic attribute not only reflects the human aspect of the prophets but also points (...) to a qualification through which they receive revelation. Through this feature, prophets, on the one hand, try to understand revelation and apply it. On the other hand, they solve the problems in their community by practicing ijtihād in cases where revelation has not come. This creates a great power that makes them superior to others. As it is known, everyone’s mental faculties are different. Although people are given intelligence according to their degree, they are not given the attribute of fatānah. At this point, reason means the power of understanding, comprehension, thinking, and reasoning. Fatanāhis a superintelligence through which prophets can see events from multiple perspectives and analyze them in depth. We shall briefly mention the fatanāh of the Prophets Muhammad and Abraham as examples. The Prophet Muhammad fought for tawḥīd (God’s unity) in his polytheistic society. In order to transform the society in question, he reformed them by acting with reason, logic, and reasoning with the support of revelation. At the end of this struggle, he successfully transformed his community into a religious, theistic, and moral society in 23 years. He was the authority to solve the people's problems in both Mecca and Medina. He successfully found solutions to peoples’ problems. His success has been explained by the attribute of fatanāh, along with divine support. When we look at the life of Prophet Abraham, who is considered to be the ancestor of the prophets, the attribute of fatānahis clearly seen in his prophecy. That is to say, in his discussions with his father Āzar, Prophet Abraham wanted him to think that "idols are inanimate objects that do not harm or benefit anyone and have no function in creation." The best example of his superintelligence is that he broke the idols in the idol household with an axe and hung the axe around the neck of the big idol. On this occasion, he made idol-worshippers use their intellect. The subject of this article is to emphasize the importance of this attribute found in the prophets, along with the support of revelation, as an example for people. To better explain the subject, the paper also examines the intellect-revelation relationship and intellect-superintellect relationship. (shrink)

This is a defense of Pyrrhonian skepticism against the charge that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence in question. The apparent conflict has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an (...) epistemic inconsistency, perhaps by both, because the determination and affirmation of equipollence is itself a judgment of sorts, one that is not suspended. The practical challenge is that, independently of any conceptual confusion or contradiction, suspending judgment in reaction to equipollence evinces doxastic commitment to equipollence, if only because human beings are not capable of making assessments requiring rational determination without believing the corresponding premises and conclusions to be true. The two analytic sections addressing these challenges are preceded by two prefatory sections, one laying out the epistemic process, the other reviewing the evidentiary context. The response from the conceptual perspective is that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is not a reasoned conclusion adopted as the truth of the matter but a natural reaction to an impression left by the apparently equal weight of opposing arguments. The response from the practical perspective is that the acknowledgment of equipollence is not just an affirmation of the equal weight of arguments but also an admission of inability to decide, suggesting that any assent, express or implied, is thrust upon the Pyrrhonist in a state of epistemic paralysis affecting the will and the intellect on the matter being investigated. This just leaves a deep disagreement, if any, regarding whether equipollence is an inference based on discursive activity or an impression coming from passive receptivity. But this, even if resolved in favor of the critic (which it need not and ought not be), is not the same as confusion or inconsistency on the part of the Pyrrhonist, the demonstration of which is the primary aim of this paper. (shrink)

John Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. He has developed and polished both in conjunction over the course of half a century. Yet the moral principles he advocates have always been more doctrinaire than the corresponding justification model should have ever allowed with design details explicitly promising objectivity. This article goes to the beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it, in the “Outline of a Decision (...) Procedure for Ethics,” with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of supervisor support on the relationship between the need to be unique and the innovative behavior. People not only strive to belong to a group but also want to be unique from others and feel exceptional. Individuals’ innovative behavior is one of the things that makes them feel different from other people. Because developing a new idea, supporting this idea, putting this idea into practice, and the positive achievements of (...) this idea distinguish people who exhibit innovative behavior from others. It depends on the behavior of supervisors whether people who break away from typical practices and procedures to feel unique and special continue to act in innovative ways. In this context, it is vitally essential for supervisors to support people who display innovative behavior. The research was conducted on employees working in the education sector in Mersin. We employed the confirmatory factor analysis to examine the fitness of the model and moderation was tested. As hypothesized, the need to be unique had a significant and positive effect on innovative behavior. This finding is consistent with existing literature and thus advance knowledge on need to be unique and innovative behavior, particular in education sector. Nonetheless, it has been determined that supervisor support doesn’t have a moderator role on the relationship between the need to be unique and innovative behavior. Although there are some researches in the literature on consumer experiences about the need to be unique and innovative behavior, but literature on education section is sparse and still long way to go to evaluate its’ reflections on the workplace. (shrink)

There is no doubt that custard apple diseases are among the important reasons that destroy the Custard Apple plant and its agricultural crops. This leads to obvious damage to these plants and they become inedible. Discovering these diseases is a good step to provide the appropriate and correct treatment. Determining the treatment with high accuracy depends on the method used to correctly diagnose the disease, expert systems can greatly help in avoiding damage to these plants. The expert system correctly diagnoses (...) Custard Apple disease to make it easier for farmers to find the right treatment based on the appropriate diagnosis. Objectives: A specialized syllable language system was established for the diagnosis of Custard Apple plant disease. (shrink)

Discussion piece on a book of the same name: Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse. Published online as part of the “Book in Focus” program of Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2021).