The article construes a modern concept of human dignity and factors influencing it. On the grounds of the Antique Greek-Roman notion of a human being as in-dividuus (Lat. not divisible, integral) and per-sona (Lat. mask, role played by an actor), the ambiguity of the human dignity is revealed: on one hand, every human being enjoys an unchangeable and non-deprivable dignity of the human being, on the other hand, the human being, as a creature and participant of social (...) relations, himself/herself creates the dignity of a person. On the grounds of the hermeneutical attitude, it is shown that that human dignity (within the meaning of individuum) may be protected only by means of the guarantees of particular human rights and, vice versa, only by ensuring particular human rights one may also guarantee the protection of human dignity. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes the conservative conception of passive or static human dignity in accordance with which human’s value is seen as value coming from the exterior (from God or from a biological human’s nature), or value seen as existing per se. In opposition to this conception, a conception of active or created dignity is being developed, which aims at treating human’s dignity not like a social relationship, but rather like a person’s individual ability to live properly (...) in the society (participate in barter relations on the ground of equivalence) and using this propriety to create own individual social value (dignity), as a personal contribution towards maintenance of concord and collaboration in the society. (shrink)

Arguments from human dignity feature prominently in the Lethal Autonomous Weapons moral feasibility debate, even though their exists considerable controversy over their role and soundness and the notion of dignity remains under-defined. Drawing on the work of Dieter Birnbacher, I fix the sub-discourse as referring to the essential value of human persons in general, and to postulated moral rights of combatants not covered within the existing paradigm of the International Humanitarian Law in particular. I then review and critique (...) dignity-based arguments against LAWS: argument from faulty targeting process, argument from objectification, argument from underappreciation of the value of human life and the argument from the absence of mercy. I conclude that the argument from the absence of mercy is the only dignity-based argument that is both valid and irreducible to another class of arguments within the debate, and that it offers insufficient justification for a global ban on LAWS. (shrink)

Cohen-Almagor's book represents a remarkable contribution to the discussion of the right to die with dignity. It offers the discussion of a wide range of topics. They include: the terminology respectful of human dignity ; the question of autonomy; the sanctity-of life – quality of life debate; criticism of some extreme quality-of-life position; criticism of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between critical and experiential interests and the consequences this author draws from it; active and passive euthanasia; the Dutch experience (...) and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; and many others. The book is discussed from a basically sympathetic view, where some details are focused on as meriting some further examination. Some remarks are offered to indicate the complexity of the definition of autonomy; a defense of Dworkin's argument is offered; an insistence on the necessity to rely on moral conferring features is remarked. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to ponder the intricate issue of the right to die in dignity by focusing attention on the role of the patient's beloved people. I first provide critical examination of some of the arguments advanced by Ronald Dworkin. I proceed by contemplating relevant scenarios and examining three American court decisions: Saikewicz, Spring and Gray. The first case, Saikewicz, concerns a patient who had no family or other beloved people. I observe that this fact (...) had a significant bearing on the court's ruling not to provide him treatment. The second case, Spring, involves a patient whose family wanted to withhold treatment from him. I argue that we should be cautious of incidents in which the best interests of the patient's beloved people come at the expense of the best interests of the patient. Spring is an example of such a case. The third case, Gray, serves as an example whereby the best interests of the patient coincide with the best interests of her beloved people. I conclude by arguing that attention has to be given to the question of whether the patient's close-ones demonstrate a unified position in regard to the destiny of the patient. Gegenstand des Beitrags ist es, das schwierige Problem des Rechts, in Würde zu sterben, im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Personen zu überdenken, die dem Patienten nahestehen. Der Autor setzt sich zunächst kritisch mit einigen von Ronald Dworkin vorgetragenen Argumenten auseinander. Dann stellt er die relevanten Fallgestaltungen dar und untersucht drei Entscheidungen amerikanischer Gerichte: die Fälle Saikewicz, Spring und Gray. Der erste Fall, Saikewicz, betrifft einen Patienten ohne Familie oder andere ihm nahestehende Personen. Dieser Umstand hatte einen wesentlichen Einfluß auf die Entscheidung des Gerichts, von der Anordnung einer Behandlung des Patienten abzusehen. Im zweiten Fall, Spring, wünschte die Familie, daß der Patient nicht behandelt würde. Der Autor mahnt für alle die Fälle zur Vorsicht, bei denen die Umstände so beschaffen sind, daß das wohlverstandene Interesse der Angehörigen und das des Patienten kollidieren. Der Fall Spring ist ein Beispiel für eine solche Kollisionssituation. Der dritte Fall, Gray, dient als ein Beispiel, in dem sich das wohlverstandene Interesse des Patienten und das der ihm nahestehenden Personen decken. Zuletzt geht es um die Frage, ob die Angehörigen und andere dem Patienten nahestehende Personen in ihren Vorstellungen über das weitere Schicksal des Patienten übereinstimmen oder nicht. Die Frage verdient eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit. (shrink)

The article discusses the way people wish to die, analyzing the legal situation in countries that permit either euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. While criticizing the Dutch, Belgian and Swiss models, I argue that the Oregon model is the one with apparently little abuse. Building on the experiences of Oregon, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Northern Territory of Australia, the article ends with a set of guidelines to improve the conduct of PAS.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948;Bearing in mind (...) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

This book advances Oruka's argument that the right to a human minimum is the most basic and necessary means to ensuring human dignity, a precondition to functioning as a moral agent. It also defends and promotes an understanding of justice as ensuring both egalitarian and ecological fairness at the global level.

This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it (...) provides an analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s antiabortion opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., which overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, on the one-hand suggests that the Court may be moving toward eliminating all non-enumerated fundamental rights not deeply rooted in the Nation’s longstanding history and tradition. On the other hand, it may suggest only that the Court might be just opening the door to overruling specific non-enumerated rights with which it no longer agrees. Either way, (...) many long-recognized, non-enumerated, human rights, beyond abortion that are essential to individual autonomy and human dignity are now up for grabs. Such rights in the area of privacy law will most likely include not just abortion, but also contraception, interracial marriage, and the Court’s more recent recognition of same-sex marriage, and possibly still other precedents, including whether states can criminalize adult consensual same-sex behavior in private. More importantly, the proposed foundation for this Court’s potential departure from its past case precedents cannot be justified even by claiming such rights are not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. As I hope to show in this article, neither from the point of view of looking to this Nation’s longstanding history and traditions, if properly understood, nor from the point of view of allowing Equal Protection to aide in identifying forms of discrimination not previously recognized or afforded much attention, can departures from past human rights precedents based in autonomy be justified. (shrink)

The idea that there is such a thing as a human right to health has become pervasive. It has not only been acknowledged by a variety of international law documents and thus entered the political realm but is also defended in academic circles. Yet, despite its prominence the human right to health remains something of a mystery - especially with respect to its philosophical underpinnings. Addressing this unfortunate and intellectually dangerous insufficiency, this book critically assesses the stipulation that (...) health is a human right which - as international law holds - derives from the inherent dignity of the human person. Scrutinising the concepts underlying this stipulation, it shall conclude that such right cannot be upheld from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Richard Mohr emphasizes the importance of dispelling false beliefs about lesbians and gay men, and establishing legislation that protects the rights of sexual minorities. He argues that homophobic policies originate in the belief that gay men and lesbians are categorically less morally valuable than others, rather than deserving of unequal treatment because of their behaviors or actions. In response, I show that homophobic panic over lesbian or gay sex acts is actually quite influential, and argue that Mohr fails to take (...) account of the political and philosophical significance of sexual freedom, and the inextricability of sexual being and sexual doing. (shrink)

I argue that Habermas’s proposed system of rights fails to offer an adequate account of the relation between rights and moral injury. In providing a non-moral justification for rights, Habermas’s functional-normative argument excludes the moral intuition that persons are worthy of being protected from a class of injurious actions (i.e. false imprisonment, religious persecution). Habermas does offer clearly stated reasons for his proposed normative, yet non-moral foundation for a legitimate legal order, including the claim that the functional imperatives of modern (...) legal systems cannot be reduced to morality. My positive thesis is that at least some rights are moral norms whose content and justification derive from a moral point of view informed by the idea of persons as free and equal. (shrink)

The right-to-die debate has gone on for centuries, playing out most recently as a spectacle of protest surrounding figures such as Terry Schiavo. In _Deconstructing Dignity_, Scott Cutler Shershow offers a powerful new way of thinking about it philosophically. Focusing on the concepts of human dignity and the sanctity of life, he employs Derridean deconstruction to uncover self-contradictory and damaging assumptions that underlie both sides of the debate. Shershow examines texts from Cicero’s _De Officiis_ to Kant’s _Groundwork of (...) the Metaphysics of Morals_ to court decisions and religious declarations. Through them he reveals how arguments both supporting and denying the right to die undermine their own unconditional concepts of human dignity and the sanctity of life with a hidden conditional logic, one often tied to practical economic concerns and the scarcity or unequal distribution of medical resources. He goes on to examine the exceptional case of self-sacrifice, closing with a vision of a society—one whose conditions we are far from meeting—in which the debate can finally be resolved. A sophisticated analysis of a heated topic, _Deconstructing Dignity _is also a masterful example of deconstructionist methods at work. (shrink)

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients (...) are not able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. (shrink)

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients (...) are not able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 91-106.

Dignity is an expansive ideal, figuring in international covenants, codes of research involving human participants, and debates about decision making at the end of life. One result of this expansiveness is that human dignity can be appropriated by proponents on both sides of many issues, thereby appearing more as a rhetorical flourish than as a serious element in argumentation. However, an appreciation of narrative inquiry shows that opposing representations of dignity constitute alternative assessments of responsible action, both (...) of which can be morally reasonable. One implication is that normative disagreements, as between deathbed decisions about palliative care or euthanasia, can be expected to occur, so that the ideal of dignity should be legally expressed in a practice of supportive laissez-faire in preference to any undue regulation of dying. (shrink)

In 2016, the European Parliament approved the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) whose core aim is the safeguarding of information privacy, and, by corollary, human dignity. Drawing on the field of philosophical anthropology, this paper analyses various interpretations of human dignity and human exceptionalism. It concludes that privacy is essential for humans to flourish and enable individuals to build a sense of self and the world.

This book proposes a new agenda for research into a Critical Theory of Human Rights. Each chapter pursues three goals: to reconstruct modern philosophical theories that have contributed to our views on human rights; to highlight the importance of humanity and human dignity as a complementary dimension to liberal rights; and, finally, to integrate these issues more directly in contemporary discussions about cosmopolitanism. The authors not only present multicultural perspectives on how to rethink political and international theory in terms (...) of the normativity of human rights, but also promote an international dialogue on the prospects for a critical theory of human rights discourses in the 21st century. (shrink)

The ‘dignity and worth of the human person’ emphasised in international human rights instruments resonate strongly in relation to the world’s ageing population, which is projected to be the fastest growing population group in the world and often among the most vulnerable. While elderly persons as a group are heterogeneous and their socio-economic life situation varies significantly between individuals, the need for universal support mechanisms such as non-contributory old-age benefits have been recognised by many states, and currently, over 100 (...) countries around the world provide some form of social pension targeted towards the elderly populations. This article appraises a sample of these old-age pension schemes from the perspective of the right to social security, with particular emphasis on the dignity and worth of the human person as espoused within the international human rights regime. (shrink)

The right to bodily integrity (RBI) may seem inapt for inclusion in this volume, which is supposed to address new human rights, for as A. M. Viens notes, the RBI is a long-standing fixture in the philosophical and legal discussion of rights. However, Viens does, I think, make a good case for the right’s inclusion here. Not only does he note the increasing recognition of a new right to genital integrity derived from the more general RBI, he (...) also argues for a new conceptualisation of the RBI itself: he argues that we ought to decompose the RBI into several constituent rights, delineated according to the different values from which they derive – rights to bodily autonomy, bodily dignity, bodily ownership, well-being, and so on. (shrink)

Dutch medical ethics policy is renowned for being highly liberal, due largely to the Dutch law on euthanasia. The Netherlands is one of the very few countries in which euthanasia performed by physicians and physician-assisted suicide has been legalized. Acts of euthanasia and PAS go unpunished, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.

This chapter sides with those who believe that a right to stay should be counted among fundamental human rights. However, it also acknowledges that there are good reasons for objecting to the most popular justifications of the right to stay, which are based on the assumption that people have valuable ties to their community of residence and that people’s life plans are located where they live. In response to these qualms, this chapter argues that the best way to (...) make sense of the right to stay is to conceive it as belonging to the category of “control rights”; these are the rights that protect people’s control over their own bodies and personal space, which is an essential condition for personhood and human dignity. This account of the right to stay can overcome the most pressing objections to its recognition as a fundamental human right. (shrink)

This paper draws upon Hannah Arendt's idea of the 'right to have rights' to critique the current protection gap faced by refugees today. While refugees are protected from refoulement once they make it to the jurisdiction or territory of a state, they face an ever-increasing array of non-entrée policies designed to stymie access to state territory. Without being able to enter a state capable of securing their claims to safety and dignity, refugees cannot achieve the rights which ought (...) to be afforded to them under international law. Drawing upon both legal theory and political philosophy, this paper argues that refugees today, just as the stateless in Arendt’s time, must be afforded the ‘right to have rights’, understood as a right to enter state territory. (shrink)

On the grounds of the fundamental value of the human rights, which is the human dignity, this article describes a basis of the right to health care in terms of quality, discloses its concept, reviews the spheres of health system in which this right is exercised: health care and public health. The right to health care is stressed as one of the fundamental rights, without which the person will not able to enjoy other rights: economic, political (...) and social rights. It comprises the right to enjoy the best physical and mental health. The right to health care is not absolute in itself: efficiency of its implementation depends upon both ability of administrative and institutional systems, which were created by the state, to properly implement the assigned functions and upon the individual, its state of health and lifestyle. (shrink)

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due (...) to an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition — at the level of a constitutional standard — of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability. -/- Punktem wyjścia jest analiza argumentacji na rzecz tezy o stosowalności do prawa do ochrony życia (art. 38 Konstytucji RP), klauzuli limitacyjnej określającej warunki ograniczania konstytucyjnych wolności i praw (art. 31 ust. 3). Mimo niemal powszechnej akceptacji tej tezy, nie wytrzymuje ona krytyki opartej na pierwszeństwie, które w polskim porządku prawnym mają zobowiązania traktowe dotyczące praw człowieka, wobec regulacji ustawowych. Ze względu na wzorzec międzynarodowy, który nie przewiduje stosowania klasycznej klauzuli limitacyjnej do prawa do życia, mimo uznania - na poziomie standardu konstytucyjnego - stosowalności klauzuli z art. 31 ust. 3 do art. 38 i ochrony życia w ogóle, stosowalność tej klauzuli będzie uniemożliwiona przy każdej próbie formułowania standardu ustawowego. Autor zwraca uwagę na wadliwość wnioskowania prowadzącego od uznania dopuszczalności pewnych ograniczeń ochrony jakiejś wartości (np. życia) na podstawie wyjątków ex definitione obecnych w standardzie międzynarodowym, do tezy o stosowalności klauzuli limitacyjnej przy kształtowaniu standardu ustawowego w polskim systemie prawnym. (shrink)

Preserving dignity during the dying process requires reviewing the roles of those involved in the treatment, care methods and decision-making. This article examines the participation and responsibility assigned to nurses regarding decision-making in the final stages of life, as laid out in the Rights to and Guarantee of Dignity for the Individual During the Process of Death Act. This text has been analysed on the levels of socio-cultural practice and discourse practice, using the critical discourse analysis methodology. The (...) results show that, although the law is another result of the social trend of patient empowerment, the responsibility of the nurses is not recognised, and they are left out of the decision-making process in the final stages of life. (shrink)

As the single most important experience in the lives of all people, the process and event of death must be handled carefully by the medical community. Twentieth-century advances in life-sustaining technology impose new areas of concern on those who are responsible for dying persons. Physicians and surrogates alike must be ready and willing to decide not to intervene in the dying process, indeed to hasten it, when they see the autonomy and dignity of patients threatened. In addition, the very (...) ways we talk about death and dying need to come under scrutiny, and it is likely that our technical advances should be parallelled by equally arduous advances in the semantic and rhetorical approaches we take to death. (shrink)

Human beings as imperfect rational beings face continuous challenges, one of them has to do with the lack of recognizing and respecting our inner dignity in present times. In this collective paper, we address the overall theme—Philosophy of Education in a New Key from various perspectives related to dignity. We address in particular some of the constraints and possibilities with regard to this issue in various settings such as education and society at large. Klas Roth discusses, for example, (...) that it is not uncommon that the value of human beings has to do with their price in, inter alia, their social, cultural, political and economic settings throughout the world. He argues that such a focus does not necessarily draw attention to the inner dignity of human beings, but that human beings ought to do so in education and society at large. Lia Mollvik discusses views of inner and outer dignity, and argues that there needs to be a balance in between them, and that the balance ought to be acknowledged in education. Rama Alshoufani discusses the classification of human beings in terms of various diagnoses related to the asserted dysfunction of the brain, and she argues that such classification does paradoxically not necessarily respect people with such diagnoses as ends in themselves. On the contrary, she argues that their inner dignity is not respected, but that it should be. Other such failures are due to the lack of inner dignity when it comes to Children’s rights as discussed by Rebecca Adami, and to the lack of recognition of human beings’ vulnerability as discussed by Katy Dineen. Fariba Majlesi criticizes a too strong emphasis on substantive notions of humanist education, which seem to hinder new ways of thinking; she argues that it is necessary to acknowledge the latter in and through education in order to preserve the dignity of human beings. Dignity, it is argued throughout the paper, has an inner moral worth, and is beyond price. (shrink)

The prohibition on administering lethal medication to a patient can be found in the first code of medical deontology (450 BC), which calls on doctors to practice their art with purity and piety. Today, in some countries, doctors are faced with an ethical and deontological dilemma: patients or their relatives request deep and continuous sedation in the name of the “right to die”, believing their life to be inhuman and unworthy! The very concept of the “right to die” (...) is a complex and delicate subject, undefined and un-framed by law. However, it is often discussed in the context of individual rights and medical ethics, often leaving the physician torn on one side by compassion and a sense of medical duty to alleviate a patient’s unnecessary suffering. The “right to die” is an ethical and legal concept that supports the freedom of a human being who is incurably ill or “tired of living” to end his or her life, or to obtain the necessary assistance to do so, by refusing treatment. Yet the universal Hippocratic law that underpins medical practice formally prohibits doctors from assisting suicide. This prohibition is based on the physician’s commitment to defending and preserving life until its natural end. The aim of this study was to see in what sense we can speak of a “right to die” in the philosophy of medicine, so that death can be experienced with humanity and dignity, even by means of deep and continuous sedation. The subject is all the more topical as this right is claimed in the name of human dignity and individual rights and freedoms. (shrink)

On 26 February 2020, the German Constitutional Court rejected a law from 2015 that prohibited any form of ‘business-like’ assisted suicide as unconstitutional. The landmark ruling of the highest federal court emphasised the high priority given to the rights of autonomy and free personal development, both of which constitute the principle of human dignity, the first principle of the German constitution. The ruling echoes particularities of post-war Germany’s end-of-life debate focusing on patient self-determination while rejecting any discussion of active (...) assistance to die through a lethal injection administered by a doctor. This brief report discusses the ruling in the light of the broader sociopolitical and historical context of the German end-of-life debate. (shrink)

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but (...) rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity. (shrink)

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but (...) rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant's concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity. (shrink)

Human dignity: social movements invoke it, several national constitutions enshrine it, and it features prominently in international human rights documents. But what is human dignity, why is it important, and what is its relationship to human rights? -/- This book offers a sophisticated and comprehensive defence of the view that human dignity is the moral heart of human rights. First, it clarifies the network of concepts associated with dignity. Paramount within this network is a core notion (...) of human dignity as an inherent, non-instrumental, egalitarian, and high-priority normative status of human persons. People have this status in virtue of their valuable human capacities rather than as a result of their national origin and other conventional features. Second, it shows how human dignity gives rise to an inspiring ideal of solidaristic empowerment, which calls us to support people's pursuit of a flourishing life by affirming both negative duties not to block or destroy, and positive duties to protect and facilitate, the development and exercise of the valuable capacities at the basis of their dignity. The most urgent of these duties are correlative to human rights. Third, this book illustrates how the proposed dignitarian approach allows us to articulate the content, justification, and feasible implementation of specific human rights, including contested ones, such as the rights to democratic political participation and to decent labour conditions. Finally, this book's dignitarian approach helps illuminate the arc of humanist justice, identifying both the difference and the continuity between the basic requirements of human rights and more expansive requirements of social justice such as those defended by liberal egalitarians and democratic socialists. -/- Human dignity is indeed the moral heart of human rights. Understanding it enables us to defend human rights as the urgent ethical and political project that puts humanity first. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem o propósito de analisar a terminologia direitos naturais e direitos humanos nos séculos XVII e XVIII. Trata-se de mostrar, por um lado, que, não obstante a terminologia direitos humanos, à primeira vista faça referência, sobretudo, ao denominado Século das Luzes, urge dar-se conta de que a terminologia mais comum no período era a de direitos naturais fundamentais, ou inalienáveis, e, por outro lado, que a compreensão da passagem e, por conseguinte, a mudança terminológica que se dá dos (...) direitos naturais aos direitos humanos é imprescindível para situar e demarcar o processo reflexivo e de aprimoramento da compreensão dos direitos humanos na atualidade a partir do enfoque da dignidade humana como fundamento. Palavras-chave: Direitos naturais. Direitos humanos. Liberdade. Igualdade. Dignidade. (shrink)

st of these lectures, I present a conception of dignity that preserves its ancient association with rank and station, and a conception of human dignity that amounts to a generalization of high status across all human beings. The lectures argue that this provides a better understanding of human dignity and of the work it does in theories of rights than the better-known Kantian conception. The second lecture focuses particularly on the importance of dignity - understood in (...) this way - as a status defining a person's relation to law: their presentation as persons capable of self-applying the law, capable of presenting and arguing a point of view, and capable of responding to law's demands without brute coercion. Together the two lectures also illuminate the relation between dignity conceived as the ground of rights and dignity conceived as the content of rights; they also illuminate important ideas about dignity as noble bearing and dignity as the subject of a right against degrading treatment; and they help us understand the sense in which dignity is better conceived as a status than as a kind of value. (shrink)

According to the orthodox or humanist conception of human rights, individuals have a moral duty to promote the universal realization of human rights. However, advocates of this account express the implications of this duty in extremely vague terms. What does it mean when we say that we must promote human rights satisfaction? Does it mean that we must devote a considerable amount of our time and resources to this task? Does it mean, instead, that we must make occasional donations to (...) charities working to advance human rights realization? In this essay, I argue that this duty can only be constructed as imperfect. This means that it confers agent-relative discretion on us to decide when, how, and to what extent to advance the human rights of others. It also means that it is neither correlative with rights nor enforceable. As I will explain, the main reason for this is that any attempt to construct it as a perfect duty would infringe the dignity of the potential duty bearers and thereby undermine the very values that human rights practice aspires to serve. Finally, I will conclude by providing some guidelines for those who wish to comply with their imperfect duties to improve the situation of those whose human rights are in peril. (shrink)

There is little need to argue for the importance of human rights (HRs) in our world. If one looks at the role they play today, it is hard to deny that their impact has increased beyond anything the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration could have hoped or imagined. However, even though human rights today have a far greater impact on politics than in the past, the philosophical reflection that surrounds them has had a less fortunate history. It is doubtful (...) whether we are today in a better position than we were in 1948 to answer any of the philosophical questions surrounding them, including, and perhaps most crucially, the question about their foundation. Why are human rights standards—of whatever sort—that we should adopt, or even just take seriously? The first two parts of this paper summarize my recent work on the above question (Caranti, 2017) and the third takes it a step further. I will 1) show why the main orientations in the contemporary philosophy of human rights all fail to yield a satisfactory foundation, 2) sketch an alternative foundation that exploits Kant’s account of human dignity in a rather critical way; and 3) address one major objection my approach is bound to attract (and in a certain form has already attracted). Since my foundation suggests that we have dignity (and as a consequence human rights) because we are autonomous, that is, capable of moral behavior, some scholars have argued that I am bound to the counterintuitive conclusion that people with a temporary or permanent lack of rational capacity, which would cause a condition of “impaired autonomy,” are not entitled to the protection of human rights. While this objection does nothing but reformulate in the language of human rights an old, classical objection to Kant’s ethics, replying to it requires mobilizing new intellectual resources. (shrink)

The principle of respect for human dignity plays a crucial role in the emerging global norms relating to bioethics, in particular in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This instrument, which is a legal, not merely an ethical document, can be regarded as an extension of international human rights law into the field of biomedicine. Although the Declaration does not explicitly define human dignity, it would be a mistake to see the emphasis put on this (...) notion as a mere rhetorical strategy. Rather, the appeal to dignity reflects a real concern about the need to promote respect both for the intrinsic worth of human beings and for the integrity of the human species. But dignity alone cannot solve most of the dilemmas posed by biomedical practice. This is why international biolaw combines, on the one hand, the appeal to human dignity as an overarching principle with, on the other hand, the recourse to human rights, which provide an effective and practical way forward for dealing with bioethical issues at a global level. (shrink)