The claim may be made that the Foucauldian analytics of power, in its detailed attention to the question of how modern societies are rendered governable, has superseded classical and radical analyses. This paper points to problems occasioned by Foucauldian governmentality's reliance on Foucault's flawed conception of the subject. These problems undermine the ambition of this style of research to outline possibilities for political intervention. It is suggested that educational critique can draw usefully on the scrupulous specificity of Foucauldian governmental analysis (...) but that only a critique firmly based in a normative framework aligned to an idea of democratic sociality can aspire to political effectiveness. (shrink)

Though Foucault was intrigued by the possibilities of radical social transformation, he resolutely resisted the idea that such transformation could escape the effects of power and expressed caution when it came to the question of revolution. In this article we argue that in one particularly influential line of development of Foucault’s work his exemplary caution has been exaggerated in a way that weakens the political aspirations of post-Foucaldian scholarship. The site of this reduction is a complex debate over the role (...) of normativity in Foucaldian research, where it has been claimed that Foucault’s genealogical approach is unable to answer the question ‘ Why fight?’ The terms of this debate are limited by a dominant though selective interpretation of Foucault’s analytics of power, where power is understood primarily in terms of government, rather than struggle. In response we suggest that if we reconfigure power-as-government to power-as-war, this adjusts the central concern. ‘ Why fight?’ becomes replaced by the more immediate question, ‘ How fight?’ Without denying the obvious benefits of cautious scholarly work, we argue that a reconfiguration of Foucault’s analytics of power might help Foucaldian research to transcend the self-imposed ethic of political quietism that currently dominates the field. (shrink)

This text maps the network of concepts that constitute the general catagory of reason. In the process it shows that some famous philosophical doctrines are based on mistaken assumptions in this conceptual area. In particular, it aims to undermine the arguments of Hume and is modern followers to the effect that reason can be theoretical but not practical (can govern thought but not action) and that value judgements cannot be validly inferred from facts.

As in other areas of medical practice, relatives accompany patients to genetic consultations. However, unlike in other areas, the consultations may be relevant to the relatives’ health because they may be at risk of developing the same genetic condition as the patient. The presence of relatives in genetic consultation may affect the decision‐making process and it raises questions about the perception of patient autonomy and the way it is practiced in genetics. However, these issues have not been examined in previous (...) empirical studies. This article aims to fill this gap by reporting findings from a qualitative study with clinicians working in the area of inherited breast cancer. The findings indicate that family presence has an impact on the patient's decisions to undergo genetic testing and preventative operations when she is diagnosed as a carrier. The findings further indicate that, unlike in other areas of medical practice, blood relatives who are present in consultations are perceived by clinicians as patients or potential patients, and this in turn increases their involvement in discussions in the consultation room. Finally, the findings indicate that in genetics, a relational approach to autonomy is applied. Decisions are made in a social context, where the relatives’ views are heard and taken into account. The findings suggest that the conventional bioethical approach to autonomy, which perceives the decision‐making unit as comprising a clinician and an individual patient, is challenged in genetics. The findings thus suggest that bioethicists, lawyers and policy‐makers should consider whether this individualistic approach is still valid and applicable. (shrink)

In “Properties and the Interpretation of Second-Order Logic” Bob Hale develops and defends a deflationary conception of properties where a property with particular satisfaction conditions actually exists if and only if it is possible that a predicate with those same satisfaction conditions exists. He argues further that, since our languages are finitary, there are at most countably infinitely many properties and, as a result, the account fails to underwrite the standard semantics for second-order logic. Here a more lenient version of (...) the view is explored, which allows for the possibility of countably infinite predicates understood as the product of linguistic supertasks. This enriched deflationist account of properties—the Infinitary Deflationary Conception of Existence—supports the standard semantics for models with countable first-order domains, and allows one to prove the categoricity of the second-order Peano axioms. (shrink)

One of the main reasons for providing formal semantics for languages is that the mathematical precision afforded by such semantics allows us to study and manipulate the formalization much more easily than if we were to study the relevant natural languages directly. Michael Tye and R. M. Sainsbury have argued that traditional set-theoretic semantics for vague languages are all but useless, however, since this mathematical precision eliminates the very phenomenon (vagueness) that we are trying to capture. Here we meet this (...) objection by viewing formalization as a process of building models, not providing descriptions. When we are constructing models, as opposed to accurate descriptions, we often include in the model extra ‘machinery’ of some sort in order to facilitate our manipulation of the model. In other words, while some parts of a model accurately represent actual aspects of the phenomenon being modelled, other parts might be merely artefacts of the particular model. With this distinction in place, the criticisms of Sainsbury and Tye are easily dealt with—the precision of the semantics is artefactual and does not represent any real precision in vague discourse. Although this solution to this problem is independent of any particular semantics a detailed account of how we would distinguish between representor and artefact within Dorothy Edgington's degree-theoretic semantics is presented. (shrink)

Written for undergraduates, the educated layperson, and scholars in fields other than philosophy, _The Myth of Religious Neutrality _offers a radical reinterpretation of the general relations between religion, science, and philosophy. This new edition has been completely revised and updated by the author.

Though dividing one’s attention between two input streams typically impairs performance, detecting a behaviorally relevant stimulus can sometimes enhance the encoding of unrelated information presented at the same time. Previous research has shown that selection of this kind boosts visual cortical activity and memory for concurrent items. An important unanswered question is whether such effects are reflected in processing quality and functional connectivity in visual regions and in the hippocampus. In this fMRI study, participants were asked to memorize a stream (...) of naturalistic images and press a button only when they heard a predefined target tone. Images could be presented with a target tone, with a distractor tone, or without a tone. Auditory target detection increased activity throughout the ventral visual cortex but lowered it in the hippocampus. Enhancements in functional connectivity between the ventral visual cortex and the hippocampus were also observed following auditory targets. Multi-voxel pattern classification of image category was more accurate on target tone trials than on distractor and no tone trials in the fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus. This effect was stronger in visual cortical clusters whose activity was more correlated with the hippocampus on target tone than on distractor tone trials. In agreement with accounts suggesting that subcortical noradrenergic influences play a role in the attentional boost effect, auditory target detection also caused an increase in locus coeruleus activity and phasic pupil responses. These findings outline a network of cortical and subcortical regions that are involved in the selection and processing of information presented at behaviorally relevant moments. (shrink)

Dooyeweerd’s account of abstraction is examined and found to be faulty. He holds that abstract thinking isolates aspects which must then be synthesized, whereas I argue that we cannot isolate any aspect from the others however so hard we try. But our very inability to isolate aspects is then turned into an alternative version of a transcendental critique of theory making. Instead of asking for a basis for synthesizing aspects we have isolated, the new version asks: what is the nature (...) of the aspectual connectedness which is so strong that it cannot be interrupted even by abstraction? I argue that it is impossible for anyone to understand the meaning of a concept fully without taking a position on this issue, whether that is done implicitly or explicitly. Moreover, every answer to this question presupposes a divinity belief. Hence, this recasting of the critique yields a demonstration of the religious regulation of all concepts and every theory. In this way the goal of Dooyeweerd’s critique is achieved, even if not in the way he envisioned. (shrink)

Truth values are, properly understood, merely proxies for the various relations that can hold between language and the world. Once truth values are understood in this way, consideration of the Liar paradox and the revenge problem shows that our language is indefinitely extensible, as is the class of truth values that statements of our language can take – in short, there is a proper class of such truth values. As a result, important and unexpected connections emerge between the semantic paradoxes (...) and the set-theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

The problem of determinism arises in all the major areas of philosophy. The first part of this book, first published in 1991, is a critical and historical exposition of the problem and the most important ideas and arguments which have arisen over the many years of debate. The second part considers the various forms of determinism and the implications that they engender.

This chapter examines the debate between advocates of classical logic and advocates of intuitionistic logic. It examines the semantic and epistemic issues on which this debate is usually conducted. After introducing the idea that logic is a model of correct reasoning, the chapter explores the viability of a logic intermediate between classical and intuitionistic.

Timothy Williamson’s Modal Logic as Metaphysics is a book-length defense of necessitism about objects—roughly put, the view that, necessarily, any object that exists, exists necessarily. In more formal terms, Williamson argues for the validity of necessitism for objects (NO: ◻︎∀x◻︎∃y(x=y)). NO entails both the (first-order) Barcan formula (BF: ◇∃xΦ → ∃x◇Φ, for any formula Φ) and the (first-order) converse Barcan formula (CBF: ∃x◇Φ → ◇∃xΦ, for any formula Φ). The purpose of this essay is not to assess Williamson’s arguments either (...) for necessitism (although discussion of these arguments will play a central role in the dialectic) or for necessitism’s two famous corollaries. Instead, the focus shall be a general principle governing abstract objects—the abstract of principle (or AOP) —instances of which seems to be at work in some of Williamson’s central arguments for necessitism. The AOP can be straightforwardly formulated and applied within the neo-logicist framework—in fact, arguably the principle is most naturally formulated in neo-logicist terms. -/- After closely examining, and carefully formalizing, the AOP, the remainder of the paper focuses on arguments for necessitism-like claims (the exact meaning of “necessitism-like” will become clearer as the essay progresses) based on the AOP. In particular, we shall focus on the instance of the AOP that applies to the abstract objects governed by the most well-known and most fully studied abstraction principle: Hume’s Principle (HP). It turns out that, although we cannot reconstruct a valid argument for necessitism based on this numerical instance of the AOP, we can obtain valid arguments for weaker, but equally interesting conclusions. In particular, we shall show that, although HP combined with the AOP (and some additional, related assumptions) allows the contents of the domains of possible worlds to vary, the size of those domains must remain constant. The paper concludes by developing and critiquing some related arguments for necessitism based on applying relevant instances of the AOP to abstraction principles governing sets (or extensions), and to a simple objectual abstraction principle. (shrink)

The eighteenth century saw the publication of many scientific and technical dictionaries, particularly in France, one of the most important being P. J. Macquer's Dictionnaire de chymie. Both the original text of 1766 and the revised and enlarged version of 1778 were translated into several languages, sometimes with authoritative notes and additions by the translators. No mere list of definitions, Macquer's work contained long articles that made it a comprehensive treatise on chemistry, and it set the pattern for many subsequent (...) chemical dictionaries. We have endeavoured to give an account of the circumstances in which the various editions, reprints and translations were published, and we add detailed bibliographical descriptions of them. Bibliographical purists consider that all the copies of a book printed from the same setting of type constitute an ‘edition’, and that there is a new edition when all or most of the type has been reset. However, Macquer described his revised and expanded text of 1778 as the ‘second edition’ and this designation has been adopted by subsequent writers, even though the original text was reprinted several times from different settings of type before 1778. In order to avoid confusion we therefore refer to all versions of the 1766 and 1778 editions as ‘issues’, ‘printings’ or ‘reprints’ of the first and second edition respectively. (shrink)

The current spread of coronavirus has caught our modern world by surprise, which leads to widespread panic, fear and confusion. However, if we view the unfolding of these events from a scientific historical perspective of past human evolution, we may discover the reoccurring patterns of the environmental conditions that give rise to such epidemics. Hence, we can figure out better methods to prepare and react to the infectious agents that spread diseases that have shaped the course of human history before. (...) Here, I propose a holistic view of human evolution, with an interdisciplinary approach that studies how cyclic variation in solar UV energy affects the evolution of viruses and shapes the symbiotic dynamics of human life on earth. (shrink)

We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato :331–342, 2010) as a corollary. Furthermore, it follows from our results that the union of a single-peaked domain and a single-dipped domain is dictatorial.

In this paper, we present a formal recipe that Frege followed in his magnum opus “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” when formulating his definitions. This recipe is not explicitly mentioned as such by Frege, but we will offer strong reasons to believe that Frege applied it in developing the formal material of Grundgesetze. We then show that a version of Basic Law V plays a fundamental role in Frege’s recipe and, in what follows, we will explicate what exactly this role is and (...) explain how it differs from the role played by extensions in his earlier book “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik”. Lastly, we will demonstrate that this hitherto neglected yet foundational aspect of Frege’s use of Basic Law V helps to resolve a number of important interpretative challenges in recent Frege scholarship, while also shedding light on some important differences between Frege’s logicism and recent neo-logicist approaches to the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

One familiar philosophical use of the term ‘evil’ just contrasts it with ‘good’, i.e., something is an evil if it is a bad thing, one of life’s “minuses.” This is the sense of ‘evil’ that is used in posing the traditional theological problem of evil, though it is customary there to distinguish between moral evils and natural evils. Moral evils are those bad things that are caused by moral agents; natural evils are those bad things that are not caused by (...) moral agents. Since the existence of evils of both sorts is usually taken to be indubitable, the problem of evil is then construed as the problem of how to square their existence with the existence of an all-powerful and benevolent God. (shrink)

Leading research projects are evidence of the growing public interest in genetic diagnosis and treatment. In this context, disclosure of genetic information to relatives has become a prominent issue. However, this involves patient confidentiality, which is grounded in law and conflicts with disclosure to relatives. When conducting a legal and bioethical discussion in this context, it is first necessary to examine how clinicians perceive the role of law in their practice and how they interpret it. A qualitative study was therefore (...) conducted among clinicians in Israel. The findings indicate that the clinicians’ approach is more relational than that of the law, in view of their pro-active steps to ensure that familial information reaches the relatives when the patient is reluctant to convey this information themselves. In light of these findings the authors argue that the law can resolve situations of explicit and implicit refusal to inform relatives. (shrink)

This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever.

_Der Mythos der religiösen Neutralität_ bietet eine radikale Neuinterpretation der allgemeinen Beziehungen zwischen Religion, Wissenschaft und Philosophie.

In the opening section of Ovid's Ars Amatoria 3 the poet, in an attempt to gain favour with his female addressees, lists a number of legends where it is men who are the deceivers. In this list he includes Aeneas, et famam pietatis habet, tamen hospes et ensem I praebuit et causam mortis, Elissa, tuae . The terms in which Aeneas' guilt is cast are striking. Aeneas is criticized not for his lover's faithlessness, but for his shattering of the rules (...) of hospitium. At the heart of hospitium, in as much as it is friendship between strangers, lay the ideals of duty, loyalty, reciprocity, and the exchange of services, pietas includes, in this context, a reference to the guest's sense of, or actual fulfilment of, the duty to pay a proper return on the hospitality received. Aeneas had a reputation for doing his duty as a hospes, i.e. as someone who was conscientious about his duty to make an appropriate return. But, according to Ovid, the return which he actually made was diametrically opposed to a proper return, and consisted of a sword and a reason for Dido to kill herself with it. Ovid's decision to frame Aeneas' guilt in terms of hospitium reflects and emphasis adopted both in his own earlier epistle from Dido to Aeneas , and in the Aeneid itself. The erotic relationship between Dido and Aeneas in Book 4 of the Aeneid evolves out of the hospitium relationship established between them in Book 1. When Aeneas leaves Dido he asserts that their relationship is that of host and guest rather than of husband and wife, and that he has acted and will act well in this hospitium relationship . 9). Dido, for her part, even after she has been forced to drop the argument that she and Aeneas are married , continues to attack Aeneas and the Trojans as bad or faithless hospites , and ends by renouncing hospitium with them. (shrink)