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Scott F. Aikin [75]Scott Forrest Aikin [2]
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Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University
  1. Prospects For Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.
    Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. (...)
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  2. An Atheistic Argument From Ugliness.Scott F. Aikin & Nicholaos Jones - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):209-217.
    The theistic argument from beauty has what we call an 'evil twin', the argument from ugliness. The argument yields either what we call 'atheist win', or, when faced with aesthetic theodicies, 'agnostic tie' with the argument from beauty.
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  3. Developing Group-Deliberative Virtues.Scott F. Aikin & J. Caleb Clanton - 2010 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (4):409-424.
    In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of (...)
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  4. Dialecticality and Deep Disagreement.Scott F. Aikin - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):173-179.
    In this paper, I will argue for a complex of three theses. First, that the problem of deep disagreement is an instance of the regress problem of justification. Second, that the problem of deep disagreement, as a regress problem, depends on a dialecticality requirement for arguments. Third, that the dialecticality requirement is plausible and defensible.
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  5. Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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  6.  94
    Introduction: Epistemology’s Ancient Origins and New Developments.Scott F. Aikin - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (1):7-13.
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  7.  43
    Deep Disagreement, the Dark Enlightenment, and the Rhetoric of the Red Pill.Scott F. Aikin - 2019 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (3):420-435.
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  8. Meta-Epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):175-185.
    I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
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  9.  73
    Two Forms of the Straw Man.Robert Talisse & Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Argumentation 20 (3):345-352.
    The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.
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  10.  87
    Straw Men, Weak Men, and Hollow Men.Scott F. Aikin & John Casey - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):87-105.
    Three forms of the straw man fallacy are posed: the straw, weak, and hollow man. Additionally, there can be non-fallacious cases of any of these species of straw man arguments.
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  11. Poe's Law, Group Polarization, and the Epistemology of Online Religious Discourse.Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - Social Semiotics 22 (4).
    Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious extremism are indistinguishable from instances of sincere extremism. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of ways, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles than religion. Further, regular invocations of Poe's Law in critical discussions have the threat of further (...)
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  12. Why We Argue : A Guide to Political Disagreement.Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse - 2013 - Routledge.
    Why We Argue : A Guide to Political Disagreement presents an accessible and engaging introduction to the theory of argument, with special emphasis on the way argument works in public political debate. The authors develop a view according to which proper argument is necessary for one’s individual cognitive health; this insight is then expanded to the collective health of one’s society. Proper argumentation, then, is seen to play a central role in a well-functioning democracy. Written in a lively style and (...)
     
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  13. Still Searching for a Pragmatist Pluralism.Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1):145 - 160.
  14. Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts.Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour & Robert B. Talisse - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219.
    An intuitive view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement says that when epistemic peers disagree, they should suspend judgment. This abstemious view seems to embody a kind of detachment appropriate for rational beings; moreover, it seems to promote a kind of conciliatory inclination that makes for irenic and cooperative further discussion. Like many strategies for cooperation, however, the abstemious view creates opportunities for free-riding. In this essay, the authors argue that the believer who suspends judgment in the face of peer (...)
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  15. Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Human Studies 29 (3):317-340.
    Pragmatism's naturalism is inconsistent with the phenomenological tradition's anti-naturalism. This poses a problem for the methodological consistency of phenomenological work in the pragmatist tradition. Solutions such as phenomenologizing naturalism or naturalizing phenomenology have been proposed, but they fail. As a consequence, pragmatists and other naturalists must answer the phenomenological tradition's criticisms of naturalism.
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  16.  33
    Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion.Scott F. Aikin - forthcoming - Topoi:1-8.
    My objective in this paper is to compare two philosophical problems, the problem of the criterion and the problem of deep disagreement, and note a core similarity which explains why many proposed solutions to these problems seem to fail along similar lines. From this observation, I propose a kind of skeptical solution to the problem of deep disagreement, and this skeptical program has consequences for the problem as it manifests in political epistemology and metaphilosophy.
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  17.  24
    Why We Argue: A Sketch of an Epistemic-Democratic Program.Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse - 2014 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 29 (2):60-67.
    This essay summarizes the research program developed in our new book, Why We Argue : A Guide to Political Disagreement. Humans naturally want to know and to take themselves as having reason on their side. Additionally, many people take democracy to be a uniquely proper mode of political arrangement. There is an old tension between reason and democracy, however, and it was first articulated by Plato. Plato’s concern about democracy was that it detached political decision from reason. Epistemic democrats attempt (...)
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  18.  44
    Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.
    Abstract Epistemic infinitism is certainly not a majority view in contemporary epistemology. While there are some examples of infinitism in the history of philosophy, more work needs to be done mining this history in order to provide a richer understanding of how infinitism might be formulated internal to different philosophical frameworks. Accordingly, we argue that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can be read as operating according to an ?impure? model of epistemic infinitism. The infinite obligation inaugurated by the ?face to (...)
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  19. Reasonable Atheism: A Moral Case for Respectful Disbelief.Scott F. Aikin - 2011 - Prometheus Books.
    Arguing in mixed company -- What atheism is -- On the new atheism -- Ethics without God -- A moral case for atheism -- Religion in politics.
     
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  20. John Dewey's Quest for Unity: The Journey of a Promethean Mystic (Review). [REVIEW]Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4):656-659.
    There is what should be called the Curious George Model of Analysis, wherein the internal conflicts of some protagonist or program are the most revealing and significant features of the story. Take George. He is a good little monkey, but he's curious. These are virtues of sorts, but George's curiosity drives him first to investigate a yellow hat, then to try to fly like the seagulls, to investigate the telephone, and finally to try holding a large bunch of balloons. In (...)
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  21. Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (2):155-169.
    Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will term tu quoque judo.
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  22.  75
    The Problem of Worship.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - Think 9 (25):101-113.
    Theism is a cluster of views. The first of which is that God exists. Others are that God has all the relevant omni-attributes, that He created the world, and that He communicates with and performs miracles on behalf of humans. There is one additional view that is often overlooked. It is that humans are obligated to worship God. Importantly, this issue of worship is of central importance to traditional theism. And it extends into pagan thought that predates Christianity. Take, for (...)
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  23. Three Objections to the Epistemic Theory of Argument Rebutted.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Argumentation and Advocacy 44:130-142.
    Three objections to the epistemic theory of argument are presented and briefly rebutted. In light of this reply, a case for argumentative eclecticism is made.
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  24.  50
    Contrastive Self‐Attribution of Belief.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
    A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that (...)
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  25.  66
    Does Divine Hiding Undermine Positive Evidential Atheism?Scott F. Aikin - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (2):205-212.
  26.  79
    John Dewey's Quest for Unity By Richard Gale.Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (2):242.
  27. Nicholas of Cusa’s De Pace Fidei and the Meta-Exclusivism of Religious Pluralism.Scott F. Aikin & Jason Aleksander - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (2):219-235.
    In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism.
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  28. Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Possibility of Religion.Scott F. Aikin & Michael P. Hodges - 2006 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (1):1-19.
    John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the (...)
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  29.  94
    Modest Evidentialism.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. As such, a (...)
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  30.  73
    Perelmanian Universal Audience and the Epistemic Aspirations of Argument.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 41 (3):pp. 238-259.
  31. Nagel on Public Education and Intelligent Design.Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour & Robert B. Talisse - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:209-219.
    In a recent article, Thomas Nagel argues against the court’s decision to strike down the Dover school district’s requirement that biology teachers in Dover public schools inform their students about Intelligent Design. Nagel contends that this ruling relies on questionable demarcation between science and nonscience and consequently misapplies the Establishment Clause of the constitution. Instead, he argues in favor of making room for an open discussion of these issues rather than an outright prohibition against Intelligent Design. We contend that Nagel’s (...)
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  32.  95
    Modus Tonens.Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (4):521-529.
    Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialectical ends. However, there are cases in which incredulous restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an analysis of one common instance of the inappropriate use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call “modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate and provides a cue to like-minded onlookers that dialectical opponents (...)
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  33.  45
    Holding One’s Own.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (4):571-584.
    There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question.
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  34.  85
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  35.  50
    Prospects for Moral Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):172-181.
    This article poses two regresses for justification of moral knowledge and discusses three models for moral epistemic infinitism that arise. There are moral infinitisms dependent on empirical infinitism, what are called “piggyback” moral infinitisms. There are substantive empiricist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of descriptive facts to justify normative rules. These empiricist infinitisms are developed either as infinitist egoisms or as infinitist sentimentalisms. And, finally, there are substantive rationalist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of normative reasons to justify moral rules. (...)
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  36.  13
    Modeling Critical Questions as Additional Premises.Douglas Walton, Thomas F. Gordon & Scott F. Aikin - unknown
    This paper shows how the critical questions matching an argumentation scheme can be mod-eled in the Carneades argumentation system as three kinds of premises. Ordinary premises hold only if they are supported by sufficient arguments. Assumptions hold, by default, until they have been questioned. With exceptions the negation holds, by default, until the exception has been supported by sufficient arguments. By “sufficient arguments”, we mean arguments sufficient to satisfy the applicable proof standard.
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  37.  23
    ’KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE BELIEF’ REBUTTED.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosohy 6 (2):5 - 13.
  38.  16
    Modest (but Not Self-Effacing) Transcendental Arguments.Scott F. Aikin - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (1):69-79.
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  39.  25
    The Illusion of Doubt, by Genia Schönbaumsfeld: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, Pp. Xi + 165, £35. [REVIEW]Allysson Vasconcelos Lima Rocha & Scott F. Aikin - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):625-626.
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  40.  48
    Prospects for Skeptical Foundationalism.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
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  41.  22
    Xenophanes the High Rationalist.Scott F. Aikin - 2014 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1):1-14.
  42.  18
    Xenophanes the High Rationalist: The Case of F1:17-8.Scott F. Aikin - 2014 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (1):1-14.
    Scholarship on Xenophanes’s F1 has had two foci, one on the rules of the symposium and the other on the religious program posed at its close. Thus far, the two areas of focus have been treated as either separate issues or as the religious program proposed in the service of the sympotic objectives. Instead, I will argue that the sympotic norms Xenophanes espouses are in the service of the broader program of rational theology.
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  43. Don't Fear the Regress: Epistemic Infinitism and Cognitive Value.Scott F. Aikin - manuscript
    This essay is an introductory overview of the considerations in favor of epistemic infinitism, the view that the demands of justification are that one must have non-terminating series of reasons for one's beliefs if they are to be knowledge.
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  44.  11
    Pragmatism and “Existential” Pluralism: A Reply to Hackett.Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (4):502-514.
    In this reply to J. Edward Hackett’s “Why James Can Be an Existential Pluralist,” we show that Hackett’s argument against our 2005 thesis that pragmatism and pluralism are inconsistent fails. First, his rejection of our distinction between epistemic and metaphysical forms of pluralism does not affect our original argument’s soundness. Second, his proposed existential pluralism is a form of monism, and so fails as an example of pragmatist pluralism. Though we no longer hold the inconsistency thesis that we defended in (...)
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  45. Evidentialism and James' Argument From Friendship.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):173-180.
    William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
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  46.  26
    Responsible Sports Spectatorship and the Problem of Fantasy Leagues.Scott F. Aikin - 2013 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):195-206.
    Given a variety of cases of failed spectatorship, a set of criteria for properly attending to a sporting event are defined. In light of these criteria, it is shown that Fantasy League participation occasions a peculiar kind of failure of sports spectatorship.
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  47.  22
    On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy.Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld & Robert B. Talisse - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (3):425-428.
  48.  4
    The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present.Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.) - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
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  49.  28
    Pregnant Premise Arguments.Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (3):357-363.
  50.  47
    Bar Room Knowledge and Epistemic Pragmatism: Comments on Jamie Phillips.Scott F. Aikin - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):55-57.
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