It is now typical for human subjects research to be regulated by review by an independent research ethics committee in most jurisdictions. However it is common for countries to opt to only compulsorily regulate medical research while leaving some or all non-medical research either unregulated or only regulated on a voluntary basis. In this paper I will argue, using regulation in the UK as an example, that it is difficult to justify this sharp distinction in practices. While I won’t come (...) to any definitive conclusions in this paper as to whether research ought to be regulated compulsorily I will suggest that we would be better to regulate all research, albeit perhaps with a lighter touch than the present UK system if we want to prevent some highly risky research avoiding appropriate regulation. I will examine several arguments to defend making such a distinction; that medical professionals have special moral duties, that medical research has a higher magnitude/frequency of risks and that regulating non-medical research constitutes the inappropriate imposition of the medical model onto non-medical research. Having critiqued these objections I will then discuss the advantages of harmonizing the regulation of research and conclude that there is not a good reason to treat medical and non-medical research as fundamentally different in kind. (shrink)

Biomedical research, on the one hand, contributes to important goals from generation of knowledge about the human body to the development and testing of therapeutics of all kinds. On the other hand, it can produce serious and sometimes unforeseeable consequences. In the ethical analysis of these two aspects of biomedical research, two important argumentative strategies play a major role. First, slippery slope arguments are used to warn of potential risks and to highlight knowledge-based limitations. Second, a dual-use problem describes the (...) challenge that already established techniques can be used for both morally wrong and morally right purposes. These two argumentative strategies appear to share several similarities, which will be investigated in this article. For this purpose, the article will first provide clear working definitions for both types of argument. This lays the foundation for the further ethical analysis. In a second step, and in order to investigate the similarities and differences of the argumentative strategies with an example from current ethical debates, CRISPR-Cas9, a currently very promising tool of genome editing, will be examined. The extent to which the possible applications of this genome editing tool can be addressed by slippery slope arguments or the dual use problem will be investigated. For this purpose, selected studies involving the use of CRISPR-Cas9 will be examined. Based on this two-step, analytic and example-based comparison of slippery-slope argumentation and dual-use considerations, the article will detail the ethically relevant difference between the two argumentative strategies and at the same time contribute to the ongoing ethical debate about CRISPR-Cas9. (shrink)

Liao and Carbonell discuss the role of (supposed) racial differences and racism in two medical devices: pulse oximeters and spirometers. They show that what might seem like cases of mere bias, are...

정신분석은 증상, 꿈, 실수 등에서 무의식을 발견하고 이를 연구한 학문이다. 분열분석은 정신분석에 대한 비판으로부터 비롯되었고, 기존 무의식에 새로운 지평을 연 학문이다. 그러나 정신분석에 대한 비판 위에서 분열분석이 출현한 까닭인지, 두 학문의 대립은 여전히 첨예하다. 본 연구는 정신분석과 분열분석 각 학문의 정초 지점과 주요 문제를 살펴보며, 각각의 학문이 지향하고자 하는 방향과 그 의의를 밝히고, 그를 위해 다르게 개념화된 무의식의 특성과 그차이를 보여준다. 정신분석은 심인적인 증상과 아픔을 겪는 사람의 치유와 회복을 위해 시작되었다. 이를 위해 세팅된 임상 장면에서 무의식의 장을 발견하였고, 이에 접근하기 (...) 위하여 최초로 무의식의 이론들을 고안하고 연구해왔다. 분열분석은 정신분석이 주체의 자율성에 대한 지점으로 나아가지 못한다는 문제로부터 비롯되었으며, 무의식과 광기에 대한 긍정성을 재조명하며 분열증적 과정을 통한 생성과 실천을 향한다. 이에 작동과 생산을 강조하는 분자적 무의식·기계적무의식 등 무의식의 새로운 개념을 제시한다. 본 연구는 정신분석과 분열분석의 비판 혹은 대립 지점들에 주목하기보다, 각 학문의 근본적 차이와 개념의 차이에 대한 이해를 구하는 데에 그 목적이 있다. (shrink)

Theism is often supposed to be distinguished from atheism by the heavy weight of metaphysical belief that it carries. This paper argues that this is not as illuminating a way of distinguishing the theist's from the atheist's outlook as is often supposed. The key divergence consists not so much in matters of theoretical belief or philosophical argument as in practical differences in affective response and in the adoption of certain models for living. Two characteristically religious virtues, humility and hope, (...) and two distinctively religious responses, awe and thanksgiving, are discussed in order to illustrate this. The paper's conclusion, while not denying a cognitive core to theism, argues that warranted assent to the metaphysical truth of God's existence cannot be a precondition for theistic hermeneusis and praxis.1. (shrink)

It has been claimed that difference-making plays important roles in both metaphysics and epistemology. The idea is that facts often make a difference to other facts. Thus, causes are said to make a difference to their effects, and the world is thought to make a difference to what is believed. One way to cash out this idea is in terms of the notion of counterfactual dependence between the facts in question. It has recently been objected by some philosophers, however, that (...) the counterfactual-dependence account misrepresents the difference-making idea, prompting them to offer a different, weaker construal of the idea in question, which, they claim, illuminates a number of problems in both epistemology and metaphysics. This article, while acknowledging that the difference-making idea is a genuine constraint on some of our concepts, challenges the claim that the weaker interpretation has significant philosophical potentials and, having delineated its real function, spells out the lessons that should be drawn from its failure. (shrink)

The j?taka story of the Bodhisattva Sad?prarudita, the most well known version of which is found in the A??as?hasrik?-prajñ?p?ramit?-s?tra, is a story that has been used in different ways in various Buddhist traditions that flourished in India, Central Asia, China and Tibet. For example, it is quoted and discussed in several commentarial and biographical works in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan and it is found in Candrak?rti’s Prasannapad?,??ntideva’s?ik??samuccaya, and works about the lives of eminent Tibetan masters, such as Marpa, Milarepa, Rechungpa. (...) In some works Sad?prarudita is presented as the paragon of one who searches for prajñ?p?ramit?; in others he is the model for those who desire to serve their gurus. In China, moreover, during the early stage of the Pure Land tradition, Sad?prarudita was regarded as the preeminent exemplar of one practising the niànfós?nmèi????. This paper will examine the story of Sad?prarudita as it is preserved in different sources, and will address its significance and the possible reasons for its employment by different Buddhist traditions. (shrink)

Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...) kinds underwrite different kinds of moral value. Demonstrating that patients have phenomenal consciousness — conscious states with some kind of qualitative feel to them — shows that they are moral patients, whose welfare must be taken into consideration. But only if they are subjects of a sophisticated kind of access consciousness — where access consciousness entails global availability of information to cognitive systems — are they persons, in the technical sense of the word employed by philosophers. In this sense, being a person is having the full moral status of ordinary human beings. We call for further research which might settle whether patients who manifest signs of consciousness possess the sophisticated kind of access consciousness required for personhood. (shrink)

The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which consciousness is significant and must allow (...) massive vagueness in conscious experience. I also will argue that a nonreductive theory of the conscious-of relation can easily provide a very satisfying, unified explanation of the ways in which this relation is significant. (shrink)

Phenomenal Difference' grants new attention to contemporary black British art, exploring its critical and social significance through attention to embodied experience, affectivity, the senses and perception. Much before scholars in the arts and humanities took their recent 'ontological turn' toward the new materialism, black British art had begun to expose cultural criticism's overreliance on the concepts of textuality, representation, identity and difference. Illuminating that original field of aesthetics and creativity, this book shows how black British artworks themselves can become the (...) basis for an engaged and widely-reaching philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of the epistemological significance of taking into consideration alternative perspectives, particularly those from other cultures. We have a moral duty to respect the beliefs and practices of other cultures, but do we have an epistemological duty to take these beliefs and practices into consideration in our own deliberations? Are views that are held without exposure to alternatives from other cultures less credible than those that have undergone such exposure?

In the absence of empirical confirmation, scientists may judge a theory's chances of being viable based on a wide range of arguments. The paper argues that such arguments can differ substantially with regard to their structural similarly to empirical confirmation. Arguments that resemble empirical confirmation in a number of crucial respects provide a better basis for reliable judgement and can, in a Bayesian sense, amount to significant \textit{non-empirical} confirmation. It is shown that three kinds of non-empirical confirmation that have (...) been specified in earlier work do satisfy those conditions. (shrink)

What you ought to do is sensitive to circumstances that are not under your control, or to luck. So plain luck is often morally significant. Still, some of us think that there's no moral luck - that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are not sensitive to luck. What explains this asymmetry between the luck-sensitivity of ought-judgments and the luck-insensitivity of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness judgments? I suggest an explanation, relying on the analogy to rational luck. I argue that some rational assessments - (...) like how well one plays the hand one's dealt - are luck-insensitive; that we have reason to believe some moral evaluations are analogous to such assessments; and that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness judgments are precisely those luck-insensitive moral evaluations. I also draw an implication regarding agent-regret. (shrink)

Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count five senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question.

SNODENT is a dental diagnostic vocabulary incompletely integrated in SNOMED-CT. Nevertheless, SNODENT could become the de facto standard for dental diagnostic coding. SNODENT's manageable size, the fact that it is administratively self-contained, and relates to a well-understood domain provides valuable opportunities to formulate and test, in controlled experiments, a series of hypothesis concerning diagnostic systems. Of particular interest are questions related to establishing appropriate quality assurance methods for its optimal level of detail in content, its ontological structure, its construction and (...) maintenance. This paper builds on previous–software-based methodologies designed to assess the quality of SNOMED-CT. When applied to SNODENT several deficiencies were uncovered. 9.52% of SNODENT terms point to concepts in SNOMED-CT that have some problem. 18.53% of SNODENT terms point to SNOMED-CT concepts do not have, in SNOMED, the term used by SNODENT. Other findings include the absence of a clear specification of the exact relationship between a term and a termcode in SNODENT and the improper assignment of the same termcode to terms with significantly different meanings. An analysis of the way in which SNODENT is structurally integrated into SNOMED resulted in the generation of 1081 new termcodes reflecting entities not present in the SNOMED tables but required by SNOMED's own description logic based classification principles. Our results show that SNODENT requires considerable enhancements in content, quality of coding, quality of ontological structure and the manner in which it is integrated and aligned with SNOMED. We believe that methods for the analysis of the quality of diagnostic coding systems must be developed and employed if such systems are to be used effectively in both clinical practice and clinical research. (shrink)

Dual functional brain asymmetry refers to the notion that in most individuals the left cerebral hemisphere is specialized for language functions, whereas the right cerebral hemisphere is more important than the left for the perception, construction, and recall of stimuli that are difficult to verbalize. In the last twenty years there have been scattered reports of sex differences in degree of hemispheric specialization. This review provides a critical framework within which two related topics are discussed: Do meaningful sex (...) class='Hi'>differences in verbal or spatial cerebral lateralization exist? and, if so, Is the brain of one sex more symmetrically organized than the other? Data gathered on right-handed adults are examined from clinical studies of patients with unilateral brain lesions; from dichotic listening, tachistoscopic, and sensorimotor studies of functional asymmetries in non-brain-damaged subjects; from anatomical and electrophysiological investigations, as well as from the developmental literature. Retrospective and descriptive findings predominate over prospective and experimental methodologies. Nevertheless, there is an impressive accummulation of evidence suggesting that the male brain may be more asymmetrically organized than the female brain, both for verbal and nonverbal functions. These trends are rarely found in childhood but are often significant in the mature organism. (shrink)

This study examines the importance of microcultural differences on perceived ethical problems. This study also sought to identify the relationship between perceived ethical problems and value orientations as shown in the Hunt and Vitell's (1993) General Theory of Marketing Ethics. The data was collected from 173 Javanese, 128 Batak, and 170 Indonesian-Chinese marketing managers in Indonesia. The results indicate that, (1) Religious Value Orientation is positively related to the perceived ethical problems scores, and (2) there are significant (...) class='Hi'>differences among the three ethnic microcultural groups relative to their perceived ethical problems scores. These results imply that acculturation training program for expatriates should include aspects of microcultures and ethical perceptions held by the local managers. The establishment of ethical corporate culture and formalised codes of conduct are recommended for future ethics training. (shrink)

The Cognitive Reflection Test is purported to test our inclination to overcome impulsive, intuitive thought with effortful, rational reflection. Research suggests that philosophers tend to perform better on this test than non-philosophers, and that men tend to perform better than women. Taken together, these findings could be interpreted as partially explaining the gender gap that exists in Philosophy: there are fewer women in Philosophy because women are less likely to possess the ideal ‘philosophical personality’. If this explanation for the gender (...) gap in Philosophy is accepted, it might be seen to exonerate Philosophy departments of the need to put in place much-needed strategies for promoting gender diversity. This paper discusses a number of reasons for thinking that this would be the wrong conclusion to draw from the research. Firstly, the CRT may not track what it is claimed it tracks. Secondly, the trait tracked by the CRT may not be something that we should value in philosophers. Thirdly, even if we accept that the CRT tracks a trait that has value, this trait might be of limited importance to good philosophising. Lastly, the causal story linking the gender gap in CRT score and the gender gap in Philosophy is likely to be far more complex than this explanation implies. (shrink)

One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame—due to Jessica Brown—is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in (...) an instructive way. Drawing on the lessons learned, I put forward an alternative approach to the nature of epistemic blame. My account understands epistemic blame in terms of modifications to the intentions and expectations that comprise our “epistemic relationships” with one another. This approach has a number of attractions shared by Brown’s account, but it can also explain the significance of epistemic blame. (shrink)

There is a well-known moral quandary concerning how to account for the rightness or wrongness of acts that clearly contribute to some morally significant outcome – but which each seem too small, individually, to make any meaningful difference. One consequentialist-friendly response to this problem is to deny that there could ever be a case of this type. This paper pursues this general strategy, but in an unusual way. Existing arguments for the consequentialist-friendly position are sorites-style arguments. Such arguments imagine (...) varying a subject’s predicament bit by bit until it is clear that a relevant difference has been achieved. The arguments offered in this paper are structurally different, and do not rely on any sorites series. For this reason, they are not vulnerable to objections that have been leveled against the sorites-style arguments. (shrink)

Cultural differences in daily emotions were investigated by administering emotion questionnaires four times a day throughout a one-week period. Respondents were American students, Japanese students living in the United States, and Japanese students living in Japan. Americans rated their emotional lives as more pleasant than did the Japanese groups. The dimension of emotional pleasantness (unpleasant-pleasant) was predicted better by interdependent than independent concerns in the Japanese groups, but this was not the case in the American group where the variance (...) predicted by interdependent and independent concerns did not significantly differ. It is argued that cultural differences in the concerns most strongly associated with pleasantness are related to differences in ideals, norms, and practices of what it means to be a person. Cultural differences in the concerns are assumed to implicate differences in the nature of emotional experience. (shrink)

In a recent paper, I argued that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust both across demographic groups and across development. Machery and Stich reply by reviewing a series of studies that do show significant differences in philosophical intuition between different demographic groups. This is a helpful point, which gets at precisely the issues that are most relevant here. However, even when one looks at those very studies, one finds truly surprising robustness. In other words, despite the presence of statistically (...) significant differences between demographic groups, a core finding coming out of those studies is that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. (shrink)

Every now and then when watching a movie, we come across faces in which we recognize a significant value, because they represent some important cultural models we use to assign meaning to our experience of the world. By way of example, I will discuss the faces of the protagonists of two recent films, Abdellatif Kechiche’s La vie d’Adele. Chapitres 1 & 2 (2013; English title Blue Is the Warmest Colour) and Leonor Serraille’s Jeune femme (2017), comparing them with the (...) faces of the protagonists of some older movies, such as Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson’s Shrek (2001) and James Cameron’s Avatar (2009). I will argue that the way in which the faces are portrayed is similar to the narrative structure of the stories of the characters they belong to, and that the signs and narrative structures used to construct the discourses about the world in those films are at the same time similar to those of two important cultural models of what it means to be young men and women in our times. As these cultural models are different, yet interconnected, I will argue that the most meaningful faces in cinema change due to the transformation of the cultural models they derive from and that a sociosemiotic method based on a structuralist vision of culture can help identify the most culturally significant symbolic faces on screen, and elsewhere. (shrink)