El presente artículo pretende destacar que las respuestas afectivas de los seres humanos ante la realidad son constitutivas de los juicios morales desde dos perspectivas: a) un ordo amoris objetivo con funciones normativas; b) un ordo amoris descriptivo que explica las variaciones en los juicios morales. El problema filosófico consiste en que la descripción de la afectividad suele ser abordada por ciencias empíricas y es parte de la casuística. Pero, desde la perspectiva fenomenológica de Max Scheler (...) se hace posible su abordaje filosófico, sin caer en la casuística. De modo análogo, a lo que sucede en la lógica y su tratamiento de las falacias, la axiología fenomenológica puede describir la afectividad en busca de aquellos elementos que distorsionan el juicio moral. This article aims to emphasize that affective responses of human beings to reality are constitutive of moral judgments from two perspectives: a) an objective ordo amoris with normative functions; b) a descriptive ordo amoris, which explains the variety of moral judgments. The philosophical problem consists in the fact that description of affectivity is usually examined by empirical sciences and is part of casuistry. But from the point of view of Max Scheler’s phenomenology it is possible to study this issue without the tendency to casuistry. In a similar way to logic and its dealing with fallacies, phenomenological axiology is able describe emotions seeking those elements that distort moral judgment. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients (...) in relation to a disturbance on the level of the “minimal self”. Subsequently, the discussion has highlighted the importance of disorders on the level of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity (Thomas Fuchs) and on the level of “existential feelings” (Matthew Ratcliffe). This paper argues that Max Scheler and Bin Kimura allow us to focus on an aspect which has been neglected so far: that of a “relational self” that relates to the very foundation of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality and that can thus be reborn in the encounter with the other and may position itself differently in the world. In Scheler’s perspective, the world of persons with schizophrenia is the result of an axiological disorder (valueception) that impairs contact with the primordial life impulse (Lebensdrang). As a consequence, they are incapable of attuning emotionally and socially with others: this prevents the singularity from being reborn in the encounter with the other and forces them to position themselves in their own solipsistic universe. Moving in a similar direction, Bin Kimura interprets the world of persons with schizophrenia as the result of a disorder of aida (one of the central concepts of Japanese culture that indicates the space of being in between). The disorder of aida compromises the basic relationship (Grundverhältnis in the sense of Viktor von Weizsäcker) and hinders what Bin Kimura calls festum, i.e. the birth of subjectivity, so that it is experienced by persons with schizophrenia only as ante festum. Starting from these two perspectives, I argue the existence of an axiological and anthropogenetic dimension of psychopathology. I begin with a discussion of Zahavi’s concept of minimal self and the thesis that reveals the disorders on this level of subjectivity as the origin of the world of persons with schizophrenia. I, then, analyze Max Scheler’s position and its historic importance for the emergence of phenomenological psychopathology. Thereafter, I introduce the concepts of “disorder of aida” (Bin Kimura) and “disorder of ordo amoris” (Max Scheler). Finally, I develop the concept of a “psychopathology of ordo amoris” by also comparing it with Ratcliffe’s thesis of “existential feelings”. (shrink)

Scheler, like Jaspers, gives a key importance to the relations with alterity and grounds both the individual formation and social ontology on the practices of “sharing emotions”. My work attempts to interpret the impairments related to the capacities of communication – that Jaspers places at the roots of psychopathology and that the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura has more recently argued to be the core of schizophrenia – as impairment of what Scheler calls ordo amoris, that is the “order (...) of feeling” of a person: like a "Psychopathology of the Ordo Amoris". (shrink)

This paper is about love of one’s neighbour near and far given humanity’s division into nations. The primary dialogue partner is Peter Singer and his preference utilitarian approach to moral reasoning wherein the challenge is to count the welfare of individuals impartially, regardless—or, at least, with far less regard than is often given—of divisions into nation-states. The claim is made that, despite the considerable and proper challenges from Singer and other so-called new cosmopolitans, it remains possible and, indeed, necessary at (...) the present time for Christian people to work with an account of nation and nationhood as permitted within divine providence. This claim is cast in terms of traditional Christian teaching about the order of love (L. ordo amoris). (shrink)

How comes that two organisms can interact with each other or that we can comprehend what the other experiences? The theories of embodiment, intersubjectivity or empathy have repeatedly taken as their starting point an individualistic assumption (the comprehension of the other comes after the self-comprehension) or a cognitivist one (the affective dimension follows the cognitive process). The thesis of this book is that there are no two isolated entities at the origin which successively interact with each other. There is, rather, (...) an impersonal stratum – the original affectivity (Gefühlsdrang) – which lets the living organisms be constitutively attuned with the expressive dimension of the life from the very beginning. The book aims to rethink the issue of corporality on the basis of a biosemiotics of the interaction between lived body (Leib) and environment (Umwelt). The human emotions reveals themselves as devices that experiment further attunement levels and expose the human being – because of her ex-centricity – to the alienation in various forms of the psychopathological existence. This is an unprecedented perspective that turns to psychopathology to reread against the light the watermark weaving the structure of personal singularity. What emerges is an intermediate territory confining both with philosophy and psychiatry: the psychopathology of ordo amoris. The author advances the project of a new psychopathology of ordo amoris, not only tackling with the 19th-century tradition of psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology, but also with the contemporary disputes on intersubjectivity in phenomenology and with those on schizophrenia as disruption of aida or as disembodiment process in psychiatry. What results from his project is the first systematic study on the international level showing the relevance of Schelerian concepts of body schema (Leibschema) and order of feeling (ordo amoris) to understand the disruptions of emotional regulation on the psychopathological dimension as well as on the formation process of the singularity. (shrink)

Para explicar el crecimiento en el querer libre se parte de la libertad como actividad constitutiva en el acto de ser personal y a través del yo quiero se la extiende a los actos de la voluntad. Estos actos se prolongan en forma curva desde simplex volitio hasta el ordo amoris. El crecimiento curvo se transmite al querer-hacer en sus distintas dimensiones, tales como la acción técnica, la cultura integrada en la praxis y el quehacer histórico.

Max Scheler seems to present two distinct approaches to philosophy of culture. In the early period of his Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and “Ordo Amoris,” he describes cultures as being defined by their distinct order of value preferencings. In his later period of his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” however, Scheler explains the dynamics of culture in terms of the interaction of what he calls “real” and “ideal sociological factors,” rooted in various drives and (...) spirit, respectively. These approaches are fully compatible and complementary, the former describing culture’s vertical structure and the latter, its horizontal structure. Together these two approaches offer a comprehensive philosophy of culture, deserving greater attention. (shrink)

The idols of self-knowledge.--Ordo Amoris.--Phenomenology and the theory of cognition.--The theory of the three facts.--Idealism and realism.

The meanings of person in Scheler’s phenomenology are discussed on three levels: that of epistemology, of ontology and of ethics. One can find the possible unity among these three levels through the concept of “selffeeling”. There are also three different philosophical meanings of self-feeling: “self-feeling 1” on epistemological level, “self-feeling 2” on ontological level, and “self-feeling 3” on ethical level. The person is self-given and gains its selfidentity through “self-feeling 1”. The person is related to its own existence and its (...) being, as well as to the absolute being in the negative and positive “selffeeling 2”. Therefore, the pattern of the being of the person is the becoming of the person, more exactly, is the to-be of the person toward the ideal ordo amoris and the ideal value-essence of person. According to Scheler, “self-feeling 3” builds the technique of personal salvation. One can completely understand Scheler’s phenomenological concept of person through the three meanings of self-feeling. (shrink)

The translator of Scheler’s essay, “On the Rehabilitation of Virtue,” presents an account of the context of this essay in Scheler’s work and of its relevance to his concept of the ordo amoris and to his critique of Kant. The translator discusses the intended audience of the essay, its moral purpose, and the method of its procedure. The postscript further reflects on the essay’s central themes of humility and reverence, suggesting avenues for a critical assessment of Scheler’s conclusions. (...) It ends with some reflections on the contemporary value of Scheler’s contributions in this essay to a historical and philosophical understanding of the conflict between science and religion. (shrink)

La relación entre lenguaje y creación no se reduce para San Agustín en los recursos que presenta un término de la analogía para ilustrar al otro, sino que el lenguaje tiene un poder de agenciamiento en la realidad cuya eficacia está en su capacidad de determinar, contaminar, purificar o enredar las relaciones del ordo amoris. A lo largo de La Ciudad de Dios puede verse como la palabra performa, su potencia es una promesa en sí misma, su posibilidad (...) o imposibilidad comunicativa son asuntos que devienen, para el de Hipona, de la palabra en relación, del cuerpo de una palabra inserta y encarnada en una trama de vínculos visibles e invisibles que se ordenan o no, según su condición, a lo divino. (shrink)

Phenomenologists turn to Augustine to remedy the neglect of life, love, and language in the Cartesian cogito: (1) concerning life, Edmund Husserl appropriates Augustine’s analysis of distentio animi, Edith Stein of vivo, and Hannah Arendt of initium; (2) concerning love, Max Scheler appropriates Augustine’s analysis of ordo amoris, Martin Heidegger of curare, and Dietrich von Hildebrand of affectiones; (3) concerning language, Ludwig Wittgenstein appropriates Augustine’s analysis of ostendere, Hans-Georg Gadamer of verbum cordis, and Jean-Luc Marion of confessio. Phenomenology’s (...) non-Cartesian Augustinianism can tell us something about phenomenology, namely that it is engaged in the project of recontextualizing the cogito, and something about Augustine, namely how radically different his project is than Descartes’s. Phenomenology presents an Augustine that is well positioned for the debates of our times concerning mind and world, desire and the human person, and language and embodiment. (shrink)

The present article focuses on American and European personalism during the early part of the twentieth century . The immediate predecessor of the personalist movement as such was the philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze who inspired two of his students, Methodist Borden Parker Bowne and Rudolf Eucken. In France, in the meantime, Charles Renouvier published his Le personnalisme in 1903, while Emmanuel Mounier later presented personalism as a new political philosophy under the influence Alexandre Marc’s comments on Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethik. Mounier’s (...) Manifeste au service du personnalisme develops a dialectical critique on both liberal bourgeois individualism and all forms of collectivism, all, in his opinion, ‘inverted theocracies’ with shared dehumanizing tendencies. As alternative, it was necessary for personalism to become the leading spiritual and philosophical guide in order to Refaire la Renaissance . As a matter of fact, Jacques Maritain’s Humanisme intégral might justly be considered a first attempt to describe the nature of a new civilization in any detail. Maritain is more explicit on the Christian face of this new humanism, while refuting any kind of mancentred humanism. Mounier’s and Maritain’s personalist ideas together with Max Scheler’s non-formal ethics of value and his Aktlehre had a considerable influence on Louis Janssens. In Personne et société he not only criticizes several contemporary European ideologies in line with Mounier, but he also accepts that persons can only be really known by co-operation, in line with Scheler’s idea of inter-subjectivity and Aquinas’ idea of the social nature of the human being. Following Maritain, Janssens distinguishes between the human being as individual and the human person. Individuality contains a material component, characterized by its concrete position in space and time, while the person and his/her spiritual component facilitate a movement away from the self towards others in freedom and love. The person is not only understood as the highest value, he/she is able to control the hierarchy of values by his/her ordo amoris, a flexible undertaking influenced by the love of others in which love opens each person for growth towards higher values. (shrink)

Max Scheler never published a theory of art, but his aesthetics, like the rest of his thought, occupies an intriguing position that links early phenomenology, Catholic personalist thought, and philosophical anthropology. His metaphysics of the person and theory of value, when combined with his account of the lived-body and of our access to other minds through love, translates into a powerful, humanistic theory of art. This article elaborates what Scheler’s aesthetics would look like had he developed it and applied it (...) to film. Film offers an intimate access to the lives, bodies, and minds of others that is particularly well-suited to Scheler’s idea that art reveals the moral personality—the ordo amoris or “order of love”—that makes up the value-essence of the person. The person’s unique and highest possibilities for acting, feeling, and valuing are the contents of their spiritual essence and these, often thought obscure and inaccessible, are made present in film. (shrink)

Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...) the origin of ethics there is a non-authoritarian way of orientation that comes from otherness and arises from the emotional sphere thanks to a "care of desire". The expression cura sui has often been interpreted as a care confined to a private and solipsistic dimension with the aim of strengthening the self-referential subject. By "care of desire" I mean a care not turned upon itself but made possible by a disclosure coming from otherness and addressed to the transformation of the individual and of society. In the human existence, emotions reveal an extraordinary plasticity. They are not already regulated by instinct but develop and get to maturity even many years after biological birth. Moreover, this maturation process does not follow a universal process identical for everyone, being different for every individual. In fact it finds its realization in the unique order of feelings (ordo amoris) that characterizes every individual. Emotions guide actions and the way we interact with the others and with the world. In the human existence they become plastic and don't have only a homeostatic function of self-regulation. They give flexibility to our way of perceiving, of existing and of taking our position in the world. The care of desire is dedicated to the plasticity of emotions and makes ethics, i.e. a person's formation process (Bildung) and flourishing, possible. It also allows the transition from the “environmental closedness” (Umweltgeschlossenheit) to the world-openness (Weltoffenheit). To sum up, the care of desire implies the transition from a solipsistic self-care to a “care for world-openness”. From this point of view, emotion is no more the secondary result of a cognitive process, but at the origin of every formative, perceptive and cognitive process: In the beginning was the emotion. Yet in this process of creative transformation not every emotion has the same significance: at the core of emotions’ plasticity there are love and wonder (thaumàzein), whose peculiar feature is “lack of envy” (aphthonoi). (shrink)

Una de las obras fundamentales para entender el pensamiento de Max Scheler lleva por título la expresión angustiniana "ordo amoris". ¿Se trata de una mera coincidencia o se puede estrechar la relación entre ambos pensadores? El artículo muestra que un análisis exhaustivo de la cuestión nos lleva a concluir que existe una profunda influencia del santo de Hipona en Scheler, revelada explícitamente en las citas agustinianas de Scheler, e implícitamente en nociones centrales del pensamiento scheleriano, como la "Gesinnung" (...) o "disposición del ánimo". (shrink)

El valor moral de nuestra vida práctica depende de nuestro conocimiento de valores. Más aún, según Scheler, la intuición adecuada de un valor plenamente dado motiva necesariamente nuestro querer a la realización de ese valor. Pero lo habitual es, más bien, que los valores de diferentes tipos nos sean dados en diferentes grados de inadecuación. Por esa razón, estamos sometidos a posibles engaños valorativos y, por tanto, a la posibilidad de una vida éticamente mala. Con el fin de mostrar las (...) formas y fuentes de engaño valorativo identificables a priori, este artículo aborda, en primer lugar, la correlación estratificada entre valores y emociones intencionales a partir de los sentidos schelerianos del concepto de ordo amoris; en segundo lugar, se considera algunas “medidas del conocimiento” para, a partir de ellas, distinguir dos grandes tipos de trastorno del ordo amoris basados en diferentes formas de engaños o ilusiones del sentir, preferir y amar. (shrink)

Listening is not an incorporeal experience; we do not listen with our non-extended minds. We listen with all our body, and music can change completely our personal structure. It is through sound experience that we change and asset ourselves. Studies in the doctrine of affects often use sonorous metaphors and concepts such as Stimmung, resonance, consonance, that refer to sound experience. In this paper, I try first of all to show how listening is rooted in body experience. Then, I argue (...) for a new consideration of the notion of person that takes into account the fundamental sonorous basis – psycho-acoustic – of its constitution. Thanks to sounds we can reach a new conceptualization of emotional relations between persons which we attain through the person’s ordo amoris. Additionally, with the analysis of sounds we grasp some aspects of emotional experience related to the singular person (intra-personal). So, if sounds are profoundly related to corporeal experience, so strongly involving affects as to modify our personal structure and form a person’s constitution, and affects can really do that, their relationship need to be inquired where both sound experience and affection are rooted: corporeity. (shrink)

E. W. Ch. Sartorius , a forgotten lutheran theologian of the 19th century, provides a comprehensive understandig of God as love in the three volumes of his dogmatics . He sees love as the intentional relative property of the surrrender of one self-conscious particular being to another. In applying this concept to the being of God, Sartorius develops the trinity of three divine persons from the statement ‘God is love’. However, this conception seems to fail because this particular concept of (...) love implicitly presupposes a concept of individual self-consciousness. Consequently, God is “loving selfconsciousness” – three times. The main problem consists in the fact, that Sartorius, although he is able to develop the trinity from the concept of love, he is unable to show how the persons are constituted by love. However, the relationship of the notions of ordo amoris and surrender, the concept of faith as trusting in being loved and his concept of a specific relationship of the doctrine of the trinity to soteriology in order to avoid forms of “panentheism” could provide interesting suggestions for the present discussion of the doctrine of God. (shrink)

In[aut]Stein, EdiththeOntologysocial 1930s essays, SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith develops a theory of vocationVocation closely resembling Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s ethicsEthic of the “true selfSelftrue” as he was developing it in the 1920s, but may also be found in the conclusion to the 1920/24 lecture course, Einleitung in die Ethik, and in numerous manuscript studies from the 1920s and 1930s recently published in Husserliana Vol. XLII.) as well as Scheler[aut]Scheler, Max’s thought on personal destiny in the essay “Ordo Amoris\”Ordo Amoris”, (...) by Scheler, Max”. For all three thinkers, vocationVocation is specific both to individuals and to one’s humanity in general in setting before us a particular moral calling to become who one truly is. While SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith’s ideaIdea of vocationVocation, here, seems to refer to an individualIndividual’s “personal naturePersonpersonal nature” and how this nature sets forth a particular course of life, nonetheless SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith indicates that this “personal naturePersonpersonal nature” and the particular vocational call of the individualIndividual is itself conditioned by essentially social processes. I will argue that SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith had already worked out the description of the constitutionConstitution of the moral self and its vocationVocation through belonging to a communityCommunity sufficient to support this later position in her early work in phenomenologyPhenomenology, and in particular On the Problem of Empathy\”On the Problem of Empathy”, by Stein, Edith as well as her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities\”Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities”, by Stein, Edith. SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith’s argument is that the moral self is not and cannot be radically individualIndividual, nor constituted wholly individually, but is brought to givenness only in the context of a social realityReality, disclosing a constitutive connection between individualIndividual and communityCommunity in moral contexts. Finding the phenomenological resources for developing an account of the selfSelf, the in this way heads off a certain danger, potentially implicit in a phenomenological account of the moral task as a “personal” vocationVocation, to think of the moral task as radically individualIndividual, i.e. as constituted independently of one’s belonging to a communityCommunity. Likewise, Timothy Martell[aut]Martell, Timothy sees a similar problem at work in Heidegger[aut]Heidegger, Martin’s conception of the authentic self, which seems to see the authentic self as somehow independent of and in tension with social realityReality. While I take no position here, on the adequateness of these as authentic readings of either Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmundor Heidegger[aut]Heidegger, Martin, it seems nonetheless that SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith’s approach to the problem of social ontologyOntologysocial and her later work on the theory of vocationVocation offers an escape from the temptation present in phenomenological readings of moral selfhoodSelfhood to take the moral self and the moral vocationVocation in purely individualistic terms.). Thus, if SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith can show, phenomenologically, that and how one’s moral self is constituted within a social context, then her thought can make an important contribution to the growing field of literature on phenomenological ethical theory. I will attempt to lay bare here the general outlines of SteinXE „[aut]Stein, Edith’s social ontologyOntologysocial as developed in her early works and its applicability to the discussion of the sources of personal moral identityIdentitymoral. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es dar cuenta de la doctrina de santo Tomás sobre los aspectos morales del conocimiento de la verdad. El artículo se estructura en tres secciones. La primera, introductoria, examina la noción de verdad y sus dimensiones gnoseológicas (verdad y juicio). La segunda se ocupa del carácter final de la verdad: bien y fin no sólo del entendimiento sino del hombre. La tercera parte extrae las consecuencias antropológicas y morales de tales afirmaciones, examinando el papel regulativo (...) de las virtudes morales en el conocimiento. Entonces comparece más claramente el tema que da título a este estudio: la necesidad de amar la verdad para hacerse con ella pues la virtud es un ordo amoris. (shrink)

A busca da vida feliz e o caminho que nos leva até ela, sempre se colocou como um dos grandes pilares das reflexões de Santo Agostinho. O presente trabalho tem a intenção de apresentar alguns aspectos da ética agostiniana, principalmente a noção de ordo amoris.

A busca da vida feliz e o caminho que nos leva até ela, sempre se colocou como um dos grandes pilares das reflexões de Santo Agostinho. O presente trabalho tem a intenção de apresentar alguns aspectos da ética agostiniana, principalmente a noção de ordo amoris. The pursuit of the happy life, and the path to it, is one of the most important themes of St. Augustine's ethics. This work intends to give a brief summary of his ethical thinking, (...) focusing on the concept of ordo amoris. (shrink)

In Augustinian reflection, the main problem of the imago Dei is the renewal of its image through being healed from lust, so as to regain the ordo amoris destroyed by sin. Current research investigates what the gratia Christi and charity contribute to the renewal of the image of God, at the level of a marriage bond that human race was given as part of the act of creation. This emerges as a primary element, both in the original state (...) of man and in his recovery through the gratia Christi. (shrink)

In the following paper, both Max Scheler and Edgar Sheffield Brightman’s rankings of value are compared. In so doing, Brightman’s table of values is found wanting along the lines of Scheler’s value rankings. The reason is, in part, that Scheler’s ordering of preference and hierarchy of feelings more readily explain what Brightman’s account presupposes: affective intentionality. What is more, we can apply Brightman’s test of consistency to Scheler’s account and find it more desirable than how Brightman defines what values are (...) in his A Philosophy of Religion. Between both thinkers an account will emerge that can help clarify the commensurability of values in experience-based accounts of value in both thinkers. In doing so, a blended account reaches three conclusions about how each personalist might adopt points the other would have suggested to him. Love is the process of coalescement in rough outlines; The ordo amoris should reflect the rational coherence of Brightman’s more systematic laws; And the demand of coherence means that phenomenology in Scheler becomes a system of idealistic metaphysics concerning values despite the fact that Brightman thinks the moral law system will hold phenomenologically regardless of which metaphysical interpretation of reality holds sway about values. (shrink)

This article states that it is important for a debate on freedom and its consequences for constitutional state, to have a clear view of ‘man and the world’. On the basis of Augustine’s thoughts on the concept of ‘man and the world’ some important arguments for a debate on freedom and constitutional state are being outlined. On the basis of several texts of Augustine, human being should be seen as trinitarian imago dei. Man, characterised as such, consists even in its (...) perverted condition of at least three foundational elements: an ontological relationality, an intrinsic need for the transcendent Good and a prominence for love/the will. These constituting elements of human being should be safeguarded in the situation of temporary peace we live in. This is the responsiblity of all human beings. The relevance of Augustine’s view of man and the world is fourfold: freedom is freedom in dependence . This concept is a warning against fundamentalism of any kind that holds a claim of truth without recognizing the importance of humility and the theological and historical facts of the imperfect. Secondly, the thought of Christ as ‘just and justifying mysterium dei . The origin of morals lies not within human being itself, but is communicated by the incarnate Word: i.e. from a transcendent source. Superbia as leading actor for political leaders and human beings in general is a denial of constituting elements of what is means to be a ‘human being’. Humilitas forms the only possible way for a society to make it really a society: a place where human beings really live together. Thirdly, a people cannot be defined merely on the basis of a legal definition. The ordo amoris is an imporant constituent element of human being and of society. Finally, the recognition of relationality and dialogue as givens. These elements belong to being a human being. Only in community is true freedom possible without denying each individual’s unicity. (shrink)

The present collection of essays was designed by translator David Lachterman to provide the reader with a better understanding of Scheler’s major work, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, which will also be published in translation by Northwestern University Press. Lachterman provides us with an illuminating preface which sketches the general character of Scheler’s thought, particularly its relationship to Husserl and Heidegger, and which discusses each of the five selections. Four of the five essays presented here are incomplete (...) works, and three were never published in Scheler’s lifetime. The first, "The Idols of Self-Knowledge," is an attempt to differentiate psychical and physical phenomena and criticizes the way Brentano went about making this distinction. In "Ordo amoris" Scheler maintains with Augustine and Pascal, the priority of love over cognition. In "Phenomenology and the Theory Cognition," Scheler develops his own account of the phenomenological method. "The Theory of the Three Facts" represents Scheler’s views on the distinction between phenomenological, scientific and common sense "facts." The last essay is entitled "Idealism and Realism" and demonstrates "that it is a mistake to opt for either one of the parties to this conflict," and argues instead for a phenomenology of essences. The last section of this text, which was to be a confrontation of Scheler with the then recently published Being and Time, never appeared but is still awaiting publication in the critical edition of Scheler’s works. One welcomes Prof. Lachterman’s initiative in making available to the English reader these essays of one of the most significant figures in twentieth century German philosophy.—J. D. C. (shrink)

La búsqueda de lo divino, que aparece en el cristianismo como un asunto espiritual, perfila ser tema de importancia para una mística agustiniana que tiene referencias a la figura de Dios, esto es, expresiones que intentan describir la naturaleza divina. Así pues, el santo de Hipona, a través de términos como luz y verdad, presenta los rasgos de un Dios que parece mostrarse tal como es, pero para alcanzar una visión tan inefable, es necesario el deseo de esta; una búsqueda (...) de Dios que, traducida en amor, es un proceso de ascenso a la verdad de lo divino permeado por ese intenso deseo de ello. De manera que un deseo de Dios posiblemente connota una erótica entendida como amor vehemente; el cual, para interés del presente artículo, puede resignificar la noción común de erótica y de sexualidad inherentes al carácter relacional del ser humano, a veces visto con sospecha. (shrink)

This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative affective (...) attitudes. Our aim is twofold: to investigate the influence of Scheler on Zambrano’s thought and to demonstrate how Scheler’s phenomenology of affectivity transformed in Spanish philosophy and, in particular, in Zambrano’s work. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper focuses on Scheler’s model of affectivity (section 2), presents an overview of Scheler’s reception in Spain focusing on Zambrano’s knowledge of his works (section 3), and examines Zambrano’s notion of the heart tracing parallelisms in Scheler’s works (section 4). The paper concludes with a discussion on Zambrano’s extension and transformation of the metaphor of the heart in the context of Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

Research explored methods for “shortening the food links” or developing the “local foodshed” by connecting farmers with food service buyers (for restaurants and institutions) in Colorado. Telephone interviews were used to investigate marketing and purchasing practices. Findings include that price is not a significant factor in purchasing decisions; that food buyers prioritize quality as their top purchasing criterion but are not aware that local farmers can provide higher quality, that institutions are interested in buying locally; that small farms can offer (...) comparable or higher quality produce andservice; and that farmers need to show buyers what the quality of produce and service they can provide. (shrink)

Scholars have suggested that leaders’ ethical failures at the beginning of the twenty-first century have raised awareness about the importance of ethical leadership (EL). Yet, there has been no systematic effort to evaluate whether this awareness indeed led to changes in EL or how followers react to this leadership style over time. To address this gap, we examine the evolution in EL means, variability, and its associations with follower outcomes between 2004 and 2019. Our cross-temporal meta-analysis included 359 independent samples (...) from 314 studies published between 2005 and 2020 and focused on followers’ ratings of their leaders using the Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS; Brown et al., in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 117–134, 2005). Using cubic spline meta-regressions, our results indicated no global changes in EL mean levels and variability across the 15-year period. Nevertheless, country-level comparisons revealed different EL-trends in China (i.e. decrease) versus the United States (i.e. stable), and further moderation analyses highlighted the role of cultural value dimensions and national corruption rates. Finally, we also found that the relationship between EL and desirable follower outcomes (e.g. organizational citizenship behavior) became gradually stronger over time on a global level. These results provide a solid empirical basis to evaluate cross-temporal trends in EL and its (changing) impact on follower outcomes across the globe. (shrink)