This book develops a philosophical structure for historical explanation that resolves disputes about the scientific status of history that have persisted since the nineteenth century. It does this by showing why historical explanations must take the form of a narrative and by making their logic explicit. The books formulates a unique positive account of the logic of narrative explanations. This logic reveals how the rational evaluation of narrative explanation becomes possible. The book also develops a nonrealist (irrealist) metaphysics (...) and epistemology of history--that is, it argues that there exists no one fixed past but many pasts. It includes a novel reading of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, displaying how Kuhn offers a narrative explanation of theory change in science. The book situates narrative explanations within a naturalistic framework. Naturalism regards all canons of rational inquiry as evolving and contingent. The book also argues for the general philosophical significance of historical explanation. The first four chapters defuse methodological and the metaphysical objections to narrative explanations. The final three chapters explore how narrative explanations relate to other sciences. It will be of interest to researchers in historiography, theory of history, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, and epistemology"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In this work, Collingridge offers a general philosophy of criticism. Many philosophers influenced by the ideas of Karl Popper have hoped to see an expansion from his view of the operation of criticism within science to a more general account of criticism, and, until now, moves in this direction have had only limited success. This book extends Popper's account of the role of criticism in science to many other areas of inquiry.

It is often claimed in parts of the psychiatric literature that neuroscientific research into the biological basis of mental disorder undermines dualism in the philosophy of mind. This paper shows that such a claim does not apply to all forms of dualism. Focusing on Kenneth Kendler’s discussion of the mind–body problem in biological psychiatry, I argue that such criticism of dualism often conflates the psychological and phenomenal concepts of the mental. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge that there are different varieties (...) of dualism, and so overlooks the important metaphysical insights of contemporary dualist philosophers. I argue that while the neuroscientific research underpinning biological psychiatry challenges the traditional dualism of René Descartes, it does not pose any problem for the more modern dualism of David Chalmers. It is possible to take seriously the scientific claims of biological psychiatry while holding that this latter form of dualism is true. This has implications for the positioning of the mind–body problem in psychiatry. While the “easy” problem of explaining psychological processes is relevant to the aims of biological psychiatry, psychiatrists need not worry about the “hard” problem of consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, Waters introduces American Indians who hold a Ph.D. in philosophy. Waters explains that because American Indians are unable to garner the financial, collegial, and academic support needed to rise to inclusive positions in the philosophical profession, most of our colleagues and students remain uneducated and ignorant about indigenous people and our philosophies that are still alive today on this shared American continent. America’s indigenous philosophers have important contributions to make to philosophy and culture; yet our conceptual (...) nonexistence exacerbates our veridical non- integration. It is a cultural luxury for the APA to not address these problems. In some moral worlds, the APA Board might have a positive obligation to address the status of American Indian philosophy with all due haste. Three possible ways of indexing American Indian philosophy for inclusion in the discipline are presented, each raising unique and particular problems for the profession. It is suggested a field of Indigenous philosophy (global) could emerge over time, having subfields of diverse cultural philosophies, not necessarily linked to nation states or current geopolitical regions. Concluding, given issues of invisibility, alliances, and responsibility, the APA remains historically morally bound to address and perhaps even redress American Indian exclusionism in the profession upon which it acts, and in the culture it complicitly creates. (shrink)

In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self and being aware of being a self. While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability (...) to explicitly represent one's own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between being aware of oneself "as subject" and being aware of oneself "as object." The focus of existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability to think about oneself, while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

This volume brings together a group of logic-minded philosophers and philosophically oriented logicians to address a diversity of topics on the structural analysis of non-classical logics. It mainly focuses on the construction of different types of models for various non-classical logics of current interest, including modal logics, epistemic logics, dynamic logics, and observational predicate logic. The book presents a wide range of applications of two well-known approaches in current research: structural modeling of certain philosophical issues in the framework of (...) non-classic logics, such as admissible models for modal logic, structural models for modal epistemology and for counterfactuals, and epistemological models for common knowledge and for public announcements; conceptual analysis of logical properties of, and formal semantics for, non-classical logics, such as sub-formula property, truthmaking, epistemic modality, behavioral strategies, speech acts and assertions. The structural analysis provided in this volume will appeal not only to graduate students and experts in non-classic logics, but also to readers from a wide range of disciplines, including computer science, cognitive science, linguistics, game theory and theory of action, to mention a few. (shrink)

The paper presents the reflection on philosophical foundations of contemporary physical concepts of global history and global structure of Universe. It shows that Democritus's dualism of "matter and void" is changed now in dualism of "matter and energy" in the frame of the strings theory, where anything what looks like "a void" is absent. At the same time the Poincare-Perelman's theorem calls to rethink Democritus's philosophy in the light of "space and hole" discourse and call it to come (...) back. On the level of philosophy doctrines for contemporary fundamental physics it in necessary to combine dialectically the concept of "matter and void/hole" and the concept "matter and energy" (or "matter and singular conditions"). It is possible to do on the way of rethinking of H. Bergson's ideas presented in his book "Matter and memory". The conclusion is that fundamental dualism consists the relation "visible matter - invisible historical memory" inside of Universe. (shrink)

The structural abstract discusses the features of modern post-non-classical scientific discourse, according to which all kinds of scientific and religious knowledge are simplified mental construction of a complex objective reality. All accumulated religious knowledge is a combination of various theoretical models of divine reality, the performance of which was checked by centuries of experience of mystical connection with the Lord. According to the requirements of scientific and religious discourse on incompleteness of knowledge, all religious texts of the Bible, the Koran, (...) the Torah, etc. are not carriers of absolutely probable knowledge. The sacred reality they describe is far more complex. The structural abstract reveals the originality of the subject and object of religious narration and the special nature of the mystical fact. The empirical basis of Christian knowledge is the books of the Old and New Testaments, which set the initial basis of Christian knowledge. The array of interpretations of sacred knowledge, accumulated over two thousand years of the Christianity development, it constitutes the main volume in the system of Christian knowledge. Christian theology provides a comprehensive understanding of Christian doctrine and its historical development. A special role is played by mystical knowledge-management-experiencing, the knowledge of God in the structure of Christian knowledge. The peculiarity of knowledgemanagement-experiencing determines that it comes directly from God. Theology can be achieved in the course of many years of practical work of an ascetic. The mystical side of knowledge-management is the experience of a direct connection with the Lord, which is difficult to convey in words. Secret knowledge-management exists only in real time in the existential reality of sacred experience. The structural abstract distinguishes two types of metaphysical knowledge – Western and Eastern metaphysics. Western metaphysics is considered to be the universal, most developed type of philosophical rational knowledge, the main goal of which is to develop a theoretical model of the fundamental reality, what is the God. It is reasonable to call Eastern metaphysics the metaphysics of the Path originating in the middle of the first millennium BC in India (Brahmanism, Buddhism, Jainism, etc.) and China (Taoism). Orthodoxy is the Christian version of the metaphysics of the Path, while Sufism is in Islam. Everything is subordinated to the liberation of the ascetic from worldly desires and the achievement of a mystical connection with God in Eastern metaphysics. The metaphysics of the Path includes three components – theoretical construction of the God, difficult practical actions (the Path) and the secret knowledge-management of the God, which are considered in inseparable unity. The Orthodox version of the metaphysics of the Path is one of the most developed in Eastern metaphysics.The texts of Western and Eastern metaphysics differ considerably. The works of Western metaphysicians appeal to the human mind and are predominantly speculative. The writings of Eastern metaphysicians try to reproduce the mental reality of the Path of merit of Enlightenment to a large extent. If rational knowledge of the fundamental foundations of the universe prevails in Western metaphysics, then Orthodox metaphysics is guided by the desire to enter the mystical space of divine reality. (shrink)

A framework is developed for understanding what is “taken for granted” both in philosophy and in life generally, which may serve to orient philosophical inquiry and make it more effective. The framework takes in language and its development, as well as mathematics, logic, and the empirical sphere with particular reference to the exigencies of life. It is evaluated through consideration of seven philosophical issues concerned with such topics as solipsism, sense data as the route to knowledge, the possible (...) reduction of geometry to logic, and the existence and status of human rights. Various dichotomies and the notion of continuity are evidently highly strategic. (shrink)

Discusses some of the philosophical ideas about knowledge and applies them to organizational design and information processing in order to create new ideas and new ways of thinking. Explains how this can be achieved by a discussion of the issues surrounding organizational design and the impact of design on information processing. Reviews the ideas concerning the theory of knowledge proposed by rationalists, such as Descartes and empiricists, such as Locke and how these relate to other epistemological theories such as (...) historicism and pragmatism. Concludes by discussing the means by which philosophical theories of knowledge can assist towards new considerations of information processing. (shrink)

One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and reports, we identify two issues surrounding the structure of public-policy recommendations.

In 1974, John Maynard Smith wrote in his little book Models in Ecology, A theory of ecology must make statements about ecosystems as a whole, as well as about particular species at particular times, and it must make statements that are true for many species and not just for one… For the discovery of general ideas in ecology, therefore, different kinds of mathematical description, which may be called models, are called for. Whereas a good simulation should include as much detail (...) as possible, a good model should include as little as possible. (1974. (shrink)

In this dissertation, the author articulates and defends a version of the historically important view that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. In Chapter 1, the author defends a certain conception of the role of phenomenology in the theory of consciousness. The author argues that any theory of consciousness must account for the properties that phenomenology reveals consciousness to have. The most important properties in this regard are structural: temporality, synchronic unity, and self-referentiality. It is argued that these properties can be given (...) a rigorous description and that mathematical models of the structure of consciousness can be developed. ;In Chapter 2, the author argues that there are no phenomenological data that preclude a theory that identifies consciousness with a brain process. By carefully attending to what consciousness can and cannot reveal about itself in introspection, the author argues, one can see clearly that phenomenology can play its necessary role in the theory of consciousness without at the same time undermining physicalism. ;In Chapter 3, the author discusses the structural phenomenological data. The discussion is informed by the classic work of William James as well as the work of the Phenomenological philosophers, Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Aron Gurwitsch. ;In Chapter 4, the author examines various versions of the view that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. The author argues that any adequate theory of the type must maintain that states or phases of consciousness must be genuinely self-referential. The author then goes on to present a model of the self-referential structure of consciousness using some tools from contemporary Set Theory. ;In Chapter 5, the author replies to certain important objections to the self-referentialist theory of consciousness. ;In Chapter 6, the author examines some connections the theory defended bears to the mathematico-computational theory of consciousness suggested by Douglas Hofstadter and to the outstanding neurobiological theories of consciousness presented by Antonio Damasio and Gerald Edelman. ;In Chapter 7, the author argues that the supposition that consciousness is the embodiment of a certain self-referential structure implies elegant solutions to some outstanding problems in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This book represents a unique attempt to restore a 'new-classical' aspiration towards a philosophical system able to provide some certainties. Using the distinctive feature of presenting an original and complete philosophical system, author Francesco Belfiore diverges from the philosophical literature of the last decades, which has been ever more focused upon specific fields.

The central idea of this essay is that philosophical thinking revolves around aporetic clusters, i.e., sets of individually plausible, but collectively inconsistent propositions. The task of philosophy is to dissolve such clusters, either by showing that the propositions in question, contrary to first impression, are compatible with each other, or by showing that it is permissible to abandon at least one of the propositions involved. This view of philosophical problems not only provides a very good description of well-understood (...) philosophizing, but is also better suited than others to explain some seemingly strange characteristics of philosophy, most notably its armchair character, the large variety of incommensurable doctrines by which it is characterized, and its concern with its own history. (shrink)

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries antiquarians, geologists and savants debated whether the summits of particular Highland mountains were the vestiges of iron-age forts or evidence of extinct volcanoes. A blend of antiquarian-historical methodology deeply affected the geological narratives that British savants and gentlemen of science developed during this period. The histories of architecture, and the fine and practical arts regularly functioned as proxies for visualizing the history, structure and operations of the earth. The case of vitrified (...) forts discovered in Scotland highlights how the theoretical and practical arts directly informed geological theory to create what George Bellas Greenough claimed was a ‘philosophical pursuit’. Focusing on the contributions of John MacCulloch over the ambiguous identification of vitrified ruins, this paper shows how geological history was entwined with broad cultural interests in the progress of society and its rise from Nature. First, the essay examines the meaning and role of ‘imitation’ and ‘copying’ in art and architecture. Second, it applies these concepts within the framework of the vitrified-ruin debate that antiquarians and geologists engaged. Third, it demonstrates how the ‘imitation’ of Nature in the practical arts was a useful tool for making claims about earth structure. (shrink)

We are born of the nothingness incomprehensible to each of us individuals and find death in the midst of the limitlessness. I have absolutely no idea why I am living here and now. I don’t know why the world is the way it is. I have been thrust into existence and am coldly surrounded by the limitless space. When humans cannot fully grasp the foundations of existence, we become encumbered by the feeling known as “fear.” I was a young boy (...) when I acquired that fear of death. (....) -/- The place where young people encounter “death” is in manga. In the last issue of Devilman, the creature was the very image of death, a disembodied torso. In the background angels are dancing on the sea. Also, in the final episode of Joe of Tomorrow, death lies in a ring. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysics provides resources for understanding a world in value-realist terms. Central to this value realism is an aesthetic conception of rationality that sees a hope implicit in our practices—the hope that our linguistic tools are suited to the task of getting things right in our fields of inquiry. This pragmatic hope entails an understanding of individual freedom and responsibility to participate in a patient restructuring of the world toward the highest retention of value. It also enables an understanding of (...) individual freedom as obstructive to this restructuring. One task of this article is to show that attunement in theory to the hope implicit in practice can ameliorate this obstructiveness. A subsequent task is to show that, insofar as this preliminary hope is not a metaphysical premise, but a regulative ideal seeking satisfaction, it can serve as a warrant for an implicit theology in linguistic pragmatism. In this way, I argue that we can come to see pragmatism as a method lending itself to a philosophical theology of the Whiteheadian variety. We can do this precisely insofar as rationalism is seen as predicated on an aesthetic ideal of harmony—a harmony between what is and what ought to be our matters of concern. We can come to see the structure of rationality in terms of an aestheticism corrective of analytic conceptions of meaning and truth. (shrink)

This book builds on existing work in genre analysis and move analysis in English for Specific Purposes and applies this new framework to academic philosophical discourse, offering new insights into how ESP traditions can elucidate shifts in language conventions across disciplinary contexts. The volume begins by surveying the state-of-the-art in English for Specific Purposes and genre theory, as well as other genre theory paradigms before turning the focus on move analysis. Lucas and Lucas seek to maximize the potential of (...) move analysis to precisely operationalize functional units of discourse by implementing a cognitive theory of genre grounded in frame semantics. Using the case of academic research articles in philosophy, the authors demonstrate how this framework can reveal distinctive dimensions unique to philosophical discourse and in turn, how such an approach might be applied more broadly to examine nuances in language across disciplines and inform ESP research in the future. This book will appeal to students and researchers in English for Specific Purposes, discourse analysis, academic writing, applied linguistics, and rhetoric and composition. (shrink)

This volume provides a philosophical introduction to and analysis of the study of metaphor. By proceeding from the concrete analysis of complex metaphors, White is able to identify a range of features which are incompatible with standard accounts of the way words function in metaphor.

21세기 우리 한국 사회가 노년 세대를 마주 보는 멸시와 혐오의 분위기는 보다 가중되었다. 또한 노인 세대의 정치적 결집은 지난 2016년 말 이후 한국 사회의 세대 갈등을 더욱 심화시켜 왔다. 한국사회는 개인의 개성을 존중하는 분위기보다는 세대간 집단적 이해관계에 따라 사회 현상을 설명하는 것에 익숙해 왔다. 이런 점에서 한국 사회는 역사적 경험에 의해 비롯된 386세대와 같은 공통된 특성 ‘세대’를 중심으로 그 시대의 변화를 설명하는 것에 다소 친숙해져 왔다. 왜냐하면 세대 갈등은 ‘내 집단’과 ‘타 집단’간의 구별을 전제로 하고 있다. 이러한 세대간 갈라치기는 첨예한 (...) 세대간 권력관계를 암시하기도 한다. 또한 세대란 “연속적이면서도 동시에 불연속적인 시대의 변화”를 뜻하기도 한다. 이를테면 세대란 시대의 변화에 따르는 변곡점에 의해 세대 집단을 통해 드러낸다. 이런 측면에서 세대론은 한 시대의 표상을 드러내 주기도 한다. 그런데 세대론이 흥미로운 사실은 시대의 인식이 어떤 한 세대에 따라 각각 분절되면서 세대 간의 서로 다른 상대적 관계에 따라 점차 단절되고 있다.BR 이런 관점에서 필자는 칼 만하임의 세대 문제, 미셸 푸코가 주장했던 권력의 담론 형성과정을 통해 세대간 갈등 구조를 이해함으로써 상호세대론 및 자기 세대와 타 세대의 관계를 고찰할 것이다. 또한 필자는 지금까지 세대 문제에 준거점이 되었던 세대 개념과 세대간 갈등들을 한국 사회에 어떻게 적용될 수 있을 것인지에 대해 살펴볼 것이다. 따라서 이러한 세대 개념과 세대간 갈등이 한국 사회에서 철학적 및 사회학적으로 어떤 의미가 있는지에 대해 고찰하고자 한다. (shrink)

Divided into three parts, this work is a record of the direction Kuhn was taking during the last two decades of his life. It consists of essays in which he refines the basic concepts set forth in "Structure"--Paradigm shifts, incommensurability, and the nature of scientific progress.

I aim to develop a tool for comparing theories of vagueness, using Structured Query Language. Relevant SQL snippets will be used throughout.

Philosophy often at least implicitly includes and depends on a logical structure which is also that of jokes. This is the case when philosophy involves questioning or establishing concepts in their own right, and when it involves the kinds of metaphysics which ask about reality and the world as a whole or as such. Taking this humour-like structure into account in presenting philosophy helps, among other things, to lay open part of the character of philosophy itself, to underscore (...) the radical self-perspective that is constitutive of philosophy, and to contextualise the often confusing experience of coming to grips with an unfamiliar philosophical framework. (shrink)

Investigation and analysis of the history of the concepts employed in contemporary philosophy of mind could significantly change the contemporary debate about the explainability of consciousness. Philosophical investigation of the history of the concept of qualia and the concept of scientific explanation most often presupposed in contemporary discussions of consciousness reveals the origin of both concepts in some of the most interesting philosophical debates of the twentieth century. In particular, a historical investigation of the inheritance of concepts of (...) the elements of experience and the nature of scientific explanation from C. I. Lewis and Rudolf Carnap to contemporary theorists like David Chalmers shows the profound continuity of these concepts throughout the analytic tradition, despite important changes in the dimensions of philosophical relevance and significance that have characterized the emerging debate. I argue that, despite the significant methodological shift from the foundationalist epistemology of the 1920s to today's functionalist explanations of the mind, the problem of explaining consciousness has remained the problem of analysing or describing the logical and relational structure of immediate, given experience. Appreciation of this historical continuity of form recommends a more explicit discussion of the philosophical reasons for the underlying distinction between structure and content, reasons that trace to Lewis and Carnap's influential but seldom-discussed understanding of the relationship between subjectivity, conceived as the realm of private, ineffable contents, and objectivity, understood as public, linguistic expressibility. With this historical background in mind, the contemporary debate about the explanation of consciousness can be re-interpreted as a debate about the relationship between ineffable experience and structurally conceived meaning. (shrink)

There is an extensive body of work that has previously examined the teaching of ethics in business schools whereby it is hoped that the values and behaviours of students might be provoked to show positive and enduring change. Rather than dealing with the content issues of particular business ethics courses per se, this article explores the philosophical foundations and the structural conditions for developing ethical training programs in business schools. It is informed by historical analysis, specifically, an examination of (...) Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies that inspires virtue ethics, and together provides four conditions for consideration: respect for law, dialectics, imitation and deliberation. We outline the necessary structural conditions for implementing these requirements as well as suggesting the necessary pedagogical protocol applicable to all courses. It is argued that reference to our two ancient Greek philosophers provide many valuable and insightful lessons for the implementation of ethical training today including choice of theoretical content and the approach towards learning. Further, the enactment of a pedagogical protocol requires a policy of recruiting and managing business school teachers-instructors that takes into account, and consciously encourages, intellectual, relational and spiritual pedagogical qualities. (shrink)

In Meaning and Structure, Peregrin argues that recent and contemporary (post)analytic philosophy, as developed by Quine, Davidson, Sellars and their followers, is largely structuralistic in the very sense in which structuralism was originally tabled by Ferdinand de Saussure. The author reconstructs de Saussure's view of language, linking it to modern formal logic and mathematics, and reveals close analogies between its constitutive principles and the principles informing the holistic and neopragmatistic view of language put forward by Quine and his followers. (...) Peregrin also indicates how this view of language can be made compatible with what is usually called 'formal semantics'. Drawing on both the Saussurean tradition and recent developments in analytic philosophy of language, this book offers a unique study of the ways in which the concept of meaning can be seen as consisting in the concept of structure. (shrink)

The Triadic Structure of the Mind provides a philosophical system that offers fresh solutions in the fields of ontology, knowledge, ethics, and politics. The second edition includes a more extensive treatment of the topics addressed in the first edition, the introduction of new concepts, and the inclusion of additional thinkers.

Recent scholarship has focused on the provocative suggestion that there is a deep unity linking the philosophical projects of Iris Murdoch, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Mary Midgley. In addition to providing scholars with the opportunity to consider what these four shared, the unanimity story also offers an occasion to reflect on what is distinctive about each. Whereas Anscombe, Foot, and Midgley each turn to broadly Aristotelian resources for developing an alternative to the dominant non‐cognitivism of their day, Murdoch (...) turns to Platonic ones. The nature of Murdoch's Platonism, however, is not always well understood and has been identified as a “recurring question.” This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing attempt to understand Murdoch's distinctive, Platonic alternative to the ethical non‐cognitivism of her day. I contend that Murdoch's philosophical method, especially its transcendental elements, is an unexplored resource for better understanding the character of her Platonism as a modest one. (shrink)

Investigation and analysis of the history of the concepts employed in contemporary philosophy of mind could significantly change the contemporary debate about the explainability of consciousness. Philosophical investigation of the history of the concept of qualia and the concept of scientific explanation most often presupposed in contemporary discussions of consciousness reveals the origin of both concepts in some of the most interesting philosophical debates of the twentieth century. In particular, a historical investigation of the inheritance of concepts of (...) the elements of experience and the nature of scientific explanation from C. I. Lewis and Rudolf Carnap to contemporary theorists like David Chalmers shows the profound continuity of these concepts throughout the analytic tradition, despite important changes in the dimensions of philosophical relevance and significance that have characterized the emerging debate. I argue that, despite the significant methodological shift from the foundationalist epistemology of the 1920s to today's functionalist explanations of the mind, the problem of explaining consciousness has remained the problem of analysing or describing the logical and relational structure of immediate, given experience. Appreciation of this historical continuity of form recommends a more explicit discussion of the philosophical reasons for the underlying distinction between structure and content, reasons that trace to Lewis and Carnap's influential but seldom-discussed understanding of the relationship between subjectivity, conceived as the realm of private, ineffable contents, and objectivity, understood as public, linguistic expressibility. With this historical background in mind, the contemporary debate about the explanation of consciousness can be re-interpreted as a debate about the relationship between ineffable experience and structurally conceived meaning. (shrink)

In this article, the author represents the aspect of philosophical and religious doctrine of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik, a Polish personalist, which deals with the way the philosopher understands freedom as a structural component of a personality that enables a man to realize his inner and outer potential in both individual and social planes, in all dimensions of human existence: soul, body, intellect, will, actions, perception and creation of existence. Interrelation and interdependence between freedom and responsibility of a personality, as (...) well as between freedom and will of a person, are the issues of principle for a Catholic thinker. As interpreted by Bartnik, responsibility is a measure of freedom, because of direct relationship between them: the more freedom a person possesses, the greater responsibility it takes to implement and use it. The relationship between freedom and will explains the dialectic character of structure of a personality. Freedom of a man is manifested through auto- determination, which means the ability of will to make free choices, and ultimately the will determines itself, being evaluated by practical mind. Freedom in personal existence concerns personality as a whole, but not the will or actions taken separately. That is why, Bartnik believes, it is better to speak about personal freedom and free existence of a personality. Choice -making proves freedom of a man, but when choosing an option, a person chooses himself, thus creating his own spiritual image. Existence consists of possibilities to choose from and means the core and backbone structure of a personality in the dynamic process of self-realization. (shrink)