Explores proper timing and the arts of rulership in the work that inspired China's first emperor.

The Lüshi chunqiu was written for and inspired the king who united the warring state to become China's first emperor in 221 BCE. This book explicates the concept of "proper timing," proposing that it helps bring unity to the diverse eclectic content of the text. The book analyzes the roles of human nature, the justification for the existence of the state, and the significance of personal, historical and cosmic timing. An organic instrumental position emerges from the diverse theories contained (...) in the Lüshi chunqiu. The conclusion looks at ways to apply the Lüshi chunqiu’s philosophy to contemporary issues of time and timing, human nature, political order and constitutions, social and environmental ethics. (shrink)

When addressing the notion of proper time in the theory of relativity, it is usually taken for granted that the time read by an accelerated clock is given by the Minkowski proper time. However, there are authors like Harvey Brown that consider necessary an extra assumption to arrive at this result, the so-called clock hypothesis. In opposition to Brown, Richard TW Arthur takes the clock hypothesis to be already implicit in the theory. In this paper I will present (...) a view different from these authors by taking into account Einstein’s notion of natural clock and showing its relevance to the debate. (shrink)

The canonical proper time formulation of relativistic dynamics provides a framework from which one can describe the dynamics of classical and quantum systems using the clock of those very systems. The framework utilizes a canonical transformation on the time variable that is used to describe the dynamics, and does not transform other dynamical variables such as momenta or positions. This means that the time scales of the dynamics are described in terms of the natural local time coordinates, which is (...) the most meaningful parameterization of phenomena such as the approach to equilibrium, or the back reaction of interacting systems. We summarize the formalism of the canonical proper time framework, and provide example calculations of the eigenvalues of the hydrogen atom and near horizon description of a scalar field near a Schwarzschild black hole. (shrink)

In this paper, we report on a new approach to relativistic quantum theory. The classical theory is derived from a new implementation of the first two postulates of Einstein, which fixes the proper-time of the physical system of interest for all observers. This approach leads to a new group that we call the proper-time group. We then construct a canonical contact transformation on extended phase space to identify the canonical Hamiltonian associated with the proper-time variable. On quantization (...) we get a new relativistic wave equation for spin 1/2 particles that generalizes the Dirac theory. The Hamiltonian is positive definite so we naturally interpret antiparticles as particles with their proper-time reversed. We show that for the hydrogen atom problem, we get the same fine structure separation. When the proton spin magnetic moment is taken into account, we get the standard hyperfine splitting terms of the Pauli approximation and two additional terms. The first term is small in p-states. It diverges in s-states, and provides more than enough to account for the Lamb-shift when the proton radius is used as a cut off. The last term promises to provide a correction to the hyperfine splitting term. Although incomplete, the general approach offers hope of completely accounting for the hydrogen spectrum as an eigenvalue problem. (shrink)

A clock-transport method of synchronization employing proper time is described that yields in any given inertial system the same result as slow transport, but that imposes no limit on transport proper speed. It is argued that because the method involves only the empirically validated kinematic invariant proper time, on which all observers must agree, there exists an option to synchronize clocks in such a way that thesimultaneity of spatially separated events is agreed upon by all observers, hence (...) is “absolute.” Such agreement refers only to phase equality of members (present at the events judged simultaneous) of comoving clock sets, not to clock rates or clock phase numerical values in different inertial systems. The demonstration employs only the on-worldline assertions of Einstein's kinematics. It thus depends on a limited subset of his ideas and allows a different identification of the spacelike invariant. (shrink)

It will be argued that Minkowski's implementation of distances is inconsistent. An alternative implementation will be proposed. In the new model the proper time of an object is taken as its fourth coordinate. Distances will be measured according to a four dimensional Euclidean metric. In the present approach mass is a constant of motion. A mass can therefore be ascribed to photons and neutrinos. Mechanics and dynamics will be reformulated in close correspondence with classical physics. Of particular interest is (...) the equation of motion for the proper time momentum. In the classical limit it reduces to the classical law of conservation of (kinetic+potential) energy. In the relativistic limit it is similar to the conservation of energy of the theory of relativity. The conservation of proper time momentum allows for an alternative explanation for Compton scattering and pair annihilation. On the basis of the proper time formulation of electrodynamics also an alternative explanation will be offered for the spectra of hydrogenic atoms. The proper time formulation of gravitational dynamics leads to the correct predictions of gravitational time dilation, the deflection of light and the precession of the perihelia of planets. For this no curvature will be needed. That is, spacetime is flat everywhere, even in the presence of sources of gravitation. Some cosmological consequences will be discussed. The present approach gives a new notion to energy, antiparticles and the structure of spacetime. The contents of the present paper will have important implications for the foundations of physics in general. (shrink)

On the basis of the Woodhouse causal axiomatics, we show that conformal proper times and an extra variable in addition to those of space and time, together give a physical justification for the ‘chronometric hypothesis’ of general relativity. Indeed, we show that, with a lack of these latter two ingredients and of this hypothesis, clock paradoxes exist for which the unparadoxical asymmetry cannot be recovered when using the ‘clock and message functions’ only. These proper times originate from a (...) given conformal structure of the spacetime when ascribing different compatible projective structures to each Woodhouse particle, and then, each defines a specific Weylian ‘sheaf structure’. In addition, the proper time parameterizations are defined via path-dependent conformal scale factors, which act like sockets for any kind of physical interaction and also represent the values of the variable associated with the extra dimension. (shrink)

This article analyzes Toole’s novel from a causal perspective, focusing on the cause-effect dynamics that make the plot advance, from the initial event at D.H. Holmes until the outcome in the Night of Joy. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies has been applied to identify a series of 47 causal events that summarize all actions with an impact on plot development. Our research shows that the causal study of the novel is a useful approach that can reinforce or modify (...) qualitative assessments of previous studies. The relevance of “Night of Joy” plot within the whole narrative and its key role in the rest of the subplots are verified in numerical terms. Besides, we have expanded and quantified the causal chains operating in the novel; and we have made sure, as well, that every subplot is essential in order to reach the final outcome (with the only exception of Dr. Talc’s story). Finally, we have formulated an alternative outline of secondary plots than the ones supported by preceding research by using numeric metrics, demonstrating that “Paradise Vendors” and “Dorian Greene”, previously considered secondary storylines, exert a high impact on Confederacy’s finale, and are, perhaps, not so secondary plots after all. (shrink)

The genesis of Feynman's original approach to QED is reviewed. The main ideas of his original presentation at the Pocono Conference are discussed and compared with the ones involved in his action-at-distance formulation of classical electrodynamics. The role of the de Sitter group in Feynman's visualization of space-time processes is emphasized.

We discuss the question of whether or not a general Weyl structure is a suitable mathematical model of space–time. This is an issue that has been in debate since Weyl formulated his unified field theory for the first time. We do not present the discussion from the point of view of a particular unification theory, but instead from a more general standpoint, in which the viability of such a structure as a model of space–time is investigated. Our starting point is (...) the well known axiomatic approach to space–time given by Elhers, Pirani and Schild. In this framework, we carry out an exhaustive analysis of what is required for a consistent definition for proper time and show that such a definition leads to the prediction of the so-called “second clock effect”. We take the view that if, based on experience, we were to reject space–time models predicting this effect, this could be incorporated as the last axiom in the EPS approach. Finally, we provide a proof that, in this case, we are led to a Weyl integrable space–time as the most general structure that would be suitable to model space–time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Writing and Authority in Early ChinaLothar von FalkenhausenWriting and Authority in Early China. By Mark Edward Lewis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Pp. vii + 544. Hardcover $92.50. Paper $31.95.Writing and Authority in Early China is a forceful and sparklingly original work in which Mark Edward Lewis explores the role of writing and texts in the transformation of political authority during the Warring States, Qin, (...) and Western Han periods. Following in the footsteps of the author's well-received first book1 and his magisterial contribution to the Cambridge History of Ancient China,2Writing and Authority establishes Lewis as the premier Western historian of the crucial centuries surrounding the unification of China under a centrally administered empire in 221 B.C. The book's complex, comprehensive, and coherent argument is informed by a variety of Western theoretical approaches, but it principally emanates from a close reading of the full record of transmitted texts and recently excavated manuscripts on [End Page 127] bamboo or wooden slips. The inclusion of the latter class of sources, beset with treacherous problems of decipherment, is still unusual in mainstream sinological scholarship and indicates the author's supreme confidence in his philological skills. With a firm hand, undaunted by the multifarious nature of his materials, Lewis guides the reader to some fundamental themes in recent sinology, opening manifold novel perspectives along the way. Even when dealing with well-known texts, he often proposes striking reinterpretations.In his Introduction, Lewis enumerates six main functions of writing in ancient China: enforcing state authority; creating text-based communities and "public spheres"; transcending the confines of space, time, and human mortality; fashioning figures of authority in the past; standardizing specialized technical terminology; and encrypting secret meanings. In Lewis' own words, "the culminating role of writing in the period, and the key to its importance in imperial China, was the creation of parallel realities within texts that claimed to depict the entire world" (p. 4). This ultimately led to the formation of the Confucian canon as a "textual double of the polity" that could survive cataclysmic changes of regimes.In chapter 1, "Writing the State," Lewis points out that before the Warring States period Chinese writing occurred exclusively in religious contexts. After circa 500 B.C., written documents gradually came to be used in the administration of government and trade. Both in their details of formulation and in the implication that anything committed to writing was thereby supernaturally validated, these new types of documents exhibit pervasive continuity with the earlier kinds of texts used in ritual communication with the ancestral spirits. Such continuity is also reflected in the rise of religious beliefs in a netherworld governed by a bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative processes parallel to those of the world of the living. According to Lewis, "the most important modification in the shift to an administrative polity [in the Warring States] was the extension of writing to new elements of the population. The attributes of the Zhou nobility... were transferred to the common people in the administrative documents of the new state. This widening range of inscription into the state order altered the social meaning of being recorded from a sign of power to one of subjection" (p. 13).Warring States rulers were cast in the role not of the authors of texts but of the authority behind them. Administrative and legal texts were concerned, ultimately, with the proper naming of phenomena, a process that had to adapt itself continually to the changes of the times. The authority of rulers came to encompass both human society and the natural world. "Whereas local and central administration were largely created through reworking and rewriting the ritual bases of the old Zhou order by means of a rationalizing cosmology, the re-invention of rulership drew on the contemporary religious realm and what is sometimes described as shamanism to provide images of cosmic power" (p. 42). Lewis illustrates the mechanics for applying these universal principles of rulership by a comprehensive analysis of the Zhou li (or Zhou guan), emphasizing the cosmological arrangement of the ideal government described therein and the dual administrative and religious dimensions of... (shrink)

Relativity allegedly contradicts presentism, the dynamic view of time and reality, according to which temporal passage is conceived of as an existentially distinguished ‘moving’ now. Against this common belief, the paper motivates a presentist interpretation of spacetime: It is argued that the fundamental concept of time—proper time—cannot be characterized by the earlier-later relation, i.e., not in the B-theoretical sense. Only the presentist can provide a temporal understanding of the twins’ paradox and of universes with closed timelike curves.

In the transition to Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity (SR), certain concepts that had previously been thought to be univocal or absolute properties of systems turn out not to be. For instance, mass bifurcates into (i) the relativistically invariant proper mass m0, and (ii) the mass relative to an inertial frame in which it is moving at a speed v = βc, its relative mass m, whose quantity is a factor γ = (1 – β2) -1/2 times the (...) class='Hi'>proper mass, m = γm0. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche’s Earth by Gary ShapiroKaitlyn CreasyGary Shapiro, Nietzsche’s Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. xvi + 238 pp. isbn 9780226394459. $48 (cloth).Nietzsche’s Earth is an ambitious work of expansive scope, which builds on several of Shapiro’s previous articles and contributions to anthologies. Shapiro’s comprehensive interpretation of Nietzsche’s reflections on time and “great politics,” while heavily informed by the thought of Deleuze, Guattari, and Agamben, remains firmly and (...) admirably situated in the historical and ideological contexts in which Nietzsche lived and wrote. The stated goal of the book is to “triangulat[e Nietzsche’s] thought between nineteenth-century versions” of Hegel’s notion that his time was the “desired culmination of the world” (ix) and certain prevailing contemporary attitudes that in some respects look awfully close to this Hegelian idea, such as “apocalyptic religious passions” or “the apparent supremacy of the global market” (understood either as a laudable achievement or as an inevitability to which we should resign ourselves). Here, Shapiro aims to compile an instructive Nietzschean account, one that informs how we think about such attitudes and what we should do about them.According to Shapiro’s Nietzsche, we must resist Christian and Hegelian conceptions of the “world” that understand the present moment as a stage—perhaps even the final stage—in a progressive teleological process that culminates in a state of worldly perfection or completion, one in which “great events” that transform human life are no longer possible. This requires us (1) to resist an understanding of time as the unfolding of such a process. It also requires us (2) to recognize “‘world-history’ and the states, churches, and other institutions it celebrates” as “problematic shadows of God” that wrongfully claim to make sense of “significant events and exhaust all meaning” (x)—tempting us toward passively nihilistic ways of relating to and engaging the world around us—and (3) to embrace a Nietzschean conception of the “earth” (more specifically, his notion of the “human-earth [Menschen-Erde]”) that broadens earthly horizons and understands the [End Page 214] future as radically open-ended (185). In the course of making the case for this reorientation, Shapiro argues that Nietzsche develops his notion of “earth” directly in contrast to Hegel’s notion of “world,” a provocative but surprisingly compelling claim.After reorienting ourselves in the manner described above, we must be watchful for times in which world-expanding (or, perhaps better, earth-expanding) possibilities for transformative social and political change—paradigm shifts that broaden earthly horizons, creating new possibilities for future humanity while also facilitating individual affirmation—become possible. And we must “seize the fleeting moment, the Kairos, or opportunity, as it rushes by” by recognizing and actively enabling such transformations when the proper moment arises (that is, when the significance of potentially earth-shifting “events” makes itself clear) and it is within our power to do so. Importantly, while Shapiro’s Nietzsche thinks such opportunities are rare, he does not think the individuals able to seize such opportunities—to “recogniz[e], yield[] to, and ultimately tyranniz[e]” transformative events—are. For example, they need not be Übermenschen (107).On Shapiro’s view, Nietzsche’s call for such transformative change is a call for a new “great politics” (BGE 208)—a “radically plural” (5) politics that sees new possibilities for existence and the direction of the earth emerge from hybrid, nomadic, cosmopolitan, and experimental social arrangements—in contrast to the limited, totalizing, and flattening political formation of the nation-state. Since Shapiro thinks Nietzsche’s concept of “great politics” is best characterized as a “great politics of the earth” (9, 15, 200), however, enacting these changes and envisioning future possibilities requires us to remain “loyal to the earth.” Acting in accordance with this Nietzschean command on Shapiro’s view involves not only renaturalizing humanity (KSA 9:11[211])—affirming our status as embodied animals with a host of natural instincts (Z “Prologue” 3) by creating future possibilities that leave ample room for the expression of those instincts—but also recognizing the fruitfulness of various human projects and ways of inhabiting the earth (such as “nomadic and nonstate groupings” [13]), such that... (shrink)

ABSTRACT The welcome expansion of kairos beyond its traditional locus in public debate to a broad range of discourse forms and persuasive actions has not been matched by a reevaluation of the temporal logic of kairos, which is still seen as located in teleologic time. This article suggests that Walter Benjamin’s understanding of time could refigure kairos as a nonteleological relationship among past, present, and future. Benjamin provides a theoretical rationale for kairotic action that is distributed in time and space (...) and accounts for kairos of objects, places, technologies, and works of art. These temporal affordances, usually developed separately in contemporary theory, are deeply connected in Benjamin’s writing; his understanding of time therefore integrates currently unconnected lines of research and supports a fluid but coherent understanding of kairotic agency. (shrink)

In a way similar to classical mechanics where we have the concept of inertial time as expressed in the motions of bodies, in the theory of relativity we can regard the inertial time as the only notion of time at play. The inertial time is expressed also in the propagation of light. This gives rise to a notion of clock—the light clock, which we can regard as a notion derived from the inertial time. The light clock can be seen as (...) a solution of the theory, which complies with the requirement that a clock to be so must have a rate that is independent from its past history. Contrary to Einstein’s view, we do not need the concept of “clock” as an independent concept. This implies, in particular, that we do not need to rely on the notions of atomic clock or atomic time in the theory of relativity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The sense of kairos is of time as having an event-like character. Fundamental here is a split between quantitative time and a qualitatively distinct moment. The decisive moment connects the kairological to crisis. By exploring the accounts of kairos in three contemporaries responding to the sense of crisis in 1920s Germany—Benjamin, Heidegger, and Tillich—this article shows the manner in action in the kairos can be understood as both responsive and non-opportunist. Themes such as the “tiger leap” (Benjamin), the “moment (...) of vision” (Heidegger), and the “shuddering” of time (Tillich) are analyzed to demonstrate how these accounts taken in dialogue with one another give an understanding of kairos, as a displacement and disruption of time as chronos and not simply as an interruption in chronological time. Such a disruption of chronological time is a necessary condition for responsible action, giving a measure also for the present. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics and Economies of Inquiry: Certeau, Theory, and the Art of PracticeTony Schirato (bio) and Jen Webb (bio)In this paper we will look at what Certeau, in The Practice of Everyday Life, calls “Theories of the Art of Practice.” Certeau is perhaps best known as a theorist of the ways in which everyday practices inhabit the institutions and sites of power and official culture, while not being in (...) any sense recuperable or explicable to these “proper places.” In “Theories of the Art of Practice” he concerns himself not with cultural practices themselves but, rather, with the specific relationship between theoretical discourse and the object of that discourse. In order to do this he takes as examples certain cultural theorists—most obviously Foucault and Bourdieu—whose work is strongly underpinned by an emphasis on the relation between discourse and practice. He offers a detailed consideration and critique of their theories of practice and the tactics those theorists use to escape the theory/practice dichotomy.In the first two paragraphs of “Theories of the Art of Practice,” Certeau identifies the two points which, taken together, constitute the broad narrative of this section of Practice. The first relates to the theoretical basis from which we can approach practice. “Everyday practices,” he writes:depend on a vast ensemble which is difficult to delimit but which we may provisionally designate as an ensemble of procedures. The latter are schemas of operations and of technical manipulations. On the basis of some recent and fundamental analyses (those of Foucault, Bourdieu, Vernant and Détienne, and others) it is possible, if not to define them, at least to clarify their functioning relative to discourse (or to “ideology,” as Foucault puts it), to the acquired (Bourdieu’s habitus), and to the form of time we call an occasion (the kairos discussed by Vernant and Détienne). These are different ways of locating a technicity of a certain type and at the same time situating the study of this technicity with respect to current trends in research.[43]An important issue here is Certeau’s critique of the extent to which each theorist applies a specific technicity (Foucault’s disciplinary procedures, Bourdieu’s habitus) in an attempt to delimit the field, to reduce the multiplicity of practice—or the theorizing of practice—to a singularity. As he points out in his essay on Nicholas of Cusa [“The Gaze” 6], such “ways of proceeding are subject to a common problematics,” because they inscribe a particular way of thinking and seeing and, in that process, risk excluding other ways of understanding. However, Cusa’s praxis: [End Page 86]does not presuppose a language proper to theory, an autonomous metalanguage that would provide a distinct linguistic space for speculation.... A task related to each singularity liberates, as it were, and develops... the “impulsion” which is integral to each and which is revealed to be infinite by the very impossibility of finding a hierarchical unity among singularities.[“The Gaze” 7]What Certeau looks for in the work of Bourdieu and Foucault is the moment, or the “impulsion,” which allows a theoretical engagement with practice. If practice can’t be called up, defined, or finally explicated, what can be done is to plot the relationships between power and its structures, logics, places, and discourse and the objects of power (practices) it seeks to identify and regulate. This allows us to identify both how power seeks to exclude the heterogeneity that is practice and the ways in which practice, despite these acts of exclusion and regulation, leaves its mark on official places (discourses, institutions, the objective structures of cultural fields). What Certeau does is to explore how others (Foucault and Bourdieu in particular, Vernant and Détienne) have explored this terrain.The second move Certeau makes is to contextualize those theories of practice, not so much as metadiscourses or generalized maps but as practices themselves, specific to a time and place and informed both by their theoretical antecedents and by the politics, logics, and discourses of the field(s) within which they operate. This allows Certeau to exemplify both how bodies of theory (as well as intellectual fields) come about and develop and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Writing and Authority in Early ChinaLothar von FalkenhausenWriting and Authority in Early China. By Mark Edward Lewis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Pp. vii + 544. Hardcover $92.50. Paper $31.95.Writing and Authority in Early China is a forceful and sparklingly original work in which Mark Edward Lewis explores the role of writing and texts in the transformation of political authority during the Warring States, Qin, (...) and Western Han periods. Following in the footsteps of the author's well-received first book1 and his magisterial contribution to the Cambridge History of Ancient China,2Writing and Authority establishes Lewis as the premier Western historian of the crucial centuries surrounding the unification of China under a centrally administered empire in 221 B.C. The book's complex, comprehensive, and coherent argument is informed by a variety of Western theoretical approaches, but it principally emanates from a close reading of the full record of transmitted texts and recently excavated manuscripts on [End Page 127] bamboo or wooden slips. The inclusion of the latter class of sources, beset with treacherous problems of decipherment, is still unusual in mainstream sinological scholarship and indicates the author's supreme confidence in his philological skills. With a firm hand, undaunted by the multifarious nature of his materials, Lewis guides the reader to some fundamental themes in recent sinology, opening manifold novel perspectives along the way. Even when dealing with well-known texts, he often proposes striking reinterpretations.In his Introduction, Lewis enumerates six main functions of writing in ancient China: enforcing state authority; creating text-based communities and "public spheres"; transcending the confines of space, time, and human mortality; fashioning figures of authority in the past; standardizing specialized technical terminology; and encrypting secret meanings. In Lewis' own words, "the culminating role of writing in the period, and the key to its importance in imperial China, was the creation of parallel realities within texts that claimed to depict the entire world" (p. 4). This ultimately led to the formation of the Confucian canon as a "textual double of the polity" that could survive cataclysmic changes of regimes.In chapter 1, "Writing the State," Lewis points out that before the Warring States period Chinese writing occurred exclusively in religious contexts. After circa 500 B.C., written documents gradually came to be used in the administration of government and trade. Both in their details of formulation and in the implication that anything committed to writing was thereby supernaturally validated, these new types of documents exhibit pervasive continuity with the earlier kinds of texts used in ritual communication with the ancestral spirits. Such continuity is also reflected in the rise of religious beliefs in a netherworld governed by a bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative processes parallel to those of the world of the living. According to Lewis, "the most important modification in the shift to an administrative polity [in the Warring States] was the extension of writing to new elements of the population. The attributes of the Zhou nobility... were transferred to the common people in the administrative documents of the new state. This widening range of inscription into the state order altered the social meaning of being recorded from a sign of power to one of subjection" (p. 13).Warring States rulers were cast in the role not of the authors of texts but of the authority behind them. Administrative and legal texts were concerned, ultimately, with the proper naming of phenomena, a process that had to adapt itself continually to the changes of the times. The authority of rulers came to encompass both human society and the natural world. "Whereas local and central administration were largely created through reworking and rewriting the ritual bases of the old Zhou order by means of a rationalizing cosmology, the re-invention of rulership drew on the contemporary religious realm and what is sometimes described as shamanism to provide images of cosmic power" (p. 42). Lewis illustrates the mechanics for applying these universal principles of rulership by a comprehensive analysis of the Zhou li (or Zhou guan), emphasizing the cosmological arrangement of the ideal government described therein and the dual administrative and religious dimensions of... (shrink)

The sense of _kairos_ is of time as having an event-like character. Fundamental here is a split between quantitative time and a qualitatively distinct moment. The decisive moment connects the kairological to crisis. By exploring the accounts of _kairos_ in three contemporaries responding to the sense of crisis in 1920s Germany—Benjamin, Heidegger, and Tillich—this article shows the manner in action in the _kairos_ can be understood as both responsive and non-opportunist. Themes such as the "tiger leap" (Benjamin), the "moment of (...) vision" (Heidegger), and the "shuddering" of time (Tillich) are analyzed to demonstrate how these accounts taken in dialogue with one another give an understanding of _kairos_, as a displacement and disruption of time as _chronos_ and not simply as an interruption in chronological time. Such a disruption of chronological time is a necessary condition for responsible action, giving a measure also for the present. (shrink)

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, ‘The Greeks had a word for it’, the literal truth is that they did! Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important distinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to (...) the unusual, pregnant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life. (shrink)

Despite the frivolous note implied in the popular expression, ‘The Greeks had a word for it’, the literal truth is that they did! Time and again we find reflected in the terminology developed by these ancient seekers after wisdom, an attention to important distinctions and a faithfulness to the details of actual experience which are truly remarkable. The Greek thinkers had, as every classical scholar and student of Greek philosophy knows, a finely developed philosophical language, one sensitive no less to (...) the unusual, pregnant experience than to the familiar details of ordinary life. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 218–223 Vijay Prashad. Arab Spring, Libyan Winter . Oakland: AK Press. 2012. 271pp, pbk. $14.95 ISBN-13: 978-1849351126. Nearly a decade ago, I sat in a class entitled, quite simply, “Corporations,” taught by Vijay Prashad at Trinity College. Over the course of the semester, I was amazed at the extent of Prashad’s knowledge, and the complexity and erudition of his style. He has since authored a number of classic books that have gained recognition throughout the world. The Darker (...) Nations , a peoples’ history of the Third World, sent defibrillating shockwaves through an academic world that had almost forgotten the epic scope and historic dignity of the non-aligned movement and post-colonial struggles. In his recent, award-winning work, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter , Prashad delves into his capacious knowledge of the Third World to excavate the discourses and narratives surrounding the upheavals of 2011. “Revolutions have no specific timetable,” states Prashad in the opening line of this exciting and provocative look at contemporary events. Instantly, an atmosphere of suspense emerges. The reader is alerted to the problem of history. Does the making of history then involve a suspension of historical time, or is it a continuous narrative structure into which events must eventually be integrated? Arab Spring, Libyan Winter shows that the answer to the question, “How is history made?” lies just as easily in the asking. The first half of the book works through the events that transpired to bring about the explosive popular uprisings of Arab Spring: Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain. But the events are not put together in a cohesive, chronological fashion. Using an uncommonly gripping style more akin to the folk-story motif of the djeli than to traditionally Orientalist academia, Prashad suspends a given situation, points out its components, and traces back the characters and genealogies that define each link before resuming a narrative. Every moment is an end to itself, and an origin of something different. Thus, the making of history becomes the suspension of its own progress, it’s catastrophic 'stability,' in a process of differentiation through inclusion. Empirically, one might suggest that history is a condition of time, and by extension, of the subject, but history is also an eminent producer of the Subject and her concept of time through memory and narrative. Hence, history is often overdetermined by a dominant narrative of the sovereign. The apparently chaotic composition of Prashad’s historicity is, then, an interstitial morphology of resistance. It illustrates that the time to act for the revolutionary lies in the gaps within the dominant historical realities. It points out the sorties of signifiers constituting nothing in the obliterated ruins of history. Through such illuminations, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter breaks through “the surface of history” to elaborate revolution’s snapping synapses, exploding interruptions and breaches, connecting flows. Messianic Politics It is tempting to think, 'History is either singular, or it is diffuse. It is either one coherent factual narrative, or it is comprised of the aletheia of the multitude.' Yet the reader finds Prashad examining the structure of history on multiple levels. For Prashad, world history is shaped by geographically defined political movements, such as communism or national liberation, with historical agents like the working class for the former and the nationalist militant for the latter. Religion, however, is another matter: “Religion has an unshakable eschatology which a post-utopian secular politics lacks.” Within the telos of religion, there appears on the horizon the image of Benjamin’s thoughts on messianic time—time as “a small fissure in the continuous catastrophe,” a break with history, may contain an ultimate redemption of the human beyond the political power struggle. Succoring the split between geo-political and utopian-religious (messianic) time in the context of Arab Spring, Prashad indicates that the base of “the deep desire and commitment to some form of democracy” is forged by the affinity between eschatological Islamist politics with the People. To think about the Subject of messianic time in the context of the lack of a “coherent timetable” for emancipatory politics, it is perhaps best to return to the modern tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr., whose prefigurative blending of liberation theology and emancipatory politics became most important during his works of 1963, the climactic year of “The Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” the March on Washington, and the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church. In “The Letter,” King states the point bluntly: Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” in view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word “wait!” It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” The timing of rebellious action must not be a part of history. It must change history. The kairos appears spontaneous and untimely in its convulsive, shocking presence, yet it is, deeper still, a path, a longue durée , forged through diligent and rigorous praxis. King put a finer point on the path of historic liberation in his declaration in his 1963 speech at Western Michigan University: “[T]ime is neutral.... Somewhere along the way we must see that time will never solve the problem alone but that we must help time. Somewhere we must see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels on inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be co-workers with God. Without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social stagnation. We must always help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.” Time, then, exists in “the neutral,” while action must turn to the kairos , not only of taking time, but taking the right time. By turning our relation to time into kairos , we move time from its context within history to a duration between histories—the longue dure?e of Messianic time. The implementation of neutrality in this context suggests a broad space of time to extend through the valley of positive and negative. In Roland Barthes’s lectures from 1978, the neutral takes place in this minimal distance of non-conflict that exists outside of two extremes. It is, in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “the non-general, the non-generic, as well as the non-specific.” For Blanchot, the neutrality of time permeates life as death, impassive and beyond control; such is the neutrality of messianic time, which permeates the charge of history, changing the "I" into the "one." The neutrality of time therefore implicates history in a case against extremism, showing that the work of the radical is not to tend to any particular side, but to have the time to navigate through the terrible terrain of history by altering its course, its patterns and rhythms of movement, connection, sociality. Hence, one does not simply “make history,” one alters the course of history in accordance to “the right time.” The historical path toward emerging power is transmitted as a gesture to the outside of history, against history; a gesture as simple as reaching out. Thus a counterhistory, to use Foucault’s term, is brought forward as the guide of time past a point of no return, a Rubicon, the point where the normal path of history falls to the past. The subject, who must be the only true agent of history, facilitates time through helpfulness, and both the Subject and her history become decentered in relation to one another. Yet history negates the neutrality of time. As Barthes discloses, although the neutral is the “thought and practice of the nonconflictual, it is nevertheless bound to assertion, to conflict, in order to make itself heard.” Engaged with history, time is charged with a destiny, and becomes an opposition. As Prashad insists, “For Arab lands, the events of early 2011 were not the inauguration of a new history, but the continuation of an unfinished struggle that is a hundred years old.” The emergence of the Subject during Arab Spring did not conceive of a new history, but changed the path of history toward a different destiny. “Historical grievances combined with inflationary pressures now met with the subjective sense that victory might be at hand—this was not simply a protest to scream into the wind, but a protest to actually remove autocrats from their positions of authority. The facts of resistance had given way to the expectation of revolutionary change.” The negativity of this charge toward “revolutionary destiny” rendered control, as a positive force, seriously lacking. The lack of control lies in the problem that the Subject is not totally detemporalized or timeless, but untimely in her presence. The Subject is untimely, because her work is visionary, and it is only through such visionary work that the Rubicon can be crossed. Still, the crossing of this border is haunted by anxiety over an impending disaster that lays in wait. It is only through the form of what Benjamin calls divine violence, captivated not with the justice of the means, but the ends—the transformation of history—that a revelation of history’s traumatic foundations can be liberated, and patterns and rhythms of time developed throughout obscured traditions awakened. In this situation, the Subject appears to be outside of right, but setting the state to rights. Because her position is correct, in-so-far as the rebelling subject rebels due to a lack of recognition, her representation appears outside of the norm, which is mistaken as right. Therefore, such visionary work must be carried out through obscured traditions, underground, away from the surveillance of empire. Explaining his method from the start along the lines of Marx’s metaphor of the mole, Prashad insists, “It is the burrowing that is essential, not simply the emergence onto the surface of history.” Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a book on uncharted networks of time, spread out over the 252 pages like an elaborate spider’s web of passages intertwining with and overwhelming the machinery of the state. Although untimely, Arab Spring was not a flash in the pan, or a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Prashad notes that the government’s suspension of these tools led to further radicalism by furthering communications through face-to-face encounters. In existential terms, Arab Spring might be thought of as a revolution of Being over techne , an uprising of the unchartable, infinite potential of the Other. The name of this Other is found in Chance. The faith of the revolution lies in the proper decentering of the subject, its giving to the Other of time, for only with respect to time does history actually appear on the horizon of the subject, rather than as an imposition. This time of historical agency appears as a moment when anything can happen—a revolutionary truth event where everything comes into question while being realized in its Otherness as a community of the people begins anew in the streets amidst discourse, friendship, reconfigurations of hegemony, and a becoming of a constituent power. Throwing a wrench into the gears of the “cobwebbed tradition” of Orientalism, the decentering of history in Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is a defining quality of its impassioned revolutionary cry. But perhaps the most paradigmatic points of the book emerge from the unexpected voices. To make the connection between the particular manifestations of revolutionary demands to the general historic terms of revolution, Prashad quotes an anonymous young Egyptian in Tahrir Square, who reminds us, “[T]he French Revolution took a very long time so the people could eventually get their rights.” Far from timelessness, the historicization of Arab Spring must exist precisely within the most uncanny appearance of time, as something that does not appear to come from the natural state of time as we know it, but in arriving has completely transformed the way that we understand time. Strange Monsters Revolution is never as simple as a revolt from below against a rusting structure of elites trying to remain in power. As with the French Revolution, Arab Spring consisted of complex familial ties, outside interests, and religious factions fighting alongside, often in awkward juxtaposition to, liberals, working class parties, farmers, and students. It is perhaps because of this historically difficult and incongruous composition that the Arabic word for revolution is thawra , referring to the image of the bull, or thawr , which has religious significance as a pagan deity for the Ancient Semitic tribes and Cartheginians. If Daniel Guérin was correct in saying, “Anarchism and Marxism drink from the same spring,” then it is quite a different oasis that drove the thirsty beast of revolution through what Prashad calls, “the Libyan labyrinth.” Recalling Bataille’s Acéphale, the intestinal labyrinth gains significance as the mode of metabolism and rumination in which, “(the Acephale) has lost himself, loses me with him, and in which I discover myself as him, in other words, as a monster.” Unraveling the discourse of the revolution, the flows of power and hegemony—from Qaddafi’s nationalist coup in 1969 to the wars with Chad from 1978 to 1987, the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s to, finally, the War on Terror—we find that the metabolic process of Libyan Winter ends in the production of oil. In a process of what Prashad calls “involution,” Qaddafi’s bellicose policies, along with his attempts to nationalize Islam together with oil, mutated the source of his power, turning his house against itself. Already a divided nation, with its two major cities on opposite geographic sides of the country, Libya became split between two opposed political powers—liberal reformists and staunch nationalists—as Qaddafi’s political disengagement manifested through what can only be described in psychoanalytic terms as a recursive passage a l’act (mysteriously calling Wikipedia “Kleenex,” declaring that opponents drank hallucinogens with their instant coffee, and so on). Prashad declares, “The mercurial style that Qaddafi adopted was not about his personality alone, but also a leader’s natural response to a system that relied upon power brokers whose own loyalty… did not have any ideological commitment to the system.” As in the case of other nations during Arab Spring, the true expression of revolt was an outward exposition of what had inwardly been happening in microcosmic societies throughout the realm—from indigenous tribes to political parties, for a century, the people, partly motivated by (and in resistance to) economic impositions of development, had been changing the traditional social compositions and participating in what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls, “the relative autonomy of the movement from the leaders.” It was this empowerment of political reconfigurations taking place under the context of new democratic assemblages that shocked the elites and evoked such a powerful response. Unlike Qaddafi’s awkward policy choices and rants, real acts of power from the West were clear and decisive. Prashad sets the stages of war and diplomacy, far removed from the deserts, mountains, and cities that forged the backdrop of popular politics. Taking place under the now-classic architecture of the “four pillars” of US interests—oil, the War on Terror, Israel, and the circumvention of Iranian hegemony—we find elites rubbing elbows in “Heliopolist cocktail parties and hushed conferences in Kasr al-Ittihadiya” as well as the Concorde-Lafayette hotel in Paris, which provides the setting for a meeting of anti-Qaddafi figures consolidating their power. These scenes are buttressed with the careful portraiture of key historical actors. As Prashad brings the stage of history to life, we find the diplomats and liberals like Frank Wisner, whose career has brought him from Enron in the late 1990s to the Obama Administration, under the aegis of which he was meeting with Mubarak about military support during Arab Spring. We spy the provocateurs, for instance, gauche cavalier , Bernard Henri-Levy, who telephones Sarkozy from Benghazi about the need for more NATO air strikes. We follow the rebel military establishment as it suffers mysterious deaths and even more mysterious assents (like that of apparent CIA cohort, Khalifa Hifter). In each of these intriguing characters, we find different representations of the security state biopolitique: an oil-injected reification that drives Arab Spring from the resentment of rising food prices to the brink of implosion in Libyan Winter. Reminiscent of the scenes of Cold War soirées represented in old Bond films, the aristocratic fight for oil against democracy that was Libyan Winter presents a harsh truth that the new global crisis is simply the continuation of the old history: the global exploitation of capitalism waged against the imagination of the people. As Benjamin laments, “The labyrinth is the right path for the person who always arrives early enough at his destination. This destination is the marketplace.” Yet, “(t)he labyrinth is the habitat of… a humanity (a class) which does not want to know where its destiny is taking it.” Thus, the labyrinth leads, like the desert, only further into itself. As Blanchot explains, “The desert is even less certain than the world; it is never anything but the approach to the desert.” Only the visionary can take time out of the involution toward oblivion. It is here, in this approach to and escape from history, that we find ourselves within Benjamin’s Golgotha, Blanchot’s desert: A space of indeterminate uncertainty where we become familiar only with our own exile. Blanchot writes, “For the moderated and moderate man, the room, the desert, and the world are strictly determined places. For the man of the desert and the labyrinth, devoted to the error of a journey necessarily a little longer than his life, the same space will be truly infinite, even if he knows that it is not, all the more so since he knows it.” The desert, as allegory, provides an eschatology, a mortality in the destiny of Arab Spring. But any allegory of nature might lead to a labyrinthine eschatology (for example, in Bachelard, the forest presents "a limitless world"); the prescience of the untimely is always an uncanny acceptance of the infinite within the finite—the outside of what is understood. Transgenerational and occupied with the image of the future, the untimely makes otherness its home as it proceeds toward liberation. In the work of helping time navigate this dangerous passage of history, Prashad illustrates that the more violent break with history may have occurred in the peaceable struggles of Tahrir Square, and not in the military clashes of Qaddafi with his former Generals who defected to the CIA and NATO countries. It might be possible to suggest, then, that in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, the historical subject of the people was drawn together in a Dionysian dance of different rhythms in the marvelous realm of the ancients, while we fear that the case of Libya suggests an Apollonian future where time, itself, may lay dying under the machinic hand of history. The properly Nietzschean inversion would follow: time is dead, for history has killed it. Yet, if time is dead, struck down in Golgotha, exposed in the desert, mauled by the thawra , it is only in the present sense that it is rendered impossible outside of the context into which the untimely has thrown us. Thus, if history becomes an art of revolution, life as being-towards-death (death as the provocation of the neutrality of time) becomes what Benjamin calls “the allegory of resurrection” through the glorious ruins of history. Prashad ends his work with a rousing finale: “The time of the impossible has presented itself. In Egypt, where the appetite for the possibilities of the future are greatest, the people continue to assert themselves into Tahrir Square and other places, pushing to reinvigorate a Revolution that must not die… For them the slogan is simple: Down with the Present. Long live the Future. May it be so.&rdquo. (shrink)

Verzameling filosofische verhandelingen over tijd onder de titel Kairos = de juiste tijd of het juiste moment in het Grieks.

Kairos has been a key concept in medicine for millennia and is frequently understood as “the right time” in relation to treatment. In this study we scrutinize kairos in the context of diagnostics. This has become highly topical as technological developments have caused diagnostics to be performed ever earlier in the disease development. Detecting risk factors, precursors, and predictors of disease (in biomarkers, pre-disease, and pre-pre-disease) has resulted in too early diagnoses, i.e., overdiagnoses. Nonetheless, despite vast advances in science and (...) technology, diagnoses also come too late. Accordingly, timing diagnostics right is crucial. In this article we start with giving a brief overview of the etymology and general use of the concepts of kairos and diagnosis. Then we delimit kairos in diagnostics by analysing “too early” and “too late” diagnosis and by scrutinizing various phases of diagnostics. This leads us to define kairos of diagnostics as the time when there is potential for sufficient information for making a diagnosis that is most helpful for the person. It allows us to conclude that kairos is as important in diagnostics as in therapeutics. (shrink)

For the last ten years, within molecular life sciences, the reproducibility crisis discourse has been embodied as a crisis of trust in scientific images. Beyond the contentious perception of “questionable research practices” associated with a digital turn in the production of images, this paper highlights the transformations of gel electrophoresis as a family of experimental techniques. Our aim is to analyze the evolving epistemic status of generated images and its connection with a crisis of trust in images within that field.From (...) the 1980s to the 2000s, we identify two key innovations (precast gels and gel docs) leading to a “two‐tiered” gel electrophoresis with different standardization procedures, different epistemic statuses of the produced images and different ways of generating (dis)trust in images. The first tier, exemplified by differential gel electrophoresis (DIGE), is characterized by specialized devices processing images as quantitative data. The second tier, exemplified by polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE), is described as a routine technique making use of image as qualitative “virtual witnessing.” The difference between these two tiers is particularly apparent in the ways images are processed, even though both tiers involve image digitization. Our account thus highlights different views on reproducibility within the two tiers. Comparability of images is insisted upon in the first tier while traceability is expected in the second tier. It is striking that these differences occur not only within the same scientific field, but even within the same family of experimental techniques. In the second tier, digitization entails distrust, whereas it implies a collective sentiment of trust in the first tier. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Chronos and Kairos Chronos and Scientific Time Climate and Garden Aesthetics Subjective Time Objective or Shared Time Cyclical Time The Garden's Times Moving Through the Garden Experiences of Time in the Garden Notes.

In nontheistic moral traditions, there is a typical ethical conundrum concerning the relation between cosmic order and human agency. Within those traditions, it is generally recognized that the universe has its own order and history that are independent of human will. A moral discourse has to find space to accommodate human agency in the midst of the iron grid of cosmic law. Both Confucius and Aurelius use the concept of timeliness (kairos) to resolve the difficult issue. But their philosophies take (...) on divergent paths. By studying their resolutions of the issue, we will be able to appreciate the distinctive nature of their nontheistic moral narratives. (shrink)

This essay seeks a philosophical understanding of the nature of kairos that, in turn, discloses the nature of philosophizing. This essay claims that the kairos of philosophy is dialogue, and that dialogue is kairological in two ways: (1) Dialogue is not just a phenomenon that occurs in chronological time but, rather, imposes its own time in order to see how life (or being) itself is disclosed to us; (2) dialogue is kairological because it denotes a moment in which we are (...) pushed into the open, which demands our receptivity and response. Section I explains kairos as “circumstance” in Aristotle, as a required point of view in Heidegger, and as related to the beginning of creation in Schelling. Section II understands dialogue, as the kairos of philosophy, as a crisis—a breaking away from an ordinary understanding of and experience in the world. This destabilizing experience resonates with the untimeliness of philosophizing. (shrink)

This essay develops a Rahnerian view of kairos and proposes its contemporary utility in addressing the multiple prophetic calls to action in our media-saturated environment. In Rahner’s theology, kairos is the time of grace and opportunity, inaugurated by the event of Jesus Christ, in which each human person must accept or reject God’s loving self-communication. Because the chronos of daily life takes place within the kairos of Jesus Christ, there is kairos in every moment of chronos. Thus, the typical depiction (...) of chronos and kairos is inverted. Instead of occasional moments of kairos interrupting the ongoing stream of chronos, Rahner portrays chronos as set within the larger reality of kairos. Our chronos takes place within the kairos of Jesus Christ. Such a view does not mitigate or prioritize the many prophetic calls contemporary Christians receive. It can, however, place them in appropriate theological context of the history of God that succeeds. Kairos is a reality created by God’s salvific activity and an opportunity to participate in the salvific love of God. (shrink)

The recent wave of interest in the “theological-political” has focused scholarly attention on the constellation of ideas associated with “messianic time.” The term kairós belongs to this constellation, and Giacomo Marramao’s brief but ambitious text of the same name both proposes and performs a “kairological” reconfiguration of the close relationship between philosophy and time. Marramao’s argument for the productive potential of “cosmic disorientation” and contingency will merit the attention of historians interested in Benjamin’s blend of messianism and historical materialism, and (...) of anyone who is intrigued by the prospect of a messianism without apocalypticism. (shrink)

The Greek term kairós signifies on the one hand an opportune moment and time for decision-making and on the other hand the unpredictable yet expected moment of Christ's return on the Judgment Day according to Paul. The goal of this essay is to establish the connection between kairós and Heidegger's central concept of,,Ereignis", which he developed in his later years. The Freiburg lectures on the phenomenology of religious life from the early 1920s and the posthumously published works from the 1930s (...) and 1940s will serve to illustrate how the tradition of the Greek and Christian kairós influenced Heidegger's development of the idea of possibly overcoming the chronometric and metaphysical understanding of time as,,Jetztzeit". He was thus able to deny the ontological privilege of present and presence. The role of Paul is decisive for Heidegger's thinking: the factual experience of the first Christian communities has not only had an external influence on the,,Daseinsanalytik"; it has also influenced the entire development of,,Seinsgeschichte" and has had a significant impact on Heidegger's last attempt to define,,Seinsgeschichte" itself through the,,Ereignis" beyond any ontological perspective. (shrink)

The predominant contemporary concept of time is arguably measurable time, promoted as being in accordance with science. This is commonly understood as the time of physics, as, for instance, E. A. Milne claims in an article from 1950 on the modern conception of time, contrasting this with Plato's description of time as the “moving image of eternity”. The prevalence of an emphasis on measurability within such a conception of time is hard to avoid, although this can be nuanced somewhat. In (...) this article I turn to the ancient Greek notion of kairos in order to find another approach to the question of conceptions of temporality. A main objective is to indicate what this concept signifies in terms of adjusting to circumstances, catching the right moment and paying attention to due measure. I also briefly consider Baltasar Gracián's notions of festina lente and détencion in an attempt to show how this suggests a way in which we may be able to develop the ability to do the right thing at the right moment. (shrink)

In this article we reflect on the phenomenon of waiting, interpreted in our own context, but drawn from a text by Heidegger. The text implies that the bored person is waiting for the moment in which something will, as they presume, dissipate their boredom. We will proceed to show the internal structure of time as a lived experience of the phenomenon of waiting while bored, and how this time is existentially configured as pain. To do this, the temporal structure of (...) such waiting will be examined phenomenologically to demonstrate how it transforms the existence of whoever is waiting while bored. (shrink)

This essay seeks a philosophical understanding of the nature of kairos that, in turn, discloses the nature of philosophizing. This essay claims that the kairos of philosophy is dialogue, and that dialogue is kairological in two ways: (1) Dialogue is not just a phenomenon that occurs in chronological time but, rather, imposes its own time in order to see how life (or being) itself is disclosed to us; (2) dialogue is kairological because it denotes a moment in which we are (...) pushed into the open, which demands our receptivity and response. Section I explains kairos as “circumstance” in Aristotle, as a required point of view in Heidegger, and as related to the beginning of creation in Schelling. Section II understands dialogue, as the kairos of philosophy, as a crisis—a breaking away from an ordinary understanding of and experience in the world. This destabilizing experience resonates with the untimeliness of philosophizing. (shrink)

Die levinassche Erschließung von Gerechtigkeit als dem Äußersten zu Denkenden fordert eine Reflexion darüber heraus, wie Gerechtigkeit jeweils wieder in der konkreten Begegnung mit den Anderen verwirklicht wird. Wie ist die erhoffte Gerechtigkeit des Einen mit dem konkret werdenden Ethischen durch die Handlung des Anderen zum Zeitpunkt des Geschehens verstrickt? Diese »Verstrickung« wird als eine Komplikation verstanden, welche die beruhigte Einsamkeit des modernen Subjekts stört. Dieses störende Ereignis der Verantwortung lässt sich nicht als Ergebnis eines Kalküls zwischen Verbotenem und Erlaubtem (...) begreifen. Denn die wirkliche Gerechtigkeit geschieht nur in der konkreten geschichtlichen Handlung, die die theoretischen Widersprüche, die sich in einem zeitlos-idealistischen Denken zu geben scheinen, übersteigt. (shrink)

The time of art: Negri and Virno on kairòs, language, and creation. Negri and Virno aim to establish a concept of art that demonstrates a difference within a contemporary society that they see as completely dominated by the market. A time regime presenting the spheres of work and non-work as separate, structures human life. Yet in fact, work today stretches beyond the borders of both spheres. Labor power consists mainly in creativity, communication, and cooperation. Virno and Negri state that a (...) market-oriented time regime that perpetuates a divide between labor time and non-labor time presents itself as a dismeasure. It attempts to objectively measure and structure something that is really a dynamic and intersubjective matter, namely the immaterial traits that are also potentially productive of life in general, and that are productive of art. When Negri and Virno call the work of art a singular mode of labor power, they imply that it deploys the elements of labor power in a manner that is different from market-oriented labor, that it exploits their capacity to produce life itself in a meaningful way. Yet neither Negri nor Virno puts forth a broad concept of art that embodies the potential that they attribute to it. This article aims to extend Negri’s and Virno’s proposals and present a conceptualization of the nature of the artwork that would posit the difference in relation to dismeasure of the market as Negri and Virno conceive it. (shrink)

Cornélius Castoriadis fut un libre penseur. Il a réactualisé le kairos : ce temps de l'action politique et de l'imaginaire créatif. Cet ouvrage est consacré à l'analyse et à l'interprétation de son apport majeur concernant le kairos : ce moment propice et opportun, qui est le temps de l'acteur et de l'action. Son oeuvre est porteuse d'espoir ; il ne s'est pas attardé sur les côtés obscurs de la société et ses souffrances, mais s'est préoccupé avant tout de sa libération. (...) Pour lui, l'anthropos est à la recherche de la maîtrise du temps, et il possède un imaginaire créatif. Castoriadis a ainsi rétabli la possibilité que possède l'être humain de pouvoir innover et intervenir dans sa société en la modifiant. (shrink)

To relax the apparent tension between nonlocal hidden variables and relativity, we propose that the observable proper time is not the same quantity as the usual proper-time parameter appearing in local relativistic equations. Instead, the two proper times are related by a nonlocal rescaling parameter proportional to |ψ|2, so that they coincide in the classical limit. In this way particle trajectories may obey local relativistic equations of motion in a manner consistent with the appearance of nonlocal quantum (...) correlations. To illustrate the main idea, we first present two simple toy models of local particle trajectories with nonlocal time, which reproduce some nonlocal quantum phenomena. After that, we present a realistic theory with a capacity to reproduce all predictions of quantum theory. (shrink)