[ita]Completando un precedente articolo si analizza la concezione gnoseologica di Maurice Blondel, di cui viene respinta una interpretazione relativistica, pur riconoscendo in lui alcuni limiti, in particolare una eccessiva diffidenza verso il concetto. [eng] Completing a previous article, the gnoseological conception of Maurice Blondel is analyzed, and a relativistic interpretation of her is rejected, even if some of its limits are recognized, in particular an excessive diffidence towards the concept.

The article intends to analyse the problem of the coexistence of opposite and alternative “comprehensive doc- trines” in today's Western society, on the basis of a comparison between the thought of Schmitt, Böckenförde, Habermas, Rawls and Charles Taylor. In this regard the article proposes a possible solution to avoid, on the one hand, the intolerant goal of a total homogeneity, and on the other a naive and aproblematic acceptance of a relativistic multiculturalism.

[ita] Blondel offre una prospettiva gnoseologica complementare al tomismo: se quest'ultimo sottolinea troppo la forza del concetto, Blondel da parte sua la relativizza un po' troppo. Tra le due prospettive occorre quindi cercare una sintesi. -/- [eng] Blondel offers a gnoseological perspective complementary to tomism: if the latter excessively underlines the strength of the concept, Blondel instead underestimates it. Between the two perspectives it is therefore necessary to seek a synthesis.

This paper is about a discussion between two Italian philosophers: Gustavo Bontadini and Alessandro Emiliani. The first object of human knowledge is or not immediate (/intuitive)?

von Balthasar was one of the most important theologians of the 20th century, its theological production was creative and original, but it is also a linked to De Lubac and the Nouveux Théologies.

De Lubac, a French theologian, underlines the theme of freedom, referring to St. Augustine against an intellectualistic rationalism prevailed in post-Tridentine Catholic thought.

Un fattore per giungere a una certezza esistenzialmente stringente è l'intersoggettività, che non annulla il valore della personale competenza al vero, ma lo integra, dandogli una piena efficacia. Il dialogo dunque, un dialogo teso alla oggettività del vero, come ingrediente necessario della certezza.

Blondel was attacked as relativist by neotomists such as Garrigou-Lagrange: here we explain how his conception of truth is not relativistic. [in italian].

Is the material world opaque to its Meaning or it guest in itself a Sense that somehow is manifest in its own concrete appearance? Here, also following Teilhard de Chardin, Von Balthasar and Luigi Giussani, this second thesis is supported.

Thoughts for a fully realistic metaphysics, beyond the neoscolastical abstractness.

Medieval philosophy is a very rich thought and deserves to be studied with more attention and more time than they do in schools.

Unlike many neotomists, the evaluation of modernity in De Lubac is not totally negative. The value of the subject, as in Pico della Mirandola, is positive. The sense of justice, as in Proudhon, is positive. A new value of the material world is positive. The problem is not to absolutize these values, such as in Comte or in Marx or in Nietzsche.

In a society that becomes more and more multicultural, is it still possible to guarantee harmonious coexistence, based on shared values? Or do we have to resign ourselves to the idea of an inevitable clash, or at least an inevitable incommunicability, between "us" and "them"? This question refers to this other: is there objectively an essential commonality among all human beings? And is human reason capable of grasping truly universal truths and values, therefore universally shared? In this text, the affirmative (...) response goes hand in hand with the thesis that the objective truth must be sought collaboratively, as the title says: with a dia -logue in which each subject does not renounce the logos, that is, his inexhaustible competence to know the truth. (shrink)

[ita] Henri de Lubac, che ha dedicato alla Sacra Scrittura la poderosa “ Esegesi medioevale”, ho sottolineato l'importanza della costituzione conciliare “Dei Verbum” che recupera l'idea originaria della Rivelazione come rivelazione non di tanti “articoli di fede”, atomicamente concepiti, ma dell'unica Persona del Verbo incarnato. Per cui credere non è aderire a tante verità frammentate, ma aderire alla Presenza di Cristo, il Verbo fattosi carne. [en] Henri de Lubac, who dedicated the "Medieval exegesis" to sacred writing, underlined the importance of (...) the conciliatory constitution "Dei Verbum", which rediscovers the original idea of revelation as revelation not of several "articles of faith", atomically conceived, but of the living Person of the Incarnate Verb. Believing does not mean adhering to many fragmented truths, but in the presence of Christ. (shrink)

The Dominican Garrigou-Lagrange contested the definition of truth proposed by Maurice Blondel as relativistic and modernistic. That definition (adaequatio realis mentis et vitae) influenced a lot of theologians of Nouvelle Théologie, stressing an existential sense of truth.

Henri de Lubac is not a philosopher, but has some well -thought out philosophical beliefs, many of which derived from Blondel.

L'uomo non si può compiere, per il teologo francese Henri de Lubac, se non in Dio, sia Origine (creatore) e Fine ultimo. Qualunque meta finita quindi è destinata a rivelarsi come non appagante. Lo sostenevano già non solo Agostino e i Padri della Chiesa, ma anche Tommaso d'Aquino , col concetto di “desiderium naturale videndi Deum”, poi dimenticato dai tomisti moderni, e riscoperto appunto da de Lubac.

Although revolutionary, Teilhard de Chardin's true thought was not contradictory with the Christian dogma. This is what Henri de Lubac, authoritative interpreter of Teilhard, claims. In this article we report its essential theses.

[ita] L'articolo analizza la concezione della grazia nel pensiero del teologo milanese Carlo Colombo. Egli affronta tale tema con la consueta tendenza alla sintesi e alla moderazione, confrontando soprattutto le tesi di Tommaso d'Aquino e del Molina e adottando una soluzione che salvi al tempo stesso la giustizia di Dio e il suo essere Mistero ineffabile. -/- [eng] The article analyzes the conception of grace in the thought of the Milanese theologian Carlo Colombo. He deals with this theme with the (...) usual tendency to synthesis and moderation, above all comparing the theses of Tommaso d'Aquino and Molina and adopting a solution that at the same time saves the justice of God and his being ineffable mystery. (shrink)

Perché la filosofia moderna (post-medioevale) si è progressivamente allontanata dal realismo, dalla tradizionale idea di verità come conformità (_adaequatio_) alla realtà. Vi è sia una (sofferta) reazione agli eccessi dogmatici (e potenzialmente intolleranti) del tipo di realismo medioevale, sia una volontà di sottrarsi, sottraendosi all'oggettività del finito, alla dipendenza da Dio, Oggettività suprema.

Between faith and reason there is no opposition or contradiction, but possible harmony. On the one hand, God don't want that his intelligent creatures walk in the dark. On the other hand, however, he wants to be loved freely by his intelligent creatures, and therefore does not force us to believe in Him.

Accept or refuse psychoanalysis, from a theological point of view? If a materialistic and pansexualist anthropology is unacceptable, psychoanalysis still offers valid elements for a certain level of the human being.

[ita] L'articolo analizza la concezione di verità in Tommaso d'Aquino, di cui si sottolinea una sostanziale validità, a patto di integrarsi con la prospettiva più affettivo-esistenziale tipica della Patristica e di Blondel. [eng] The article analyzes the conception of truth in Tommaso d'Aquino, underlining a substantial validity of it, provided that it is completed with the most existential perspective typical of the Patristic and Blondel.

Molta filosofia moderna rifiuta l'idea di verità (filosofica) oggettiva, in quanto porterebbe alla violenza. Così ad esempio Derrida. Ma una corretta idea di verità oggettiva non ha questa implicazione di intolleranza.

Conoscere non riguarda solo l'intelligenza, ma anche l'affettività e un insieme di fattori extra-teoretici (=non meramente conoscitivi o intellettuali). In particolare una certezza esistenzialmente forte sui problemi filosofici decisivi non può essere raggiunta senza un coinvolgimento della libertà, in una “esperienza integrale”.

De Lubac did not fully condemn modernity as neotomism did, but he appreciated some positive aspects (such as the value of subject and of justice), even if he condemned atheism (in Comte and Marx).

Il testo cerca di attualizzare la filosofia medioevale, traducendo il suo linguaggio, spesso incomprensibile per la nostra mentalità antimetafisica, in termini il più possibili esistenziali e pertinenti con le domande di senso, che caratterizzano l'uomo in quanto tale. La seconda edizione, del 2023, è puramente digitale.

In line with much current literature, Bradley’s regress is here discussed as an argument that casts doubt on the existence of states of affairs or facts, understood as complex entities working as truthmakers for true sentences or propositions. One should distinguish two versions of Bradley’s regress, which stem from two different tentative explanations of the unity of states of affairs. The first version actually shows that the corresponding explanation is incoherent; the second one merely points to some prima facie implausible (...) consequences of the explanation it stems from, e.g., that there are infinite explanatory chains and that, for any given fact, there are infinitely many facts involving exemplification relations of increasing levels. But these consequences can be swal- lowed after all, thereby leading to the acceptance of a doctrine which may be called fact infinitism, a doctrine adumbrated in a well-known discussion of relations by Meinong. (shrink)

The guise of the good is the thesis that an agent can only want, or intentionally do or pursue something, if and because this seems good to the agent in some respect or other. Bernard Williams criticizes the guise of the good in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. In this paper I reconstruct and assess his hitherto unnoticed critical remarks. Williams's opposition is based on the idea that it takes an “extra step” to go from desiring or pursuing something (...) to thinking of it as good. To show this, he employs an argument from elimination (with two strands: an argument from personal ends and an argument from immediate ends), and a separate argument which I call the one‐desire argument. I review and reject two types of answers to Williams's objections: answers that explore different varieties of what it can mean to “think of as good,” and answers that focus on different varieties of goodness under the guise of which one can desire something. I then consider whether a different, but nearby thesis, namely the guise of normative reasons, can accommodate Williams's objections, concluding that this alternative also fails. I end by looking at how this debate might move forward. (shrink)

Starting from the ‘Dewey Lectures’, Rawls presents his conception of justice within a contextualist framework, as an elaboration of the basic ideas embedded in the political culture of liberal-democratic societies. But how are these basic ideas to be justified? In this article, I reconstruct and criticize Rawls’s strategy to answer this question. I explore an alternative strategy, consisting of a genealogical argument of a pragmatic kind – the kind of argument provided by authors like Bernard Williams, Edward Craig and Miranda (...) Fricker. I outline this genealogical argument drawing on Rawls’s reconstruction of the origins of liberalism. Then, I clarify the conditions under which this kind of argument maintains vindicatory power. I claim that the argument satisfies these conditions and that pragmatic genealogy can thus partially vindicate the basic ideas of liberal-democratic societies. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that one approach to normative political theory, namely contextualism, can benefit from a specific kind of historical inquiry, namely genealogy, because the latter provides a solution to a deep-seated problem for the former. This problem consists in a lack of critical distance and originates from the justificatory role that contextualist approaches attribute to contextual facts. I compare two approaches to genealogical reconstruction, namely the historiographical method pioneered by Foucault and the hybrid method of pragmatic genealogy (...) as practiced by Bernard Williams, arguing that they both ensure an increase in critical distance while preserving contextualism’s distinctiveness. I also show, however, that only the latter provides normative action-guidance and can thus assist the contextualist theorist in the crucial task of discerning how far certain contextual facts deserve their justificatory role. I prove this point by showing how a pragmatic genealogy of the practice of punishment can inform the contextualist’s reflection about the role this practice should play in a transitional scenario, i.e. in the set of circumstances societies go through in the aftermath of large-scale violence and human rights violations. (shrink)

The guise of the good is the claim that whatever I desire or intentionally do is seen by me as good in some respect. Historical scholarship has so far predominantly focused on ancient and medieval...

According to the doctrine of the guise of the good, all that is desired is seen by the subject as good to some extent. As a claim about action, the idea is that intentional action, or acting for a reason, is action that is seen as good by the agent. I explore the thesis' main attractions: it provides an account of intentional behavior as something that makes sense to the agent, it paves the way for various views in meta-ethics and (...) normative ethics, and it offers a unified account of practical and theoretical reason. In response to common objections, I examine points of current debate: what is it for something to appear as good? Is value or normative reasons the basic concept at work? How to explain akrasia, perversity in action, and expressive action? I conclude with an overview of alternatives to the guise of the good. (shrink)

Pragmatic vindicatory genealogies provide both a cause and a rationale and can thus affect the space of reasons. But how far is the space of reasons affected by this kind of genealogical argument? What normative and evaluative implications do these arguments have? In this paper, I unpack this issue into three different sub-questions and explain what kinds of reasons they provide, for whom are these reasons, and for what. In relation to this final sub-question I argue, most importantly, that these (...) arguments are ambiguous about what they give us reasons for, meaning that they can be interpreted both as justifications for recognizing the normative standing of certain norms, values, and practices - and thus for living by them - and as excuses for those that do so. I illustrate this point by reference to the genealogical vindication of honour cultures, showing how the vindicatory argument can illuminate such case as one of excusing moral ignorance. Drawing on legal theory and moral philosophy, I show that different evaluative and normative implications hang on the result of the interpretation as either justification or excuse, and show that this ambiguity is a virtue rather than a limitation. (shrink)

Law and economics scholarship has traditionally analyzed efficient breach cases monolithically. By grouping efficient breach cases together, this literature treats the subjective motives and the distributive effects of the breach as immaterial. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment introduced a distinction based on the intent and the effects of the breach, allowing courts to use disgorgement remedies in cases of ‘opportunistic’ breach of contract (i.e., ‘deliberate and profitable’ breaches). In this article, we evaluate this approach, focusing on the (...) effects of disgorgement remedies on allocative and productive efficiency, information-forcing and competitive effects, and restraint of breach-searching incentives. We show that, even from a purely consequentialist perspective, disgorgement remedies may be normatively warranted, especially when involving sellers’ breach. Recent experimental evidence revealed that the preferences and reactions of ordinary people are in line with our evaluation of the effects of opportunistic breach. (shrink)

The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those (...) of their fitting targets, the explanation of value tends to have a different content. In particular, objects have value in virtue of the features that make them valuable, and these need not involve any attitudinal properties. If this is right, then there are reasons to doubt the claim that for objects to have value is just for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Insofar as value is a property, it appears to be distinct from the property of objects being the fitting targets of attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match facts about the intensity (...) of fitting attitudes and facts about value, particularly in the case of solitary goods. I argue that this challenge can be met by including the notion of a veil of ignorance in the formulation of FA, and understanding its role as bracketing the relevance of certain facts when determining the fittingness of attitudes to states of affairs. (shrink)

In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” Jacques Derrida returns to the controversy with Jonathan Searle to clarify his position but above all because he “would have wished to make legible the (philosophical, ethical, political) axiomatics hidden beneath the code of academic discussion.” I intend, in turn, to return to this text in order to find in it not only the conditions of an ethics of academic discussion but also of interpretation in a deconstructive perspective. In “Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” (...) in fact, it is possible to point out the necessity of a certain ethical treatment of the texts. In particular, how can we determine the conditions of an ethical use of quotation against the always possible manipulation of the text that quotation makes possible? I attempt to answer this question claiming that the reading protocol of deconstruction meets these conditions showing us at the same time the ethical conditions of scientific discourse in general, beyond any scientific claim of objectivity. (shrink)

The paper presents a positive argument for a version of metaphysically light ethical non-naturalism from the nature of mental states such as desires. It uses as its premise the time-honoured, and recently rediscovered, doctrine of the guise of the good, whereby it is essential to desire that the object of desire be conceived as good or as normatively favoured under some description. The argument is that if the guise of the good is a correct theory of desire, then a certain (...) version of non-naturalism is better placed than other meta-ethical views to make sense of it. First I define ethical non-naturalism and the guise of the good, providing also an initial defence of the latter. Then I briefly survey some historical precedents and proceed to the argument. For each major meta-ethical view I consider I offer reasons why combining them with the guise of the good leads to consequences that are or should be unwelcome by the guise of the good. At the end of this elimination process a form of relatively metaphysically light non-naturalism will emerge as the view that best fits with the guise of the good. (shrink)