ObjectiveThe study is an explorative investigation aimed to assess the differences in acute stress response patterns of health workers facing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) during Italy’s first lockdown.MethodsA cross-sectional investigation using convenience sampling method was conducted in Italy during April 2020. Eight hundred fifty-eight health workers participated in the research filling out self-report measures including Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), and Impact of Event Scale–Revised (IES-R).ResultsModerate/severe depression was found in 28.9% (95% CI, 25.8–32.04), (...) moderate/severe anxiety in 55.4% (95% CI, 51.9–58.8), insomnia in 15% (95% CI, 12.5–17.5), and distress in 52.5% (95% CI, 48.5%–56.6) of participants. The 3% of health workers reported frequent suicidal thoughts. Female sex, working for >15 h/week in a COVID-19 unit, and living apart from family were associated with a significantly higher risk of distress, anxiety, insomnia, depression, and functional impairment. Four profiles were identified on the basis of psychopathological measures: Profile_0 included 44% (N= 270); Profile_1, 25.6% (N= 157); Profile_2, 19.1% (N= 117); and Profile_3, 11.3% (N= 69) of participants. Results showed a significant effect for Profiles X IES-R (η2= 0.079;f= 0.29), indicating that in all profiles, except for Profile_0, avoidance scale is lower than hyperarousal and intrusion symptoms scales of the IES-R. This characteristic could be a probable index of the control exerted by the responders to not fly away from their job.ConclusionThe identification of specific profiles could help psychiatrists and emergency psychologists to build specific interventions in terms of both primary and secondary prevention to face future waves of the COVID-19 outbreak. (shrink)

In Sagvolden et al.'s conceptualization of how a poor behavioral, social, and academic repertoire arises from an impaired interaction with the environment of an individual with a neurological disorder, we see a convergence between the medical diagnosis and the functional assessment on which the behavioral educational approach is based. If children with such a disorder do show delay-of-reinforcement steepened gradients, it is possible to predict their behavior under given circumstances. This could bring us to more precise diagnostic criteria and better (...) intervention techniques. (shrink)

The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming “mindscience.” Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative “mindscience.” The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions (...) that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework – an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. (shrink)

Wilson et al. draw our attention to the problem of a science of intentional change. We stress the connection between their approach and existing paradigms for learning and goal generation that have been developed in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and psychology. These paradigms outline the structural principles of a domain-general and teleologically open agent.

The seventeenth century saw dramatic advances in mathematical theory and practice. With the recovery of many of the classical Greek mathematical texts, new techniques were introduced, and within 100 years, the rules of analytic geometry, geometry of indivisibles, arithmatic of infinites, and calculus were developed. Although many technical studies have been devoted to these innovations, Mancosu provides the first comprehensive account of the relationship between mathematical advances of the seventeenth century and the philosophy of mathematics of the period. Starting with (...) the Renaissance debates on the certainty of mathematics, Mancosu leads the reader through the foundational issues raised by the emergence of these new mathematical techniques, including the influence of the Aristotelian conception of science in Cavalieri and Guldin, the foundational relevance of Descartes' Geometrie, the relation between geometrical and epistemological theories of the infinite, and the Leibnizian calculus and the opposition to infinitesimalist procedures. In the process Mancosu draws a sophisticated picture of the subtle dependencies between technical development and philosophical reflection in seventeenth century mathematics. (shrink)

From Brouwer To Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920s offers the first comprehensive introduction to the most exciting period in the foundation of mathematics in the twentieth century. The 1920s witnessed the seminal foundational work of Hilbert and Bernays in proof theory, Brouwer's refinement of intuitionistic mathematics, and Weyl's predicativist approach to the foundations of analysis. This impressive collection makes available the first English translations of twenty-five central articles by these important contributors and many others. (...) The articles have been translated for the first time from Dutch, French, and German, and the volume is divided into four sections devoted to (1) Brouwer, (2) Weyl, (3) Bernays and Hilbert, and (4) the emergence of intuitionistic logic. Each section opens with an introduction which provides the necessary historical and technical context for understanding the articles. Although most contemporary work in this field takes its start from the groundbreaking contributions of these major figures, a good, scholarly introduction to the area was not available until now. Unique and accessible, From Brouwer To Hilbert will serve as an ideal text for undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mathematics, and will also be an invaluable resource for philosophers, mathematicians, and interested non-specialists. (shrink)

This paper deals with a case of Virgilian ambiguity, namely the famous hemistich at Aen. 4.298 omnia tuta timens. By highlighting a plausible reading with a causal force (‘fearing everything too calm’, ‘because of the excessive calmness’), it seeks to demonstrate that this hemistich is an ambiguous passage. This view is confirmed through the imitation by Valerius Flaccus, who, in alluding to the Virgilian passage (Argonautica 8.408–12), highlights its ambiguity by including both of the most plausible readings.

Can taxation and the redistribution of wealth through the welfare state be conceived as a modern system of circulation of the gift? But once such a gift is institutionalized, regulated and sanctioned through legal mechanisms, does it not risk being perverted or corrupted, and/or not leaving room for genuinely altruistic motives? What is more: if the market’s utilitarian logic can corrupt or ‘crowd out’ altruistic feelings or motivations, what makes us think that the welfare state cannot also be a source (...) of corruption? To explain the standard answers to the abovementioned questions as well as their implications I will first re-examine two opposing positions assumed here as paradigmatic examples of other similar positions: on the one hand, Titmuss’s work and the never-ending debate about it; on the other, Godbout’s position, in-so-far as it shows how Titmuss’s arguments can easily be turned upside down. I will then introduce and reinterpret Einaudi’s “critical point” theory as a more complex and richer anthropological explanation of the problems and answers considered herein. Through the analysis of these paradigmatic positions I will develop two interrelated arguments. 1) The way these problems are posed as well as the standard answers to them are: a) subject to fallacies: the dichotomy fallacy and the fallacy of composition; b) too reductive and simplistic: we should at least try to clarify what kind of ‘gift’ or ‘corruption’ we are thinking about, and who or what the ‘giver’, the ‘corrupter’, the ‘receiver’ and/or the ‘corrupted’ party are. 2) The answers to these problems cannot be found by merely following a theoretical approach, nor can they be merely based on empirical evidence; instead, they need to take into account the forever troublesome, ambiguous and unpredictable matter of human freedom. (shrink)

As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...) that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only. (shrink)

This article introduces a novel theoretical framework for addressing epistemic injustice—a phenomenon where certain groups or individuals are systematically excluded from knowledge creation and dissemination processes—by employing ontological relativity and conceptual analysis. “Ontological relativity” refers to a philosophical perspective that posits our understanding of reality as being shaped by our toolbox of concepts, categories, language, and social practices; “conceptual analysis” is a method of inquiry that involves the rigorous examination and deconstruction of a particular concept or set of concepts in (...) order to uncover their constituent elements, relationships, and underlying assumptions. To exemplify the effectiveness of the ontology‐based approach, two paradigmatic applications are explored: (a) educational practices and (b) clinical practice and access to health care. Through the presentation of these applications and the step‐by‐step illustration of the applied methodology, the aim of the article is to showcase the efficacy of ontology in tackling epistemic injustices, suggesting innovative paths for future research in this domain. (shrink)

The study of evil and the different forms in which it manifests itself has long been the interest of a significant number of scholars, mainly philosophers and theologians. Yet, following the libera...

The publication of Guido Calabresi’s book “The Future of Law and Economics” has drawn a substantial amount of attention among law and economics scholars. We thought that the best way to devote special attention to this book was to devote a Special issue to it. This article situates Calabresi’s book among other reflections on the future of the discipline, introduces and explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. -/- We emphasize how Calabresi’s (...) historical-conceptual standpoint allows him to isolate the stakes of different future developments around the question of how could further appreciation of legal institutions that defy the standard economic assumptions help the field develop theoretically. Overall, the contributors all shared Calabresi’s attempt to restore the balance between Law and Economics and the need to better account for the “whole unanalysed experience of human race”, often neglected by the Economic Analysis of Law approach. Most disagreements are about the ‘how’. In any case, the search for the Law and Economics ‘not (yet) taken’ or for other “Law and … ” approaches is always open to the Future. (shrink)

This introduction explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. The difficulty of a genuine dialogue and understanding between economics, law and humanities, seems to be due not only to the fragmentation of reflections on man, but to a real ‘conflict of anthropologies’. What kind of conceptions of man and human values are presupposed by and / or privileged by economics, law, economic approaches to law and social sciences? How and when do these (...) conceptions come into conflict within and between disciplines? How do these conceptions of man and his values influence the conceptions of economics, law and institutions, and vice versa, how do these last conceptions influence the former? What are the normative, regulatory and practical implications of assuming an anthropological and / or axiological perspective instead of another? This Special issue aims at exploring the possibility of finding a common ground for discussion between economics, law and humanities, through the analysis and comparison of both the conceptions of man, human action and values assumed by economics, law and humanities, and their normative implications. The contributions to this Special issue and its organization are outlined at the end of this introduction. (shrink)

The paper aims to address the following two questions: what kind of discourse is that which attempt to found or defend the autonomy or the boundaries of a discipline? Why do such discourses tend to turn into normative, dogmatic-excommunicating discourses between disciplines, schools or scholars? I will argue that an adequate answer may be found if we conceive disciplines as dogmatics, where such discourses often take the form of a discourse on the foundation of a discipline, a foundation in the (...) name of which the scholar speaks and with which he/she entertains an identity relationship. To this purpose I will re-examine the methodological discourses of (and debates between) Pareto, Croce and Einaudi on the demarcation issue between philosophy, economics and value-judgments as highly instructive to understand such issues. (shrink)

On an influential line of thinking tracing back to Ramsey, conditionals are closely linked to the attitude of supposition. When applied to counterfactuals, this view suggests a subjunctive version of the so-called Ramsey test: the probability of a counterfactual If A, would B ought to be equivalent to the probability of B, under the subjunctive supposition that A. I present a collapse result for any view that endorses the subjunctive version of the Ramsey test. Starting from plausible assumptions, the result (...) shows that one’s rational credence in a would-counterfactual and in the corresponding might-counterfactual have to be identical. (shrink)

In Multi Agent Systems it is often the case that individual preferences are not compatible and coalitions compete to achieve a given result. The paper presents a language to talk about the conflict between coalitional choices and it expresses deontic notions to evaluate them. We will be specifically concerned with cases where the collective perspective is at odds with the individual perspective.

Il libro ricostruisce la vita e il pensiero di Jean Guitton (1901-1999), il grande amico di Paolo VI, a quasi ventʼanni dalla sua morte. La vicenda umana di questo scrittore e filosofo cristiano ha attraversato quasi integralmente il XX secolo quale testimone diretto di eventi epocali: i primi tentativi ecumenici, le due guerre mondiali, le radicalizzazioni ideologiche del secondo dopoguerra, lʼera atomica e il Concilio Vaticano II. Il primo capitolo del volume è dedicato alla ricostruzione della vita di Guitton (...) e alle sue prime sintesi accademiche; ed esso fanno seguito altri due capitoli che trattano della sua antropologia (il tempo, il pudore, l'amore umano) e della sua cristologia filosofica (le condizioni di possibilità della rivelazione, la filosofia della risurrezione, la sua innovativa mariologia). Ne viene il ritratto di un pensiero di impronta umanista, ben radicato nella tradizione francese e che forse, come già lamentava Yves Congar nel 1963, non ha avuto, fino ad oggi, quellʼattenzione e quellʼaccoglienza che sembra meritare. (shrink)

An algebraization of the notion of topology has been proposed more than 70 years ago in a classical paper by McKinsey and Tarski, leading to an area of research still active today, with connections to algebra, geometry, logic and many applications, in particular, to modal logics. In McKinsey and Tarski’s setting the model theoretical notion of homomorphism does not correspond to the notion of continuity. We notice that the two notions correspond if instead we consider a preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq (...) \) defined by \(a \sqsubseteq b\) if _a_ is contained in the topological closure of _b_, for _a_, _b_ subsets of some topological space. A _specialization poset_ is a partially ordered set endowed with a further coarser preorder relation \( \sqsubseteq \). We show that every specialization poset can be embedded in the specialization poset naturally associated to some topological space, where the order relation corresponds to set-theoretical inclusion. Specialization semilattices are defined in an analogous way and the corresponding embedding theorem is proved. Specialization semilattices have the amalgamation property. Some basic topological facts and notions are recovered in this apparently very weak setting. The interest of these structures arises from the fact that they also occur in many rather disparate contexts, even far removed from topology. (shrink)

Bringing together contributors from philosophy, international relations, security studies, and strategic studies, New Wars and New Soldiers offers a truly interdisciplinary analysis reflective of the nature of modern warfare. This comprehensive approach allows the reader to see the broad scope of modern military ethics, and to understand the numerous questions about modern conflict that require critical scrutiny. Aimed at both military and academic audiences, this paperback will be of significant interest to researchers and students in philosophy, sociology, military and strategic (...) studies, international relations, politics, and security studies, acting as an ideal course text or as supplementary reading. (shrink)

Suppose that you're certain that a certain sentence, e.g. "Frida is tall", lacks a determinate truth value. What cognitive attitude should you take towards it—reject it, suspend judgment, or what else? We show that, by adopting a seemingly plausible principle connecting credence in A and Determinately A, we can prove a very implausible answer to this question: i.e., all indeterminate claims should be assigned credence zero. The result is striking similar to so-called triviality results in the literature on modals and (...) conditionals. (shrink)

The rise of XVIIthcentury natural philosophy determines a significant break with the tradition and enthe idea of a new beginning of scientific investigation grounded on mathematics and experiment; at the same time, the diffusion of printed books represents an essential factor for the dissemination of the new philosophy. The ideal of the book, as an expression for this new philosophy, results from the speculation about the correspondence between the language and structure of the philosophical book and the “book of nature” (...) written by God. At the same time, the pursuit of this ideal requires the critical knowledge of the book tradition and the awareness of the imperfection that characterizes any given accomplishment of the ideal. This inner tension finds an exemplary solution in Newton’s Principia mathematica, where the incompleteness of the book of natural philosophy is recognized as an intrinsic feature, which directs Newton’s own selection and ordering of the material in the process of editing his work. After Newton, several attempts have been made to recover the systematic unity of natural philosophy in a single book, in a system of books or in encyclopaedies. In late XIXthcentury, as the specialization and multiplication of scientific disciplines establishes the impossibility to master natural philosophy as a whole, the intrinsic historicity of natural philosophy is recognized as a crucial factor of scientific thought itself. This significant change of perspective, compared to early modern philosophy, produces the need for different ways of understanding the unity of science and the role of books in scientific practice. Nowadays several distinguished scholars in the history and philosophy of science underscore the need to restore the historical awareness of late XIXth-early XXthcentury science among scientists, in order to promote the development of new scientific ideas. (shrink)

This volume brings together the papers published in Historiographia Linguistica 9:3 (1982), which was devoted to the history of linguistics in Italy, with Marazzini's paper first published in Historiographia Linguistica 10:1/2 (1983), and an original article by Franco Lo Piparo expressly written for this volume. The present volume provides in addition an index of subjects, as well as an index of names, which supplies bio-bibliographical references to authors discussed.

Il presente volume raccoglie il corso di Filosofia tenuto dall'autore nell'Istituto di Cultura Superiore Religiosa per laici, destinato a studenti e professionisti desiderosi di una prima iniziazione alla conoscenza dei vari orientamenti del pensiero filosofico moderno e alla riflessione sui principali problemi della filosofia, riguardanti specialmente il mondo e Dio, la vita e l'uomo, che prima o poi si presentano spontaneamente a chiunque pensa e riflette, e la cui soluzione vuole esercitare un notevole influsso sulla vita di ciascuno. Paolo (...) Dezza per molti anni professore di Metafisica Generale nella Pontificia Universita Gregoriana e per 10 anni Rettore nella stessa Universita, e stato Cardinale della Santa Romana Chiesa. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

At the same time, the book is a contribution to recent philosophical debates, in particular on the prospects for a successful nominalist reconstruction of .

The aim of this article is to shed light on an understudied aspect of Giordano Bruno's intellectual biography, namely, his career as a mathematical practitioner. Early interpreters, especially, have criticized Bruno's mathematics for being “outdated” or too “concrete”. However, thanks to developments in the study of early modern mathematics and the rediscovery of Bruno's first mathematical writings (four dialogues on Fabrizio's Mordente proportional compass), we are in a position to better understand Bruno's mathematics. In particular, this article aims to reopen (...) the question of whether Bruno anticipated the concept of infinitesimal quantity. It does so by providing an analysis of the dialogues on Mordente's compass and of the historical circumstances under which those dialogues were written. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper defends the descriptive theory of reference against recent criticisms. Saul Kripke has argued through a series of counterexamples that the descriptive theory may assign a referent to a speaker's use of a name when there is no referent, and may assign the wrong referent, or no referent at all, when there really is a referent. These conclusions follow, however, only if the speaker is not permitted to use subordinating descriptions, by means of which he borrows his reference from (...) others. It is argued that the descriptive theory can easily accomodate the use of subordinating descriptions and, on general grounds, defend their prominence in the determination of reference. The immediate consequence is that Kripke's counterexamples do not pose a serious problem for the descriptive account.RésuméCet article défend la théorie descriptive de la référence contre de récentes critiques. Saul Kripke lui a objecté, par une série de contre‐exemples, qu'elle peut assigner àľusage d'un mot par un locuteur une référence alors qǔil ňy en a pas, ou peut lui assigner une fausse référence, ou pas de référence du tout alors qǔil y en a en réalité une. Mais ces conclusions ne sont valables que si ľon ne permet pas au locuteur ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes grâce auxquelles il emprunte sa référence à?on;autres. Ľauteur montre que la théorie de la description peut facilement scar;accommoder de ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes et défend, pour des raisons générales, leur importance dans la détermination de la référence. La conséquence immédiate en est que les contre‐exemples de Kripke ne posent plus de sérieux problémes pour la théorie descriptive.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die sog. deskriptive Referenztheorie gegen kritische Argu‐mente aus neuerer Zeit verteidigt. Saul Kripke hat aufgrund von Gegenbeispielen eingewendet, dass die deskriptive Theorie bei der Verwendung eines Namens durch einen Sprecher zu einer Zuschreibung eines Referenzobjekts führen kann, wo tatsächlich kein solches vorhanden ist, und dass sie ein falsches Referenzobjekt Oder gar keines zuordnen kann, wenn wirklich eines vorhanden ist. Diese Behauptung trifft jedoch nur dann zu, wenn dem Sprecher nicht erlaubt wird, unterordnende Beschreibungen zu verwenden, mit Hilfe von welchen er seine Referenz bei andern entlehnt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die deskriptive Theorie ohne weiteres die Verwendung von unter‐ordnenden Beschreibungen einbeziehen und aus allgemeinen Gründen ihre vorherrschende Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Referenz behaupten kann. Als unmittelbare Folge dieser Auffassung ergibt sich, dass Kripkes Gegenbeispiele keine unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten bereiten. (shrink)