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  1. Barbara Abbott, Reference and Quantification: The Partee Effect.
    Partee (1973) discussed quotation from the perspective of the then relatively new theory of transformational grammar.2 As she pointed out, the phenomenon presents many curious puzzles. In some ways quotes seem quite separate from their surrounding text; they may be in a different dialect, as in her example in (1), (1) ‘I talk better English than the both of youse!’ shouted Charles, thereby convincing me that he didn’t. [Partee (1973):ex. 20] or even in a different language, as in (2): (2) (...)
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  2. Barbara Abbott (2011). Support for Individual Concepts. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:23-44.
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  3. Juan José Acero (2011). Reference and Description. Theoria 26 (2):258-261.
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  4. Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  5. Philip Atkins & Tim Lewis (2012). Unanswerable Questions for Everyone: Reply to Inan. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):263-271.
    Millianism is the familiar view that some expressions, such as proper names, contribute only their referent to the semantic content of sentences in which they occur. Inan (Philosophical Studies 2010) has recently argued that the Millian is committed to the following odd conclusion: There may be questions that he is able to grasp but that he cannot answer, either affirmatively, negatively, or with a simple I don’t know . The Millian is indeed committed to this conclusion. But we intend to (...)
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  6. Jody Azzouni (2011). Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.
    Tim Crane (2011) characterizes the cognitive role of singular thought via singular mental files: the application of such files to more than one object is senseless. As many do, he thus stresses the contrast between ‘singular’ and ‘general’. I give a counterexample, plurally-directed singular thought, and I offer alternative characterizations of singular thought—better described as ‘objects-directed thought’—initially in terms of the defeasibility of the descriptions associated with one's thinking of an object, and then more broadly in terms of whether descriptions (...)
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  7. Kent Bach, On Referring and Not Referring.
    Even though it’s based on a bad argument, there’s something to Strawson’s dictum. He might have likened ‘referring expression’ to phrases like ‘eating utensil’ and ‘dining room’: just as utensils don’t eat and dining rooms don’t dine, so, he might have argued, expressions don’t refer. Actually, that wasn’t his argument, though it does make you wonder. Rather, Strawson exploited the fact that almost any referring expression, whether an indexical, demonstrative, proper name, or definite description, can be used to refer to (...)
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  8. Ermanno Bencivenga (1983). An Epistemic Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 80 (12):785-805.
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  9. Alan Berger (ed.) (2011). Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism (...)
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  10. Rod Bertholet (1986). Referring, Demonstrating, and Intending. Philosophy Research Archives 12:251-260.
    Demonstratives have been thought to provide counterexamples to theories which analyze the notion of speaker reference in terms of the intentions of the speaker. This paper is a response to three attempts to undermine my efforts to defend such theories against these putative counterexamples. It is argued that the efforts of Howard Wettstein, M. J. More and John L. Biro to show that my own attempt to defuse the putative counterexamples offered by David Kaplan fails, are themselves unsuccessful. The competing (...)
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  11. Ewa Bińczyk (2007). Obraz, Który Nas Zniewala: Współczesne Ujęcia Języka Wobec Esencjalizmu I Problemu Referencji. Universitas.
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  12. Alexander Bird (2012). Referring to Natural Kind Thingamajigs, and What They Are: A Reply to Needham. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):103 - 109.
    Natural kind terms appear to behave like singular terms. If they were genuine singular terms, appearing in true sentences, that would be some reason to believe that there are entities to which the terms refer, the natural kinds. Paul Needham has attacked my arguments that natural kind terms are singular, referring expressions. While conceding the correctness of some of his criticisms, I defend and expand on the underlying view in this paper. I also briefly sketch an account of what natural (...)
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  13. Bill Brewer, Reference and Subjectivity.
    In ‘Fregean Reference Defended’ (1995), Sosa presents a sophisticated descriptive theory of reference, which he calls ‘fregean’, and which he argues avoids standard counterexamples to more basic variants of this approach. What is characteristic of a fregean theory, in his sense, is the idea that what makes a person’s thought about some object, a, a thought about that particular thing, is the fact that a uniquely satisfies an appropriate individuator which is suitably operative in her thinking.1 On his version, (FT), (...)
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  14. Joan Bryans (1992). Substitution and the Explanation of Action. Erkenntnis 37 (3):365 - 376.
    This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in (...)
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  15. Ross Cameron (2005). A Note on Kripke's Footnote 56 Argument for the Essentiality of Origin. Ratio 18 (3):262-275.
    In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ‘proof’ of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can’t be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke’s argument, but I show that this suffers from a more subtle (...)
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  16. J. Campbell (2004). Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):265-76.
  17. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2013). A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1159-1172.
    Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...)
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  18. Richard Coates (2009). A Strictly Millian Approach to the Definition of the Proper Name. Mind and Language 24 (4):433-444.
    A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island . A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative (...)
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  19. Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2013). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
    We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
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  20. Monte Cook (1979). Singular Terms and Rigid Designators. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):157-162.
  21. Tim Crane (2011). The Singularity of Singular Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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  22. Adrian Cussins (1999). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Theories of Reference in Evans' Theory of Thought. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper explores some problems with Gareth Evans’s theory of the fundamental and non-fundamental levels of thought [1]. I suggest a way to reconceive the levels of thought that overcomes these problems. But, first, why might anyone who was not already struck by Evans’s remarkable theory care about these issues? What’s at stake here?
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  23. Steven Davis (ed.) (1983). Causal Theories Of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, And Reference. Ny: De Gruyter.
    INTRODUCTION SECTION I In the last 20 years or so philosophers in the analytic tradition have taken an increasing interest in causal theories of a wide ...
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  24. Max Deutsch (2006). The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.
    Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth-value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, (...)
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  25. Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
    The discussion in this book range over all the main kinds of referring expressions, starting with the work of Frege and Russell on singular reference.
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  26. Delia Graff Fara (forthcoming). Names Are Predicates. Philosophical Review.
    Tyler Burge convinced us that names are predicates in at least some of their occurrences: -/- There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. -/- Names, when predicates, satisfy the being-called condition: schematically, a name "N" is true of a thing just in case that thing is called N. This paper defends the unified view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. I follow Clarence Sloat, Paul Elbourne, and Ora Matushansky in saying that when a name seems to occur (...)
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  27. Manuel García-Carpintero (1995). Doubts About Fregean Reference. Philosophical Issues 6:104-112.
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  28. Richard Gaskin (2011). Reference and the Permutation Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309.
    I argue that fidelity to the context principle requires us to construe reference as a theoretical relation. This point helps us understand the bearing of Putnam's permutation argument on the idea of a systematic theory of meaning. Notwithstanding objections that have been made against Putnam's deployment of that argument, it shows the reference relation to be indeterminate. But since the indeterminacy of reference arises from a metalinguistic perspective, our ability, as object-language speakers, to talk about the ordinary features of our (...)
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  29. P. T. Geach (1962/1968). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
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  30. Heimir Geirsson (2005). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, by Scott Soames. Disputatio.
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  31. Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
    Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we (...)
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  32. Philip A. Glotzbach (1983). Referential Inscrutablility, Perception, and the Empirical Foundation of Meaning. Philosophy Research Archives 9:535-569.
    W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) (...)
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  33. M. Gomez-Torrente (2006). Rigidity and Essentiality. Mind 115 (1):227--59.
    Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true 'identification sentences' (such as 'Cats are animals') containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...)
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  34. Peter C. Gordon (1999). Naming Versus Referring in the Selection of Words. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):44-44.
    The theory of lexical selection presented by Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer addresses the mechanisms of semantic activation that lead to the selection of isolated words. The theory does not appear to extend naturally to the referential use of words (particularly pronouns) in coherent discourse. A more complete theory of lexical selection has to consider the semantics of discourse as well as lexical semantics.
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  35. Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.) (2009). Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.
    Meinong The Legacy of "On Denoting" Edited by Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette Routledge TaylorkFrancisGroup New York London ...
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  36. Jussi Haukioja (2012). Rigidity and Actuality-Dependence. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):399-410.
    It is generally assumed that rigidity plays a key role in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of identity statements, both between proper names and between natural kind terms. However, while the notion of rigid designation is well defined for singular terms, there is no generally accepted definition of what it is for a general term to be rigid. In this paper I argue that the most common view, according to which rigid general terms are the ones which designate the (...)
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  37. Terence Horgan & Michael Tye (1988). Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:179-186.
    Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the surface grammar of the regimented sentences.
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  38. Daniel Hunter (1981). Reference and Meinongian Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:23-36.
    Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and (...)
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  39. Leo Iacono (2008). Beyond Millianism. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.
    In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent with Millianism.
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  40. Kiyoshi Ishikawa (1998). A Network Theory of Reference. Indiana University Linguistics Club Publications.
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  41. Robin Jeshion (2006). Soames on Descriptive Reference-Fixing. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):120–140.
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  42. Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
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  43. Saul A. Kripke (1986). A Problem in the Theory of Reference: The Linguistic Division of Labor and the Social Character of Naming. In Philosophy and Culture, Proceedings of the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy. Editions Montmorency.
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  44. Mark Lance (1997). The Significance of Anaphoric Theories of Truth and Reference. Philosophical Issues 8:181-198.
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  45. Stephen Leeds (1978). Theories of References and Truth. Erkenntnis 13 (1):111 - 129.
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  46. William G. Lycan (1995). On Sosa's "Fregean Reference Defended". Philosophical Issues 6:100-103.
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  47. Thomas Magnell (1991). The Extent of Russell's Modal Views. Erkenntnis 34 (2):171 - 185.
    Russell has recently been held to have had a modal logic, a full modal theory and a view of naming that anticipates Kripke's intuitions on rigid designation. It is argued here that no such claims are warranted. While Russell was not altogether silent on matters modal, he did not advance an identifiable modal logic or anything more than a modest modal theory. His view of naming involves a notion of guaranteed reference. But what Kripke's intuitions about rigidity primarily pertain to (...)
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  48. Ishani Maitra, Brian Weatherson & Jonathan Ichikawa (2012). In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):56-68.
    In “Against Arguments from Reference” (Mallon et al., 2009), Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (hereafter, MMNS) argue that recent experiments concerning reference undermine various philosophical arguments that presuppose the correctness of the causal-historical theory of reference. We will argue three things in reply. First, the experiments in question—concerning Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt example—don’t really speak to the dispute between descriptivism and the causal-historical theory; though the two theories are empirically testable, we need to look at quite different data (...)
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  49. Diego Marconi (2013). Pencils Have a Point: Against General Externalism About Artifactual Words. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):497-513.
    Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard to come by, and even fewer can (...)
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  50. Genoveva Marti (2003). The Question of Rigidity in New Theories of Reference. Noûs 37 (1):161 - 179.
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