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  1. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
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  2. Diana F. Ackerman (1976). Plantinga, Proper Names and Propositions. Philosophical Studies 30 (6):409 - 412.
    The view of names that plantinga advances in "the nature of necessity" seems to have unacceptable consequences for names in propositional attitude contexts. In this paper, I argue that he is unsuccessful in his attempt to avoid these consequences.
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  3. Kent Bach (2002). Giorgione Was so-Called Because of His Name. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):73-103.
    Proper names seem simple on the surface. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with philosophical debates about them might wonder what the fuss could possibly be about. It seems obvious why we need them and what we do with them, and that is to talk about particular persons, places, and things. You don't have to be as smart as Mill to think that proper names are simply tags attached to individuals. But sometimes appearances are deceiving.
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  4. Pierre Baumann (2010). Are Proper Names Rigid Designators? Axiomathes 20 (2-3):333-346.
    A widely accepted thesis in the philosophy of language is that natural language proper names are rigid designators, and that they are so de jure, or as a matter of the “semantic rules of the language.” This paper questions this claim, arguing that rigidity cannot be plausibly construed as a property of name types and that the alternative, rigidity construed as a property of tokens, means that they cannot be considered rigid de jure; rigidity in this case must be viewed (...)
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  5. Rod Bertolet (2001). Recanati, Descriptive Names, and the Prospect of New Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:37-41.
    The immediate purpose of this note is to provide counterexamples to François Recanati’s claim in Direct Reference that descriptive names (a name whose reference is fixed by an attributive definite description) are created with the expectation that we will be able to think of the referent nondescriptively at some point in the future. The larger issue is how to reconcile the existence of descriptive names with the theoretical commitments Recanati takes direct reference to have. The point of the claim about (...)
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  6. Chen Bo (2012). A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence. Theoria 78 (3):225-260.
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were rigid designators, (...)
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  7. Steven E. Boër (1975). Proper Names as Predicates. Philosophical Studies 27 (6):389 - 400.
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  8. David Boersema (2007). Geach on Proper Names. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
    Recently, several philosophers of language have claimed that, at least in some respects, Peter Geach proposed a view about proper names that anticipated important features of the causal theory (or historical chain theory) that was later set forth by Saul Kripke and others. Quentin Smith, for example, in his essay, "Direct, Rigid Designation and A Posteriori Necessity: A History and Critique," says explicitly that "Geach (1969) ... originated the causal or 'historical chain' theory of names" (1999). In his entry on (...)
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  9. Cynthia J. Bolton (1996). Proper Names, Taxonomic Names and Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):145-157.
    One reason why we find the causal theory of reference so interesting is because it provides an account of de re necessity. Necessity is not only predicated of statements but also of objects. It is not only discovered by means of linguistic analysis but also by means of empirical investigation. And this means that truths we once described as contingent turn out to be necessary after all. We may think that this account of de re necessity is due to the (...)
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  10. J. Van Brakel (1982). Conventions In Naming. Philosophy Research Archives 8:243-277.
    Conventions in the use of names are discussed, particularly names of linguistic expressions. Also the reference of measure terms like ‘kg’ is discussed, and it is found analogous in important respects to expression names. Some new light is shed on the token-type distinction. Applications to versions of the liar paradox are shown. The use of quotation marks is critically examined.
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  11. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
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  12. Deborah J. Brown (1996). The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's Theory of Mental Language. Review of Metaphysics 50 (1):79 - 99.
    There is a tension within Ockham's theory of mental language between its claim to being a semantics for conventional languages and its claim to being a model of concept acquisition and thought. In particular, the commitment to a redundancy-free mental language which serves to explain important semantic relations such as synonymy and ambiguity conflicts, _prima facie, with the possibility of opaque belief contexts. I argue that it is preferable to treat the theory of mental language as an idealized theory of (...)
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  13. Greg Carlson (1998). Names, and What They Are Names Of. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):69-70.
    Terms designating substances and kinds function grammatically much like proper names of individuals. This supports Ruth Millikan's theory, but it also poses the question of how we can understand the reference of kind terms when the ontological status of the kind term is uncertain or disputed.
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  14. James D. Carney (1983). Names and the de Re/de Dicto Distinction. Philosophia 12 (3-4):357-361.
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  15. James D. Carney (1977). Fictional Names. Philosophical Studies 32 (4):383 - 391.
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  16. Peter Carruthers (1983). Understanding Names. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):19-36.
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  17. Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy (2003). What Proper Names, and Their Absence, Do Not Demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):288-289.
    Hurford claims that empty variables antedated proper names in linguistic (not merely logical) predicate-argument structure, and this had an effect on visual perception. But his evidence, drawn from proper names and the supposed inability of nonhumans to recognise individual conspecifics, is weak. So visual perception seems less relevant to the evolution of grammar than Hurford thinks.
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  18. William R. Carter (1998). How Not to Preserve Kripke´ s Fundamental Insight. Teorema 17 (1):99-108.
    Kripke´s work on names and identity continues to be subject of intense critical scrutiny. The Kripkean message, briefly statet, is that names are rigid designators and that identy statements formulated in terms of names are, if true, necessarily true. Recently Micheal Jubien developes a revisionist line that denies that names serve a referential role but allows, nonetheless, that Kripke´s fundamental insight can be preserved. In my paper, I critically examine Jubien´s proposal for preserving the Kripkean insight that "deserves to be (...)
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  19. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1985). The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):91-113.
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  20. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1985). The Semantics and the Causal Roles of Proper Names. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):91 - 113.
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  21. David Charles (1994). Aristotle on Names and Their Signification. In Stephen Everson (ed.), Language. Cambridge University Press. 3--37.
  22. Ralph Clark (2011). Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names. Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...)
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  23. Richard Coates (2009). A Strictly Millian Approach to the Definition of the Proper Name. Mind and Language 24 (4):433-444.
    A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island . A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative (...)
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  24. Nino Cocchiarella (2005). Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups, and Plurals. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):135 - 179.
    Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...)
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  25. John Collins, Names, Descriptions and Quantifiers.
  26. Eros Corazza (2002). Description-Names. Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4):313-325.
    It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: "The Roman Empire", "The Beatles", "The Holy Virgin",...) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name and describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best framework with which to accommodate description-names is a multiple-proposition theory, according to (...)
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  27. Claudio F. Costa (2011). A Meta-Descriptivist Theory of Proper Names. Ratio 24 (3):259-281.
    This paper proposes a new, stronger version of the cluster theory of proper names. It introduces a meta-identifying rule that can establish a cluster's main descriptions and explain how they must be satisfied in order to allow the application of a proper name. At the same time, it preserves some main insights of the causal-historical view. With the resulting rule we can not only give a more detailed reply to the counter-examples to descriptivism, but also explain the informative contents of (...)
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  28. M. D'Cruz (2000). A Theory of Ordinary Proper Names. Mind 109 (436):721-756.
    It is widely believed that the semantic function of an ordinary proper name (e.g. 'Aristotle') is inexplicable in terms of the semantic function of an ordinary definite description (e.g. 'the last great ancient philosopher'), given a Russellian analysis of the latter. This paper questions this belief by suggesting a possible semantic explication. In brief, I propose that an ordinary proper name is a mere placeholder for an arbitrary ordinary definite description true of a given individual. The proposal is set out (...)
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  29. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Intentionalism, Descriptivism, and Proper Names. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press. 102.
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  30. Nicholas Denyer (1999). Names, Verbs and Quantification Again. Philosophy 74 (3):439-440.
    There are enormous differences between quantifying name-variables only, quantifying verb-variables only, and quantifying both. These differences are found only in the logic of polyadic predication; and this presumably is why Richard Gaskin thinks that they distinguish names from transitive verbs only, and not from verbs generally. But that thought is mistaken: these differences also distinguish names from intransitive verbs. They thus vindicate the common idea that on the difference between names and verbs we may base grandiose metaphysical distinctions, and undermine (...)
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  31. Nicholas Denyer (1998). Names, Verbs and Sentences. Philosophy 73 (4):619-623.
    Metaphysicians often declare that there are large ontological differences (properties versus individuals, universals versus particulars) correlated with the linguistic distinction between names and verbs. Gaskin argues against all such declarations on the grounds that we may quantify with equal ease over the referents of both types of expression. However, his argument must be wrong, given the massive differences between first- and second-order qualification. Its only grain of truth is that these differences show up only in the logic of relations, and (...)
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  32. Michael Devitt (2008). Reference Borrowing. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):361-366.
    In “Reference Borrowing and the Role of Descriptions,” Dunja Jutronić criticizes my view of the borrowing of names and natural kind terms. These terms should be treated, she argues, in the same way as I have tentatively suggested kind terms like ‘sloop’ should be: borrowers need to associate a categorial description that is true of the referent. I am not persuaded. Still, perhaps the suggestion should be extended to these terms anyway. I propose a way to test whether it should (...)
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  33. Michael Devitt (1976). Semantics and the Ambiguity of Proper Names. The Monist 59 (3):404-423.
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  34. Keith S. Donnellan (1970). Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions. Synthese 21 (3-4):335 - 358.
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  35. Eli Dresner (2001). Tarski's Restricted Form and Neale's Quantificational Treatment of Proper Names. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (4):405-415.
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  36. Jane Duran (1987). Russell on Names. Philosophy Research Archives 13:463-470.
    In this paper I describe a shift in Russell’s views on names from the time of “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” to An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. It is the burden of the paper that the shift arose because Russell saw an ontological and epistemological problem created by his previous account of names, and because he then tried to correct it, while simultaneously endeavoring to establish an account consistent with science. Two lines of argument are employed to support this (...)
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  37. Delia Graff Fara, 'Literal' Uses of Proper Names.
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  38. Delia Graff Fara (forthcoming). Names Are Predicates. Philosophical Review.
    Tyler Burge convinced us that names are predicates in at least some of their occurrences: -/- There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. -/- Names, when predicates, satisfy the being-called condition: schematically, a name "N" is true of a thing just in case that thing is called N. This paper defends the unified view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. I follow Clarence Sloat, Paul Elbourne, and Ora Matushansky in saying that when a name seems to occur (...)
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  39. Eduardo García-Ramírez (2011). A Cognitive Theory of Empty Names. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):785-807.
    Ordinary use of empty names encompasses a variety of different phenomena, including issues in semantics, mental content, fiction, pretense, and linguistic practice. In this paper I offer a novel account of empty names, the cognitive theory, and show how it offers a satisfactory account of the phenomena. The virtues of this theory are based on its strength and parsimony. It allows for a fully homogeneous semantic treatment of names coped with ontological frugality and empirical and psychological adequacy.
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  40. Eduardo García-Ramírez & Marilyn Shatz (2011). On Problems with Descriptivism: Psychological Assumptions and Empirical Evidence. Mind and Language 26 (1):53-77.
    We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference (...)
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  41. Alan Henderson Gardiner (1940). The Theory of Proper Names. London, Oxford University Press, H. Milford.
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  42. Richard T. Garner (1969). On the Use of Proper Names and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Quarterly 19 (76):231-238.
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  43. K. Gluer & P. Pagin (2012). Reply to Forbes. Analysis 72 (2):298-303.
    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics (...)
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  44. Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin (2008). Relational Modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):307-322.
    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite (...)
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  45. Edward Harcourt (1993). Are Hybrid Proper Names the Solution to the Completion Problem? A Reply to Wolfgang Künne. Mind 102 (406):301-313.
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  46. Heidi Harley & Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (2001). Innateness, Abstract Names, and Syntactic Cues in How Children Learn the Meanings of Words. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1107-1108.
    Bloom masterfully captures the state-of-the-art in the study of lexical acquisition. He also exposes the extent of our ignorance about the learning of names for non-observables. HCLMW adopts an innatist position without adopting modularity of mind; however, it seems likely that modularity is needed to bridge the gap between object names and the rest of the lexicon.
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  47. John Hawthorne (ed.) (2003). Language and Mind. Blackwell.
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  48. John Hawthorne & David Manley (2012). The Reference Book. Oxford University Press.
    This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins with a defense of the view that neither is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It then challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work (...)
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  49. Richard Heck (ed.) (1997). Language, Truth, and Logic. Oxford University Press.
    A Festschrift for Michael Dummett. Includes papers by Christopher Peacocke, Alexander George, Sanford Shieh, John McDowell, Jason Stanley, John Campbell, Barry Taylor, Crispin Wright, George Boolos, Charles Parsons, and Richard Heck.
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  50. Wolfram Hinzen (2007). An Essay on Names and Truth. Oxford University Press.
    This pioneering book lays new foundations for the study of reference and truth.
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