Search results for 'Objectivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism & Relativism Philadelphia (2003). JCB Mohr, 1962. Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. In Lorraine Code (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Pennsylvania State University Press. 7--377.score: 30.0
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  2. Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.score: 24.0
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After (...)
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  3. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.score: 24.0
    Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (...)
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  4. Joseph Margolis (1966). Objectivism and Interactionism. Philosophy of Science 33 (June):118-123.score: 24.0
    The views of linguistic analysts and objectivists are explored with regard to the question of interactionism. It is argued that the admission of a logical difference between explanation by cause and explanation by motive cannot disqualify causal explanations of human action, cannot be construed as challenging the competence of science, and cannot count against interactionism. It is also argued that objectivist programs for eliminating mentalistic concepts either implicitly admit interactionism or cannot distinguish relevantly between interactionism and parallelism.
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  5. Elinor Mason (2013). Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2).score: 24.0
    In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the (...)
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  6. May Brodbeck (1966). Objectivism and Interaction: A Reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.score: 21.0
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  7. Joseph Margolis (1966). Reply to a Reaction: Second Remarks on Brodbeck's Objectivism. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):293-300.score: 21.0
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  8. Albert Ellis (1968). Is Objectivism a Religion? New York, L. Stuart.score: 21.0
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  9. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1987). An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Color. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41:127-141.score: 21.0
     
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  10. Leonard Peikoff (2012). Understanding Objectivism: A Guide to Learning Ayn Rand's Philosophy of Objectivism. New American Library.score: 21.0
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  11. Ayn Rand (1990/1967). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New American Library.score: 21.0
  12. Ayn Rand (1986/1988). The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism From a to Z. New American Library.score: 21.0
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  13. John W. Robbins (1974). Answer to Ayn Rand: [A Critique of the Philosophy of Objectivism]. Robbins.score: 21.0
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  14. Alfred Schramm (2006). Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’. In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume II. Ashgate.score: 21.0
    This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed (although into different directions) in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all , or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One (...)
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  15. Maya J. Goldenberg (2009). Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (2):168-187.score: 18.0
    Because “evidence” is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM), the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist philosophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach. This article redirects critical attention toward EBM’s rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of (...)
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  16. Peter A. Graham (2010). In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation. Ethics 121 (1):88-115.score: 18.0
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current (...)
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  17. Michael Huemer, Why I Am Not an Objectivist.score: 18.0
    3.1. Why logic is a priori. 3.2. Why mathematics is a priori. 3.3. Why ethics is a priori. 3.4. The nature of a priori knowledge - Acquired through the faculty of reason; knowledge of universals. 4. Universals 4.1. What are they? - "universal" & "particular" defined 4.2. The (real) problem of universals - "nominalism" & "realism" defined; why these are the only two possible positions. 4.3. Rand the realist - why Rand must be a realist, whether she knows it or (...)
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  18. Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett (2011). Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.score: 18.0
    Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.
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  19. Michael Huemer, Critique of "the Objectivist Ethics&Quot;.score: 18.0
    The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview.
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  20. Austin Harrington (2000). Objectivism in Hermeneutics? Gadamer, Habermas, Dilthey. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (4):491-507.score: 18.0
    Gadamer and Habermas both argue that some earlier theorists of interpretation in the human sciences, despite recognizing the meaningful character of social reality, still succumb to objectivism because they fail to conceive the relation of interpreters to their subjects in terms of cross-cultural normative “dialogue.” In particular, Gadamer and Habermas claim that the most prominent nineteenth-century philosopher of the human sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey, fell prey to a misleading Cartesian outlook which sought to ground the objectivity of interpretation on complete (...)
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  21. Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.score: 18.0
    Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective (...)
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  22. Elisabeth Schellekens (2006). Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):163-177.score: 18.0
    This paper is concerned with the possibility of an objectivism for aesthetic judgements capable of incorporating certain ‘subjectivist’ elements of aesthetic experience. The discussion focuses primarily on a desired cognitivism for aesthetic judgements, rather than on any putative realism of aesthetic properties. Two cognitivist theories of aesthetic judgements are discussed, one subjectivist, the other objectivist. It is argued that whilst the subjectivist theory relies too heavily upon analogies with secondary qualities, the objectivist account, which allows for some such analogies (...)
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  23. Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.score: 18.0
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives (...)
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  24. Richard J. Bernstein (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. University of Pennsylvania Press.score: 18.0
    "A fascinating and timely treatment of the objectivism versus relativism debates occurring in philosophy of science, literary theory, the social sciences, ...
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  25. Paul Diesing (1966). Objectivism Vs. Subjectivism in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):124-.score: 18.0
    Recent developments in social science methods have made most of the objectivism-subjectivism arguments in the philosophy of social science obsolete. Developments in experimental methods have made possible a behavioristic treatment of everything cherished as important in human action by the subjectivists; developments in computer and mathematical models have made possible a type of theory which carries out the program of the subjectivists but is not vulnerable to the arguments of the objectivists. What remains of the philosophical argument are two (...)
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  26. Elisabeth Schellekens (2008). A Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgments: Towards An Aesthetic Psychology. Dissertation, University of Londonscore: 18.0
    This doctoral thesis is an examination of the possibility of ascribing objectivity to aesthetic judgements. The aesthetic is viewed in terms of its being a certain kind of relation between the mind and the world; a clear understanding of aesthetic judgements will therefore be capable of telling us something important about both subjects and objects, and the ties between them. In view of this, one of the over-riding aims of this thesis is the promotion of an ‘aesthetic psychology’, a philosophical (...)
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  27. T. J. Mawson (2008). The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45 (17-18):207-212.score: 18.0
    I argue for the rational inescapability of value objectivism, the thesis that at least some normative appraisal is not simply a matter of how, subjectively, we feel about the world; it is a matter of how, objectively, the world ought to be. I do this via a two-stage argument, the first stage of which is based around a thought experiment, the second stage of which is based on how those who reject the argument of the first stage must present (...)
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  28. Andrew Jason Cohen (2000). On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and (“Objectivist”) “Liberal Metaphysicians”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.score: 18.0
    It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...)
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  29. Don Dedrick (1995). Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Color Vision. Dialogue 34 (1):35-44.score: 18.0
    In Color for Philosophers C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism?a view which identifies colour with some or other property of objects?must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called "simple objectivism," takes it that an adaptationist theory of biological (...)
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  30. Maeve Cooke (2000). Between 'Objectivism' and 'Contextualism': The Normative Foundations of Social Philosophy. Critical Horizons 1 (2):193-227.score: 18.0
    One of the principal challenges facing contemporary social philosophy is how to find foundations that are normatively robust yet congruent with its self-understanding. Social philosophy is a critical project within modernity, an interpretative horizon that stresses the influences of history and context on knowledge and experience. However, if it is to engage in intercultural dialogue and normatively robust social critique,social philosophy requires non-arbitrary,universal normative standards.The task of normative foundations can thus be formulated in terms of negotiating the tension between 'contextualism' (...)
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  31. T. D. J. Chappell (1998). The Incompleat Projectivist: How to Be an Objectivist and an Attitudinist. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.score: 18.0
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set (...)
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  32. Robert M. Sade (1995). A Theory of Health and Disease: The Objectivist-Subjectivist Dichotomy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (5):513-525.score: 18.0
    Competing contemporary theories of health, the reductionist (purportedly value-free) and the relativist (purportedly value-based) theories, both rest upon an understanding of value as grounded in desiring, a subjective state. Both can be classified as subjectivist theories. An alternative set of theories, those resting on an understanding of value as grounded in desirability (or goodness) of an objective goal, can be classified as objectivist theories. The ultimate goal of all living things is life, the standard by which states or functions can (...)
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  33. F. E. Trainer (1983). Ethical Objectivism‐Subjectivism: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Moral Thought∗. Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):192-207.score: 18.0
    Abstract Previous conceptual analyses and empirical research concerning moral development and moral education have almost completely failed to take into account the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist positions on the nature of morality. This paper begins by outlining the essential elements in the two positions and pointing to the significance of the issue for the study of moral thought and for the discussion of moral maturity. Reference is briefly made to problems in current theories arising from the neglect of the (...)
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  34. Jonathan Matusitz & Eric Kramer (2011). A Critique of Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. [REVIEW] Poiesis and Praxis 7 (4):291-303.score: 18.0
    This analysis comments on Bernstein’s lack of clear understanding of subjectivity, based on his book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Bernstein limits his interpretation of subjectivity to thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. The authors analyze the ideas of classic scholars such as Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. Husserl put forward his notion of transcendental subjectivity and phenomenological ramifications of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Nietzsche referred to subjectivity as perspectivism, the inescapable fact that any (...)
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  35. Domenico Costantini (1989). Objectivism and Subjectivism in the Foundations of Statistics. Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):387 - 396.score: 18.0
    The difference between carnap's and de finetti's conceptions of probability does not consist of a couple of requirements, As carnap asserted in a letter to de finetti. The paper is intended to give a theoretical justification for this denial. In order to do this, The author stresses the difference between (tolerant) objectivism and (radical) subjectivism. The difference is discussed in statistical terms. The discussion is faced with respect to predictive inferences, A type of statistical inference that both carnap and (...)
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  36. Eran Dorfman (2013). Naturalism, Objectivism and Everyday Life. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:117-133.score: 18.0
    In this paper I analyse the role of naturalism and objectivism in everyday life according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Husserl attributes the naturalistic attitude mainly to science, he defines the objectivist attitude as a naiveté which equally applies to the natural attitude of everyday life. I analyse the relationship between the natural attitude and lived experience and show Husserl's hesitation regarding the task of phenomenology in describing the lived experience of everyday life, since he considers this experience to (...)
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  37. Margarita M. Valdés (1999). Practical Ethics and Moral Objectivism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:73-81.score: 18.0
    Moral philosophers working today on concrete moral issues seem to assume certain views that are opposite to those of their predecessors; chief among these is that morality has an objective basis, that it is not just the result of subjective reactions, but comprises a body of beliefs acquired through some kind of perception of certain traits of reality. However, the reasons for thinking that people who discuss substantive moral issues are committed to moral objectivism are either not very clear (...)
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  38. Joseph Margolis (1996). Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.score: 18.0
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x” (in accord with the usual reading of Plato’s Theaetetus). I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, however (...)
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  39. Mario Gómez‐Torrente (2014). Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account. Noûs 48 (4):n/a-n/a.score: 18.0
    I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of (utterances of) color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with (...)
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  40. Ramon M. Lemos (1965). Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism in Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):56-65.score: 18.0
    The relativist contends that one has a duty to do something if and only if one's society holds that one does. The subjectivist maintains that one has a duty to do something if and only if one believes that one does. The objectivist argues that men have objective duties which are sometimes independent of what either they or their societies believe they are. My object is to indicate what seem to be some obvious, Yet fatal, Objections to relativism and subjectivism, (...)
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  41. Karey Harrison (1985). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis. Telos 1985 (63):223-227.score: 18.0
    Bernstein's recent book examines the extensive debate on the nature of human rationality. He suggests that this debate is beginning to converge — from the varying perspectives of philosophy of science, hermeneutics, sociology, anthropology, and moral and political philosophy — on a new conception of rationality. This new conception breaks with the standard opposition between objectivism and relativism, the terms in which the debate has previously been conducted. His reading of the debate attempts to show that some of the (...)
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  42. Lester Hunt (2000). Flourishing Objectivism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 2 (1):105 - 115.score: 18.0
    Lester Hunt reviews Tara Smith's Viable Values: A Study of the Root and Reward of Morality. He finds it an excellent contribution to the ongoing discussion of Objectivist ethics. Especially noteworthy, he says, are Smith's treatment of the concept of intrinsic value, her use of the concept of flourishing, and her treatment of the relations between the interests of different people. Though the book provides no sustained discussion of casuistical applications, epistemological assumptions, or potentially interesting side-issues, it raises many provocative (...)
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  43. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley (1998). Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18 (3):409-447.score: 18.0
    The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a doctrinal shift—from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a subjectivist view in modem criminal codes—is consistent with lay intuitions of the principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist view of modern codes in defining the (...)
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  44. Patrick Toner (2007). Objectivist Atheology. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8 (2):211 - 235.score: 18.0
    Objectivists insist on the primacy of existence—the axiom that existence exists. This axiom is taken to entail that the universe exists independent of any consciousness, human or divine. Objectivists hold that a straightforward consequence of this axiom is that God does not exist. The central argument of this paper is that the Objectivist atheological argument based on the primacy of existence fails. Atheological arguments based on the alleged incoherence of the Divine attributes are at best inconclusive. Theism has not been (...)
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  45. Russ Shafer-Landau (1994). Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):331-344.score: 15.0
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  46. David Enoch, Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (And Why You Are, Too).score: 15.0
    You may think that you're a moral relativist or subjectivist - many people today seem to. But I don't think you are. In fact, when we start doing metaethics - when we start, that is, thinking philosophically about our moral discourse and practice - thoughts about morality's objectivity become almost irresistible. Now, as is always the case in philosophy, that some thoughts seem irresistible is only the starting point for the discussion, and under argumentative pressure we may need to revise (...)
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  47. Michael Huemer, The Objectivist Theory of Free Will.score: 15.0
    Imagine we are at a murder trial. Randy Smith is accused of killing his Aunt Millie. The defense admits that on the night of the murder, Smith had an argument with his Aunt, that he took a pistol out of his jacket and shot her. She died of the gunshot wound. Smith knew that the gun was loaded, that Millie was directly in front of it, and that he was pulling the trigger. He was not insane at the time, there (...)
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  48. Christopher Edelman (2011). Montaigne's Moral Objectivism. Philosophy and Literature 35 (1):32-50.score: 15.0
    "Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in" (1.31.152, VS205).1 Remarks such as this from the essay "Of cannibals" have led commentators to argue that Montaigne subscribes to the theory of moral relativism, and that he takes "reason" to be a subjective, rather than an objective, standard for judgment.2 Yet (...)
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  49. John Dewey (1941). The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy 38 (20):533-542.score: 15.0
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