Search results for 'Objectivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  3
    Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism & Relativism Philadelphia (2003). JCB Mohr, 1962. Black, Max. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. In Lorraine Code (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Pennsylvania State University Press 7--377.
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  2. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
    Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (...)
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  3. Elinor Mason (2013). Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2).
    In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the (...)
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  4.  7
    Kathleen Touchstone (2016). Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School. Libertarian Papers 8 (1):23-57.
    : The purpose of this paper is to address from a normative perspective issues raised by John Mueller in Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element. Mueller criticizes economists, including Austrians, for failing to properly address unilateral transfers—in particular, charity, childcare, and crime—in economic thought. Mueller challenges economist Gary Becker’s position that giving increases the […] The post “Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School” appeared first on Libertarian Papers.
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  5. Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After (...)
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  6.  31
    Joseph Margolis (1966). Objectivism and Interactionism. Philosophy of Science 33 (June):118-123.
    The views of linguistic analysts and objectivists are explored with regard to the question of interactionism. It is argued that the admission of a logical difference between explanation by cause and explanation by motive cannot disqualify causal explanations of human action, cannot be construed as challenging the competence of science, and cannot count against interactionism. It is also argued that objectivist programs for eliminating mentalistic concepts either implicitly admit interactionism or cannot distinguish relevantly between interactionism and parallelism.
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  7.  5
    James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, Tomasz Wysocki & Miguel A. Endara (2015). “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”. Journal of Cognition and Culture 15:386-401.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ age were found to significantly affect (...)
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  8. Ayn Rand (1990). Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New American Library.
  9. Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter (1987). An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism About Color. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41 (1):127-141.
     
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  10. David Kelley (2000). The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand Truth and Toleration in Objectivism. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
  11.  93
    Darren Domsky (2004). Keeping a Place for Metaethics: Assessing Elliot's Dismissal of the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate in Environmental Ethics. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):675-694.
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  12.  21
    Ruth Weintraub (1990). Objectivism Without Objective Probabilities. Theoria 56 (1-2):23-41.
    After defending the pluralistic approach to the interpretation of probability statements, I argue that the correctness of objective probability statements is not to be explained in terms of objective probabilities attached to propositions. Such an explanation will enable us to uphold an intuitively appealing connection between probability and action only in indeterministic contexts, whereas the objectivity of probability statements doesn’t depend on the truth of indeterminism. I show how objective probability statements can be interpreted without ascribing objective probabilities to propositions. (...)
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  13.  22
    May Brodbeck (1966). Objectivism and Interaction: A Reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.
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  14.  9
    Joseph Margolis (1966). Reply to a Reaction: Second Remarks on Brodbeck's Objectivism. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):293-300.
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  15. Harry Binswanger & Leonard Peikoff (1988). The Ayn Rand Lexicon Objectivism From a to Z. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  16. Albert Ellis (1968). Is Objectivism a Religion? New York, L. Stuart.
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  17. Leonard Peikoff (2012). Understanding Objectivism: A Guide to Learning Ayn Rand's Philosophy of Objectivism. New American Library.
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  18. Ayn Rand (1986). The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism From a to Z. New American Library.
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  19. John W. Robbins (1974). Answer to Ayn Rand: [A Critique of the Philosophy of Objectivism]. Robbins.
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  20. Alfred Schramm (2006). Methodological Objectivism and Critical Rationalist ’Induction’. In Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford & David Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment, Volume Ii. Ashgate
    This paper constitutes one extended argument, which touches on various topics of Critical Rationalism as it was initiated by Karl Popper and further developed in his aftermath. The result of the argument will be that critical rationalism either offers no solution to the problem of induction at all, or that it amounts, in the last resort, to a kind of Critical Rationalist Inductivism as it were, a version of what I call Good Old Induction. One may think of David Miller (...)
     
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  21.  63
    Richard J. Bernstein (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. University of Pennsylvania Press.
    "A fascinating and timely treatment of the objectivism versus relativism debates occurring in philosophy of science, literary theory, the social sciences, ...
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  22.  58
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology. In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn. Cambridge University Press
    There is a kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of objective epistemic norms. It is generally regarded as harmless. There is another kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of an objectivist account of justification, one that takes the justification of a belief to turn on its accuracy. It is generally regarded as hopeless. It is a strange and unfortunate sociological fact that these attitudes are so prevalent. Objectivism about norms and justification (...)
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  23. Maya J. Goldenberg (2009). Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (2):168-187.
    Because “evidence” is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM), the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist philosophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach. This article redirects critical attention toward EBM’s rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of (...)
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  24. Peter A. Graham (2010). In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation. Ethics 121 (1):88-115.
    There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current (...)
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  25.  36
    Mario Gómez‐Torrente (2014). Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account. Noûs 49 (3):3-40.
    I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. (...)
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  26.  67
    Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives (...)
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  27.  29
    Fritz J. McDonald (2016). Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism. In Piotr Makowski, Mateusz Bonecki & Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy (eds.), Praxiology and the Reasons for Action. Transaction Publishers
    Subjectivism about reasons is the view that a person has a reason to perform act A if she has some motivation to do A, or would have motivation to do A in certain circumstances. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a series of arguments against subjectivism about reasons. In Parfit’s view, if subjectivism were true, nothing would actually matter. Parfit contends that there are only two positions regarding reasons: objectivism and subjectivism. I will argue for an inclusive position (...)
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  28. Allan Gotthelf & James G. Lennox (eds.) (2013). Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge: Reflections on Objectivist Epistemology. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    The philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand is a cultural phenomenon. Her books have sold more than twenty-eight million copies, and countless individuals speak of her writings as having significantly influenced their lives. Despite her popularity, Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism has received little serious attention from academic philosophers. _Concepts and Their Role in Knowledge_ offers scholarly analysis of key elements of Ayn Rand’s radically new approach to epistemology. The four essays, by contributors intimately familiar with this area of her work, (...)
     
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  29.  25
    Brian Hedden (2016). A Defense of Objectivism About Evidential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):716-743.
    Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one’s own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous (...)
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  30.  43
    Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
    Numerous arguments exist against color objectivism, the view that colors exist independently of any observer or any special observational circumstances. The most important group of objections exploits the high degree of variability of colors. Because there is no perceiver‐independent, well‐motivated standard for choosing among perceptual variants with respect to color properties, variability of colors is supposed to refute color objectivism.Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a (...)
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  31.  79
    Robert M. Sade (1995). A Theory of Health and Disease: The Objectivist-Subjectivist Dichotomy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (5):513-525.
    Competing contemporary theories of health, the reductionist (purportedly value-free) and the relativist (purportedly value-based) theories, both rest upon an understanding of value as grounded in desiring, a subjective state. Both can be classified as subjectivist theories. An alternative set of theories, those resting on an understanding of value as grounded in desirability (or goodness) of an objective goal, can be classified as objectivist theories. The ultimate goal of all living things is life, the standard by which states or functions can (...)
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  32.  22
    T. J. Mawson (2008). The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 49 (17-18):43-48.
    I argue for the rational inescapability of value objectivism, the thesis that at least some normative appraisal is not simply a matter of how, subjectively, we feel about the world; it is a matter of how, objectively, the world ought to be. I do this via a two-stage argument, the first stage of which is based around a thought experiment, the second stage of which is based on how those who reject the argument of the first stage must present (...)
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  33. Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
    Most objectivist and dispositionalist theories of color have tried to resolve the challenge raised by color variations by drawing a distinction between real and apparent colors. This paper considers such a strategy to be fundamentally erroneous. The high degree of variability of colors constitutes a crucial feature of colors and color perception; it cannot be avoided without leaving aside the real nature of color. The objectivist theory of color defended in this paper holds that objects have locally many different objective (...)
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  34.  51
    Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley (1998). Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18 (3):409-447.
    The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a doctrinal shift—from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a subjectivist view in modem criminal codes—is consistent with lay intuitions of the principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist view of modern codes in defining the (...)
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  35. Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett (2011). Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.
    Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.
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  36.  35
    T. J. Mawson (2008). The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45 (17-18):207-212.
    I argue for the rational inescapability of value objectivism, the thesis that at least some normative appraisal is not simply a matter of how, subjectively, we feel about the world; it is a matter of how, objectively, the world ought to be. I do this via a two-stage argument, the first stage of which is based around a thought experiment, the second stage of which is based on how those who reject the argument of the first stage must present (...)
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  37.  82
    Elisabeth Schellekens (2006). Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):163-177.
    This paper is concerned with the possibility of an objectivism for aesthetic judgements capable of incorporating certain ‘subjectivist’ elements of aesthetic experience. The discussion focuses primarily on a desired cognitivism for aesthetic judgements, rather than on any putative realism of aesthetic properties. Two cognitivist theories of aesthetic judgements are discussed, one subjectivist, the other objectivist. It is argued that whilst the subjectivist theory relies too heavily upon analogies with secondary qualities, the objectivist account, which allows for some such analogies (...)
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  38.  4
    Kathleen Touchstone, Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School.
    : The purpose of this paper is to address from a normative perspective issues raised by John Mueller in Redeeming Economics: Rediscovering the Missing Element. Mueller criticizes economists, including Austrians, for failing to properly address unilateral transfers—in particular, charity, childcare, and crime—in economic thought. Mueller challenges economist Gary Becker’s position that giving increases the […] The post “Charity, Childcare, and Crime: From Objectivist Ethics to the Austrian School” appeared first on Libertarian Papers.
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  39. Michael Huemer, Why I Am Not an Objectivist.
    3.1. Why logic is a priori. 3.2. Why mathematics is a priori. 3.3. Why ethics is a priori. 3.4. The nature of a priori knowledge - Acquired through the faculty of reason; knowledge of universals. 4. Universals 4.1. What are they? - "universal" & "particular" defined 4.2. The (real) problem of universals - "nominalism" & "realism" defined; why these are the only two possible positions. 4.3. Rand the realist - why Rand must be a realist, whether she knows it or (...)
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  40.  98
    Michael Huemer, Critique of "the Objectivist Ethics".
    The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview.
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  41.  84
    Austin Harrington (2000). Objectivism in Hermeneutics? Gadamer, Habermas, Dilthey. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (4):491-507.
    Gadamer and Habermas both argue that some earlier theorists of interpretation in the human sciences, despite recognizing the meaningful character of social reality, still succumb to objectivism because they fail to conceive the relation of interpreters to their subjects in terms of cross-cultural normative “dialogue.” In particular, Gadamer and Habermas claim that the most prominent nineteenth-century philosopher of the human sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey, fell prey to a misleading Cartesian outlook which sought to ground the objectivity of interpretation on complete (...)
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  42.  4
    Miloš Taliga (2016). Why the Objectivist Interpretation of Falsification Matters. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (4):335-351.
    The article distinguishes between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of scientific method, links subjectivism with good reasons, and argues its uselessness for our understanding of science. It applies the distinction to the method of falsification, explains why objectivism regards falsification to be conjectural, immune to the Duhem–Quine thesis, and immune to the problem of underdetermination. It confronts the falsifying mode of inference with the fallacy of begging the question and with the paradox of inference, and suggests how modus tollens helps (...)
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  43.  60
    Andrew Jason Cohen (2000). On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and (“Objectivist”) “Liberal Metaphysicians”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
    It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...)
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  44.  48
    Don Dedrick (1995). Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Color Vision. Dialogue 34 (1):35-44.
    In Color for Philosophers C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism?a view which identifies colour with some or other property of objects?must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called "simple objectivism," takes it that an adaptationist theory of biological (...)
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  45.  27
    F. E. Trainer (1983). Ethical Objectivism‐Subjectivism: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Moral Thought∗. Journal of Moral Education 12 (3):192-207.
    Abstract Previous conceptual analyses and empirical research concerning moral development and moral education have almost completely failed to take into account the distinction between objectivist and subjectivist positions on the nature of morality. This paper begins by outlining the essential elements in the two positions and pointing to the significance of the issue for the study of moral thought and for the discussion of moral maturity. Reference is briefly made to problems in current theories arising from the neglect of the (...)
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  46.  53
    Edward Younkins (2010). Human Nature, Flourishing, and Happiness: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, Positive Psychology, and Ayn Rand's Objectivism. Libertarian Papers 2.
    This article presents a skeleton of a potential paradigm of human flourishing and happiness in a free society. It is an exploratory attempt to construct an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into a clear, consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. Holding that there are essential interconnections among objective ideas, the article specifically emphasizes the compatibility of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, Positive Psychology, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism arguing that particular ideas from these areas can be integrated into a paradigm (...)
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  47.  37
    Margarita M. Valdés (1999). Practical Ethics and Moral Objectivism. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:73-81.
    Moral philosophers working today on concrete moral issues seem to assume certain views that are opposite to those of their predecessors; chief among these is that morality has an objective basis, that it is not just the result of subjective reactions, but comprises a body of beliefs acquired through some kind of perception of certain traits of reality. However, the reasons for thinking that people who discuss substantive moral issues are committed to moral objectivism are either not very clear (...)
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  48.  27
    Eran Dorfman (2013). Naturalism, Objectivism and Everyday Life. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:117-133.
    In this paper I analyse the role of naturalism and objectivism in everyday life according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Husserl attributes the naturalistic attitude mainly to science, he defines the objectivist attitude as a naiveté which equally applies to the natural attitude of everyday life. I analyse the relationship between the natural attitude and lived experience and show Husserl's hesitation regarding the task of phenomenology in describing the lived experience of everyday life, since he considers this experience to (...)
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  49.  3
    Mario Gómez‐Torrente (2016). Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account. Noûs 50 (1):3-40.
    I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. (...)
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  50.  18
    Karey Harrison (1985). Review of Richard Bernstein Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis. Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 63 (Spring):223-227.
    Bernstein's recent book examines the extensive debate on the nature of human rationality. He suggests that this debate is beginning to converge — from the varying perspectives of philosophy of science, hermeneutics, sociology, anthropology, and moral and political philosophy — on a new conception of rationality. This new conception breaks with the standard opposition between objectivism and relativism, the terms in which the debate has previously been conducted. His reading of the debate attempts to show that some of the (...)
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