Search results for 'Russell's Principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285-295.score: 540.0
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  2. Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295.score: 540.0
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  3. Marco Ruffino (1994). The Context Principle and Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Types. Synthese 98 (3):401 - 414.score: 522.0
    In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
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  4. Christian Beyer (forthcoming). Russell's Principle Considered From Both a Neo-Fregean and a Husserlian Viewpoint. Acta Analytica.score: 450.0
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  5. L. E. Fletschhacker (1979). Is Russell's Vicious Circle Principle False or Meaningless? Dialectica 33 (1):23-35.score: 435.0
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  6. P. Vatrdy & L. Fleischhacker (1979). Some Remarks on the Relationship Between Russell's* Vicious‐Circle Principle and Russell's Paradox. Dialectica 33 (1):3-19.score: 435.0
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  7. Mark T. Nelson (1998). Bertrand Russell's Defence of the Cosmological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):87-100.score: 324.0
    According to the cosmological argument, there must be a self-existent being, because, if every being were a dependent being, we would lack an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent beings at all, rather than nothing. This argument faces an important, but little-noticed objection: If self-existent beings may exist, why may not also self-explanatory facts also exist? And if self-explanatory facts may exist, why may not the fact that there are any dependent beings be a self-explanatory fact? And (...)
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  8. Nikolay Milkov (2008). Russell's Debt to Lotze. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.score: 315.0
    Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After (...)
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  9. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):354-373.score: 306.0
    Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns (...)
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  10. Scott Edgar, Hermann Cohen's Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History: A Rationalist Interpretation.score: 297.0
    This paper defends a Leibnizian rationalist interpretation of Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (1883). The first half of the paper identifies Cohen’s various different philosophical aims in the PIM. It argues that they are unified by the fact that Cohen’s arguments for addressing those aims all depend on a single shared premise. That linchpin premise is the claim that mathematical natural science can represent individual objects only if it also represents infinitesimal magnitudes. The second (...)
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  11. Reinhardt Grossmann (1972). Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties. Noûs 6 (2):153-164.score: 297.0
    The author argues that the primary lesson of the so-Called logical and semantical paradoxes is that certain entities do not exist, Entities of which we mistakenly but firmly believe that they must exist. In particular, Russell's paradox teaches us that there is no such thing as the property which every property has if and only if it does not have itself. Why should anyone think that such a property must exist and, Hence, Conceive of russell's argument as a (...)
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  12. William C. Kneale (1971). Russell's Paradox and Some Others. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):321-338.score: 297.0
    Though the phrase 'x is true of x' is well formed grammatically, it does not express any predicate in the logical sense, because it does not satisfy the principle of reduction for statements containing 'x is true of'. recognition of this allows for solution of russell's paradox without his restrictive theory of types.
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  13. Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra (1987). Russell's Logicist Definitions of Numbers, 1898–1913: Chronology and Significance. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):141-169.score: 297.0
    According to the received view, Russell rediscovered about 1900 the logical definition of cardinal number given by Frege in 1884. In the same way, we are told, he stated and developed independently the idea of logicism, using the principle of abstraction as the philosophical ground. Furthermore, the role commonly ascribed in this to Peano was only to invent an appropriate notation to be used as mere instrument. In this paper I hold that the study of Russell's unpublished manuscripts (...)
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  14. Bernard Linsky (2005). Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics. Russell 24 (2):133-172.score: 293.0
    This article presents notes that Russell made while reading the works of Gottlob Frege in 1902. These works include Frege's books as well as the packet of off-prints Frege sent at Russell's request in June of that year. Russell relied on these notes while composing "Appendix A: The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege" to add to The Principles of Mathematics, which was then in press. A transcription of the marginal comments in those works of Frege appeared in the (...)
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  15. Gregory Landini (1996). Logic in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (4):554-584.score: 291.0
    Unaware of Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift, Russell's 1903 The Principles of Mathematics set out a calculus for logic whose foundation was the doctrine that any such calculus must adopt only one style of variables–entity (individual) variables. The idea was that logic is a universal and all-encompassing science, applying alike to whatever there is–propositions, universals, classes, concrete particulars. Unfortunately, Russell's early calculus has appeared archaic if not completely obscure. This paper is an attempt to recover the formal system, showing its (...)
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  16. Bernhard Weiss (1994). On Russell's Arguments for Restricting Modes of Specification and Domains of Quantification. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):173-188.score: 291.0
    Russell takes his paper ?On denoting? to have achieved the repudiation of the theory of denoting concepts and Frege?s theory of sense, and the invention of the notion of incomplete symbols.This means that Russell attempts to solve the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes without making use of a theory of sense.Instead, his strategy is to revise his logical ontology by arguing that certain symbols should be treated as incomplete.In constructing such arguments Russell, at various points, makes use of epistemological and (...)
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  17. Kevin C. Klement (2001). Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's Response Adequate? History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.score: 287.0
    In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his philosophy (...)
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  18. Sébastien Gandon (2009). Toward a Topic-Specific Logicism? Russell's Theory of Geometry in the Principles of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):35-72.score: 271.0
    Russell's philosophy is rightly described as a programme of reduction of mathematics to logic. Now the theory of geometry developed in 1903 does not fit this picture well, since it is deeply rooted in the purely synthetic projective approach, which conflicts with all the endeavours to reduce geometry to analytical geometry. The first goal of this paper is to present an overview of this conception. The second aim is more far-reaching. The fact that such a theory of geometry was (...)
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  19. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion 51 (121):149-172.score: 267.0
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...)
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  20. Philippe Rouilhan (1992). Russell and the Vicious Circle Principle. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):169 - 182.score: 267.0
    The standard version of the story of Russell's theory of types gives legitimately precedence to the vicious circle principle, but it fails to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of incomplete symbols and of the ultimate universalist perspective of Russell's logic. It is what the Author tries to do. This enables him to resolve the apparent contradiction which exists in "Principles" between the ontological commitment of the theory itself with respect to individuals, propositions, and functions, and the (...)
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  21. Darryl Jung (1999). Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):55-80.score: 267.0
    Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be (...)
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  22. Leonard Linsky (1988). Terms and Propositions in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (4):621-642.score: 243.3
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  23. Wilfrid Hodges (1998). Them Just the Authors—Seem to Have Read Cantor's Argument in a Variety of Places. In My Records Only One Author Refers Directly to Cantor's Own Argument [7]. One Quotes Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics'[20] Later. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (1):1-16.score: 243.3
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  24. Wilfrid Hodges (1998). X2. Cantor's Proof. The Authors of These Papers—Henceforth Let Me Call Them Just the Authors—Seem to Have Read Cantor's Argument in a Variety of Places. In My Records Only One Author Refers Directly to Cantor's Own Argument [7]. One Quotes Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics'[20] Later. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (1).score: 243.3
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  25. Thomas Oberdan (forthcoming). Russell's Principles of Mathematics and the Revolution in Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Perspectives on Science.score: 243.3
  26. Antonio Rauti (2004). Propositional Structure and B. Russell's Theory of Denoting inThe Principles of Mathematics. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):281-304.score: 238.3
  27. Philip E. B. Jourdain (1912). Mr. Bertrand Russell's First Work on the Principles of Mathematics. The Monist 22 (1):149-158.score: 238.3
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  28. Francesco Orilia (2003). Logical Rules, Principles of Reasoning and Russell's Paradox. In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia. 179--192.score: 238.3
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  29. Ernest Nagel (1944). Review: James Feibleman, A Reply to Bertrand Russell's Introduction to the Second Edition of The Principles of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (3):77-78.score: 238.3
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  30. L. Susan Stebbing (1938). Review of B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics; and S. K. Langer, An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. [REVIEW] Philosophy 13 (52):481-.score: 225.0
  31. Anders Kraal (2013). The Aim of Russell's Early Logicism: A Reinterpretation. Synthese:1-18.score: 225.0
    I argue that three main interpretations of the aim of Russell’s early logicism in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) are mistaken, and propose a new interpretation. According to this new interpretation, the aim of Russell’s logicism is to show, in opposition to Kant, that mathematical propositions have a certain sort of complete generality which entails that their truth is independent of space and time. I argue that on this interpretation two often-heard objections to Russell’s logicism, deriving from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (...)
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  32. Margaret Cuonzo (2010). Intuition and Russell´s Paradox. Principia 5 (1-2):73-86.score: 224.0
    In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of (...) paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class. (shrink)
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  33. Sara L. Uckelman (2009). The Ontological Argument and Russell's Antinomy. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):309-312.score: 224.0
    In this short note we respond to the claim made by Christopher Viger in [4] that Anselm’s so-called ontological argument falls prey to Russell’s paradox. We show that Viger’s argument is based on a flawed premise and hence does not in fact demonstrate what he claims it demonstrates.
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  34. Kevin C. Klement (2009). A Cantorian Argument Against Frege's and Early Russell's Theories of Descriptions. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.score: 218.0
    It would be an understatement to say that Russell was interested in Cantorian diagonal paradoxes. His discovery of the various versions of Russell’s paradox—the classes version, the predicates version, the propositional functions version—had a lasting effect on his views in philosophical logic. Similar Cantorian paradoxes regarding propositions—such as that discussed in §500 of The Principles of Mathematics—were surely among the reasons Russell eventually abandoned his ontology of propositions.1 However, Russell’s reasons for abandoning what he called “denoting concepts”, and his rejection (...)
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  35. Ian Proops (2001). Logical Syntax in the Tractatus. In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. 163.score: 216.0
    An essay on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense and its relation to his idea that "logic must take care of itself". I explain how Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism is supposed to resolve Russell's paradox, and I offer an alternative to Cora Diamond's influential account of Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the error in the so-called "natural view" of nonsense.
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  36. Otavio Bueno (2001). Logicism Revisited. Principia 5 (1-2):99-124.score: 216.0
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I (...)
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  37. Nicolas Maudet & Nicholas Rescher (2000). Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities. Informal Logic 20 (1).score: 216.0
    As Russell's paradox of "the set of all sets that do not contain themselves" indicated long ago, matters go seriously amiss if one operates an ontology of unrestricted totalization. Some sort of restriction must be placed on such items as "the set of all sets that have the feature F' or "the conjunction of all truths that have the feature G." But generally, logicians here introduce such formalized and complex devices as the theory of types or the doctrine of (...)
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  38. Andrew Knight (2012). Review The Three Rs and the Humanity Criterion: An Abridged Version of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique by W. M. S. Russell and R. L. Burch Balls Michael Fund for the Replacement of Animals in Medical Experiments Nottingham, England. [REVIEW] Journal of Animal Ethics 2 (1):107-109.score: 215.0
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  39. David Bostock (2009). Russell's Early Theory of Denoting. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):49-67.score: 212.0
    The article concerns the treatment of the so-called denoting phrases, of the forms ?every A?, ?any A?, ?an A? and ?some A?, in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. An initially attractive interpretation of what Russell's theory was has been proposed by P.T. Geach, in his Reference and Generality (1962). A different interpretation has been proposed by P. Dau (Notre Dame Journal, 1986). The article argues that neither of these is correct, because both credit Russell with a more thought-out theory (...)
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  40. Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.score: 211.0
    In Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconventional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly” entities. In the latter (...)
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  41. Graham Stevens (2006). Russell's Repsychologising of the Proposition. Synthese 151 (1):99 - 124.score: 211.0
    Bertrand Russell’s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as “psychological occurrences”. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell’s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood (...)
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  42. Gregory Landini (1998). Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory. Oxford University Press.score: 211.0
    This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished "substitutional" theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the (...)
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  43. Geoffrey Hellman, Russell's Absolutism Vs.(?) Structuralism.score: 211.0
    Along with Frege, Russell maintained an absolutist stance regarding the subject matter of mathematics, revealed rather than imposed, or proposed, by logical analysis. The Fregean definition of cardinal number, for example, is viewed as (essentially) correct, not merely adequate for mathematics. And Dedekind’s “structuralist” views come in for criticism in the Principles. But, on reflection, Russell also flirted with views very close to a (different) version of structuralism. Main varieties of modern structuralism and their challenges are reviewed, taking account of (...)
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  44. André Fuhrmann (2002). Russell's Way Out of the Paradox of Propositions. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213.score: 211.0
    In Appendix B of Russell's The Principles of Mathematics occurs a paradox, the paradox of propositions, which a simple theory of types is unable to resolve. This fact is frequently taken to be one of the principal reasons for calling ramification onto the Russellian stage. The paper presents a detaiFled exposition of the paradox and its discussion in the correspondence between Frege and Russell. It is argued that Russell finally adopted a very simple solution to the paradox. This solution (...)
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  45. Bertil RolF (1982). Russell's Theses on Vagueness. History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (1):69-83.score: 211.0
    In a seminal paper of 1923 on vagueness, Bertrand Russell discussed some of the most important problems concerning the nature of vagueness, its extension within the language, and its relation to truth and logic. The present paper inquires into Russell's theory. The following topics will be analysed and discussed in turn in sections 1?5: Russell's definition of vagueness; his claim that all phrases are vague; his theory of the source of the vagueness in our language; his principles for (...)
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  46. Francisco A. Rodriguez Consuegra (1989). Russell's Theory of Types, 1901–1910: Its Complex Origins in the Unpublished Manuscripts. History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):131-164.score: 211.0
    In this article I try to show the philosophical continuity of Russell's ideas from his paradox of classes to Principia mathematica. With this purpose, I display the main results (descriptions, substitutions and types) as moments of the same development, whose principal goal was (as in his The principles) to look for a set of primitive ideas and propositions giving an account of all mathematics in logical terms, but now avoiding paradoxes. The sole way to reconstruct this central period in (...)
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  47. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.score: 204.0
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting” (the so-called "George IV puzzle"). This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that (...)
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  48. Russell Powell (2010). What's the Harm? An Evolutionary Theoretical Critique of the Precautionary Principle. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (2):181-206.score: 198.0
    The precautionary principle (“the Principle”) has been widely embraced as the new paradigm for contending with biological and environmental risk in the context of emerging technologies. Increasingly, it is being incorporated into domestic, supranational, and international legal regimes as part of a general overhaul of health and environmental regulation.1 Codifications of the Principle typically are vague, with their content intentionally left for scholars to debate, decision makers to interpret, and the courts to flesh out through case law. (...)
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  49. Kai F. Wehmeier (2004). Russell's Paradox in Consistent Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In Godehard Link (ed.), One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox. de Gruyter.score: 196.0
    We provide an overview of consistent fragments of the theory of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik that arise by restricting the second-order comprehension schema. We discuss how such theories avoid inconsistency and show how the reasoning underlying Russell’s paradox can be put to use in an investigation of these fragments.
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