Search results for 'Russell's Principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  19
    Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  2.  22
    Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285-295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell 's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  3.  65
    Marco Ruffino (1994). The Context Principle and Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Types. Synthese 98 (3):401 - 414.
    In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
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  4.  1
    L. E. Fletschhacker (1979). Is Russell's Vicious Circle Principle False or Meaningless? Dialectica 33 (1):23-35.
    SummaryP. Vardy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated from the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the Λ‐calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in (...)
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  5. L. Fleischhacker P. Vatrdy (1979). Some Remarks on the Relationship Between Russell's* Vicious‐Circle Principle and Russell's Paradox. Dialectica 33 (1):3-19.
    SummaryRussell's vicious‐circle principle is an endeavour to express a general principle of mathematics which, as the author feels, is fundamental for mathematics. This principle, in a sense warranty of formal consistency, interdicts in some form or other the selfapplication of mathematical entities. It is shown that the VCP is a vicious‐circle fallacy; that, although it can't be given an expression which is simultaneously formal and generally valid, it is generally presupposed by mathematics as far as a consistent (...)
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  6.  35
    Maciej Sendłak (2013). Modal Meinongianism, Russell's Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction. Polish Journal of Philosophy (2):63-78.
    The subject of my article is the principle of characterization – the most controversial principle of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, I would like to show that Russell’s well-known objection to Meinong’s Theory of Objects can be reformulated against a new modal interpretation of Meinongianism that is presented mostly by Graham Priest. Secondly, I would like to propose a strategy which gives uncontroversial restriction to the principle of characterization (...)
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  7. Christian Beyer (forthcoming). Russell's Principle Considered From Both a Neo-Fregean and a Husserlian Viewpoint. Acta Analytica.
     
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  8. Mark Textor (1998). The Semantic Challenge to Russell's Principle. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
     
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  9. P. Vatrdy & L. Fleischhacker (1979). Some Remarks on the Relationship Between Russell's* Vicious‐Circle Principle and Russell's Paradox. Dialectica 33 (1):3-19.
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  10. Mark T. Nelson (1998). Bertrand Russell's Defence of the Cosmological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):87-100.
    According to the cosmological argument, there must be a self-existent being, because, if every being were a dependent being, we would lack an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent beings at all, rather than nothing. This argument faces an important, but little-noticed objection: If self-existent beings may exist, why may not also self-explanatory facts also exist? And if self-explanatory facts may exist, why may not the fact that there are any dependent beings be a self-explanatory fact? And (...)
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  11.  41
    Nikolay Milkov (2008). Russell's Debt to Lotze. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.
    Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After (...)
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  12.  76
    Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):354-373.
    Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns (...)
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  13.  92
    Scott Edgar, Hermann Cohen's Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History: A Rationalist Interpretation.
    This paper defends a Leibnizian rationalist interpretation of Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (1883). The first half of the paper identifies Cohen’s various different philosophical aims in the PIM. It argues that they are unified by the fact that Cohen’s arguments for addressing those aims all depend on a single shared premise. That linchpin premise is the claim that mathematical natural science can represent individual objects only if it also represents infinitesimal magnitudes. The second (...)
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  14. Hartley Slater (2002). The Fallacy in Russell's Schema. Russell 22 (2).
    An analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference, which Bertrand Russell initiated, exposes the common fallacy in them, and has consequences for some of Graham Priest's work. Notably it undermines his defence of the Domain Principle, and his consequent belief that there are true contradictions. Use of Hilbert's epsilon calculus shows, instead, that we must allow for indeterminacy of sense in connection with paradoxes of self-reference.
     
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  15.  81
    William C. Kneale (1971). Russell's Paradox and Some Others. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):321-338.
    Though the phrase 'x is true of x' is well formed grammatically, it does not express any predicate in the logical sense, because it does not satisfy the principle of reduction for statements containing 'x is true of'. recognition of this allows for solution of russell's paradox without his restrictive theory of types.
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  16.  45
    Reinhardt Grossmann (1972). Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties. Noûs 6 (2):153-164.
    The author argues that the primary lesson of the so-Called logical and semantical paradoxes is that certain entities do not exist, Entities of which we mistakenly but firmly believe that they must exist. In particular, Russell's paradox teaches us that there is no such thing as the property which every property has if and only if it does not have itself. Why should anyone think that such a property must exist and, Hence, Conceive of russell's argument as a (...)
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  17.  7
    Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra (1987). Russell's Logicist Definitions of Numbers, 1898–1913: Chronology and Significance. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):141-169.
    According to the received view, Russell rediscovered about 1900 the logical definition of cardinal number given by Frege in 1884. In the same way, we are told, he stated and developed independently the idea of logicism, using the principle of abstraction as the philosophical ground. Furthermore, the role commonly ascribed in this to Peano was only to invent an appropriate notation to be used as mere instrument. In this paper I hold that the study of Russell's unpublished manuscripts (...)
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  18.  7
    Bernhard Weiss (1994). On Russell's Arguments for Restricting Modes of Specification and Domains of Quantification. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):173-188.
    Russell takes his paper ?On denoting? to have achieved the repudiation of the theory of denoting concepts and Frege?s theory of sense, and the invention of the notion of incomplete symbols.This means that Russell attempts to solve the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes without making use of a theory of sense.Instead, his strategy is to revise his logical ontology by arguing that certain symbols should be treated as incomplete.In constructing such arguments Russell, at various points, makes use of epistemological and (...)
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  19. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 51 (121):149-172.
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...)
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  20.  31
    Philippe Rouilhan (1992). Russell and the Vicious Circle Principle. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):169 - 182.
    The standard version of the story of Russell's theory of types gives legitimately precedence to the vicious circle principle, but it fails to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of incomplete symbols and of the ultimate universalist perspective of Russell's logic. It is what the Author tries to do. This enables him to resolve the apparent contradiction which exists in "Principles" between the ontological commitment of the theory itself with respect to individuals, propositions, and functions, and the (...)
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  21.  17
    Darryl Jung (1999). Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):55-80.
    Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be (...)
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  22. Otavio Bueno (2001). Logicism Revisited. Principia 5 (1-2):99-124.
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I (...)
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  23.  11
    Margaret Cuonzo (2010). Intuition and Russell´s Paradox. Principia 5 (1-2):73-86.
    In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of (...) paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class. (shrink)
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  24.  7
    Sara L. Uckelman (2009). The Ontological Argument and Russell's Antinomy. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):309-312.
    In this short note we respond to the claim made by Christopher Viger in [4] that Anselm’s so-called ontological argument falls prey to Russell’s paradox. We show that Viger’s argument is based on a flawed premise and hence does not in fact demonstrate what he claims it demonstrates.
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  25.  48
    Peter G. Jones, Solving Metaphysics Part I - Metaphysics in a Nutshell: A Lazy Philosopher's Guide.
    This essay proposes that metaphysics is best done as lazily as possible, and that a lazy approach, which some would call 'high level', is effective where it means that issues are simplified and unpleasant facts are faced with no wriggling on the hook. It sketches out the solution proposed by Buddhism or more generally mysticism. It suggest that the principle obstacle to a solution for metaphysics is Russell's Paradox, and that it can be overcome.
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  26.  26
    Gary Hatfield (2013). Russell's Progress: Spatial Dimensions, the From-Which, and the At-Which. In Dina Emundts (ed.), Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. De Gruyter 321–44.
    The chapter concerns some aspects of Russell’s epistemological turn in the period after 1911. In particular, it focuses on two aspects of his philosophy in this period: his attempt to render material objects as constructions out of sense data, and his attitude toward sense data as “hard data.” It examines closely Russell’s “breakthrough” of early 1914, in which he concluded that, viewed from the standpoint of epistemology and analytic construction, space has six dimensions, not merely three. Russell posits a three-dimensional (...)
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  27. Ian Proops (2001). Logical Syntax in the Tractatus. In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge 163.
    An essay on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense and its relation to his idea that "logic must take care of itself". I explain how Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism is supposed to resolve Russell's paradox, and I offer an alternative to Cora Diamond's influential account of Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the error in the so-called "natural view" of nonsense.
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  28.  2
    Nicolas Maudet & Nicholas Rescher (2000). Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities. Informal Logic 20 (1).
    As Russell's paradox of "the set of all sets that do not contain themselves" indicated long ago, matters go seriously amiss if one operates an ontology of unrestricted totalization. Some sort of restriction must be placed on such items as "the set of all sets that have the feature F' or "the conjunction of all truths that have the feature G." But generally, logicians here introduce such formalized and complex devices as the theory of types or the doctrine of (...)
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  29. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it (...)
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  30.  6
    Murali Ramachandran (1996). The Ambiguity Thesis Versus Kripke's Defence of Russell. Mind and Language 11 (4):371-387.
    In his influential paper 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', Kripke defends Russell's theory of descriptions against the charge that the existence of referential and attributive uses of descriptions reflects a semantic ambiguity. He presents a purely defensive argument to show that Russell's theory is not refuted by the referential usage and a number of methodological considerations which apparently tell in favour of Russell's unitary theory over an ambiguity theory. In this paper, I put forward a case for (...)
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  31. Russell Powell (2010). What's the Harm? An Evolutionary Theoretical Critique of the Precautionary Principle. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (2):181-206.
    The precautionary principle (“the Principle”) has been widely embraced as the new paradigm for contending with biological and environmental risk in the context of emerging technologies. Increasingly, it is being incorporated into domestic, supranational, and international legal regimes as part of a general overhaul of health and environmental regulation.1 Codifications of the Principle typically are vague, with their content intentionally left for scholars to debate, decision makers to interpret, and the courts to flesh out through case law. (...)
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  32.  20
    Kai F. Wehmeier (2004). Russell's Paradox in Consistent Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In Godehard Link (ed.), One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox. De Gruyter
    We provide an overview of consistent fragments of the theory of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik that arise by restricting the second-order comprehension schema. We discuss how such theories avoid inconsistency and show how the reasoning underlying Russell’s paradox can be put to use in an investigation of these fragments.
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  33.  21
    Alan Schwerin (2002). Our Statements Are Likely to Be Wrong: On Russell's Big Thesis. In Bertrand Russell on Nuclear War, Peace and Language: Critical and Historical Essays. Praeger 91 - 115.
    What is the relationship between Russell's conception of philosophy and that of the author of the Tractatus, Ludwig Wittgenstein? My paper is an attempt to show that Russell and the early Wittgenstein do not share the same conception of philosophy and that the fault lines of their divergent views can be located in The Problems of Philosophy i,e, before the traditionally cited Theory of Knowledge manuscript.
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  34. Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). A Neglected Resolution of Russell’s Paradox of Propositions. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):328-344.
    Bertrand Russell offered an influential paradox of propositions in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, but there is little agreement as to what to conclude from it. We suggest that Russell's paradox is best regarded as a limitative result on propositional granularity. Some propositions are, on pain of contradiction, unable to discriminate between classes with different members: whatever they predicate of one, they predicate of the other. When accepted, this remarkable fact should cast some doubt upon some of (...)
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  35.  32
    Naomi Eilan (2015). A Relational Response to Newman's Objection to Russell's Causal Theory of Perception. Theoria 81 (1):4-26.
    The causal theory of perception has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman's set-theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP, in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: Newman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge to (...)
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  36.  13
    Daniele Mezzadri (2014). Types, Forms and Unity. Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Judgment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2):177-193.
    This paper investigates Wittgenstein's "notorious" criticism of Russell's theory of judgment. Instead of advancing a further new interpretation of it, though, I analyze and discuss some of the most promising readings of the Russell/Wittgenstein dispute put forward in the secondary literature; I aim to show that, despite their alleged reciprocal opposition, they cohere with each other because they are, at bottom, different ways of highlighting the same question. I then connect Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell to the account of the (...)
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  37.  10
    John Corcoran (1983). 1983 Review in Mathematical Reviews 83e:03005 Of: Cocchiarella, Nino “The Development of the Theory of Logical Types and the Notion of a Logical Subject in Russell's Early Philosophy: Bertrand Russell's Early Philosophy, Part I”. Synthese 45 (1980), No. 1, 71-115. MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 83:03005.
    CORCORAN RECOMMENDS COCCHIARELLA ON TYPE THEORY. The 1983 review in Mathematical Reviews 83e:03005 of: Cocchiarella, Nino “The development of the theory of logical types and the notion of a logical subject in Russell's early philosophy: Bertrand Russell's early philosophy, Part I”. Synthese 45 (1980), no. 1, 71-115 .
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  38.  44
    Tim Button (2014). The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists From Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):261-289.
    Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to (...)
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  39.  30
    José L. Zalabardo (2015). Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment. In Michael Campbell & Michael O’Sullivan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Perception. Routledge 126-151.
    I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.
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  40. Nicholas Griffin (1991). Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship. Clarendon Press.
    Based mainly on unpublished papers this is the first detailed study of the early, neo-Hegelian period of Bertrand Russell's career. It covers his philosophical education at Cambridge, his conversion to neo-Hegelianism, his ambitious plans for a neo-Hegelian dialectic of the sciences and the problems which ultimately led him to reject it.
     
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  41.  88
    Ian Proops (2006). Russell’s Reasons for Logicism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292.
    What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the (...)
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  42. Charles Pigden, Russell's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A 27000 word survey of Russell’s ethics for the SEP. I argue that Russell was a meta-ethicist of some significance. In the course of his long philosophical career, he canvassed most of the meta-ethical options that have dominated debate in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries — naturalism, non-naturalism, emotivism and the error-theory (anticipating Stevenson and Ayer on the one hand and Mackie on the other), and even, to some extent, subjectivism and relativism. And though none of his theories quite worked (...)
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  43.  45
    Fatema Amijee (2013). The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.
    In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention (...)
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  44.  40
    Nino Cocchiarella (2000). Russell's Paradox of the Totality of Propositions. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):25-37.
    Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics.
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  45.  27
    Kevin C. Klement (2014). The Paradoxes and Russell's Theory of Incomplete Symbols. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):183-207.
    Russell claims in his autobiography and elsewhere that he discovered his 1905 theory of descriptions while attempting to solve the logical and semantic paradoxes plaguing his work on the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I hope to make the connection between his work on the paradoxes and the theory of descriptions and his theory of incomplete symbols generally clearer. In particular, I argue that the theory of descriptions arose from the realization that not only can a class not be (...)
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  46.  30
    Sajahan Miah (2006). Russell's Theory of Perception 1905-1919. New York: Continuum.
    This book focuses on Russell's work from 1905 to 1919, during which period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge.
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  47.  27
    André Fuhrmann (2010). Russell´s Early Type Theory and the Paradox of Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):19-42.
    The paradox of propositiOns, presented in Appenclix B of Russell's The Principies of Mathernatics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity (...)
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  48.  58
    Kevin C. Klement, Russell's Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Russell's paradox represents either of two interrelated logical antinomies. The most commonly discussed form is a contradiction arising in the logic of sets or classes. Some classes (or sets) seem to be members of themselves, while some do not. The class of all classes is itself a class, and so it seems to be in itself. The null or empty class, however, must not be a member of itself. However, suppose that we can form a class of all classes (...)
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  49.  16
    Erik C. Banks (2009). Russell's Hypothesis and the New Physicalism. Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 6.
    Bertrand Russell claimed in the Analysis of Matter that physics is purely structural or relational and so leaves out intrinsic properties of matter, properties that, he said, are evident to us at least in one case: as the internal states of our brains. Russell's hypothesis has figured in recent discussions of physicalism and the mind body problem, by Chalmers, Strawson and Stoljar, among others, but I want to reject two popular interpretations: 1. a conception of intrinsic properties of matter (...)
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  50.  53
    Ricardo Restrepo Echavarria (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle’s employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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