Search results for 'Russell's Principle' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285-295.score: 120.0
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  2. Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295.score: 120.0
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  3. Marco Ruffino (1994). The Context Principle and Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell's Theory of Types. Synthese 98 (3):401 - 414.score: 116.0
    In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
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  4. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Wittgenstein on Circularity in the Frege-Russell Definition of Cardinal Number. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):354-373.score: 96.0
    Several scholars have argued that Wittgenstein held the view that the notion of number is presupposed by the notion of one-one correlation, and that therefore Hume's principle is not a sound basis for a definition of number. I offer a new interpretation of the relevant fragments on philosophy of mathematics from Wittgenstein's Nachlass, showing that if different uses of ‘presupposition’ are understood in terms of de re and de dicto knowledge, Wittgenstein's argument against the Frege-Russell definition of number turns (...)
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  5. Christian Beyer (forthcoming). Russell's Principle Considered From Both a Neo-Fregean and a Husserlian Viewpoint. Acta Analytica.score: 90.0
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  6. L. E. Fletschhacker (1979). Is Russell's Vicious Circle Principle False or Meaningless? Dialectica 33 (1):23-35.score: 87.0
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  7. P. Vatrdy & L. Fleischhacker (1979). Some Remarks on the Relationship Between Russell's* Vicious‐Circle Principle and Russell's Paradox. Dialectica 33 (1):3-19.score: 87.0
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  8. Margaret Cuonzo (2010). Intuition and Russell´s Paradox. Principia 5 (1-2):73-86.score: 84.0
    In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case of (...) paradox, this is an ambiguity in the notion of a class. (shrink)
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  9. Sara L. Uckelman (2009). The Ontological Argument and Russell's Antinomy. Logic and Logical Philosophy 18 (3-4):309-312.score: 84.0
    In this short note we respond to the claim made by Christopher Viger in [4] that Anselm’s so-called ontological argument falls prey to Russell’s paradox. We show that Viger’s argument is based on a flawed premise and hence does not in fact demonstrate what he claims it demonstrates.
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  10. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion 51 (121):149-172.score: 83.0
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...)
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  11. Mark T. Nelson (1998). Bertrand Russell's Defence of the Cosmological Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):87-100.score: 80.0
    According to the cosmological argument, there must be a self-existent being, because, if every being were a dependent being, we would lack an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent beings at all, rather than nothing. This argument faces an important, but little-noticed objection: If self-existent beings may exist, why may not also self-explanatory facts also exist? And if self-explanatory facts may exist, why may not the fact that there are any dependent beings be a self-explanatory fact? And (...)
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  12. Bernard Linsky (2005). Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics. Russell 24 (2):133-172.score: 79.0
    This article presents notes that Russell made while reading the works of Gottlob Frege in 1902. These works include Frege's books as well as the packet of off-prints Frege sent at Russell's request in June of that year. Russell relied on these notes while composing "Appendix A: The Logical and Arithmetical Doctrines of Frege" to add to The Principles of Mathematics, which was then in press. A transcription of the marginal comments in those works of Frege appeared in the (...)
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  13. Nikolay Milkov (2008). Russell's Debt to Lotze. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.score: 77.0
    Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After (...)
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  14. Gregory Landini (1996). Logic in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (4):554-584.score: 77.0
    Unaware of Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift, Russell's 1903 The Principles of Mathematics set out a calculus for logic whose foundation was the doctrine that any such calculus must adopt only one style of variables–entity (individual) variables. The idea was that logic is a universal and all-encompassing science, applying alike to whatever there is–propositions, universals, classes, concrete particulars. Unfortunately, Russell's early calculus has appeared archaic if not completely obscure. This paper is an attempt to recover the formal system, showing its (...)
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  15. Kevin C. Klement (2001). Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's Response Adequate? History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.score: 76.3
    In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his philosophy (...)
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  16. Giovanni Mion (forthcoming). The Square of Opposition: From Russell’s Logic to Kant’s Cosmology. History and Philosophy of Logic:1-6.score: 73.0
    In this paper, I will show to what extent we can use our modern understanding of the Square of Opposition in order to make sense of Kant’s double standard solution to the cosmological antinomies. Notoriously, for Kant, both theses and antitheses of the mathematical antinomies are false, while both theses and antitheses of the dynamical antinomies are true. Kantian philosophers and interpreters (including Schopenhauer, for example) have criticized Kant’s solution as artificial and prejudicial. In the paper, I do not dispute (...)
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  17. Ian Proops (2001). Logical Syntax in the Tractatus. In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. 163.score: 72.0
    An essay on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense and its relation to his idea that "logic must take care of itself". I explain how Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism is supposed to resolve Russell's paradox, and I offer an alternative to Cora Diamond's influential account of Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the error in the so-called "natural view" of nonsense.
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  18. Otavio Bueno (2001). Logicism Revisited. Principia 5 (1-2):99-124.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I (...)
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  19. Nicolas Maudet & Nicholas Rescher (2000). Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities. Informal Logic 20 (1).score: 72.0
    As Russell's paradox of "the set of all sets that do not contain themselves" indicated long ago, matters go seriously amiss if one operates an ontology of unrestricted totalization. Some sort of restriction must be placed on such items as "the set of all sets that have the feature F' or "the conjunction of all truths that have the feature G." But generally, logicians here introduce such formalized and complex devices as the theory of types or the doctrine of (...)
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  20. Sébastien Gandon (2009). Toward a Topic-Specific Logicism? Russell's Theory of Geometry in the Principles of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (1):35-72.score: 71.0
    Russell's philosophy is rightly described as a programme of reduction of mathematics to logic. Now the theory of geometry developed in 1903 does not fit this picture well, since it is deeply rooted in the purely synthetic projective approach, which conflicts with all the endeavours to reduce geometry to analytical geometry. The first goal of this paper is to present an overview of this conception. The second aim is more far-reaching. The fact that such a theory of geometry was (...)
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  21. Reinhardt Grossmann (1972). Russell's Paradox and Complex Properties. Noûs 6 (2):153-164.score: 71.0
    The author argues that the primary lesson of the so-Called logical and semantical paradoxes is that certain entities do not exist, Entities of which we mistakenly but firmly believe that they must exist. In particular, Russell's paradox teaches us that there is no such thing as the property which every property has if and only if it does not have itself. Why should anyone think that such a property must exist and, Hence, Conceive of russell's argument as a (...)
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  22. Scott Edgar, Hermann Cohen's Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History: A Rationalist Interpretation.score: 71.0
    This paper defends a Leibnizian rationalist interpretation of Hermann Cohen’s Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (1883). The first half of the paper identifies Cohen’s various different philosophical aims in the PIM. It argues that they are unified by the fact that Cohen’s arguments for addressing those aims all depend on a single shared premise. That linchpin premise is the claim that mathematical natural science can represent individual objects only if it also represents infinitesimal magnitudes. The second (...)
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  23. William C. Kneale (1971). Russell's Paradox and Some Others. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):321-338.score: 71.0
    Though the phrase 'x is true of x' is well formed grammatically, it does not express any predicate in the logical sense, because it does not satisfy the principle of reduction for statements containing 'x is true of'. recognition of this allows for solution of russell's paradox without his restrictive theory of types.
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  24. Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra (1987). Russell's Logicist Definitions of Numbers, 1898–1913: Chronology and Significance. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):141-169.score: 71.0
    According to the received view, Russell rediscovered about 1900 the logical definition of cardinal number given by Frege in 1884. In the same way, we are told, he stated and developed independently the idea of logicism, using the principle of abstraction as the philosophical ground. Furthermore, the role commonly ascribed in this to Peano was only to invent an appropriate notation to be used as mere instrument. In this paper I hold that the study of Russell's unpublished manuscripts (...)
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  25. Kai F. Wehmeier (2004). Russell's Paradox in Consistent Fragments of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. In Godehard Link (ed.), One Hundred Years of Russell’s Paradox. de Gruyter.score: 70.0
    We provide an overview of consistent fragments of the theory of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik that arise by restricting the second-order comprehension schema. We discuss how such theories avoid inconsistency and show how the reasoning underlying Russell’s paradox can be put to use in an investigation of these fragments.
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  26. Bernhard Weiss (1994). On Russell's Arguments for Restricting Modes of Specification and Domains of Quantification. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):173-188.score: 69.0
    Russell takes his paper ?On denoting? to have achieved the repudiation of the theory of denoting concepts and Frege?s theory of sense, and the invention of the notion of incomplete symbols.This means that Russell attempts to solve the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes without making use of a theory of sense.Instead, his strategy is to revise his logical ontology by arguing that certain symbols should be treated as incomplete.In constructing such arguments Russell, at various points, makes use of epistemological and (...)
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  27. Anders Kraal (2013). The Aim of Russell's Early Logicism: A Reinterpretation. Synthese:1-18.score: 67.0
    I argue that three main interpretations of the aim of Russell’s early logicism in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) are mistaken, and propose a new interpretation. According to this new interpretation, the aim of Russell’s logicism is to show, in opposition to Kant, that mathematical propositions have a certain sort of complete generality which entails that their truth is independent of space and time. I argue that on this interpretation two often-heard objections to Russell’s logicism, deriving from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (...)
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  28. Philippe Rouilhan (1992). Russell and the Vicious Circle Principle. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):169 - 182.score: 65.0
    The standard version of the story of Russell's theory of types gives legitimately precedence to the vicious circle principle, but it fails to appreciate the significance of the doctrine of incomplete symbols and of the ultimate universalist perspective of Russell's logic. It is what the Author tries to do. This enables him to resolve the apparent contradiction which exists in "Principles" between the ontological commitment of the theory itself with respect to individuals, propositions, and functions, and the (...)
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  29. Darryl Jung (1999). Russell, Presupposition, and the Vicious-Circle Principle. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):55-80.score: 65.0
    Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be (...)
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  30. Kevin C. Klement (2009). A Cantorian Argument Against Frege's and Early Russell's Theories of Descriptions. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.score: 64.0
    It would be an understatement to say that Russell was interested in Cantorian diagonal paradoxes. His discovery of the various versions of Russell’s paradox—the classes version, the predicates version, the propositional functions version—had a lasting effect on his views in philosophical logic. Similar Cantorian paradoxes regarding propositions—such as that discussed in §500 of The Principles of Mathematics—were surely among the reasons Russell eventually abandoned his ontology of propositions.1 However, Russell’s reasons for abandoning what he called “denoting concepts”, and his rejection (...)
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  31. Ian Proops (2011). Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions. Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.score: 62.0
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting” (the so-called "George IV puzzle"). This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that (...)
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  32. Ian Proops (2006). Russell’s Reasons for Logicism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2):267-292.score: 62.0
    What is at stake philosophically for Russell in espousing logicism? I argue that Russell's aims are chiefly epistemological and mathematical in nature. Russell develops logicism in order to give an account of the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge that is compatible with what he takes to be the uncontroversial status of this science as true, certain and exact. I argue for this view against the view of Peter Hylton, according to which Russell uses logicism to defend the (...)
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  33. Kevin C. Klement, Russell's Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 62.0
    Russell's paradox represents either of two interrelated logical antinomies. The most commonly discussed form is a contradiction arising in the logic of sets or classes. Some classes (or sets) seem to be members of themselves, while some do not. The class of all classes is itself a class, and so it seems to be in itself. The null or empty class, however, must not be a member of itself. However, suppose that we can form a class of all classes (...)
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  34. Ricardo Restrepo Echavarria (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.score: 62.0
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle’s employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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  35. Sajahan Miah (2006). Russell's Theory of Perception 1905-1919. New York: Continuum.score: 62.0
    This book focuses on Russell's work from 1905 to 1919, during which period Russell attempted a reductionist analysis of empirical knowledge.
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  36. Charles Pigden, Russell's Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 62.0
    A 27000 word survey of Russell’s ethics for the SEP. I argue that Russell was a meta-ethicist of some significance. In the course of his long philosophical career, he canvassed most of the meta-ethical options that have dominated debate in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries — naturalism, non-naturalism, emotivism and the error-theory (anticipating Stevenson and Ayer on the one hand and Mackie on the other), and even, to some extent, subjectivism and relativism. And though none of his theories quite worked (...)
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  37. Peter Milne (2008). Russell's Completeness Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (1):31-62.score: 62.0
    Bertrand Russell’s 1906 article ‘The Theory of Implication’ contains an algebraic weak completeness proof for classical propositional logic. Russell did not present it as such. We give an exposition of the proof and investigate Russell’s view of what he was about, whether he could have appreciated the proof for what it is, and why there is no parallel of the proof in Principia Mathematica.
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  38. George Santayana (1911). Russell's Philosophical Essays. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (3):57-63.score: 62.0
    This article is Santayana's review of Bertrand Russell's 1910 book, Philosophical Essays.
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  39. Christopher Toner (2011). The Virtues (and a Few Vices) of Daniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (3):453-468.score: 62.0
    Daniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues is principally a defense of the Aristotelian claim that phronesis is part of every unqualified virtue—a defense of what Russell calls "hard virtue theory" and "hard virtue ethics." The main support for this is the further claim that we would be unable to act well reliably, or form our character reliably, without phronesis performing its "twin roles": correctly identifying the mean of each virtue, and integrating the mean of each virtue with those (...)
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  40. Michael Kremer (2008). Soames on Russell's Logic: A Reply. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):209 - 212.score: 62.0
    In “What is History For?,” Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell’s logic in volume 1 of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. This note rebuts two of Soames’s replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell’s logic does not fit the argument of the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and that Soames’s contextual definition of classes does not match Russell’s contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames’s presentation of Russell’s logic misrepresents what Russell took to be (...)
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  41. Larry M. Jorgensen (2011). Russell’s Leibnizian Concept of Vagueness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (3):289-301.score: 62.0
    The account of vagueness Bertrand Russell provided in his 1923 paper, entitled simply “Vagueness” (see Russell [1923]1997), has been thought by some to be inconsistent. One main objection, raised by Timothy Williamson (1994), is that Russell’s attempt early in the paper to distinguish vagueness from generality is at odds with the definition of vagueness he presents later in the same paper. It is as if, as Williamson puts it, Russell “backslides” from his previous distinction (1994, 60), resulting in a conflation (...)
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  42. Kevin C. Klement (2014). The Paradoxes and Russell's Theory of Incomplete Symbols. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):183-207.score: 62.0
    Russell claims in his autobiography and elsewhere that he discovered his 1905 theory of descriptions while attempting to solve the logical and semantic paradoxes plaguing his work on the foundations of mathematics. In this paper, I hope to make the connection between his work on the paradoxes and the theory of descriptions and his theory of incomplete symbols generally clearer. In particular, I argue that the theory of descriptions arose from the realization that not only can a class not be (...)
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  43. André Fuhrmann (2010). Russell´s Early Type Theory and the Paradox of Propositions. Principia 5 (1-2):19-42.score: 62.0
    The paradox of propositiOns, presented in Appenclix B of Russell's The Principies of Mathernatics (1903), is usually taken as Russell's principal motive, at the time, for moving from a simple to a ramified theory of types. I argue that this view is mistaken. A closer study of Russell's correspondence with Frege reveals that Russell carne to adopt a very different resolution of the paradox, calling into question not the simplicity of his early type theory but the simplicity (...)
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  44. Tim Button (forthcoming). The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists From Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.score: 62.0
    Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference, and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, the minimalist regards them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents; and, when applied (...)
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  45. Ricardo Restrepo Echavarria (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.score: 62.0
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle’s employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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  46. Naomi Eilan (2013). A Relational Response to Newman's Objection to Russell's Causal Theory of Perception. Theoria 80 (2).score: 62.0
    The causal theory of perception (CTP) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman's set-theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP, in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: Newman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge (...)
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  47. Erik C. Banks (2009). Russell's Hypothesis and the New Physicalism. Proceedings of the Ohio Philosophical Association 6.score: 62.0
    Bertrand Russell claimed in the Analysis of Matter that physics is purely structural or relational and so leaves out intrinsic properties of matter, properties that, he said, are evident to us at least in one case: as the internal states of our brains. Russell's hypothesis has figured in recent discussions of physicalism and the mind body problem, by Chalmers, Strawson and Stoljar, among others, but I want to reject two popular interpretations: 1. a conception of intrinsic properties of matter (...)
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  48. Ricardo Restrepo (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.score: 62.0
    John Searle believes that computational properties are purely formal and that consequently, computational properties are not intrinsic, empirically discoverable, nor causal; and therefore, that an entity’s having certain computational properties could not be sufficient for its having certain mental properties. To make his case, Searle employs an argument that had been used before him by Max Newman, against Russell’s structuralism; one that Russell himself considered fatal to his own position. This paper formulates a not-so-explored version of Searle’s problem with computational (...)
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  49. David Sullivan (2008). Russell's Transcendental Argument Revisited. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4 (1):200.score: 62.0
    Normal.dotm 0 0 1 148 741 Kansas State University 14 1 1037 12.0 0 false 18 pt 18 pt 0 0 false false false /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman";} This paper seeks to delineate some of the significant modes of philosophical resistance to, and subversion of, British Idealism already operational in Russell's earliest work. One key tactic employed in An Essay On the (...)
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  50. David Bostock (2009). Russell's Early Theory of Denoting. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):49-67.score: 61.3
    The article concerns the treatment of the so-called denoting phrases, of the forms ?every A?, ?any A?, ?an A? and ?some A?, in Russell's Principles of Mathematics. An initially attractive interpretation of what Russell's theory was has been proposed by P.T. Geach, in his Reference and Generality (1962). A different interpretation has been proposed by P. Dau (Notre Dame Journal, 1986). The article argues that neither of these is correct, because both credit Russell with a more thought-out theory (...)
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