English summary: Ordinary, unmethodical experience forms our lives. It accumulates when we interact with our environment as living beings, and combines cognitive, affective and volitional elements. In it, questions of meaning and value and issues of knowledge become strongly interdependent. In a normative sense, modern culture has tremendously upgraded the status of ordinary people's experience. However, at the same time, our world is increasingly determined by the methodological experience of the (natural) sciences and by the technology they (...) have made possible. Will scientific experience now replace ordinary experience, or will it complement and regulate it? How do facts and values relate to one another and what does this mean for our understanding of democracy? Matthias Jung starts by developing an integrated approach to ordinary experience, taking into account insights from areas including hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism and cognitive science. As a result, three main areas of discussion emerge: knowledge, values and ideology, all of which are covered in their respective individual chapters. German description: Gewohnliche, unmethodische Erfahrung formt unser Leben. Sie vollzieht sich, wenn wir als lebendige Wesen mit unserer Umwelt interagieren, und verbindet jeweils kognitive, affektive und willentliche Dimensionen. Fragen nach Sinn und Wert und Wissensfragen sind in ihr eng aufeinander bezogen. Normativ hat die Kultur der Moderne die Erfahrung gewohnlicher Menschen enorm aufgewertet, doch gleichzeitig wird unsere Welt immer starker von der methodischen Erfahrung der (Natur-)Wissenschaften und der von ihr ermoglichten Technik bestimmt. Ersetzt nun wissenschaftliche die gewohnliche Erfahrung oder erganzt und korrigiert sie diese? Wie verhalten sich Fakten und Werte zueinander und was ergibt sich daraus fur unser Verstandnis von Demokratie? Matthias Jung entwickelt zunachst ein integriertes Konzept gewohnlicher Erfahrung und nimmt dabei Einsichten u.a. aus Hermeneutik, Phanomenologie, Pragmatismus und Kognitionswissenschaften auf. Daraus ergeben sich drei exemplarische Problemfelder: Wissen, Werte und Weltanschauung. Ihnen sind jeweils eigene Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

Meine Rekonstruktion von HeImholtz' Begründung der Energieerhaltung beabsichtigt, vor allem das Verhältnis von empirischen und nichtempirischen Elementen aufzuklären. Als erstes möchte ich zeigen, worin die nichtempirischen Elemente bestehen und dass Helmholtz bereits in der Einleitung, wo der selbständige Energiebegriff noch nicht entwickelt ist, an entscheidenden Stellen auf die wissenschaftliche Erfahrung Bezug nimmt. Im Gegensatz zur Transzendentalphilosophie macht Helmholtz die Geltungsbedingungen seines Mechanismus von zukünftigen empirischen Ergebnissen der Wissenschaft abhängig. Er gibt seinem Mechanismus in diesem Zusammenhang eine hypothetische Geltung, (...) an deren bloß vorübergehenden Charakter er aber bemerkenswerterweise keinen Zweifel hegt. (1.) Im zweiten Teil gehe ich der Frage nach, in welchem Maß die mit großer Siegesgewissheit vorgetragene mechanistische Begründung in die Formulierungen des Erhaltungssatzes Eingang findet. Helmholtz verwendet mehrere Energiebegriffe. Haben diese insgesamt oder nur teilweise einen von speziellen naturphilosophischen Annahmen unabhängigen Status? Auf welche Teile der Schrift hätte sich ein Wissenschaftler im vergangenen Jahrhundert stützen können, weIcher von der Energieerhaltung, nicht aber von Helrnholtz' Mechanismus überzeugt gewesen wäre? (2.). (shrink)

Naturbegriffe beschreiben naturphilosophische Gegenstandsbereiche und fassen Resultate naturphilosophischer Diskurse zusammen. Gehört ihre Bestimmung zu den grundlegenden Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie, so stellt ihre gegenwärtige Vielfalt für die Naturphilosophie eine Herausforderung dar, Von kaum einer wirkungsgeschichtlich bedeutsamen Definition von Natur ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten behauptet worden, ihr komme keine Relevanz für den Diskurs zu. Der Beitrag zeigt Ordnungsstrukturen in der Pluralität der Verwendungsweisen auf und begründet den aktuellen Geltungsanspruch traditioneller Begriffe im Bezug auf spezifische Erfahrungsweisen. Nach einer Einführung beginne ich mit (...) der Unterscheidung von wissenschaftlicher und nichtwissenschaftlicher Naturerfahrung, beziehe auf diese Differenz die Aufgaben der Naturphilosophie und gehe dann mit einer Klassifikation von Naturbegriffen zum exemplarischen Teil über. In diesem diskutiere ich am Beispiel bestimmter Aspekte der Naturbegriffe von Aristoteles und Descartes ihre für die Gegenwart typischen Bedingungen der Verwendung in nichtwissenschaftlicher Erfahrung sowie darüber hinaus vorkommender Verwendungen. (shrink)

To explain the interaction of stillness and motion of thought, Nicholas Cusanus formulated his renowned comparison with a cosmographer, which through five gateways, corresponding to the five senses, receives information about the world in the form of messages. What follows therefrom is not directly an analysis of the world but of the Creator, whom the philosopher mirrors in himself as a creator of scientific symbols.Cusanus was repeatedly suspected of Pantheism. What is crucial, however, for the critique of reasonning is (...) the parallelism, that God's omnipresence in his creation corresponds to a universal capacity of the human mind to perceive everything by means of a hypothetical otherness . Therefrom proceeds the general projection that everything can be seen in mathematical terms. Mathematical calculating, working with figures, reducing to units, leads Cusanus to God's creative power as much as to the functioning of the intellect.However, his renowned mental experiments on the minimum and maximum were purely in pursuit of the goal of describing the fluid frontiers of defined thought. This is also true of his cosmology. Cusanus argued mathematically in order to prove the non-mathematical and the non-realistic. (shrink)

What makes advances in experience possible? Does this question demand a metaphysical, fundamentally epistemological, or scientific response? The volume discusses Kant s notion of experience from the vantage point of prominent current representatives of these basic approaches. It explores metaphysics, epistemology, and the scientific theory of experience while drawing on systematic and methodological perspectives. ".

Alfred Schütz' hat einen Kriterienkatalog zur Charakterisierung unterschiedlicher Erkenntnisstile entwickelt, in dem die Auszeichnung der Lebenswelt nur an wenigen, leicht korrigierbaren Stellen Eingang findet. (1. Abschnitt). Um ihn auf die Lebenswelt anzuwenden, rekurriere ich auf Husserls Bestimmung der Lebenswelt als Wahrnehmungswelt und auf das von Schütz und Thomas Luckmann entwickelte Schichtenmodell der Lebenswelt. Die Lebenswelt erscheint in der Konsequenz als sozial eingrenzbarer Kontext, der von anderen, geltungstheoretisch gleichrangigen Erfahrungen abgehoben ist. Sie bezeichnet keine kultur- oder naturumfassende Kategorie, sondern referiert auf (...) einen beschränkten Handlungsraum (2. Abschnitt). Abschließend ziehe ich Schütz' Kriterienkatalog zur Kennzeichnung zweier nichtlebensweltlicher Erfahrungsbereiche heran, die für den modernen Ausdifferenzierungsprozeß der Erfahrung und für die phänomenologische Analyse von Erfahrungstypen eine herausragende Rolle spielen: Die experimentelle Naturwissenschaft und die Subjektivität (3. Abschnitt). (shrink)

In his famous essay „Der Essay als Form“ („The Essay as Form"), Adorno accuses Descartes of committing science to the ideal of absolute certainty (“zweifelsfreie Gewissheit”), thereby preluding the modern organized science (“organisierte Wissenschaft”), which in Adorno’s view has become alienated from real intellectual experience (“geistige Erfahrung”). In my essay, I criticize Adorno’s critique, showing that what Descartes in fact thinks about task and method of science comes much closer to the programmatical essayism of Critical Theory than Adorno (...) supposed. (shrink)

Nach einigen einleitenden Bemerkungen zur Bedeutung von Fachzeitschriften für die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften und einem Hinweis auf die wichtigsten Abschnitte des Lebenslaufes von August Leopold Crelle wird seine herausragende Rolle als Gründer und Herausgeber wissenschaftlicher Fachzeitschriften gewürdigt. Zunächst wird die dabei von Crelle besonders für das Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik geleistete Arbeit ausführlicher dargestellt, dem sich der Versuch einer Einschätzung der Bedeutung dieser Zeitschrift mit Hilfe quantitativer Kennziffern anschließt. Schließlich wird die Bedeutung des gleichfalls von Crelle begründeten (...) Journals für die Baukunst untersucht und herausgearbeitet, daß durch das Baujournal den deutschen Ingenieuren wichtige Informationen und Erfahrungen aus dem technisch fortgeschrittenerem Ausland übermittelt wurden. Abschließend werden fünf unveröffentlichte Dokumente im Wortlaut wiedergegeben, die mit der vorstehenden Thematik im Zusammenhang stehen.After some introductory remarks on the significance of scientific journals for the development of science and an indication of the most important aspects of the career of August Leopold Crelle , his projected role as the founder and editor of scientific journals is discussed. First of all, his achievements with the Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik are described in detail, together with an attempt to estimate the significance of this journal with the help of quantitative analyses. Then the significance of the Journal für die Baukunst , which Crelle similarly founded, is examined, and it is shown that important information and experience of technically more progressive foreign countries was transmitted to German engineers through the engineering journal. Finally, five unpublished documents are reproduced, which relate to the previous topics. (shrink)

Resumen: La idea dialéctico-hermenéutica de experiencia, entendida como Erfahrung, reivindica el lugar de esta en el lenguaje, sosteniendo que no es necesario desterrarla al territorio de lo a-racional y prelingüístico. Tanto Gadamer como también Agamben, a pesar de sus diferencias, han mostrado la incontestable vinculación entre experiencia y lenguaje: este es el lugar de la verdad de la experiencia, aunque esta no sea científica. Una experiencia no puede ser tal si no puede ser transmitida. La actual experiencia de crisis (...) se muestra, también, como una crisis de experiencia. Los seres humanos tienen su arraigo en un mundo significativo, que es el de la experiencia, el de experiencias verdaderas. Y verdaderas son las que se pueden convertir en una gran o pequeña historia.: The dialectic-hermeneutic idea of experience, understood as Erfahrung, vindicates the place it has in language, maintaining that it is not necessary to banish it from the realm of the a-rational and pre-linguistic. Both Gadamer and Agamben, despite their differences, have shown the undeniable link between experience and language: this is the place of the truth of experience, even if this truth is not scientific. An experience cannot be considered as such if it cannot be transmitted. The current experience of crisis also reveals itself as a crisis of experience. Human beings are rooted in a world of significance, the world of experience, of true experiences. And those that are true can become either a great or short story. (shrink)

In his pioneering sociological theory, which makes phenomenological concepts fruitful for the social sciences, Alfred Schütz has laid foundations for a characterization of an manifold of distinct domains of experience. My aim here is to further develop this pluralist theory of experience by buttressing and extending the elements of diversity that it includes, and by eliminating or minimizing lingering imbalances among the domains of experience. After a critical discussion of the criterion-catalogue Schütz develops for the purpose of (...) characterizing different cognitive styles, I move on to examine its application to one special style, the lifeworld. I appeal, on the one hand, to Husserl's characterization of the lifeworld as a world of perception, and on the other hand to the layer-model of the lifeworld developed by Schütz and Thomas Luckmann. A consequence of this approach is that the lifeworld appears as a socially definable context that is detached from other experiences but on an equal footing with them with respect to their claim of validity. The term "lifeworld" does not denote a category that encompasses culture or nature but refers to a delimited action-space. Finally, I draw upon Schütz' s criterion-catalogue to characterize two domains of experience outside of the lifeworld, which play a central role for the process of differentiation of experience in modernity and for the phenomenological analysis of types of experience: experimental science and subjectivity. (shrink)

The chapter approaches the hermeneutic concept of experience introduced by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960) from the perspective of the conceptual history of experience in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an overview of the concept and the epistemological function of experience (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) in Aristotle, Francis Bacon, and Hegel, it is shown that the tradition has considered experience first and foremost in methodological terms, that is, as a pathway towards a form of (...) scientific knowledge that is itself increasingly immune to experience. Science strives “beyond” experience because of the limitations inherent in the fundamentally contingent, singular, and negative character of experience: experience comes to us through unpredictable chance encounters and in singular situations and negates, tests, or “imperils” previous knowledge, thereby transforming it. By contrast, philosophical hermeneutics rethinks experience precisely in terms of these limitations. In the hermeneutic approach articulated by Gadamer and Claude Romano, experience is an encounter with the irreducible finitude and historical situatedness of one’s understanding and conceptual framework, an encounter with an otherness that puts our preunderstanding to test and requires us to revise it. Hermeneutic experience is thus a singular event that irreparably transforms us. (shrink)

Questions Cavell's thesis that scepticism is a "natural" condition for mankind, by exploring certain historical developments (such as the scientific revolution) which does give scepticism a "natural" place in modern thinking. Emphasis is laid upon the question how scepticism can be an overwhelming ordinary experience, which is traced back to the establishment of devices such as the microscope.

This article explores the aesthetic dimensions of scientific experimentation, addressing specifically how aesthetic features enter the construction, evaluation and reception of an experiment. I highlight the relationship between experiments and artistic acts in the early years of the Royal Society where experiments do not serve only epistemic aims but also aim to generate feelings of awe and pleasure. I turn to analysing which aspects of experiments are appreciated aesthetically, identifying several contenders, from the ability of an experiment to uncover (...) nature’s beauty, to encapsulating original designs and human creativity. Following this analysis, I focus on the notion of beauty: what makes an experiment beautiful? Several common qualities are explored, from the simplicity and economy of the experiment, to the significance of the experimental results. (shrink)

Das Problem, unter welchen Bedingungen eine Hypothese oder Theorienmodifikation als methodologisch akzeptabel gilt, wird in der wissenschaftstheoretischen Tradition als die Frage des Ad-Hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen diskutiert. Das gleichartige Problem tritt aber auch in Lakatos' Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme auf, welche von methodologisch zulässigen Theorienänderungen die Vorhersage 'neuer Tatsachen' verlangt. Über diesen Begriff der neuen Tatsache und damit der Adäquatheitsbedingungen für wissenschaftliche Erklärungen hat sich eine weitgefächerte Debatte entsponnen. In diesem Papier wird der Versuch unternommen, die Forderung der unabhängigen Testbarkeit einer (...) Hypothese, welche im Rahmen der Diskussion des Ad-hoc-Charakters von Hypothesen eine wichtige Rolle spielt, auch für die Frage der Spezifizierung von 'neuen Tatsachen' fruchtbar zu machen. Ich argumentiere zugunsten der Bedingung, daß eine Hypothese als methodologisch akzeptabel gelten sollte, wenn sie zumindest zwei unabhängige Tatsachen erklärt. Ein derartiger Ansatz verlangt die Kennzeichnung dessen, was als 'eine Tatsache' zu gelten hat. Die Schwierigkeit einer derartigen Kennzeichnung ist ein notorisches Problem jedes Kriteriums, das auf unabhängige Testbarkeit zielt. Eine Klärung dieses Problems wird über das Konzept der empirischen Generalisierung versucht. Als 'eine Tatsache' im methodologischen Sinne gilt demnach ein gesetzmäßiger Zusammenhang zwischen zwei Meßgrößen. Dies erlaubt weiterführend eine Klärung des Problems, was methodologisch als 'ein Experiment' zu werten ist, d. h. was als Reproduktion desselben und was als andersartiges Experiment gelten soll. Mit Hilfe dieser Klärungen wird unter anderem der Ad-hoc-Charakter der Lorentzschen Kontraktionshypothese sowie das Problem der Gleich- oder Verschiedenartigkeit von Michelson-Morley- und Kennedy-Thorndike-Experiment untersucht. (shrink)

Some experimental results in science are productively surprising or beautiful. Such results are disruptive in their epistemic nature: by violating epistemic expectations they mark the phenomenon at hand as worthy of further investigation. Could it be that there are emotions beyond these two which are also useful for the epistemic evaluation of scientific experiments? Here, I conduct a structured sociological survey to explore affective experiences in scientific experimental research. I identify that learning the results of an experiment is (...) the high emotional point in the experimenting process. Thus, experimental results can be challenging, beautiful, or boring, and they can worry, amuse, make one sad, and so on. They can also drive meta-cognitive evaluations as well as motivate specific research-related actions. From this, I advance two claims: that emotions beyond surprise and disruptive beauty are epistemically useful in empirical research, and that emotions help to overcome specific challenges of reasoning about new experimental results. (shrink)

This essay inquires into the semantics of the term “experience” in a selection of prose novels from the early modern period. Against the background of a complex history of discourses about experience, ultimately leading to a fully articulated concept of “empiricism” and “experiment”, the author traces the term’s usages in Hartlieb’s ‘Alexander’, in the novel ‘Fortunatus’ as well as in Wickram’s ‘Of Good and Bad Neighbours’. Furthermore, he elaborates those cultural topoi of experience that are based principally (...) on an understanding of “memory” and “adaptation”. As a result, the author is able to show, that all three texts place varying emphases on the topics of experience. (shrink)

Reactivity, or the phenomenon by which subjects tend to modify their behavior in virtue of their being studied upon, is often cited as one of the most important difficulties involved in social scientific experiments, and yet, there is to date a persistent conceptual muddle when dealing with the many dimensions of reactivity. This paper offers a conceptual framework for reactivity that draws on an interventionist approach to causality. The framework allows us to offer an unambiguous definition of reactivity and (...) distinguishes it from placebo effects. Further, it allows us to distinguish between benign and malignant forms of the phenomenon, depending on whether reactivity constitutes a danger to the validity of the causal inferences drawn from experimental data. (shrink)

The collection provides an analysis of the concept of beauty in the evaluation of experiments. What properties do practicing experimenters value? How have the aesthetic properties of scientific experiments changed over the years? Secondly, the volume looks at the role that aesthetic factors, including negative values such as ugliness, as well as experiences of the sublime and the profound, play in the construction of an experiment and its reception. Thirdly, the chapters provide in-depth historical case studies from the Royal (...) Society, which also allows for a study of the depiction of scientific experiment in artworks, as well as contemporary examples from the LHC and cases of AI-designed experiments. Finally, it offers a exploration of the commonalities between how we learn from experiments on the one hand, and the cognitive value of artworks on the other. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉBeaucoup ont soutenu qu'il n'y a pas de place pour des expériences scientifiques dans les sciences naturelles d'Aristote : les expériences interviennent dans la nature, mais Aristote soutient que nous devons simplement observer la nature; si nous intervenions, le résultat serait quelque chose d'artificiel ou contraire à la nature. Contre cela, je soutiens qu'Aristote a non seulement effectué des expériences scientifiques, mais a également maintenu qu'il y a beaucoup de connaissances sur la nature qui peuvent être découvertes expérimentalement.

Discusses the experiments of Aristotle, William Beaumont, Robert Norman, Stephen Hales, Konrad Lorenz, Galileo, Robert Boyle, Theodoric of Freibourg, Louis Pasteur, Ernest Rutherford, A.A. Michelson, E.W. Morley, F. Jacob, E. Wollman, J.J. Gibson, A.L. Lavoisier, Humphrey Davy, J.J. Thomson, Isaac Newton, Michael Faraday, J.J. Berzelius, and Otto Stern.

Practical realism is focused on the problem of how science really works. In the case of physics and chemistry, experiment is the centrepiece of scientific practice. The rapid development of contemporary natural science does not leave the experiment unaffected. The classical experiment is normally applied only to systems that can be considered structurally stable, repeatability being the key feature. After the introduction of the theoretical basis of irreversibility by Ilya Prigogine the essence of the experiment changed. The strict requirement (...) of repeatability has to be dropped. It will be discussed, whether the change is big enough for calling it revolutionary. There are means to update the understanding of the experiment by applying the experimental settings. The material experiment will probably be with us forever but its position on the scientific landscape will be shifted. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the major transformations in the Marburg neo-Kantian account of experience. By focusing on the problem of ‘conceptualism’, it traces connections between four issues that are central to the transcendental projects of the Marburg philosophers: the interpretation of Kant, the critique of experiential givenness, the account of objective cognition in science, and the relation between scientific and pre-scientific experience. My historical narrative identifies two shifts. The first is from Cohen's conceptualist answer to the threat (...) of subjectivism to Cassirer's functionalist answer to empiricism. The second is from Cassirer's conceptualism about scientific experience to his symbolic non-conceptualism about everyday perception. My reconstruction reveals the fate of neo-Kantian conceptualism to be linked to the fate of pre-scientific perception and suggests that the continuing significance of the Marburg philosophers lies in their responses to the coming apart of the manifest and the scientific image. (shrink)

Gandhi's politics is thoroughly biopolitical and ‘minoritarian’ in all its aspects. His political practice and concepts could be redefined as micro-political experiments in the Deleuzian sense. Gandhi himself viewed his life and practices as ‘experiments’. Like Gilles Deleuze, who grants the concept of becoming-woman a privileged position in his philosophical idea of becoming, Gandhi gives becoming-woman a decisive role in his experiments of ‘self-rule’ in both its personal and collective sense. He sees woman as the emblem of ahimsa, which according (...) to him is the only principle and means to attain ‘self-rule’. Gandhi identifies the minoritarian political potential of woman as against Man, who resists becomings by being himself destined to be static and standardised, that is, ‘Majoritarian’. From this perspective, Gandhi's concept of the practice of Brahmacharya is an experiment in becoming-woman by creating a new line of relation between man and woman that goes beyond the confinement of conjugal sexuality and familial desire. Building upon the complementary relation between the philosophical concepts of Deleuze and the political practice of Gandhi, this paper attempts a detailed re-evaluation of Gandhi's practice of Brahmacharya as a political experiment in liberating man, who otherwise acts as a subject of the colonial, national, patriarchal and biopolitical powers. (shrink)

Lewis S. Feuer shows that the gestation of the hypotheses of original-minded scientists, such as Darwin, Einstein, or Bohr, is in large part a subconscious process. Scientists try to project upon the world structural laws that, beside fitting the given physical realities, will also realize their own emotional longings among alternative worldviews. Repeatedly, too, in examining the standpoints of philosophical figures ranging from Spinoza, Descartes, Kant, and Mill to contemporary figures such as Einstein, Lovejoy, and Hook, Feuer illumines how sociological (...) antipathies project themselves into scientific divergences. Feuer delves into the bearing of emotive beliefs such as pacifism, socialism, anti-Semitism, upon the formation of concurrent worldviews, often fixations of scientific belief, held with the same passion in science as in religion. (shrink)

Despite the many turns that philosophy of technology has undergone in recent decades, the question of the nature and limits of technological determinism (TD) has been neglected, because it was considered as solved and overcome, and therefore not worth further discussion. This paper once again raises the problem of TD, by trying to save the opposing, but complementary elements of truth of the two main forms of TD that I shall call “nomological” and “normative”: (a) technology is all-pervasive and has (...) an inexorable capacity for extending itself into every field of human life, and (b) we have a capacity to counteract and orient technology, at least in some measure. In order to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent claims, the key move for my argument is a brief analysis of the notion of scientific experiment from the perspective of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. As a result, two senses of technology are distinguished, which I shall call respectively “reflective” and “methodological.” From the point of view of this distinction, the all-pervasiveness and inexorability of technology and the in principle irreducibility of human persons to technology—which nomological and normative TD assert dialectically one against the other—can be reconciled. Among other things, this requires the rejection (in one fundamental sense) of the widely held assumption, made both by nomological and normative TD, that technology is a cultural field whose contents can be neatly separated from the rest of human culture. This thesis should be replaced by the more qualified claim of the reflective unity and the methodological multiplicity of technology. (shrink)

The paper investigates the role played by pre-scientific experience in the philosophy of Josiah Royce and Edmund Husserl. Such a notion, generally associated with Husserl’s conception of the life-world (Lebenswelt) in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), finds an equivalent and historical antecedent in Royce’s distinction between a world of description and a world of appreciation. The final goal is to show how, despite their different philosophical frameworks, Royce and Husserl agree on the idea that, (...) through the rejection of the world given through mere perception (Lebenswelt/world of appreciation), European sciences have somehow failed their task of universality. As it will be shown, this idea is also due to methodological affinities among the two thinkers. The experience of interconnectedness among individual minds, while precluded in the mere scientific explanation of the world, it becomes possible through the enactment of the Lebenswelt or, as in Royce’s case, through a return to the experience of the world of appreciation. (shrink)

There are two basic approaches to the problem of induction:the empirical one, which deems that the possibility of induction depends on how theworld was made (and how it works) and the logical one, which considers the formation(and function) of language. The first is closer to being useful for induction, whilethe second is more rigorous and clearer. The purpose of this paper is to create an empiricalapproach to induction that contains the same formal exactitude as the logical approach.This requires: (a) that (...) the empirical conditions for the induction are enunciatedand (b) that the most important results already obtained from inductive logic are againdemonstrated to be valid. Here we will be dealing only with induction by elimination,namely the analysis of the experimental confutation of a theory. The result will bea rule of refutation that takes into consideration all of the empirical aspect of theexperiment and has each of the asymptotic properties which inductive logic has shown tobe characteristic of induction. (shrink)

Preservice teachers' preparedness, perception, and affect toward certain technology systems influence the student acquisition of science knowledge, process skills, teaching innovation, and willingness to use technology in their classroom. The purpose of this study was to explore teachers' affective responses to a virtual reality-enabled scientific experiment system. Fifty-one preservice teachers majoring in educational technology participated in the study. They were divided into two groups, and their reactions were measured separately on two occasions. The first occasion used a standard system (...) following the principle of Donald Norman's affective design model. The VaSE system was then revised with a strict version of ADM before the participants' reactions were measured for a second time. The positive and negative affect scale was utilized for affective state evaluation. Semi-structured interviews that focused on affective experiences were organized using an ADM framework and conducted immediately after the participants used VaSE. The results indicated that the positive affect experienced by the preservice teachers was significantly enhanced, and the negative affect was significantly weakened. Academic level, gender, and prior experience were important random effect factors that impacted the affective experience. It was also revealed that participants were more likely to be affected by immersion and interactivity in terms of enhancing positive affect and were more likely to be affected by behavioral layer elements in terms of weakening negative affect. A conclusion has been drawn to provide theoretical and practical suggestions for training preservice teachers in ways that improve their ability to integrate technology into the classroom. (shrink)

There are few doubts about the significance of science and technology for modern human culture and society. But as historians, we are still struggling to find appropriate descriptive terms to capture the broad processes of transformation brought about by “techno-science,” the merging of technical production and modern institutionalized science. This dissertation argues that the term “experience” may serve as such an analytic lens in the specific historical setting of German aviation research from the 1920s through 1945. I reconstruct, on (...) the one hand, the theorization of experience as a concept by the technical physicist Paul von Handel, influenced by the British astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington’s distinction between "scientific" and "everyday" experience. On the other hand, I use the term as a historian’s analytic concept to investigate practices in the context of flight experiments that I take to be constitutive of my historical actors’ experiences. These are recordings of experimental pilots’ cognitive judgements and bodily actions, some of them—such as in-flight note taking—continuous with older cultural technologies. On both of these levels of analysis, I explore the different resonances of “experience” as a term with a legacy as a central epistemological concept in the modern sciences, and as capturing the changing everyday reality in an increasingly technicized environment. My analysis of the textual theorization and simultaneous practical constitution of "techno-scientific experience" serves to read in a new light the story of the pilot and physicist Melitta Schiller-Stauffenberg. Of Jewish descent, Schiller chose to work for the Luftwaffe, the German air force, until her death in 1945 on a flight searching for her husband, Count Alexander Stauffenberg, who was imprisoned after his brother’s failed attempt to assassinate Hitler. The concept and practical reality of “experience” are key to understanding the two striking choices Schiller made as intrinsically connected: the professional choice of working simultaneously as a pilot and a physicist, and the political choice of supporting the Reich’s war effort. Schiller’s story may be understood as exemplifying the fragile identity of the experiencing and the knowing self in 20th-century techno-scientific modernity. (shrink)

The philosophical literatures on models and thought experiments have been developing exponentially, and independently, for decades. This independence is surprising, given how similar models and thought experiments are. They each have “lives of their own,” they sit between theory and experience, they are important for both pedagogy and cutting-edge science, they galvanize conceptual changes and paradigm shifts, and they involve entertaining imaginary scenarios and working out what happens. Recently, philosophers have begun to highlight these similarities. This entry aims at (...) taking the idea further, by trying to systematically identify places where insights from one literature can be taken up in the other. Along the way, important differences will also be highlighted. (shrink)

Objective: To analyse medical students’, graduate students’ and doctors’ and medical teachers’ perceptions of research contributions as criteria for authorship in relation to the authorship criteria defined by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors .Design: Medical students with or without prior instruction on ICMJE criteria, graduate students/doctors and medical teachers rated the importance of 11 contributions as authorship qualifications. They also reported single contributions eligible for authorship, as well as acceptable combinations of two or three qualifying contributions.Results: Conception and (...) design, Analysis and interpretation and Drafting of article formed the most important cluster in all four groups. Students without prior instruction rated Critical revision and Final approval lower than the other three groups. “Final approval” was a part of the least important cluster in all groups except among students with instruction.Conclusions: Conception and design, Analysis and interpretation and Drafting of article were recognised as the most important of the ICMJE criteria by all participants. They can be considered independent of previous instruction or experience. Final approval and Critical revision should be actively taught as important authorship criteria to future scientists. (shrink)

I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that (...) theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances. Three thought experiments are presented which have been important historically in helping us pass these tests, and two others that cause us to fail. Then I use this operationalization of understanding to clarify the relationships between scientific thought experiments, the understanding they produce, and the progress they enable. I conclude that while no specific instance of understanding (thus conceived) is necessary for scientific progress, understanding in general is. (shrink)

Are science and religion completely independent of each other? Can scientists work exclusively in the scientific domain without being influenced in any way by their own religious or other commitments? These questions have been treated in a number of ways in the course of history. In recent decades, advances in physics and biology have raised new possibilities for a deeper understanding of the issue and for a clearer picture of the right kind of interaction between science, religion, and moral (...) values. (shrink)

Otto Neurath’s empiricist methodology of economics and his contributions to politi- cal economy have gained increasing attention in recent years. We connect this research with contemporary debates regarding the epistemological status of thought experiments by reconstructing Neurath’s utopias as linchpins of thought experiments. In our three reconstructed examples of different uses of utopias/dystopias in thought experiments we employ a reformulation of Häggqvist’s model for thought experiments and we argue that: (1) Our reformulation of Häggqvist’s model more adequately complies with many (...) uses of thought experiments, especially with the open-ended discussions of utopias and dys- topias in thought experiments. (2) As a strict logical empiricist, Neurath is committed to a strictly empiricist account of thought experiments. John Norton’s empiricist argument view can indeed account for the justifications of empirical beliefs and genuine discoveries targeted by scientific utopianism in three distinct (yet connected) ways, all of which Neur- ath already contemplated: (2.I) Dealing with utopias and thought experiments on a regular basis increases creativity and inventiveness. (2.II) Particular ways of presenting knowl- edge facilitate scientific discovery and social progress. (2.III) The use of utopias in thought experiments can prompt conceptual change and allow access to new phenomena. We con- clude by highlighting that, even though thought experiments support a positive attitude for exploring new social possibilities, Neurath points out that active decisions are unavoidable. The exploration of alternatives and the awareness of a need for decisions in policy discus- sion avert a technocratic outlook in social science. (shrink)