What does it mean to read Ham Seok-heon in the 21st century? Furthermore, what does it mean to read the ‘East-Asian Classics’ through him? In this article, I would like to raise a few issues that existing discussions on the relationship between Ham Seok-heon and the East-Asian Classics have not paid attention to, in order to point out the points that we should give more weight to in the hermeneutics of Ham Seok-heon’s ‘Chewing on Old Classics’. First, Ham’s should be (...) read as an independent text in its own right, not as a commentary on the ‘Oriental Classics’. Second, his SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics should be read in the context of life and place in contemporary Korea, rather than the Laozi and the Zhuangzi relationships it addresses. Third, the meanings and values in SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics do not lie in its original interpretation of traditional commentaries, but rather in the “common sense” that guided the perceptions and practices of Ssi-al in the democratization process of twentieth-century Korea. To emphasize this aspect, I contrast it with the interpretation of the Zhuangzi in China during the same period. I want to argue that if Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century anticipated their own destiny through the interpretation and discussion of the Zhuangzi, Ham Seok-heon’s reading of the Zhuangzi was expressed as the voice of Ssi-al, which changed the subject of interpretation and at the same time called for the values of modern freedom and equality and preached the ideology of democracy and self-government to realize them. In reading Ham Seok-heon in this way, I believe that we can properly evaluate the historical and philosophical meaning and value of SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

BackgroundThis study aimed to identify the healthcare providers’ experience and perspectives toward end-of-life care decisions focusing on end-of-life discussion and physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment documentation in Korea which are major parts of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Act.MethodsA cross-sectional survey was conducted using a questionnaire developed by the authors. A total of 474 subjects—94 attending physicians, 87 resident physicians, and 293 nurses—participated in the survey, and the data analysis was performed in terms of frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation using the (...) SPSS 24.0 program.ResultsStudy results showed that respondents were aware of terminal illness and physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment in Korea well enough except for some details. Physicians reported uncertainty in terminal state diagnosis and disease trajectory as the most challenging. Study participants regarded factors (related to relationships and communications) on the healthcare providers’ side as the major impediment to end-of-life discussion. Study respondents suggested that simplification of the process and more staff are required to facilitate end-of-life discussion and documentation.ConclusionBased on the study results, adequate education and training for better end-of-life discussion are required for future practice. Also, a simple and clear procedure for completing a physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment in Korea should be prepared and legal and ethical advice would be required. Since the enactment of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, several revisions already have been made including disease categories, thus continuous education to update and support clinicians is also called for. (shrink)

A controversy of the Perception is focused on the Mind-Nature relation by Confucian Scholars in 18th century Joseon Dynasty. Chang-Hyup Kim [金昌協], especially, asserted that the Perception should be the unique side of Mind, because the Wise [智: the Mind of Judgment, remarkably about the righteous or not] is one aspect of the Nature. He needs to define the category of Wise and Perception, because the existing definition of Wise as an unprocurable activity of Mind. That might bring a confusion (...) of concepts though The Mind and Nature, in his view. More over he added the essential aspect of Perception to real activity of Perception, and in this point of view, the position of Mind is important to the process of consolidating into Nature. Therefore he asserted that we should perceive the Nature, the essence, in the side of Mind [卽心指性]. This vision of the aim to Nature in the point of Mind, which was reinvestigation of Neo-Confucianism and this was succeeded to the general with academic traditional of Nak School [洛學]. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the place of the ethics of virtues and char acter in nursing and health care in general, and in psychiatric nursing in particular. To attain this goal, the relationship between the ethics of duty (i.e. rule based ethics) and the ethics of virtue and character will be clarified in order to defend our main hypothe sis that these two types of ethics should complement each other, since both are necessary but neither (...) by itself is sufficient for nursing. This means that any applied ethics, as in nursing, should consider the importance of the agent's moral character. To support our arguments, we shall use cases from the empirical reality of psychiatric and mental health care. (shrink)

A lire attentivement Descartes, on se surprend à constater que l'inventeur de la philosophie du sujet pensant emploie rarement le mot de " sujet ", si ce n'est au sens traditionnel et scolastique de sujet des accidents ou des qualités, ou encore de substance. Le but de ce volume est donc d'aborder à nouveaux frais la question à partir de l'inventaire du vocabulaire cartésien de la " subjectivité ". Devons-nous dire ainsi que l'ego du cogito est sujet? Ou bien la (...) res cogitans? Ou encore la mens? Y a-t-il un sujet corporel chez Descartes, ou alors l'union est-elle le sujet? Y a-t-il, de la même manière, un sujet des passions? Un ipse, une ipséité serait-elle enfin le sujet chez Descartes? Multiples formes de la question de savoir s'il y a bien une philosophie du sujet chez Descartes. (shrink)

Shavelson et al. (2023) raise the familiar question of parity or fairness in the assisted dying1 debate: if we legally permit the practice for one person, should we not permit everyone similarly si...

Une des doctrines centrales de l’émergentisme est la thèse selon laquelle certaines propriétés d’un tout sont émergentes, en ce sens qu’elles sont irréductibles aux propriétés de base dont elles émergent — c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent ni être prédites, ni être expliquées à partir de leurs conditions sousjacentes. Pour comprendre et évaluer cette thèse correctement, il est essentiel que nous disposions d’un concept adéquat de réduction. Nous examinons d’abord le modèle classique de la réduction interthéorique de Nagel, et nous soutenons qu’il (...) ne nous fournit pas une base adéquate pour comprendre la thèse émergentiste. Nous proposons ensuite un autre modèle de réduction, celui de la « réduction fonctionnelle », et nous montrons qu’il constitue une base adéquate permettant d’évaluer la thèse émergentiste. Nous concluons avec une brève discussion de la question de savoir si les propriétés phénoménales d’expériences conscientes, ou qualia , sont émergentes.A central doctrine of emergentism is the thesis that some properties of wholes are emergent in the sense that they are irreducible to the “basal” properties from which they emerge — that is, they are neither predictable nor explainable in terms of their underlying conditions. To understand and properly evaluate this claim, it is essential that we have at hand an appropriate concept of reduction. This paper first examines the classic Nagel model of inter- theoretic reduction and finds it wanting as a basis for understanding the emergentist claim. Another model of reduction, “functional reduction”, is proposed, and it is argued that this model does provide an appropriate basis for evaluating the claim that certain properties of wholes are emergent. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the question whether qualia , or the phenomenal properties of conscious experience, are emergent. (shrink)

La doctrine du conatus chez Spinoza est formulée de façon si radicale que le suicide apparaît comme incompréhensible. Cela contraste avec la référence importante aux actes suicidaires dans ses ouvrages. Pour résoudre ce contraste et défendre la compatibilité entre le suicide et le conatus, nous proposons une lecture nouvelle de la proposition 5 de l’Éthique III sur la contrariété. Nous dégageons la complexité de chaque individu, la conflictualité entre ses parties, et enfin le conatus de chacune de ces parties, qui (...) jouit, en fonction des relations avec les choses extérieures, d’une certaine indépendance par rapport au conatus de l’individu dans son ensemble. (shrink)

매월당 김시습은 조선조를 대표하는 학자로서 수양대군의 왕위찬탈 사건의 불의함을 보 고 당시의 현실에 항거하여 은둔과 유랑의 삶을 선택한 생육신 가운데 한 명이다. 이 글은 매월당의 유불도 삼가사상 가운데 도가사상에 초점을 맞춰 그의 학문관을 살펴보고자 한 것이다. 이 글은 특히 매월당이 본 장자관의 기본입장이 무엇인지 살펴보는 것이 목표이다. 매월당은 자신의 시대가 장자가 언급한 인간세와 같다고 규정한다. 인간세란 기본적으 로 인간이 살아가는 세상을 가리킨다. 그러나 장자는 특히 정치적 혼란의 상황으로 야기된 난세를 지칭하여 인간세라고 규정한다. 매월당은 이러한 장자의 사상을 계승하여 자신의 시대를 인간세라고 (...) 규정한 후 그 위에서 펼쳐지는 갖가지 병폐들을 지적하면서 이에 대한 반성을 촉구한다. 여기서 대안으로 제시되는 것이 장자적 의미의 자연세계를 대변하는 도 교적 천상의 세계이며, 신선에로의 변화 가능성을 꿈꾸어보는 것이었다. 매월당은 인간세의 한계를 극복하는 방편으로써 인간세의 가치 덕목이라 할 수 있는 외 물에 대한 부정적인 태도와 이를 통한 거리두기의 입장을 취한다. 매월당은 외물에 대한 거리두기 차원에서 장자의 좌망에 주목하고 무사, 무려와 같은 무심의 마음상태를 간직해 야 함을 강조한다. 이러한 맥락에서 매월당은 방내인의 삶의 한계를 비판함과 동시에 방외 인의 삶이 가지고 있는 철학적 의의에 대해 주목하기도 한다. 그가 방내인이 이해하기에 곤란한 미친 행동을 보인 것이라던가, 평생 졸박한 삶의 태도로 일관한 것, 그리고 자기 자신을 가리켜 기형아와 같은 사람이라고 평가하면서 한 세상을 살아간 것은 매월당의 삶 의 자취가 장자철학과 밀접하게 연관된 방외인의 삶 그 자체였음을 알려준다. (shrink)

Riassunto: Lo statuto della psicologia come scienza speciale è l’oggetto del dibattito pluridecennale intercorso tra Jerry Fodor e Jaegwon Kim. La questione epistemologica delle leggi delle scienze cognitive si intreccia inestricabilmente con riflessioni di tipo metafisico sul dilemma mente-corpo: se Fodor ammette la validità delle leggi psicologiche, considerate irriducibili alle leggi della fisica, il fisicalismo riduzionista di Kim esclude invece tale possibilità. Così, il dialogo tra i due paradigmi funzionalisti delinea una serie di snodi problematici relativi sia allo status delle (...) proprietà mentali, come alla possibilità di una scienza che possa aprirsi alla inter-specificità, o alla trasversalità delle strutture di implementazione. Centrale, nel dibattito, è la nozione di realizzabilità multipla: tale argomento, che viene addotto a sostegno di un certo grado di autonomia del mentale, viene da Kim giudicato, invece, essenzialmente aporetico. Parole chiave: Filosofia della mente; Scienze cognitive; Realizzabilità multipla; Funzionalismo; Fisicalismo riduzionista Fodor, Kim and the autonomy of cognitive sciences: The status of psychology as a special science is the main topic of the debate between two of the most important philosophers of mind in our times: Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim. The epistemology of psychological laws is inextricably intertwined with the metaphysical quarrel over the mind-body problem. Fodor argues for the validity of psychological laws and their irreducibility to physical ones, whereas Kim’s reductive physicalism rules out their validity. Therefore, the dialogue between these two functionalist paradigms covers a range of open questions concerning the status of mental properties within a physicalist framework, as well as questions concerning the possibility of cross-species cognitive sciences. The notion of multiple realization is a pivotal point in this debate: it should indicate that the mind enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, yet Kim judges it to be aporetic in nature. Keywords: Philosophy of Mind; Cognitive Sciences; Multiple Realization; Functionalism; Reductive Physicalism. (shrink)

In this paper we reconstruct an argument, based on the observations of David Lewis and Jaegwon Kim, according to which, given that identities are necessary, they cannot be grounded; and given that they cannot be grounded, they cannot be explained either. We argue against two key premises of this argument. Furthermore, we present two counterexamples, in the form of two alleged sets of cases of explanation of identities. This argument against the explanation of identities is instrumental for a wider discussion (...) about the nature of explanation itself, in relation with other notions of recent philosophical interest such as grounding. (shrink)

PART ONE INDIAN THOUGHT INDIAN THOUGHT HAS A LONG AND COMPLEX DEVELOPMENT. IT is DIFFICULT TO GIVE AN EXACT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN ...

A popular rejoinder to the potential threat that incommensurability might pose to scientific realism has been the referential response: despite meaning variance, there can be referential continuity, which is sufficient for rational theory choice. This response has been charged with meta-incommensurability, according to which it begs the question by assuming realist metaphysics. However, realists take it to be a rhetorical device that hinders productive discussion. By reconstructing the debate, this paper aims to demonstrate two things. First, there are unexpected commonalities (...) between realists and non-realists, meaning that the charge of meta-incommensurability is more or less exaggerated. Second, meta-incommensurability, which is to be found in the ways to make sense of referential overlap at the token level, still plays a role in the realism debate. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)

By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...) that ICK and JCK need to be approached independently, each of which can shed light on different aspects of science, knowledge production, and acceptance. (shrink)

This book is not a conventional introduction to the philosophy of mind, nor is it a contribution to the physicalist/ dualist debate. Instead The Representational Theory of Mind demonstrates that we can construct physicalist theories of important aspects of our mental life. Its aim is to explain and defend a physicalist theory of intelligence in two parts: the first six chapters consist of an exposition, elaboration and defence of human sentience (the functionalist theory of mind), and the second part considers (...) rivals and objections to this theory. Kim Sterelny aims to introduce people to this area of philosophy by exemplifying it, to show that philosophical and empirical investigations can be synthesized to the benefit of both. --From publisher's description. (shrink)

Xenophobia is conceptually distinct from racism. Xenophobia is also distinct from nativism. Furthermore, theories of racism are largely ensconced in nationalized narratives of racism, often influenced by the black-white binary, which obscures xenophobia and shelters it from normative critiques. This paper addresses these claims, arguing for the first and last, and outlining the second. Just as philosophers have recently analyzed the concept of racism, clarifying it and pinpointing why it’s immoral and the extent of its moral harm, so we will (...) analyze xenophobia and offer a pluralist account of xenophobia, with important implications for racism. This analysis is guided by the discussion of racism in recent moral philosophy, social ontology, and research in the psychology of racism and implicit attitudes. (shrink)

Since Elga published his “Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem,” there has been an intense debate about which credence between 1/2 and 1/3 Beauty should assign to (H) the coin’s landing heads, when she is awakened on Monday. The Halfers claim that she ought to assign 1/2 to H at that moment. The Thirders argue that she ought to assign 1/3 to H then. Meanwhile, Pettigrew defended a new chance-credence coordination principle, called the “Evidential Temporal Principle” (ETP), in a (...) recent edition of his book. In this paper, I provide a novel argument against the Halfer view and a partial defense of the Thirder view, respectively based on ETP. In addition, I generalize ETP to what I call the “Evidential Centered Principle,” which links one’s credences in centered propositions with their objective chances. (shrink)

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we (...) witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved. (shrink)

Even though it has been argued that scientific cognition is distributed, there is no consensus on the exact nature of distributed cognition. This paper aims to characterize distributed cognition as appropriate for philosophical studies of science. I first classify competing characterizations into three types: the property approach, the task approach, and the system approach. It turns out that the property approach and the task approach are subject to criticism. I then argue that the most preferable way to understand distributed cognition (...) in science is provided by the system approach that takes a distributed-cognitive system as the unit of analysis. I clarify this position by considering possible objections and replies. (shrink)

Kichul Kim, né en 1969 à Séoul, a ceci de remarquable qu’il prétend — et réussit — à sculpter le son. En effet, il a une formation de sculpteur. Mais il se fascine très tôt pour le son, pour des raisons spirituelles. L’énigme du bodhisattva Gwan-eum qui, selon l’étymologie de son nom, « voit ou fait voir les sons », l’intrigue. Une intuition lui révèle — pense-t-il — de quoi il s’agit. Il va s’efforcer de le faire voir à son (...) tour. Le son fait voir, visualiser, évoquer, et on peut donc, en ce sens, voir le son. Ses installations sonores sont en général réalisées dans des formes minimales et simplifiées. Ces formes pures ne correspondent qu’au son qu’il veut diffuser. C’est le son qu’émettent des haut-parleurs, un son qu’il a enregistré et qui parle. En effet, le son, tout invisible et intangible qu’il est, par l’espace qu’il recrée et modèle, est tridimensionnel, et sculptable. Le spectateur ne peut certes pas voir ce travail sonore par ses yeux de chair, pas plus qu’il ne peut le toucher de sa main, mais son œil de l’imagination, son imagination visuelle, le construit, et en ce sens il le perçoit bien : à partir du son se crée une image, une image dont l’intensité frôle l’illusion. On a là un véritable environnement créé par le son. Inspiré par l’Extrême-Orient ancien, son art et sa pensée, Kichul Kim puise dans ses sites historiques, religieux souvent, et dans la nature, son inspiration et ses enregistrements. L’environnement particulier d’origine est rendu présent par son son, si puissamment que l’auditeur devient spectateur, recréant activement la scène originelle : spect-acteur. Plongé si profondément en lui-même, il est graduellement conduit aux portes d’une sorte de méditation, ici et ailleurs à la fois, comme hors du temps. Kichul Kim, born in 1969 in Seoul, is remarkable in that he claims—and succeeds—to carve the sound. He trained as a sculptor but was fascinated very early with the sound, for spiritual reasons. The enigma of the Bodhisattva Gwan-eum which, according to the etymology of its name, “sees or makes one see sounds”, intrigued him. He understood intuititvely what it means and tried to examplify it himself. The sound makes you see, visualize, evoke, and you can, in this sense, see the sound. His sound installations are generally performed in minimal and simplified forms. These pure forms correspond only to the sound he wants to produce. This is the sound emitted through loudspeakers, a sound that he recorded and that speaks. Indeed, the sound, as invisible and intangible as it is, thanks to the space it recreates and models, becomes three-dimensional, and “sculptable”. The spectator certainly cannot see this sonic work through his/her eyes of flesh, any more than he/she can touch it with his/her hand. But his/her eye of the imagination, the visual imagination, builds it, and in this sense he/she perceives it well: from the sound is created an image whose intensity borders on illusion. This is a real environment created by sound. Inspired by the ancient Far East, its art and thought, Kichul Kim draws from historical sites, often religious, and from nature, for his inspiration, and recordings. The particular environment of which the sounds originates is made present by the sound, so powerfully that the listener becomes a spectator, actively recreating the original scene: spect-actor. So deeply immersed in himself, he is gradually led to the gates of a kind of meditation, here and elsewhere at once, as if out of time. (shrink)

The function of concepts must be taken seriously to understand the scientific practices of developing and working with concepts. Despite its significance, little philosophical attention has been paid to the function of concepts. A notable exception is Brigandt (2010), who suggests incorporating the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use as an additional semantic property along with the reference and inferential role. The suggestion, however, has at least two limitations. First, his proposal to introduce epistemic goals as the third component (...) of concepts lacks independent grounding, except to account for the rationality of semantic change (the Grounding Problem). Second, it is hardly justified to consider epistemic goals as a semantic property (the Misplacement Problem). To remedy these predicaments, we suggest a new perspective that takes concepts as cognitive entities with a 2-layered structure rather than as merely linguistic entities and develop an account of the function of concepts. We provide empirical evidence showing that functional information affects our cognitive processes. It is claimed that the function of concepts is not a semantic property but a type of meta-information regulating a body of concept-constitutive information. (shrink)