In this paper I discuss a new kind of hinge epistemology which is called transcendental hinge epistemology. According to this view, hinges are immune from doubt because it is impossible to doubt them coherently, and this impossibility arises because any attempt to doubt them will presuppose their truth. Such an immunity is possessed only by inescapable hinges, that is, hinges that must be presupposed in every inquiry. I will argue that current hinge epistemologies fail to provide (...) a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy because they focus on escapable hinges, that is, hinges with respect to which one can entertain coherent doubts. (shrink)

In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular (...) hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges. (shrink)

The relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature (...) of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Phenomenology’s reversal of naturalism hinges on the central claim that the worldly objects that we experience acquire their ontological solidity throughout series of intentional acts that are accomplished over the course of our subjective and intersubjective lives. This posture has historically given rise to realist critiques stating that such a “correlational” ontology undermines our capacity to formulate a coherent discourse on generative natural events that predate humans, such as the Big Bang, the Earth’s accretion, the formation of the oceans, (...) etc. In this paper, I articulate a Merleau-Pontian response to this problem. I establish a continuity between the temporality that is at play in the genesis of empirical bodies and the pre-objective tension that precedes perceptual givenness. I therefore suggest treating the past of nature as a transcendental past, always at work within our present experience, instead of an objective moment that would have determined in advance a causal chain of events. (shrink)

I take up Kant's remarks about a " transcendental deduction" of the "concepts of space and time". I argue for the need to make a clearer assessment of the philosophical resources of the Aesthetic in order to account for this transcendental deduction. Special attention needs to be given to the fact that the central task of the Aesthetic is simply the "exposition" of these concepts. The Metaphysical Exposition reflects upon facts about our usage to reveal our commitment to (...) the idea that these concepts refer to pure intuitions. But the legitimacy of these concepts still hangs in the balance: these concepts may turn out to refer to nothing real at all. The subsequent Transcendental Exposition addresses this issue. The objective validity of the concepts of space and time, and hence their transcendental deduction, hinges on careful treatment of this last point. (shrink)

In this paper, I’ll sketch an approach to epistemology that draws its inspiration from two aspects of Kant’s philosophical project. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. In discussing these connections, I’ll proceed as follows. First, I’ll describe the sorts of epistemological questions (...) I’ll be focusing on, and the framework within which I’ll try to address them. Then I’ll say a bit about the connections between this framework on Kant’s own views. Next, I’ll explain in more detail how the two main elements of this framework relate to one another by explaining how a certain sort of “transcendental argument” allows us to derive conclusions about the requirements of rationality from facts about the nature of rational capacities. Then, I’ll briefly illustrate these connections with two examples: the rationality of explanatory inference like inference to the best explanation and the rationality of perceptual belief. Finally, I’ll conclude by saying a bit about the relevance of this ideas for debates about the rationality of basic beliefs or prior probabilities. (shrink)

In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. (...) As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and commitments. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the argument of Kritik der Urteilskraft §§76 –77 by placing it in the context of the “Critique of Teleological Judgment”. What role does the problematic and historically so successful figure of the intuitive understanding play in the antinomy of teleological judgment? The answer is considered indispensable to address the issue of the reception of §§76 – 77. The claim is that these sections institute the “closure” of transcendental philosophy—a closure fundamentally misunderstood by the post Kantians. On (...) the series of distinctions drawn to characterize the “peculiarity” of our human understanding and, by contrast, that of a non-human mind hinges the specific transcendental character of Kant’s philosophy. Once the condition that sustains those distinctions is abandoned transcendental philosophy is abandoned as well. (shrink)

This article argues that the work of the late Johan van der Keuken offers a contribution to ecological semiotics, and that it also defines the relationship between the semiotic animal and nature in ways that avoid glottocentricism. Taking from the recent work of Kalevi Kull, Jesper Hoffmeyer, and John Deely amongst others, I will argue that van der Keuken’s documentaries offer a view of ecology that is broader than a study of bio-physical processes that might reduce ecology to a narrow (...) political issue.In order to support this argument, I will be looking at two contrasting films from van der Keuken – Flat Jungle (1978) and Face Value (1991). The first film examines natural habitats within a confined coastal area in Western Europe, while the second film looks at human beings in the different urban environments of late-20th-century Europe. I will then argue that van der Keuken does not collapse the vital distinctions between umwelt and Lebenswelt, yet his films also succeed at reminding us of their constant interdependence. (shrink)

Based on selected writings on women's experiences of and reflections on dress and travel published in the Hong Kong feminist journal Nuliu, this paper discusses the politics of female subjectivity in relation to the everyday. The context of the discussion is the changing actualization of the well-known feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ within the local feminist movement in Hong Kong between the 1980s and the 1990s. The paper aims to create a new paradigm for analysing agency – the key (...) concept in subject formation – by critiquing the ideology of choice, which is a liberal value system that connects people's imagination with the notion of personal ‘liberation’. As demonstrated by the examples of dress and travel, the everyday is a site of both possibilities and conflict for women, who generate new strategies or tactics to negotiate not only with institutions, structures and policies, but also with ‘interpellations’, ‘temporality’, ‘spatiality’, ‘performativity’, ‘symbolism’ and ‘psyche’. (shrink)

Deontology and utilitarianism are two competing principles that guide our moral judgment. Recently, deontology is thought to be intuitive and is based on an error-prone and biased approach, whereas utilitarianism is relatively reflective and a suitable framework for making decision. In this research, the authors explored the relationship among moral identity, moral decision, and moral behavior to see how a preference for the deontological solution can lead to moral behavior. In study 1, a Web-based survey demonstrated that when making decisions, (...) individuals who viewed themselves as moral people preferred deontological ideals to the utilitarian framework. In study 2, the authors investigated the effect of moral identity and moral decision on moral behavior in an experimental study. The results showed that when deontology was coupled with the motivational power of moral identity, individuals were most likely to behave morally. (shrink)

This paper documents a quantitative study into socially responsible principles and practices adopted in registered clubs in New South Wales Australia to manage one of their social impacts – problem gambling. The survey utilised an adapted version of Aupperle''s (1982) corporate social responsibility instrument to measure the priority given to economic, legal, ethical and discretionary principles in club machine gambling operations. The survey also assessed support for certain management practices in responsible gambling. The results indicate that the participating club managers (...) prioritise economic, legal, ethical and discretionary principles respectively, and that these are statistically related to practices they have implemented and support in responsible gambling. The managers most favoured secondary harm minimisation practices, followed by reactive primary intervention. Less favoured were proactive primary intervention and discretionary practices. These principles and practices contrast markedly with those advocated by key stakeholder groups, as expressed in semi-structured interviews and submissions to the NSW Gaming Inquiry. Non-industry stakeholders favoured a more balanced set of principles and a more holistic set of management practices in responsible gambling. The results also provide validation of Aupperle''s (1982) instrument when applied to corporate management of a single social impact and for Carroll''s (1979, 1991) construct of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

Does honesty result from the absence of temptation or the active resistance of temptation? The “will’’ hypothesis suggests that honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, while the ”grace” hypothesis argues that honesty results from the absence of temptation. We examined reaction time and measured the cheating behavior of individuals who had a chance to lie for money. In study 1, we tested the “grace” hypothesis that honesty results from the absence of temptation and found a priming effect of (...) moral constructs on increasing honest behavior. In study 2, we investigated the individual’s moral identity in the same context, articulating different mechanisms that lead people to behave ethically. The result confirms that the “grace” hypothesis was valid for people who had a high moral identity, while the “will” hypothesis was accurate for individuals who had a low moral identity. (shrink)

A common reaction to Hegel’s suggestion that we collapse Kant’s distinction between form and content is that, since such a move would also deprive us of any way of distinguishing the merely logical from the real possibility of our concepts, it is incoherent and ought to be rejected. It is true that these two distinctions are intimately related in Kant, such that if one goes, the other does as well. But it is less obvious that giving them up as Kant (...) conceives them is as incoherent a proposal as many of Hegel’s critics think. It has been the point of a recent account of Hegel’s idealism to demonstrate that his critique of Kant’s dichotomy between form and content or concept and intuition does not commit him to the view that human cognition is materially creative of its content in the manner of a God-like or intuitive intellect—does not, in other words, signify a return to a pre-Critical metaphysics. This is the interpretative stance I adopt here as well, in hope of giving defenders of Kant reasons for taking Hegel more seriously. (shrink)

In the opening chapter of his thirty-sixth oration, Dio Chrysostom tells his listeners how in the course of a journey ‘through the lands of the Scythians to that of the Getae’, he stopped over in the city of Borysthenes ‘in the summer after my exile’. Dio had been exiled by Domitian, probably in a.d. 83 or 84; since his exile ended after the death of Domitian in September 96, it is generally accepted that his visit to Borysthenes took place in (...) the summer of 97. (shrink)

Outcomes research is topical in discussions about health-related research. Its emphasis on effectiveness creates an important opportunity for nurse researchers to strengthen the linkages between theory, outcomes research and nursing practice but, before care can be more effective, it is logical to establish patients’ desired outcomes. A thorough review of the implications of this requirement for the care of hospice patients is needed, but is lacking in the literature. Therefore, the literature on a ‘good death’ is reviewed as a step (...) towards assisting hospice patients to achieve what they regard as an acceptable death. The starting point is to define more clearly what it means to die a good death. The relationship between hospice care and achieving a good death is then examined. (shrink)

BackgroundPast research shows that physicians experience high ill-being but also high well-being.ObjectiveTo shed light on how medical faculty’s experiences of their job demands and job resources might differentially affect their ill-being and their well-being with special attention to the role that the work-life interface plays in these processes.MethodsQualitative thematic analysis was used to analyze interviews from 30 medical faculty at a top research hospital in Canada.FindingsMedical faculty’s experiences of work-life conflict were severe. Faculty’s job demands had coalescing effects on their (...) stress, work-life conflict, and exhaustion. Although supportive job resources helped to mitigate the negative effects of job demands, stimulating job resources contributed to greater work-life conflict, stress, and exhaustion. Thus, for these medical faculty job resources play a dual-role for work-life conflict. Moreover, although faculty experienced high emotional exhaustion, they did not experience the other components of burnout. Some faculty engaged in cognitive reappraisal strategies to mitigate their experiences of work-life conflict and its harmful consequences.ConclusionThis study suggests that the precise nature and effects of job demands and job resources may be more complex than current research suggests. Hospital leadership should work to lessen unnecessary job demands, increase supportive job resources, recognize all aspects of job performance, and, given faculty’s high levels of work engagement, encourage a climate that fosters work-life balance. (shrink)

Are risk-takers more likely to engage in unethical behaviors? We examined the relationship between risk-taking propensity and cheating in two experimental studies. In Study 1, we examined the relationship between subjects’ risk-taking propensity and their actual self-serving dishonesty using a gambling-like task. The results suggested that risk-taking propensity, measured using a behavioral approach, was positively correlated with actual self-serving dishonest behavior. In Study 2, we measured participants’ performances using a matrices test and found that the positive correlation still held. We (...) found that participants with high risk-taking propensity reported a lower perceived probability of being detected, which might drive their dishonest behavior. (shrink)

To date, much of the current research has focused on examining the direct relationships between the components of the fraud triangle theory and fraud intention. However, limited empirical studies have explored the mediating effects of rationalization and opportunity. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to examine the mediating role of rationalization and opportunity on the direct relationship between pressure and fraud intention, as well as the relationship between pressure and opportunity. A sample of 166 managers participated in the (...) study, and partial least squares structural equation modelling was used to test the proposed model and hypotheses. Results showed that pressure was positively related to both rationalization and fraud intention. Moreover, the relationship between pressure and fraud intention was found to be partially mediated by both rationalization and opportunity. Similarly, rationalization was also found to partially mediate the relationship between pressure and opportunity. These findings suggest that pressure can increase fraud intention directly, as well as indirectly through rationalization and opportunity. This study contributes to the current literature by shedding light on the interplay among the three key components of the fraud triangle theory and their effects on fraud intention. The study provides valuable insights for relevant stakeholders, both theoretically and practically. (shrink)

Introduction: Probationers, offenders with less serious and non-violent offences, and under statutory supervision, have low levels of self-esteem and physical health, and high level of family conflict, and poorer quality of family relationships. This study examined the effectiveness of the existing probation service and the additional use of a positive family holistic health intervention to enhance physical, psychological, and family well-being in probationers and relationships with probation officers.Methods: Probationers under the care of the Hong Kong Social Welfare Department were randomized (...) into a care-as-usual control group, a brief intervention group receiving two 1-h individual sessions [of a brief theory-based positive family holistic health intervention integrating Zero-time Exercise and positive psychology themes of “Praise and Gratitude” in the existing probation service], or a combined intervention group receiving BI and a 1-day group activity with family members. The outcomes were physical activity, fitness performance, self-esteem, happiness, anxiety and depression symptoms, life satisfaction, quality of life, family communication and well-being, and relationships with probation officers. Self-administered questionnaires and simple fitness tests were used at baseline, 1-month and 3-month follow-up. Linear mixed model analysis was used to compare difference in the changes of outcome variables among groups, adjusted of sex, age, and baseline values. Focus group interviews were conducted. Thematic content analysis was used.Results: 318 probationers were randomized into CAU, BI, or CI group. CAU showed enhanced physical activity, fitness performance and psychological health, and family communication with small effect sizes. BI and CI showed further improved physical activity, family communication and family well-being. Additionally, CI reported greater improvements in the relationships with probation officers than CAU with a small effect size. CI also reported greater increases in physical activity and family communication than BI with small to moderate effect sizes. Qualitative feedbacks corroborated the quantitative findings.Conclusion: Our trial provided the first evidence of the effectiveness of probation service and the additional use of an innovative, relatively low-cost, theory-based brief positive family holistic health intervention. This intervention may offer a new model for enhancing probation service.Trial Registration: The research protocol was registered at the National Institutes of Health. (shrink)

God's necessary existence makes sense. Attempt at a transcendental modal proof. - In this essay I outline a novel three-stage proof of God's necessary existence using transcendental and deductive methods. In the first step of the proof, by retorsion, it is proved that there is at least one sentence that is necessary and inescapable. In the second step, the inescapability of the modal logic supposed in the proof is shown. This step also contains a new argument in favour (...) of epistemic anti-realism. The third step finally proves the necessary existence of the person who proves. The proof thus refers to the subject, the object, and the method of this proof itself. (shrink)

Autologos. A dialogue on fundamental logic. - In this dialogue of three dialogue partners, an attempt is made to prove the logical prerequisites of any meaningful dialogue by using transcendental arguments. Among these inescapable logical premises are a semantics as strong as that of modal logic S5, and an epistemic anti-realism.

Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.

Hinging on a metaphysical examination of the concept of newness and Paul Guyer’s notion of the temporally extended self, this article analyzes what it means that we are a temporally extended being that is fashioned in time, which is none other than a transcendental object = newness, and argues that (fashioned) bodies can be things in themselves and mere phenomena simultaneously. Kant’s doctrine of self-positing assists us in decoding how the subject obtains an embodied experience while a thing in (...) itself, as well as how both a non-empirical affection and an empirical affection are at play, casually affecting the subject. By looking into how double affection is in operation, this article aims to broaden our understanding of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two recent readings of Kant’s schematism that are productive for my take on performativity. The first stems from Sibylle Krämer’s Figuration, Anschauung, Erkenntnis from 2016, in which Krämer examines Kant’s writings on schematism, while taking a special look at the notion of figurality. Krämer is keen on describing that intuitions and concepts are dissimilar, and the schema is required to make them similar. The transcendental schema or schematization, Krämer underlines, is a method or act. (...) It is not an image but figurality, and in Kant it is temporal figurality, which acts as a hinge providing homogeneity between concepts and intuitions and thereby making intuitions into something that the categories can latch onto. The second reading of the schematism I discuss is outlined in Maja Soboleva’s Das Denken des Denkens from 2016. Soboleva’s reading is monist and realist, claiming that the understanding does not judge in its primary activity but “shows” in its ability to make rules; it mimics an object for the human understanding. Intuition is crucial for thinking, since we are presented with a system of images, a sphere of semantically undetermined objects that we then judge in a concept. Finally, I conclude with my own reading of Kant’s schematism in outlining two kinds of imagination – one that imagines (Einbildungskraft) the connection in the intelligible realm and the other that emagines (Ausbildungskraft) the connection in the sensible realm. This is how in experience we take in with the senses and subsume under the concepts after concepts have been ordered or prefigured through this double schematization, which effects that intuitions and concepts are the same. (shrink)

Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is (...) the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The idea of moral certainties is venerable, highly contentious, and nevertheless alive. What I call “hinge ethics” (in analogy to hinge epistemology) combines three currents – meta-ethical concerns about the scope and limits of moral knowledge and objectivity, the idea of limits of doubt as articulated in On Certainty, and sympathies for Wittgensteinian ideas about ethics. This essay critically assesses hinge ethics, focusing on Nigel Pleasants’ work. My main objection is not that Wittgensteinian ideas about certainty cannot be transferred from (...) the domain of physical phenomena to the moral domain. Nor shall I nail my colours to the mast of moral relativism. Instead my main tack will be as follows: Several of the views hinge ethicists detect in or derive from On Certainty are intriguing and ingenious, yet either unwarranted and/or not echt Wittgensteinian. Purported moral certainties like the wrongness of killing are neither ineffable, nor non-propositional, nor quasi-transcendental preconditions of moral thought and action. In so far as morality has scaffolding foundations, it is not certainties but capacities. At least some of these capacities are cognitive, a matter of social cognition. (shrink)