Thomas Hofweber takes the semantic paradoxes to motivate a radical reconceptualization of logical validity, rejecting the idea that an inference rule is valid just in case every instance thereof is necessarily truth-preserving. Rather than this “strict validity”, we should identify validity with “generic validity”, where a rule is generically valid just in case its instances are truth preserving, and where this last sentence is a generic, like “Bears are dangerous”. While sympathetic to Hofweber’s view that strict validity should be replaced (...) by something allowing for exceptions, I argue that this should instead be truth-conduciveness, a matter of a large majority of instances being truth-preserving. The fact that inference rules have uncountably many instances, I argue, can be handled by defining truth-conduciveness as relative to finite sets of instances. Moreover, I argue that Hofweber’s position, while seemingly radical, may be less so under closer scrutiny. For the mere claim that classical rules and unrestricted truth rules are generically valid (or truth-conducive) is not in itself controversial. Also, if there is an answer to the question of which of these are also strictly valid, then the claim that generic validity is the central notion in logic is at most an interest-relative matter, since there is then also a fact of the matter as to which inference rules are (not) strictly valid. If no solution operating with strict validity to the paradoxes can be had, however, then the claim that validity should be identified with a weaker notion is better motivated. I argue that it is reasonable, in view of past failures, to conjecture that no ordinary solution will score high enough relative to standard (uncontroversial) desiderata to merit justified belief. Hence, it is unknowable which solution is correct. I further argue that this is best explained by its being metaphysically indeterminate which solution is correct. If this conjecture is true, then we ought instead to think of validity as allowing exceptions, and then take the “true logic” to be one that takes both the classical rules and the truth rules to be valid, i.e., truth-conducive. This logic scores very high on the desiderata on logics, and is therefore preferable to any logic operating with strict validity. (shrink)

Easy Ontology (EO), defended in several recent works by Amie Thomasson, and based on Carnap’s famous deflationism about metaphysics, is the view that many ontological questions, like ‘Are there numbers?’, are at bottom easy, at least when taken in their “internal” sense. Both Carnap and Thomasson take for granted that serious metaphysicians therefore cannot plausibly be interpreted as asking internal questions. Thus, they think they are committed to finding some alternative, special interpretation of metaphysicians’ utterances. I argue that none of (...) the alternative interpretations proposed in the literature are viable. More importantly, I argue that Carnap and Thomasson are wrong about this commitment. EO should instead be coupled with the view that metaphysicians ask internal questions, yet have the false belief that they can be answered only through metaphysical speculation. This is a significant modification of EO, in which the notion of an “external question” plays no role, and which results in a simpler and more plausible theory. (shrink)

I here argue that Ted Sider's indeterminacy argument against vagueness in quantifiers fails. Sider claims that vagueness entails precisifications, but holds that precisifications of quantifiers cannot be coherently described: they will either deliver the wrong logical form to quantified sentences, or involve a presupposition that contradicts the claim that the quantifier is vague. Assuming (as does Sider) that the “connectedness” of objects can be precisely defined, I present a counter-example to Sider's contention, consisting of a partial, implicit definition of the (...) existential quantifier that in effect sets a given degree of connectedness among the putative parts of an object as a condition upon there being something (in the sense in question) with those parts. I then argue that such an implicit definition, taken together with an “auxiliary logic” (e.g., introduction and elimination rules), proves to function as a precisification in just the same way as paradigmatic precisifications of, e.g., “red”. I also argue that with a quantifier that is stipulated as maximally tolerant as to what mereological sums there are, precisifications can be given in the form of truth-conditions of quantified sentences, rather than by implicit definition. (shrink)

Semantic dispositionalism is roughly the view that meaning a certain thing by a word, or possessing a certain concept, consists in being disposed to do something, e.g., infer a certain way. Its main problem is that it seems to have so many and disparate exceptions. People can fail to infer as required due to lack of logical acumen, intoxication, confusion, deviant theories, neural malfunctioning, and so on. I present a theory stating possession conditions of concepts that are counterfactuals, rather than (...) disposition attributions, but which is otherwise similar to inferentialist versions of dispositionalism. I argue that it can handle all the exceptions discussed in the literature without recourse to ceteris paribus clauses. Psychological exceptions are handled by suitably undemanding requirements (unlike that of giving the sum of any two numbers) and by setting the following two preconditions upon someone’s making the inference: that she considers the inference and has no motivating reason against it. The non-psychological exceptions, i.e., cases of neural malfunctioning, are handled by requiring that the counterfactuals be true sufficiently often during the relevant interval. I argue that this accommodates some important intuitions about concept possession, in particular, the intuition that concept possession is vague along a certain dimension. (shrink)

I show that the act-type theories of Soames and Hanks entail that every sentence with alternative analyses (including every atomic sentence with a polyadic predicate) is ambiguous, many of them massively so. I assume that act types directed toward distinct objects are themselves distinct, plus some standard semantic axioms, and infer that act-type theorists are committed to saying that ‘Mary loves John’ expresses both the act type of predicating [loving John] of Mary and that of predicating [being loved by Mary] (...) of John. Since the two properties are distinct, so are the act types. Hence, the sentence expresses two propositions. I also discuss a non-standard “pluralist” act-type theory, as well as some retreat positions, which all come with considerable problems. Finally, I extrapolate to a general constraint on theories of structured propositions, and find that Jeffrey King’s theory has the same unacceptable consequence as the act-type theory. (shrink)

I here defend a theory consisting of four claims about ‘property’ and properties, and argue that they form a coherent whole that can solve various serious problems. The claims are (1): ‘property’ is defined by the principles (PR): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property of x iff F’ and (PA): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property’; (2) the function of ‘property’ is to increase the expressive power of English, roughly by mimicking quantification into predicate position; (3) property talk should be understood at (...) face value: apparent commitments are real and our apparently literal use of ‘property’ is really literal; (4) there are no properties. In virtue of (1)–(2), this is a deflationist theory and in virtue of (3)–(4), it is an error theory. (1) is fleshed out as a claim about understanding conditions, and it is argued at length, and by going through a number of examples, that it satisfies a crucial constraint on meaning claims: all facts about ‘property’ can be explained, together with auxiliary facts, on its basis. Once claim (1) has been expanded upon, I argue that the combination of (1)–(3) provides the means for handling several problems: they help giving a happy-face solution to what I call the paradox of abstraction , they form part of a plausible account of the correctness of committive sentences, and, most importantly, they help respond to various indispensability arguments against nominalism. (shrink)

The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions and other complex senses/concepts using a special kind of functor. I consider some formulations from Peacocke's works and highlight certain problems that arise as we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using "that"-clauses. With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with objectual, first-order quantifiers and speak without further ado about their involvement in propositions. The functor notation also turns (...) out to come with an important kind of expressive strengthening, and is shown to be neutral on several controversial issues. (shrink)

The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...) says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about” is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness or reference. (shrink)

It is argued that although George Bealer's influential ‘Self-Consciousness argument’ refutes standard versions of reductive functionalism (RF), it fails to generalize in the way Bealer supposes. To wit, he presupposes that any version of RF must take the content of ‘pain’ to be the property of being in pain (and so on), which is expressly rejected in independently motivated versions of conceptual role semantics (CRS). Accordingly, there are independently motivated versions of RF, incorporating CRS, which avoid Bealer's main type of (...) refutation. I focus particularly on one such theory, which takes concepts to be event types that are individuated by their psychological roles, which has the resources of responding to each of the more specific worries Bealer expresses. (shrink)

A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...) applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions). (shrink)

Contents: 1. Introduction , 2. Overviews , 3.History and major works, 3.1 Gerhard Gentzen and proof-theory, 3.2 Wilfrid Sellars, 3.3 Gilbert Harman, 3.4 Christopher Peacocke, 3.5 Robert Brandom , 3.6 Paul Horwich, 3.7 Major works by other authors, 4. Mental content first vs. linguistic meaning first, 4.1 Content-first views, 4.2 Meaning-first views, 5. Wide vs. narrow CRS, 5.1 Overviews and major works about externalism/internalism, 5.2 Discussions about externalism within CRS, 6. Descriptive vs. normative CRS, 6.1 Overviews and major works about (...) the normativity of meaning, 6.2 The debate on normativity within CRS, 7. Holistic vs. non-holistic CRS, 7.1 Overviews of meaning holism and compositionality, 7.2 Overviews and major works about analyticity, 7.3 Criticisms against holism , 7.4 Replies to the criticisms, 8. Unilateral vs. bilateral CRS , 9. Connections between CRS and meta-ethics. (shrink)

The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...) and argue that they both attribute an implausible type of ambiguity to “true”. This can be avoided, however, if truth-ascriptions to sentences are taken as a certain form of pragmatic ellipses. I end by showing how this hypothesis accommodates a number of intuitions involving truth-ascriptions to sentences. (shrink)

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...) the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of "true" could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms ("proform", "antecedent", etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom's case that "is true" is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian's argument against deflationism). (shrink)

I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is (...) a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier. (shrink)

I here propose a hitherto unnoticed possibility of solving embedding problems for noncognitivist expressivists in metaethics by appeal to Conceptual Role Semantics. I show that claims from the latter as to what constitutes various concepts can be used to define functions from states expressed by atomic sentences to states expressed by complex sentences, thereby allowing an expressivist semantics that satisfies a rather strict compositionality constraint. The proposal can be coupled with several different types of concept individuation claim, and is shown (...) to pave the way to novel accounts for, e.g., negation. (shrink)

I here discuss two problems facing Russellian act-type theories of propositions, and argue that Fregean act-type theories are better equipped to deal with them. The first relates to complex singular terms like '2+2', which turn out not to pose any special problem for Fregeans at all, whereas Soames' theory currently has no satisfactory way of dealing with them (particularly, with such "mixed" propositions as the proposition that 2+2 is greater than 3). Admittedly, one possibility stands out as the most promising (...) one, but it requires that the Russellian treat complex properties as constituents of propositions. This leads to the second major problem for Russellians: that of proliferating propositions. I show how the most direct solution to this problem, that of rejecting complex predicative propositional constituents is available to Fregeans but very implausible for Russellians, since this virtually means rejecting complex properties. (shrink)

I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I (...) first argue that the facts about speakers’ reactions to such Curry derivations do not constitute a problem for the Triviality Theory specifically. Rather, they follow from independent, uncontroversial facts. I then propose a solution which coheres with the theory as I understand it. Finally, I consider a normative reading of their objection and offer a response. (shrink)

Nominalists need some account of correctness for sentences committed to the existence of abstract objects. This paper proposes a new statement of such conditions specifically for properties. The account builds on an earlier proposal of mine, but avoids the counter-examples against the latter pointed out by Thomas Schindler, particularly, the sentence ‘There are inexpressible properties’. I argue that the new proposal is independently motivated and more faithful to the spirit of the kind of error-theoretic nominalism that the original proposal was (...) part of. Along the way, I also propose novel treatments of Arthur Pap’s and W.V.O. Quine’s notoriously hard-to-paraphrase sentences about abstracta. (shrink)

I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...) that certain circularity charges rest on mistaken assumptions about logic that lead to Carroll’s regress. I show how the propositional quantifier can be seen as on a par with first-order quantifiers and so equally acceptable to use. While the proposed parallelism between these quantifiers is controversial in general, deflationists have special reasons to affirm it. I further argue that the main three types of approach the truth-paradoxes are open to an adherent of (Q), and that the derivation of general facts about truth can be explained on its basis. (shrink)

Deflationism about truth is often said to be incompatible with truth-theoretic semantics. However, both of these labels are ambiguous, making the truth of the incompatibility claim dependent on interpretation. I provide one pair of natural interpretations, on which both views relate essentially to grounding and on which they are indeed incompatible. This result has some intrinsic interest as well as paving the way for further needed clarifications in the debate about the relationship between the views.

The paper discusses the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), the view that “true” is inconsistent in the sense that its meaning-constitutive principles include all instances of the truth-schema (T). It argues that (IT) entails that anyone using “true” in its ordinary sense is committed to all the (T)-instances and that any theory in which “true” is used in that sense entails the (T)-instances (which, given classical logic, entail contradictions). More specifically, I argue that theorists are committed to the meaning-constitutive principles (...) of logical constants, relative to the interpretation they intend thereof (e.g., classical), and that theories containing logical constants entail those principles. Further, I argue, since there is no relevant difference from the case of “true”, inconsistency theorists’ uses of “true” commit them to the (T)-instances. Adherents of (IT) are recommended, as a consequence, to eschew the truth-predicate. I also criticise Matti Eklund’s account of how the semantic value of “true” is determined, which can be taken as an attempt to show how “true” can be consistently used, despite being inconsistent. (shrink)

Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a (...) has the property of being F’. It thereby fails both as a theory of the ordinary conception and as a replacement of the ordinary notion, assuming the latter is defective. (shrink)

I here investigate whether there is any version of the principle of charity both strong enough to conflict with an error-theoretic version of nominalism (EN) about abstract objects, and supported by the considerations adduced in favour of interpretive charity in the literature. I argue that in order to be strong enough, the principle, which I call (Charity), would have to read, “For all expressions e, an acceptable interpretation must make true a sufficiently high ratio of accepted sentences containing e”. I (...) next consider arguments based on Davidson's intuitive cases for interpretive charity, the reliability of perceptual beliefs, and the reliability of “non-abstractive inference modes”, and conclude that none support (Charity). I then propose a diagnosis of the view that there must be some universal principle of charity ruling out (EN). Finally, I present a reason to think (Charity) is false, namely, that it seems to exclude the possibility of such disagreements as that between nominalists and realists. (shrink)

I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.

IN LATE SPRING 2007, professor Allan Gibbard gave the Hägerström Lectures at Uppsala University, Sweden, under the title of “Meaning as a Normative Concept”. He met up with Gunnar Björnsson and Arvid Båve to talk about the views he develops and defends in the lectures.

Båve has argued that act-type theories of propositions entail unwanted ambiguity of sentences such as ‘Donald loves Joan’. King has argued that act-type theories of propositions entail an unwanted abundance of propositions. I reply that a version of the act-type theory can avoid these objections. The key idea is that grammar constrains the acts that can be performed by the utterance of a sentence. I present enough of the details of this version of the act-type theory to show how (...) it can be used to respond to Båve's and King's objections. I conclude that this is a promising way to develop the act-type theory of propositions. (shrink)

U clanku autori se bave militantnim potencijalom koncepta avangarde. Pojavljujuci se u politici i umetnosti u prvoj polovini 19. veka i nastojeci da unisti gotovo celokupnu tradiciju 'burzoaskog' prosvetiteljstva, politicka i umetnicka avangarda nikada nije bila sposobna da se oslobodi svojih korena u vojnickom nacinu razmisljanja. Njena prava sustina je lezala u stvaranju bojnih polja u svakoj oblasti javnog zivota gde je postojala sansa da se unisti gradjansko drustvo - njegova politika, njegova umetnost, njegov nacin razmisljanja, njegova civilizacija. U ime (...) jos necuvene slobode, ona je sirila nasilje i sejala totalitarino seme po sprzenoj zemlji. A na kraju je nisu pobedili njeni mnogobrojni neprijatelji zato jer je postala zrtva vlastite destruktivnosti. (shrink)

U clanku autori se bave militantnim potencijalom koncepta avangarde. Pojavljujuci se u politici i umetnosti u prvoj polovini 19. veka i nastojeci da unisti gotovo celokupnu tradiciju 'burzoaskog' prosvetiteljstva, politicka i umetnicka avangarda nikada nije bila sposobna da se oslobodi svojih korena u vojnickom nacinu razmisljanja. Njena prava sustina je lezala u stvaranju bojnih polja u svakoj oblasti javnog zivota gde je postojala sansa da se unisti gradjansko drustvo - njegova politika, njegova umetnost, njegov nacin razmisljanja, njegova civilizacija. U ime (...) jos necuvene slobode, ona je sirila nasilje i sejala totalitarino seme po sprzenoj zemlji. A na kraju je nisu pobedili njeni mnogobrojni neprijatelji zato jer je postala zrtva vlastite destruktivnosti. (shrink)

Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill replies (...) “that’s true,” the real meaning of Bill’s statement is “It is true that the candidate is going to win the election.” This kind of prosententialist deflationism around the use of “true,” especially in Robert Brandom’s version, is an explanation given in terms of anaphora. The prosentence is an anaphoric dependent of the sentence providing its content. Båve (Philosophical Studies, 145, 297-310. 2009) argued that the anaphoric account is not as general as prosententialists claim, and that the analogy between prosentences and pronouns is explanatorily idle because it does not do any real explanatory work. The two criticisms are connected: The lack of unity within the anaphoric theory can be used to show its poor explanatory value. The plurality of uses of “is true” exceeds the anaphoric account indeed. Therefore, prosententialism is just a superficial re-description and the real work is done by means of more general semantic terms, namely “semantic equivalence and consequence” between “p” and ““p” is true.” I analyze Båve’s arguments and highlight that he fails to acknowledge the importance of a pragmatic and expressive dimension explained by the anaphoric account, a dimension that semantic “equivalence” and “consequence” are not capable of explaining. I then show that the anaphoric account can actually explain semantic equivalence and consequence, and this is crucial because equivalence and consequence do not explain anaphoric dependence. This reverses the allegation of generality: The anaphoric account is more general. Again, the cases typically used to defend prosententialism, if correctly described, show a unitary structure: They are all versions of lazy anaphoric dependence. Therefore, the unifying principle performing the explanation here is lazy anaphora. (shrink)

Feministicka epistemologija je pristup u teoriji saznanja koji u srediste postavlja feministicke probleme. U radu se razmatra savremeni poduhvat u oblasti feministicke epistemologije: feministicki empirizam. Za razliku od drugih feministkinja koje se bave epistemologijom, njihov cilj je da zadrze osnovne pojmove analiticke tradicije, koje posmatraju u svetlu feministickih interesa. Polazeci od Kvajnove naturalisticke epistemologije, feministicke empiristkinje iznose razlicite koncepcije znanja i prirode saznajnog subjekta, stvarajuci nove poglede na odnos sociopolitickih vrednosti i naucnog istrazivanja. Svoje preimucstvo u odnosu na pristupe feministickoj (...) epistemologiji izvan analitickog okvira, empiristkinje pronalaze upravo u prihvatanju naturalistickog i empiristickog pristupa rodnim pristrasnostima. Cilj rada je da proceni koliko su one uspesne u ostvarivanju svojih zamisli i da li je jedan takav pristup prihvatljiv. (shrink)

Ovaj članak predstavlja tragove ranoga vedāntskog tumačenja Maitreyī-brāhmane, jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Brhadāranyaka-upanišadi u Brahma-sūtrama, temeljnom tekstu filozofske škole vedānte. Predmet diskusije je egzegeza Maitreyī-brāhmane prema trima starodrevnim komentatorima Āśmarathyi, Audulomiu i Kāśakrtsni. Cilj je ovog rada pokazati kakve se metode tumačenja upanišadskih tekstova koriste u različitim vedāntskim školama. Također možemo vidjeti tehnike tumačenja preuzete iz pūrva-mīmāmse, škole tumačenja vedskih tekstova, koje su preoblikovane za tumačenje upanišadi. Članak također pokazuje kako filozofsko stajalište o odnosu sopstva i apsoluta služi egzegetskoj svrsi (...) pomirenja različitih upanišadskih učenja. Učenje BS i starodrevnih komentatora je bhedābhedavāda, istodobna različitost i nerazličitost sopstva i apsoluta. Śankara tumači sūtre kao da poučavaju monistički iluzionizam. On na dvije razine istine razlikuje niži brahman i najviši brahman. Na ovaj je način mogao pomiriti sva upanišadska učenja, bilo da naginjuteizmu ili monizmu. Važna je i hermeneutička rasprava Śankarina s bhedābhedavādinom Bhartrprapañcom o prirodi znanja i djelovanja, odnosno prvenstvu upanišadi koje se bave znanjem brahmana nad brāhmanama koje se bave obrednim djelovanjem.This article presents some traces of early vedāntic interpretations of Maitreyī-brāhmana, one of the most famous parts of Brhadāranyaka-upanishad, in the Brahma-sūtras, the fundamental work of the philosophical school vedānta. Topic under discussion conveys the exegesis of Maitreyī-brāhmana according to three ancient commentators, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Kāśakrtsna. The purpose of this article is to show the methods of interpretation of upanishadic passages in different vedāntic schools. Also, we can see some techniques of interpretation taken from pūrva-mīmāmsa, the school of vedic interpretation, and adapted for upanishadic interpretation. The article shows how the main philosophical standpoint on the relation of the self and the absolute serves the exegetical purposes. So the standpoint of the BS and the ancient commentators is bhedābhedavāda, teaching of both the difference and non-difference between the self and the absolute, like sparks and fire. Śankara interprets the sūtras as teaching monistic illusionism. He also differentiates between the two levels of truth and accordingly the lower brahman and the highest brahman. In this way he was able to reconcile all upanishadic passages, whether they inclined to theism or monism. There is also an important hermeneutical discussion of Śankara with bhedābhedavādin Bhartrprapañca on the nature of knowledge and action and priority of the upanishads, part of sacred canon dealing with knowledge of brahman over the brāhmanas, which are dealing with ritual action. (shrink)

Od svih suvremenika Praxisa, koji je nesumnjivo najsnažnija pojava u novijoj povijesti filozofije i kulture na ovim prostorima, Blaženku Despot treba smatrati onom izuzetnom osobnošću koja, ni formalno niti konceptualno, ne pripada tom krugu, iako s njime dijeli problematsku suštinu prijepora kojim se svi oni u to doba intenzivno bave. Ona, kao i Praxis , oštro i bespoštedno kritizira »socijalističku zbilju«, ali pritom ide dalje, propitujući i promišljajući odnos misaonih, idejnih izvora na koje se »realizacija socijalističke zbilje« poziva, kao i (...) kvalitetu, domet i istinitost same realizacije. Tako su u žarište njezinih preokupacija postavljeni misaoni korpus Hegela i Marxa, njihove razlike i istovjetnosti, granice i nepotpunosti u odnosu na povijesnu zakrivljenost našeg vremena. Poduzimajući filozofsku analizu tzv. društvenih pojava ona poduzima suočavanje »socijalističke stvarnosti« s idejama njezinih marksističkih uzora. Stoga poduzima »ponovno čitanje Hegela«, koje znači i ponovno čitanje Marxa, naročito na onim mjestima na kojima ih je »socijalistička stvarnost«, kao i cjelokupna povijest, potpuno demantirala, a to je područje humanističkog dometa emancipacije žena. Otvarajući među prvima u nas upravo ovo teorijsko-filozofsko polje, Blaženka Despot slijedi svjetske trendove teorije i filozofije feminizma, u čemu je ostavila ne samo neizbrisivi trag doprinosu produbljavanja filozofije slobode nego je u nas postavila temelje feminističke filozofije.Blaženka Despot should be regarded as an extraordinary person among all Praxis’s contemporaries, because she was concerned with the same themes, although she did not belong to the group, neither formally nor conceptually. She, like the philosophers closely associated with Praxis , harshly and without pity criticizes the so called “socialist reality”, but goes on even further to examine and rethink the conceptual foundations on which it is based, as well as its quality, range and truthfulness of the whole project. Therefore, Hegel and Marx lie in the very centre of her interest – the differences and similarities between them, and their limitations and insufficiencies regarding the historical context of our times. Putting effort into the philosophical analysis of social phenomena , she puts “socialist reality” and the ideas of its Marxist role-models side by side. Thus, she “re-reads Hegel”, and thereby also unavoidably Marx, in the context completely neglected by both “socialist reality” and the entire history of ideas – in the context of humanistic emancipation of women. Opening that theoretic-philosophical field of investigation, Blaženka Despot follows the world trends in theory, including also dealing with the philosophy of feminism, where she left an indelible mark concerning her efforts to deepen the “philosophy of freedom” and to establish feminist philosophy in Croatia. (shrink)

Dva pjesnika, hrvatski Nikola Šop i slovenski Gregor Strniša – premda ih razlikuje pripadnost epohi i miljeu – imaju zajednički nazivnik: obojica su metafizički pjesnici i, u toj pjesničkoj dimenziji, obojica se bave relativnošću vremena i prostora, to jest vremenitošću i bezvremenošću, prostornošću i besprostornošću, koje nisu ništa drugo nego sinonimi za pojmove ljudskog i božanskog. Obojicu pjesnika dubinski motiviratraganje za Posljednjom Istinom. U Šopa ta potreba vuče porijeklo iz njegove osobne tragedije, iz strahovite nesreće koja ga je onesposobila na (...) gotovo trideset godina života i duboko mu obilježila vjeru, nagnavši ga da traga za Bogom novim putovima teologije, filozofije i kozmologije. Strnišin je pristup metafizičkom problemu kontroliraniji, nastaje iz potreba racionalnog i intelektualnog karaktera. To je bjelodano i iz načina na koji se dva pjesnika približavaju Einsteinovoj misli: Šop se približava Einsteinovu modelu svemira isključivo putem vlastite pjesničke intuicije, dok ga Strniša otvoreno preispituje u svojoj prozi, poput one naslovljene Relativnostna pesnitev, u kojoj se prvenstveno usredotočuje na problem pjesničkoga stvaranja.Although the epochs and milieus they belong to differ, the Croatian poet Nikola Šop and the Slovenian poet Gregor Strniša share a common denominator – both are metaphysical poets and, in respect of this poetic dimension, they both tackle the relativity of time and space, i.e. temporality and timelessness, and spatiality and spacelessness, which are nothing other than synonyms for the concepts of human and divine. Both poets are profoundly motivated by the search for the Final Truth. In Šop this need stems from his personal tragedy, from a horrendous accident that disabled him for almost three decades and deeply impressed his faith, having driven him to seek God on the paths of theology, philosophy and cosmology. On the other hand, Strniša’s approach to metaphysical issues is somewhat more controlled, and issues from the needs of his rational and intellectual character. This is also evident in the fashion in which the two poets approach Einstein’s thought: Šop nears Einstein’s model of universe exclusively through his own poetic intuition, while Strniša openly reflects on it in his prose, as in his Relativnostna pesnitev , in which he primarily centres on the problem of poetic creation. (shrink)

How should one live in order to live well? What are the defining characteristics of the good life? These questions - the perennial concern of classical scholars - have in the last 25 years become the subject of debates in contemporary social and political theory as well. Foucault, Taylor, Kekes, Cottingham and Nehamas have all stressed the importance of the?art of living? or?caring for the self? in light of contemporary political and economic developments. This article, as my contribution to the (...) debate, offers the analysis of two models of the?good life?: the one as presented by Plato and embodied in the literary character of Socrates, and the other as presented by Nikos Kazantzakis and embodied in the literary figure of Zorba. In general terms, Socrates advocates the rule of reason and the denigration and submission of the bodily Eros, while Zorba remains suspicious of the mind -?a careful little shopkeeper? - and stresses the significance of bodily experiences as ways of linking oneself with the rest of the universe. Hence in the article I formulate an ethic of sensual Eros by focusing on Zorba?s way of life and contrast it to the Socratic ethics. I conclude that the concern and respect for the body, for the house in which Eros dwells, is the necessary a priori for the living of the good life. This way of life is not one that rejects reason altogether, but what it does reject is the desire of reason to monopolize the individual?s life processes. Kako treba da se zivi da bi se zivjelo dobro? Sto su sustinske osobine dobrog zivota? Ova pitanja - kojima se teoreticari grcko-rimske filozofije vec odavno bave - postala su u poslednjih 25 godina i predmet debata u savremenoj drustvenoj i politickoj teoriji. Fuko, Tejlor, Kekes, Kotingham i Nehamas samo su najvazniji od onih koji su insistirali na vaznosti?umjetnosti zivljenja? ili?brige za sopstvo? u svjetlu savremenih politickih i ekonomskih desavanja. Ovaj rad, moj doprinos toj debati, nudi analizu dva modela?dobrog zivota?: jedan koji je predstavio Platon kroz svog knjizevnog junaka Sokrata i drugi koji je predstavio Nikos Kazantzakis kroz svog knjizevnog junaka Zorbu. Opste govoreci, Sokrat zastupa vladavinu razuma i unizavanje i potcinjenost tjelesnog Erosa, dok je Zorba pun sumnji vis-?-vis razuma -?tog pazljivog sitnog trgovca? - i instistira na vaznosti tjelesnih iskustava kao nacina za povezivanje sopstva sa ostatkom svijeta. Stoga u radu formulisem etiku sensualnog Erosa baziranu na Zorbinom nacinu zivota i uporedjujem je za Sokratovom etikom. Moj zakljucak je da je briga i uvazavanje tijela, kao kuce u kojoj Eros zivi, neophodan a priori za zivljenje dobrog zivota. Ovakav nacin zivota ne znaci odbacivanje razuma, ali znaci odbacivanje zelje razuma da monopolizuje sve zivotne procese pojedinca. (shrink)

Une éthique de la bio-médecine s'élabore depuis plus de vingt ans dans des institutions hospitalières, professionnelles ou politiques. Elle vise à protéger les droits de la personne face aux progrès de la techno-science. Elle est pluridisciplinaire et mêle aux chercheurs des penseurs de diverses familles d'esprit. Une aide à la décision est proposée aux praticiens par plusieurs méthodes : les « conférences de consensus » entre experts, les « protocoles » de soins, les « arbres décisionnels » qui connectent toutes (...) les hypothèses possibles et leurs issues prévisibles, l'évaluation médico-économique des coûts et de l'utilité des soins. L'éthique clinique qui commence à être intégrée aux études médicales s'intéresse aux décisions prises, ou à prendre, au chevet du malade. Des méthodes d'analyse de ces cas ont été mises au point, pour tenir compte, notamment, de la situation singulière, physique, mentale, sociale du patient et des modalités de l'expression de sa volonté. Ces analyses et prospectives font appel, entre autres spécialistes, au concours d’«- éthiciens », représentants des diverses « valeurs » spirituelles reconnues dans la société, qui sont souvent interrogés sur le fondement des décisions éthiques, et c'est alors que la théologie a son mot à dire.A biomedical ethics bas been developing for over twenty years in hospitals, professional groups and political committies. It’s goal is to protect an individual’s rights in face of techno-scientific progress. It is pluri-disciplinary and mixes groups of different intellectual tendencies with those wbo do research. Help in making decisions is given to practitioners by many metbods : “consensus conferences”between experts, treatment “protoco1s”, “decision trees” that connect all possible hypotheses and their foreseeable results, medico economical evaluation of the costs and utility of the treatments. Clinical ethics, which is beginning to be integrated into medical studies, concerns decisions already made or to be made by the bedside of the patient. Analytical methods of these cases bave been perfected to take into account the patient's special physical, mental, and social conditions, as well as his metbods of expressing his will. These analyses and their trends call upon representatives of diverse spiritual “values” recognized in society, among other specialists, at the gatherings of “ethicians“ wbo are often questioned about the basis of ethical decisions. This is wben theology has something to say. (shrink)

Stajn Rokan, norveski sociolog koji se bavio procesima nastanka drzava, nacija i demokratije u Evropi, ostavio je za sobom mnostvo pojedinacnih radova u kojima je pokusao da razvije svoj makro model politickog razvoja Evrope. Cilj mu je bio da na osnovu razlicitih istorijskih procesa, koji su uticali na stvaranje drzava i nacija, kao i na demokratizaciju, objasni mnogostranost evropskih drzava. Njegov pristup je, pri tome, antideterministicki i sirok, po cemu se uostalom njegova teorija i razlikuje od vecine drugih koje se (...) takodje bave procesima nastanka drzava i nacija. Zbog te svoje kompleksnosti se Rokanova teorija cini pogodnom za istorijsku komparativnu makrosociologiju kao i za analizu dugorocnih razvojnih puteva. Ovaj clanak ce u prvom delu prikazati Rokanovo shvatanje teorije u nacelu. U drugom delu ce se prikazati s?ma teorija, njene varijable i dimenzije. (shrink)

Slobodno vrijeme i sport su bitne i međusobno povezane pojave današnjice, koje pred misao i etiku postavljaju mnoga pitanja i nude odgovore relevantne za izbor puta kojim ćemo ići, jer usmjeravaju ljudske težnje i djelovanje. Sport je postao vrlo važan fenomen, te se njime bave filosofija i još više etika, koja u njemu ne otkriva samo negativnosti, nego i vrlo važne elemente suvremenog života. Sport je značajan za etičko mišljenje u dvama područjima – u bioetici, kao zaštiti i unapređenju življenja, (...) i u kulturi – kojoj doprinosi svojom bîti, praksom i duhovnim i moralnim vrijednostima.Free time and sport are substantial and interconnected phenomena of today. They pose many questions for thought and ethics offering answers relevant for making a choice of the direction of human aspirations and acts. Sport has become very considerable phenomenon, so philosophy and moreover ethics attend to it, discovering in the sport not only negative things, but also a very significant elements of recent life. Sport has a specific importance in ethical thought in two fields – bioethics, as a protection and development of living, and culture – to which sport contributes with its essence, its practice and its spiritual and moral values. (shrink)

Brojna su istraživanja potvrdila vezu između glazbenog obrazovanja i dobrobiti za opći razvoj djeteta. Glazbene aktivnosti koje stavljaju težište na ritam u nekim su se istraživanjima istakle kao sredstvo poticaja djetetovog razvoja u ne-glazbenim domenama. Rad se bavi ulogom temporalne dimenzije glazbe u glazbenom i općem razvoju djeteta. Iznose se dosadašnje spoznaje o percepciji, obradi i izvođenju glazbenog ritma, pulsa i metra te tijeku ritamskog razvoja djeteta. Daje se pregled istraživanja utjecaja glazbenih aktivnosti koje se temelje na ritmu na ne-glazbene (...) domene razvoja te se preporuča rani rad na ritmu. Ističe se potreba provođenja eksperimentalnih istraživanja koja bi rasvijetlila ulogu ritma u razvoju djeteta i modeli rada na ritmu primjenjivi u institucijama koje se bave djecom, uključujući i terapijske te rehabilitacijske ustanove. Numerous studies have confirmed the correlation between music education and child development. In some studies, musical activities based on rhythm have been highlighted as a means of stimulating children’s development in non-music domains. The paper deals with the role of the temporal dimension of music for both the musical and general development of the child. The text presents knowledge about the perception, processing, and performance of music rhythm, pulse, and meter, as well as the course of the rhythmic development of the child. An overview is provided of the impact of rhythm-based music activities on non-music developmental domains together with recommendation for early work on rhythm. We emphasized the need to conduct experimental research to shed light on the role of rhythm in the development of the child and the rhythmic models applicable in child care institutions, including therapeutic and rehabilitation institutions. (shrink)

Rad se bavi umiješanošću promatrača kao ograničenjem u racionalnom spoznavanju svijeta i otvaranjem prostora za druge oblike spoznaje. U velikoj mjeri ta se problematika tiče odnosa znanosti i vjere, pa se u uvodnom dijelu rada polazi od odnosa vjere i znanosti, a koji je kroz povijest prolazio kroz različite faze. U prvom poglavlju analiziraju se upravo etape kroz koje je prolazio odnos vjere, odnosno religije i znanosti: jedinstvo u srednjovjekovnoj sintezi, razilaženje i sukob, dijalog i komplementarnost. Za ostvarenje dijaloga između (...) vjere i znanosti ponajprije je zaslužan papa Pio XII. svojom enciklikom Humani generis . Ipak, najveći doprinos dijaloškom odnosu vjere i znanosti dao je papa Ivan Pavao II. koji je smatrao da jedna drugoj može biti od velike koristi te da samo dinamički odnos između teologije i znanosti može otkriti granice koje čuvaju cjelovitost obiju disciplina. Na jednak način, veliki doprinos uspostavi dijaloga vjere i znanosti dali su i znanstvenici, kako sa strane teološko-filozofske misli, tako i sa strane prirodoslovnih znanosti, osobito fizičari.U ovom radu se čini jedan iskorak u pogledu određenosti i konkretnog sadržaja granice koju znanosti ne mogu prijeći i preko koje se nalazi prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i za vjeru. Polazi se od stava da je za proučavanje bilo koga predmeta taj predmet potrebno odvojiti od promatrača, kako bi ga ovaj mogao podvrgnuti objektivnom proučavanju. Sam po sebi, taj je stav opće prihvaćen u svim znanostima i filozofiji, ali je suviše uopćen da bi eliminirao sve oblike umiješanosti i rafinirane pogreške pri zaključivanju.Pokazuje se da se u termodinamici i u Newtonovoj mehanici može točno definirati takvo stajalište promatrača, kojim je on potpuno odvojen od pojave koju promatra i iz kojega je u stanju da promatranu pojavu objektivno ispita. Takvo se stajalište onda količinski razlikuje od drugih stajališta s kojima bi bio »umiješan« u pojavu koju proučava. U znanostima u kojima se to može učiniti eksperimentalno se osnivaju, nalaze i koriste zakoni koji se mogu zvati »objektivnima«. No i u takvim znanostima ima oblika umiješanosti koji mogu ostati skriveni desetljećima i duže. U radu se ukazuje na tri takva oblika diskretne umiješanosti u termodinamici i mehanici. Za znanosti u kojima se točno količinsko razdvajanje objektivnih i umiješanih stajališta promatrača nije moglo učiniti, ili se načelno ne može učiniti, ne može biti ni sigurnosti od umiješanosti i time od rafiniranih pogrešaka u racionalnom zaključivanju. Odatle se sa znatnom heurističkom snagom izvodi zaključak da se u područjima spoznaje kojima se bave znanosti i filozofija racionalnim zaključivanjem može učiniti rafinirana pogreška i da postoji prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i vjeru.The introductory part of the work deals with the relation between science and other forms of cognition which has undergone various phases throughout history. The first chapter analyses the stages through which the relation between faith, i.e. religion, and science has passed: unity in medieval synthesis, divergence and conflict, dialogue and complementarity. Much credit goes to Pope Pius XII with his encyclical Humani Generis for the development of dialogue between religion and science. However, Pope John Paul II made the greatest contribution to the dialogical relation between faith and science. He believed that their relation could be of great value and that only the dynamic relation between religion and science could discover the limits that hold the integrity of both disciplines. In the same way, scientists, those of the theological-philosophical thought as well as those of natural sciences, especially physicists, have made a great contribution to setting up a dialogue between religion and science.This work is a step forward regarding the determinateness and concrete content of the limit that sciences cannot cross and beyond which is a space for other forms of cognition and for faith. The starting point is a standpoint that if one wants to study a subject, that subject has to be set apart from the observer, so that it can be objectively studied. In itself, that standpoint has been universally accepted in all sciences and in philosophy too, but it is too generalized to eliminate all the forms of interference and refined errors when drawing conclusions.It is established that in thermodynamics and in Newton’s mechanics one can precisely define such a standpoint of the observer, by which he/she is completely detached from the phenomenon he/she is observing and from which he/she is able to research the observed phenomenon objectively. Such a standpoint quantitatively differs from other standpoints, by which he/she would be “involved” with the phenomenon he/she is investigating. In the sciences in which it is possible to do that, laws that can be called “objective” are experimentally passed and adopted. But even in such sciences there are forms of involvement that may remain hidden for decades and longer. This work points at such three forms of discrete involvement in thermodynamics and mechanics. For the sciences in which a precise quantitative separation between the observer’s objective and involved standpoints was not possible, or is not principally possible, there cannot be safety of involvement and consequently of refined errors in rational concluding. Hence, with considerable heuristic strength, the following conclusion is drawn: All sciences, including philosophy, should explicitly take and put forward a view that, by rational conclusions, it is possible to make a refined mistake in their areas of cognition and that there is room for other forms of cognition and for religion. (shrink)

Glavna je svrha ovoga članka analizati Argument kontinuiteta, jedan od najutjecajnijih argumenata na kojemu su utemeljeni moralna osuda znanstvenih i medicinskih praksi poput istraživanja i eksperimenata s embrijem, potpomognuta reprodukcije, pobačaja, terapeutskog kloniranja, itd. Prvo se daje vrlo kratko objašnjenje pristupa koji pripisuje status markirajućeg događaja fertilizaciji, identificirajući Argument kontinuiteta među drugim argumentacijama. Nadalje, pokušava se razdvojiti tri moguće interpretacije pojma kontinuiteta pretpostavljenog u Argumentu kontinuiteta, te izdvojiti najuvjerljiviju filozofsku i znanstvenu interpretaciju postfertilizacijskog kontinuiteta. Naposljetku, tvrdim da iz filozofski i (...) znanstveno najprihvatljivije interpretacije ne slijedi: 1) da je fertilizacija nužna odrednica moralnog statusa; 2) da je fertilizacija najrazboritija odrednica moralnog statusa. Ukratko, ovaj članak ima dva cilja: I) pokazati da upravo taj argument ne povlači za sobom stajalište da su gore spomenute prakse moralno nedopustive; II) sugerirati da bi neke pragmatičke strategije koje se bave soritom-prouzročenim paradoksima mogle osigurati filozofijski i znanstveno primjeren okvir za alternativni pristup. (shrink)

Ovaj rad se bavi metodološkim aspektima obnovljenih pravno-filozofskih nastojanja da se preispita pojam međunarodnog prava. Posle kratkog osvrta na istoriju pravne filozofije i ključne tačke Hartovog i Kelzenovog pozitivističkog stanovišta, u radu se dalje ispituje na koji način se savremene pravne teorije, kako u pozitivističkoj, tako i u ne-pozitivističkoj tradiciji, bave međunarodnim pravom. Poslednji deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se skiciraju određene smernice za novi početak u filozofskoj obradi međunarodnog prava. Prvo, istorija rasprava u ovoj oblasti svedoči o tome da (...) su metodološki pravni teoretičari u pravu kada tvrde da nam utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg metoda pomaže u odgovoru na pitanje šta je pravo. Drugo, imajući na umu stalno promenjivu prirodu međunarodnog prava, odgovarajući metodološki pristup zahteva „evolucionarnu epistemologiju“ (D’Amato), koja teško da se može nazvati obeležjem analitičke jurisprudencije. Najzad, takva epistemologija je na kompleksan način povezana sa našim istraživanjem šta međunarodna pravda ili, bar, šta međunarodna „unutrašnja moralnost“ zahteva. (shrink)

Glazba ima važnu ulogu za adolescente jer se u tom životnom razdoblju oblikuju osobni i društveni identiteti, ali izgrađuju i glazbene preferencije. U okviru ovoga rada provedeno je online anketiranje koje je obuhvatilo 200 sudionika, odnosno učenika osnovnih općeobrazovnih škola iz pet hrvatskih županija u dobi od 13 i 14 godina. Cilj istraživanja bio je doznati glazbene preferencije učenika te utječu li sociodemografske varijable i nastava glazbe na njihove preferencije. Djevojčice su iskazale nešto veću sklonost prema svim ponuđenim vrstama glazbe, (...) a posebice prema popularnoj glazbi. Sudionici čiji se roditelji bave glazbom značajno su skloniji umjetničkoj i popularnoj glazbi. Kada je u pitanju mjesto življenja, značajne razlike uočene su kod sklonosti rock glazbi koja je značajno viša kod sudionika iz grada. Sudionici koji procjenjuju da postoji utjecaj nastave glazbe i oni koji kod kuće slušaju skladbe s nastave značajno češće izvještavaju o interesu za umjetničku glazbu. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju na potrebu većeg angažmana učitelja glazbe i roditelja u stjecanju glazbenih preferencija djece, posebice prema kvalitetnoj glazbi. Music plays an important role for adolescents since personal and social identities are formed during this period of life, but they also build musical preferences. Within this paper, an online survey was conducted, which included 200 respondents, i.e. primary school students from five Croatian counties aged 13 and 14. The aim of the research was to find out the musical preferences of students and whether sociodemographic variables and music teaching influence their preferences. The girls showed a slightly greater preference for all types of music offered, and especially for popular music. Respondents whose parents are involved in music are significantly more inclined to artistic and popular music. When it comes to place of residence, significant differences were observed in the preference for rock music, which is significantly higher among respondents from the city. Respondents who estimate that there is an impact of music teaching and those who listen to compositions from classes at home report an interest in art music significantly more often. The results of the research indicate the need for greater involvement of music teachers and parents in acquiring children’s musical preferences, especially towards quality music. (shrink)

Dans cet article l?auteur situe le sujet de sa recherche et donne un aper?u des th?ories dominantes qui examinent le processus de la transformation du champ acad?mique dans les pays ayant adh?r?? la D?claration de Bologne, aussi bien que des th?ories qui peuvent contribuer? expliquer l??tat actuel du champ de l?enseignement sup?rieur. L??laboration de ce sujet a pour son but principal la construction d?un instrument analytique ad?quat pour la conceptualisation et la recherche sur la r?forme du syst?me de l?enseignement sup?rieur. (...) Une attention particuli?re sera consacr?e? l?analyse du champ acad?mique en Serbie. U ovom clanku autorka daje obrazlozenje svoje istrazivacke teme i pregled dominantnih teorija koje se bave transformacijom akademskog polja u zemljama koje su se obavezale na primenu Bolonjske deklaracije, ali i teorija koje mogu doprineti objasnjenju aktuelnog stanja polja visokog obrazovanja. Glavni cilj realizacije ove teme jeste konstruisanje adekvatnog analitickog instrumenta za promisljanje i istrazivanje reforme sistema visokog obrazovanja. Posebna paznja bice posvecena analizi akademskog polja u Srbiji. (shrink)