A clarification of the role of the existential quantifier in russell's controversial 14.02. how should the existential quantifier be read? the starting point of the argument is one of the issues covered by woods. a look at russell's methods of deriving propositions from functions is a necessary preliminary. the first method involves substituting constants for variables, but the second involves the use of quantifiers. for russell's analysis of definite descriptions, it is preferable to read the existential quantifier as 'is sometimes (...) true' because this reveals the way in which 14.02 was intended to be a definition of 'exists' and also makes explicit russell's crucial use of functions in dispensing with definite descriptions as subjects of propositions. (shrink)

Ao afirmar que se pode simular a filosofia, mas não a eloqüência, Quintiliano destrói a problemática platônica da imitação (o que é de se imitar é bom, o inimitável é melhor ainda) e justifica a afirmação ao julgar o orador não por sua intenção, mas por seu ato.

Barbara Cassin, philosophe et philologue, directrice de recherche au CNRS a, notamment, dirigé le Vocabulaire européen des philosophies. Dictionnaire des intraduisibles . Elle explique, dans cet entretien, que les langues ne sont nullement interchangeables, comme l'a bien montré Humboldt au XIXe siècle : cette analyse s'applique tout autant aujourd'hui, à l'heure d'Internet et de Google. Il est donc aberrant et dangereux de faire du tout-à-l'anglais une panacée, sous prétexte qu'il s'agirait d'une solution à la fois plus simple, plus économique (...) et plus démocratique. C'est aberrant, car la pluralité des langues est un atout , de même que, par voie de conséquence, la traduction. C'est dangereux, car en cherchant à épurer les langues de leurs équivoques et la traduction de l'intraduisible, on appauvrit irrévocablement la pensée et l'on s'empêche par là même de comprendre le monde actuel dans toute sa diversité et donc de bénéficier de la mondialisation.Barbara Cassin, philosopher and philologist, director of research at CNRS, in particular, led the European Vocabulary of Philosophies. Untranslatable Dictionary . It explains in this interview, that languages ​​are not at all interchangeable, as clearly shown Humboldt in the nineteenth century   e: This analysis applies equally today, at the time of the Internet and Google . It is therefore absurd and dangerous to all-to-English panacea, under the pretext that this would be a solution to the simpler, cheaper and more democratic. This is absurd, because the multiplicity of languages ​​is an asset , as well as, consequently, translation. This is dangerous because trying to purify their ambiguous language and translating the untranslatable, is irrevocably impoverished thinking and we thus prevents an understanding of the contemporary world in all its diversity and therefore benefit from globalization. (shrink)

Le présent volume vient s’ajouter à la bibliographie déjà très abondante d’Ilaria Ramelli ; elle y aborde une nouvelle fois ses auteurs de prédilection, en particulier Origène et les Cappadociens, qu’elle rassemble sous l’étiquette d’ascétisme philosophique chrétien. L’auteur reprend ici sa méthode habituelle, qui procède par amalgames et répétitions, afin de faire à la fin admettre sa thèse, sans pour autant l’avoir proprement démontrée. L’ouvrage aborde cette fois la question de l’esclavage...

Este artigo tenta mostrar como o triunfo da ontologia sobre a sofística só é possível no momento em que, com Aristóteles, se rompe o vínculo entre ser e dizer, chave tanto da constituição da ciência do ser em Parmênides quanto da possibilidade de sua refutação pelos argumentos da " logologia" sofística.

Both Michel Foucault and Barbara Cassin address Aristotle’s thought and the 5th century BCE sources attributed to the rhetorician Gorgias in order to reconstruct the history of the strategic exclusion of the Sophistics from the Western philosophical tradition. They retrace the scene of the rhetoric agon that Aristotle engaged with Gorgias. Both theorists’ arguments illuminate that the sophist has formulated an original account of political theatricality by talking about the scenes of the logos.

Interpretar a passagem de Barbara Cassin da ontologia à logologia sofística, do gozo do ser ao gozo do corpo, exige uma secundariedade crítica, na via significante de uma feminilidade sofística. Trata-se de desconfinar o logos da idiotia do privado com seu gozo dito fora do corpo, o mais baixo grau de liberdade. Um desafio decolonial, desvio da relação sexual à relação modernidade/colonialidade, ambas furadas. Como estratégia, nem fórmula positiva e nem negativa, mas uma operação subtrativa. Literalmente, uma saída pelo (...) equívoco ab-senso ao plural das diferenças, prestigiando-se não a angústia, mas o riso. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What about the Billeter-Jullien Debate? And What Was It about? A Response to Thorsten Botz-BornsteinRalph WeberNo doubt Thorsten Botz-Bornstein is right to highlight that the debate of 2006 and 2007 (if indeed it can be called a debate1) between Jean François Billeter and François Jullien was particularly heated. It was to some extent a personal affair in that both protagonists overstepped the scholarly bounds set for an exchange of (...) arguments, the heat at times reaching the boiling point. Billeter reproached Jullien for no less than instrumentalizing China, fashioned as the absolute Other and instrumentalized for almost no other purpose than to continue a philosophical discourse established by Jullien himself, a discourse that became ever more auto-referential, furthering only the most dubious of ideological interests. In one passage, Billeter goes so far as to claim that, rather than allowing the “Chinese authors” their own voice and letting them develop their own arguments, in the end “it is always him [i.e. Jullien] who talks” (Billeter 2006a, p. 45). Regardless of just how personal Billeter’s opposition to Jullien was meant to be—and at least one commentator claims that beyond the polemical title the text offers a “rigorous argumentation” (Danjou 2006; cf. also Zufferey 2006)—Jullien certainly took it personally, asking himself in his riposte, Chemin faisant, just why Billeter was so angry at him (Jullien 2007, p. 137).His riposte is marketed on the title page in big letters as a “Réplique à ***,” which is explained by the series editors, Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin, in terms of the reaction to a splinter that more often than not swiftly removed is quickly forgotten but that occasionally provokes a considerable reflexive gesture, of just the kind that Jullien offers, thanks to ***. A quote by Foucault precedes the text itself, reading: “There are critiques to which one responds and others to which one gives a riposte. [End Page 228] Perhaps wrongly so, for why not similarly lend an ear that is attentive to incomprehension, to banality, to ignorance or to insincerity?” Only once, at the very beginning of the text, is Billeter’s name (by implication the subject either of incomprehension, banality, ignorance, insincerity, or a combination of all four) fully mentioned; thereafter only his initials, JFB, are used. Even until recently the practice of giving the silent treatment has persisted, as when Jullien in the interview with Martin and Spire simply observes “that the sinologists who criticize me … have themselves produced nothing since that critique—do you need names?” (Martin and Spire 2011, p. 209; italics in original), before referring the reader to the many books he has written since Chemin faisant. Needless to add, this point is premised on quantity trumping quality, which is at least slightly disconcerting given that Jullien’s works have been found as early as 1996 to be marked by “a great deal of overlapping if not outright repetition (or at least rewriting)” (Reding 1996, p. 162)—something that apparently still is the case in his many books “produced” since then.From one standpoint, Botz-Bornstein is also right in referring to the affair as mainly a French debate, involving a sizable number of participants and spanning a considerable period of time, from Billeter and Jullien’s 1989 and 1990 exchange in the pages of Études chinoises over how to read Wang Fuzhi (see Billeter 2006a, p. 37 n. 1); to several volumes on and in co-operative works with Jullien (Jullien and Marchaisse 2000, Marchaisse 2003, Cornaz and Marchaisse 2004, Chartier and Marchaisse 2005, Jousset 2006, and Serrurier and Bricout 2011); to the publication of the partisan Oser Construire: Pour Jullien (Chartier 2007) and Billeter’s answer to it (Billeter 2007); to the many discussions of Jullien that continue to take as their starting point the exchange with Billeter (cf. Keck 2009). The text by Martin and Spire, for instance, makes ample reference to the debate, as Botz-Bornstein mentions, and speaks out in favor of Jullien (Martin and Spire 2011, pp. 77–97). Yet, the debate is also the starting point for Jean Levi’s (2011) recent criticism of Jullien. Beyond the borders of France... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What about the Billeter-Jullien Debate? And What Was It about? A Response to Thorsten Botz-BornsteinRalph WeberNo doubt Thorsten Botz-Bornstein is right to highlight that the debate of 2006 and 2007 (if indeed it can be called a debate1) between Jean François Billeter and François Jullien was particularly heated. It was to some extent a personal affair in that both protagonists overstepped the scholarly bounds set for an exchange of (...) arguments, the heat at times reaching the boiling point. Billeter reproached Jullien for no less than instrumentalizing China, fashioned as the absolute Other and instrumentalized for almost no other purpose than to continue a philosophical discourse established by Jullien himself, a discourse that became ever more auto-referential, furthering only the most dubious of ideological interests. In one passage, Billeter goes so far as to claim that, rather than allowing the “Chinese authors” their own voice and letting them develop their own arguments, in the end “it is always him [i.e. Jullien] who talks” (Billeter 2006a, p. 45). Regardless of just how personal Billeter’s opposition to Jullien was meant to be—and at least one commentator claims that beyond the polemical title the text offers a “rigorous argumentation” (Danjou 2006; cf. also Zufferey 2006)—Jullien certainly took it personally, asking himself in his riposte, Chemin faisant, just why Billeter was so angry at him (Jullien 2007, p. 137).His riposte is marketed on the title page in big letters as a “Réplique à ***,” which is explained by the series editors, Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin, in terms of the reaction to a splinter that more often than not swiftly removed is quickly forgotten but that occasionally provokes a considerable reflexive gesture, of just the kind that Jullien offers, thanks to ***. A quote by Foucault precedes the text itself, reading: “There are critiques to which one responds and others to which one gives a riposte. [End Page 228] Perhaps wrongly so, for why not similarly lend an ear that is attentive to incomprehension, to banality, to ignorance or to insincerity?” Only once, at the very beginning of the text, is Billeter’s name (by implication the subject either of incomprehension, banality, ignorance, insincerity, or a combination of all four) fully mentioned; thereafter only his initials, JFB, are used. Even until recently the practice of giving the silent treatment has persisted, as when Jullien in the interview with Martin and Spire simply observes “that the sinologists who criticize me … have themselves produced nothing since that critique—do you need names?” (Martin and Spire 2011, p. 209; italics in original), before referring the reader to the many books he has written since Chemin faisant. Needless to add, this point is premised on quantity trumping quality, which is at least slightly disconcerting given that Jullien’s works have been found as early as 1996 to be marked by “a great deal of overlapping if not outright repetition (or at least rewriting)” (Reding 1996, p. 162)—something that apparently still is the case in his many books “produced” since then.From one standpoint, Botz-Bornstein is also right in referring to the affair as mainly a French debate, involving a sizable number of participants and spanning a considerable period of time, from Billeter and Jullien’s 1989 and 1990 exchange in the pages of Études chinoises over how to read Wang Fuzhi (see Billeter 2006a, p. 37 n. 1); to several volumes on and in co-operative works with Jullien (Jullien and Marchaisse 2000, Marchaisse 2003, Cornaz and Marchaisse 2004, Chartier and Marchaisse 2005, Jousset 2006, and Serrurier and Bricout 2011); to the publication of the partisan Oser Construire: Pour Jullien (Chartier 2007) and Billeter’s answer to it (Billeter 2007); to the many discussions of Jullien that continue to take as their starting point the exchange with Billeter (cf. Keck 2009). The text by Martin and Spire, for instance, makes ample reference to the debate, as Botz-Bornstein mentions, and speaks out in favor of Jullien (Martin and Spire 2011, pp. 77–97). Yet, the debate is also the starting point for Jean Levi’s (2011) recent criticism of Jullien. Beyond the borders of France... (shrink)

Alain Badiou est platonicien (plutôt platonicien), Barbara Cassin est sophiste (plutôt sophiste). Cela a-t-il quelque chose à voir avec le fait qu'il soit un homme et qu'elle soit une femme? Telle est la question que nous nous posons depuis longtemps. Depuis que nous nous connaissons en somme, et que nous avons commencé à travailler ensemble comme directeurs de collection. A un moment donné, nous avons pris cette question à bras-le-corps.0C'est venu, peut-être, d'une remarque à notre propos disant que, un (...) platonicien avec un(e) sophiste, cet attelage qui ne laissait rien échapper devenait pour de bon dangereux. Nous avons ri, et réfléchi. D'abord, nous avons échangé des lettres, jouant avec le plaisir d'une correspondance sporadique, parfois rauque, pendant trois ans. Au beau milieu de quoi nous avons décidé de faire un séminaire commun ailleurs, loin de nos bases : à Johns Hopkins.0On nous a obligés à répondre sans arrière-monde, Alain Badiou en mathématicien-platonicien, Barbara Cassin en philologue-sophiste. A bras-le-corps donc, mais encore latéralement comme on voit. Nous avons alors ressenti la nécessité d'exhiber les éléments clefs à quoi tiennent nos positions, ce qui philosophiquement nous tient. Puis nous avons déroulé les conséquences strictes de ces solidités quant à l'idée que nous nous faisons du rapport homme femme.0Au moment de conclure, nous nous sommes demandé ensemble pourquoi nous choisissions la Grèce. (shrink)

This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.

The archive produces a linear time that reaches towards ‘what could be’ by asserting ‘what has been’, providing us reassurance of our existence through the assertion of a reliably past past. But the Anthropocene is an era of uncontained material ramifications, where the past juts into the future and temporality warps as change accelerates unexpectedly. As an ecological and geologic epoch, documentation of the Anthropocene inherently has a relationship to natural history museums and archives. These institutions, however, troublingly rest on (...) what Elaine Graham calls ‘ontological hygiene’ – the separateness of the human subject from ‘nature’. The Anthropocene however, challenges the western post-Enlightenment binary of man vs. nature, as it (supposedly) naturalizes humans into an earth systems force. As such, documentation of this epoch might resist ontological sanitation. This article outlines an artistic research practice to create artefacts of the Anthropocene – one that invites material idiosyncrasies, objects-in-becoming, ephemerality, and decay. I suggest that artistic ‘anarchices’ prioritize process over objects, and resist linear and static representation in lieu of material, embodied and sensory artefacts. These include relational encounters with waste materials, reworked forms of ‘geology’, edible artefacts and multimedia works at landfills and feral sites. The anarchives are interpolated by a rejection of hegemonic logic, positivism and ‘objective’ truths about environmental phenomena; Situated, ambiguous and material knowledges are inwrought into the so-called Anthropocene (and any alternatives to this term). By focusing on waste as an analytical category, I explore some of the ontological breakdowns present in the Anthropocene and question how to unorder systems and disturb materiality. (shrink)

Whether viewed as unduly complex or necessarily ornate, Étienne Souriau’s written style accents the importance of placing artistic form in conversation with intellectual content. In seeking to better understand Souriau’s advocacy for a philosophy of instauration – the process through which an existence gains in existential formality – this essay examines how aesthetic tropes and devices order ontological meaning. First, it links Barbara Cassin’s case for sophistical practice to Souriau’s advocation for ontological multiplicity. The essay then reads the 1956 (...) essay “Of the Mode of Existence of the Work To-Be-Made” and Souriau’s adjacent work as consciously rhetorical and profoundly aesthetic attempts to recruit others to his philosophical commitments. This account further discerns an array of rhetorical devices (e.g. chiasmus) in Souriau’s work that function not merely to adorn description but rather to order an experience of the work-to-be-made. Attending to turns of language as contributing to reality necessarily raises questions of responsibility, so the essay’s then reconsiders philosophy’s long-standing charge of sophistic irresponsibility alongside Souriau’s skewing of agency and choice through instauration. The essay concludes by considering the implications of Souriau’s central concepts as filtered through sophistical practice as not incidental to philosophical aesthetics but a charge to philosophy to be responsible for promoting lesser existences in and across multiple modes. (shrink)

The risk and crisis communication process in public health emergencies (PHERCC, public health emergency risk and crisis communication) matrix, as proposed by Spitale, Germani, and Biller-Andorno (2...

Abstract In this essay, a new approach for the ethical study of emerging technology ethics will be presented, called anticipatory technology ethics (ATE). The ethics of emerging technology is the study of ethical issues at the R&D and introduction stage of technology development through anticipation of possible future devices, applications, and social consequences. I will argue that a major problem for its development is the problem of uncertainty, which can only be overcome through methodologically sound forecasting and futures studies. I (...) will then consider three contemporary approaches to the ethics of emerging technologies that use forecasting: ethical technology assessment, the techno-ethical scenarios approach and the ETICA approach, and I considered their strengths and weaknesses. Based on this critical study, I then present my own approach: ATE. ATE is a conceptually and methodologically rich approach for the ethical analysis of emerging technologies that incorporates a large variety of ethical principles, issues, objects and levels of analysis, and research aims. It is ready to be applied to contemporary and future emerging technologies. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-13 DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0141-7 Authors Philip A. E. Brey, Department of Philosophy, School of Behavioral Sciences, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands Journal NanoEthics Online ISSN 1871-4765 Print ISSN 1871-4757. (shrink)

In some young children brought by their parents for diagnosis of acute life-threatening events investigations suggested imposed apnoea as the cause rather than spontaneous occurrence. Covert video surveillance of the cot in which the baby was monitored allowed confirmation or rebuttal of this diagnosis. That parents were not informed of the video recording was essential for diagnosis and we assert ethically justifiable as the child was the patient to whom a predominant duty of care was owed. The procedure also avoids (...) the risk of separation of child from parent on inadequate information. (shrink)

The line of thought from which contemporary Social Science has come forth was occupied with problems of public policy in a way which has since become very much less prominent in the work of social scientists. The classic figures of social thought —Aristotle, Plato, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, Ricardo, Hobbes and Locke, Burke, Machiavelli and Hegel—were all involved in the consideration of the fundmental problems of policy from the point of view of the man (...) who had to exercise power and to make practical decisions. Even where they themselves lived in remoteness from practical affairs the clarification of the standards for the judgment and guidance of public policy was always close to the centre of their attention. The politician's problems, reduced to fundamentals, were their problems. The problem of maintaining order through the prince's exercise of power was the point of departure of classical political philosophy; it was extended by modern liberalism to the maintenance of liberty in a framework of order. Political philosophy was regarded by those who professed it, as a means of enlightening rulers—and citizens—as to the right ends and the approximate means. The great ancestor of modern empirical social research, Sir William Petty, who regarded his task as the quantitative matter-of-fact description of what existed, viewed his problem as set by the prince's need to safeguard and maximise his power. Early economic theory accepted the same task. Even after mercantalism gave way to liberalism, economic theory was still intended to be a guide to policy. (shrink)

When the editor invites comment on a response to an analysis of a criticism of a protocol already defended by the author in this journal, the issue is clearly contentious. I will comment briefly on Thomas's paper in this issue of the journal, and look at points of agreement as well as dissent.

The authors of this volume elucidate the remarkable role played by religion in the shaping and reshaping of narrative forms in antiquity and late antiquity in a variety of ways. This is particularly evident in ancient Jewish and Christian narrative, which is in the focus of most of the contributions, but also in some “pagan” novels such as that of Heliodorus, which is dealt with as well in the third part of the volume, both in an illuminating comparison with Christian (...) novels and in an inspiring rethinking of Heliodorus's relation to Neoplatonism. All of these essays, from different perspectives, illuminate the interplay between narrative and religion, and show how religious concerns and agendas shaped narrative forms in Judaism and early Christianity. A series of compelling and innovative articles, all based on fresh and often groundbreaking research by eminent specialists, is divided into three large sections: part one deals with ancient Jewish narrative, and part two with ancient Christian narrative, in particular gospels, acts, biographies, and martyrdoms, while part three offers a comparison with “pagan” narrative, and especially the religious novel of Heliodorus, both in terms of social perspectives and in terms of philosophical and religious agendas. Like the essays collected by Marília Futre Pinheiro, Judith Perkins, and Richard Pervo in 2013, which investigate the core role played by narratives in Christian and Jewish self-fashioning in the Roman Empire, the present volume fruitfully bridges the disciplinary gap between classical studies and ancient Jewish and Christian studies, offers new insights, and hopefully opens up new paths of inquiry. Contributions by (in alphabetical order): Cathryn Chew, Mark J. Edwards, Erich Gruen, Vincent Hunink, David Konstan, Karen King, Dennis MacDonald, Laura S. Nasrallah, Judith Perkins, Richard Pervo, Ilaria Ramelli, Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta, Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, and Lawrence Wills. (shrink)

Henry E. Allison presents a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . Allison pays special attention to the structure of the work and its historical and intellectual context. He argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy.

Disagreement is a pervasive feature of human life whose skeptical implications have been emphasized particularly by the ancient Pyrrhonists and by contemporary moral skeptics. Although the connection between disagreement and skepticism is also a focus of analysis in the emerging and burgeoning area of epistemology concerned with the significance of controversy, it has arguably not received the full attention it deserves. The present volume explores for the first time the possible skeptical consequences of disagreement in different areas and from different (...) perspectives, with an emphasis in the current debate over the epistemic impact of disagreement. The thirteen new essays collected here examine the Pyrrhonian approach to disagreement and its relevance to the present epistemological discussions of the topic; the relationship between disagreement and moral realism and antirealism; disagreement-based skeptical arguments in contemporary epistemology; and disagreement and the possibility of philosophical knowledge and justified belief. Given the ever-growing interest in both the significance of disagreement and the challenge of skepticism, this volume makes a new contribution by conjugating two important trends in current philosophical research. (shrink)

The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal (...) libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed. (shrink)