In the philosophy of art, one of the most important debates concerns the so-called ‘cognitive value’ of literature. The main question is phrased in various ways. Can literary narratives provide knowledge? Can readers learn from works of literature? Most of the discussants agree on an affirmative answer, but it is contested what the relevant notions of truth and knowledge are and whether this knowledge and learning influence aesthetic or literary value. The issue takes on a wider, not only philosophical, importance (...) as it is one of the central tenets of humanistic education that art and literature are valuable not only because the pleasure they afford. This paper offers a new line of argument in departing from propositional truth, arguing that literary narratives provide aesthetically significant knowledge, however, this knowledge cannot be captured in propositional form. My position depends crucially on Frank Jackson's influential knowledge argument. The paper describes a modified ‘What Mary Didn't Read’ case. In doing so, it is argued that the knowledge literary works provide should be understood as a type of experiential knowing of ‘what it is like’ analogous to what Mary acquires in the original case of seeing a new colour for the first time. (shrink)

According to the dominant theory of intentionalism, fiction and non-fiction are in a “mix-and-match” relationship with truth and falsity: both fiction and nonfiction can be either true or false. Intentionalists hold that fiction is a property of a narrative that is intended to elicit not belief but imagination or make-belief in virtue of the audience’s recognizing that such is the intention of the fiction-maker. They claim that in unlikely circumstances these fictions can turn out to be accidentally true. On the (...) contrary, I argue in this paper that fictionality and truth are incompatible. I distinguish narratives based on whether they contain invented characters or not, and offer respective sets of arguments to the effect that there is no case when a fiction is accidentally true. A narrative is either fiction or accidentally true but not both. (shrink)

BioShock Infinite is a piece of fiction that lets one peer into a world where this linearity seems overridden by a multiverse where all the possibilities exist. Stories are important for video games. Its story is one of the reasons BioShock Infinite resonates with audiences all around the world. The field of philosophy that deals with art is called aesthetics. If one think that it's even worth asking the question of whether BioShock Infinite is art or not, then one might (...) want to consider this: What is it we're asking about in this case? When we ask whether Infinite is art, we're asking about the experience of playing it. BioShock Infinite is still one of the greatest video game stories and worlds of all time. In this, it represents a big step towards artful video game design. BioShock succeeds in showing that the possibilities for artful storytelling are infinite. (shrink)

The interconnections between Nietzsche and phenomenology constitute an area that is surprisingly underexplored. Besides Nietzsche’s well-known influence on Heidegger, and Heidegger’s Nietzsche sitting on the throne of metaphysics, there is very little written about the topic. This is a strange lacuna, one likely explanation for which is the difficulty of such comparative work. For, as the editors of Nietzsche and Phenomenology, Élodie Boublil and Christine Daigle, state in their introduction, “there is not one Nietzsche confronting one phenomenology” . The multifarious (...) corpus of Nietzsche poses enough interpretive difficulties; however, the phenomenological movement to which Nietzsche is compared is itself .. (shrink)

Many of us read works of fiction passionately not only because of their entertainment value or for their aesthetic inventiveness but also because we feel that they enrich our understanding of ourselves and the world. This is where there seems to be an important resemblance to philosophy. A number of fictional works can be legitimately called “philosophical” because they are thought provoking about issues that works of philosophy explicitly deal with. However, as the hot debate concerning truth through literature or (...) literature’s cognitive value indicates, it is notoriously hard to pin down what it means to “enrich understanding” or what counts as “thought-provoking content.” Even if it is granted that literature... (shrink)

This study offers an overview of ‘the nationalities question’ in the Habsburg Empire, with special focus on its treatment by the Austrian social democrat, Otto Bauer, and the Hungarian ‘radical’ or ‘liberal socialist’, Oszkár Jászi. Analysing and comparing the writings of these intellectuals published between 1907 and 1918, this article shows how the contrasting legal and political contexts in Austria (Cisleithenia) and in Hungary (Transleithenia) led these authors to create contrasting alternative solutions to the problems posed by the multi-ethnic composition (...) of the Habsburg Empire. It is argued that these thinkers’ positions were fundamentally defined by Austria’s status as a ‘nationalities state’, Hungary’s identity as a nation-state, and the authors’ own affiliations with the dominant nationalities within their respective states. The article underscores the important temporal component at work in their respective pre-1918 assessments of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary and its effect on their stances on the reign of the Habsburgs. Whereas Bauer saw the Hungarian king and Austrian emperor Franz Joseph as a possible strong ally for the implementation of his ideas, Jászi viewed the acts of the Habsburg dynasty as alien to Hungarian interests and therefore as a source of potential danger. (shrink)

Dr. Laszlo’s hypothesis (2009) is in my opinion appealing on many levels. He proposes that phenomena of apparent transpersonal communication between human beings are due to the intermediary of information-carrying holograms in the reactive quantum vacuum produced by human brain activity. He also suggests that valid information regarding the world in general is available through the same mechanism, on the grounds that all material objects “excite the ground state of the [zero point] fi eld” and produce further such holograms. On (...) this hypothesis we are literally immersed in a sea of information, with the capacity for accessing that information as well as producing more of it by our own thought processes. (shrink)

This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in (...) the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self-defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the aporetic situation of the Bias Argument arises. (shrink)

It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to (...) show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict. (shrink)

This chapter argues that mental fictionalism can only be a successful account of our ordinary folk-psychological practices if it can in some way preserve its original function, namely its explanatory aspect. A too strong commitment to the explanatory role moves fictionalism unacceptably close to the realist or eliminativist interpretation of folk psychology. To avoid this, fictionalists must degrade or dispense with this explanatory role. This motivation behind the fictionalist movement seems to be rather similar to that of Sellars when he (...) came up with the Myth of Jones, his proto-theory of mental concepts. He was faced with the problem of preserving the explanatory status of mental concepts without turning them into proper theoretical entities. By introducing the Sellarsian proto-theory of concepts related to the mental and outlining its main points, this chapter aims to provide a critique of the two versions of mental fictionalism that are arguably the strongest: Adam Toon’s prop-oriented pretence theory and Tamás Demeter’s expressive storyism. (shrink)

The need to establish a research field within psychology didactics at secondary level has recently been voiced by several researchers internationally. An analysis of a Swedish case coming out of secondary level education in psychology presented here provides an illustration that complexity thinking – derived from complexity theory – is uniquely placed to consider and indicate possible solutions to challenges, described by researchers as central to the foundation of a new field. Subject-matter didactics is defined for the purpose of this (...) paper as a combination of general didactics and subject- matter content, and considering the international nature of research traditions coming out of psychology, the implications of the results presented here cannot be regarded as limited solely to national concerns. An on-line survey was sent to secondary schools in Sweden. Discussions and lectures along with teaching to the book – alternatively used as inspiration – emerged as central from the thematic analysis of the results, providing the first mapping of teaching practices in secondary level psychology in Sweden. An analysis, founded on complexity thinking – combined with a model enabling a delimitation of the scope of study – focused on time use and the importance placed on self-knowledge, along with the transformation of theory into practice. The former pointing to a teacher centred nested subsystem (e.g. asymmetric relations between teachers and students), the latter pointing to student centred nested subsystems coming out of embodied knowledge (e.g. students as node) where psychological perspectives are learnt through self-reflexion, case studies and everyday life experiences (turning theory to practice), implying a holistic approach. The analysis applied to the Swedish case provides an illustration of how complexity theory has the potential to address challenges at micro and macro level to the establishment of a new research field in psychology didactics and to indicate possible solutions. Psychologies high relevance to everyday life, multi-causality, perspective pluralism, dynamic systems character and scientific character, makes complexity thinking a relevant approach in the consideration of challenges to the establishment of a research field in didactics of psychology. (shrink)

In the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics, a simple direct proof of the Spin Geometry Theorem of Penrose is given; and the structure of a model of the ‘space of the quantum directions’, defined in terms of elementary SU-invariant observables of the quantum mechanical systems, is sketched.

The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. (...) The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil. (shrink)

The book aims to provide a comprehensive, new look at business ethics topics and models from a European perspective. Apart from theoretical arguments and empirical data, case studies and games are used to get closer to real life problematics of business. The book is written by leading business ethics professors of the Community of European Management Schools (CEMS). Chapters of the handbook first describe the central issue and the latest theories and practices. They then introduce new approaches and analyze real (...) world examples. Finally conclusions are provided, which include ethical warning signals, proposals for future research and suggested policy recommendations. (shrink)

The story of quantum probability theory and quantum logic begins with von Neumann’s recognition1, that quantum mechanics can be regarded as a kind of “probability theory”, if the subspace lattice L of the system’s Hilbert space H plays the role of event algebra and the ‘tr’-s play the role of probability distributions over these events. This idea had been completed in the Gleason theorem 2.

This paper proposes a specific approach to understanding the nature of technology that encompasses the entire field of technological praxis, from the making of primitive tools to using the Internet. In that approach, technology is a specific form of human agency that yields to (an imperfect) realization of human control over a technological situation—that is, a situation not governed to an end by natural constraints but by specific human aims. The components of such technological situations are a given collection of (...) natural or artificial beings, humans, human aims, and situation-bound tools. By performing technological situation analysis, the essential form of tool making, the complex system of relationships between science and technology, technological practices with and without machines, the finiteness or imperfectness of any technology, and engineering (i.e., the possibility of the creation of technological situations) can be considered. For a better characterization of the approach to technology, the paper also presents a comparison of other philosophies of technology. Following Feenberg’s comparative analysis, the so-called fundamental question of the philosophy of technology is formulated, its two sides are identified, and it is applied for clarification of our position within philosophy of technology. In our approach, all human praxis can be considered to be technological; more precisely, every human activity has a technological aspect or dimension. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenologicalsuccessionof experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny (...) this fact or should embracead hocand metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising. (shrink)

The spin geometry theorem of Penrose is extended from SU to E invariant elementary quantum mechanical systems. Using the natural decomposition of the total angular momentum into its spin and orbital parts, the distance between the centre-of-mass lines of the elementary subsystems of a classical composite system can be recovered from their relative orbital angular momenta by E-invariant classical observables. Motivated by this observation, an expression for the ‘empirical distance’ between the elementary subsystems of a composite quantum mechanical system, given (...) in terms of E-invariant quantum observables, is suggested. It is shown that, in the classical limit, this expression reproduces the a priori Euclidean distance between the subsystems, though at the quantum level it has a discrete character. ‘Empirical’ angles and 3-volume elements are also considered. (shrink)

I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But (...) in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore. (shrink)

This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the fault of the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. (...) In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them. (shrink)

A physical theory is a partially interpreted axiomatic formal system, where L is a formal language with some logical, mathematical and physical axioms, and with some derivation rules, and the semantics S is a relationship between the formulas of L and some states of affairs in the physical world. In our ordinary discourse, the formal system L is regarded as an abstract object or structure, the semantics S as something which involves the mental/conceptual realm. This view is of course incompatible (...) with physicalism. How can physical theory be accommodated in a purely physical ontology? The aim of this paper is to outline an account for meaning and truth of physical theory, within the philosophical framework spanned by three doctrines: physicalism, empiricism, and the formalist philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

An error in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which wrongly predicted the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers by 2035, fueled doubts about the authority, honesty and rigor of the IPCC as a leading institution in climate science and, correspondingly, raised questions about whether global warming is anything more than a hoax put forward by environmentalists. The late and confusing reaction of the IPCC to these allegations only worsened the matter. By comparing assessment reports issued by (...) the IPCC, this paper asks the question: ‘Why, despite extensive peer review, did the Himalayan glacier melting rate error get published?’ I chronicle exactly what happened, consider why it happened as it did, and show how these answers require us to rethink the concept of ‘peer review’ in scientific practice. I also identify several future directions for peer review if it wants to stay ahead of the game, bearing in mind the forthcoming IPCC Assessment Reports. (shrink)

Commitments of “getting to zero” or becoming a regenerative company are raising investor, customer, and employee expectations at a time when businesses are struggling just to reduce negative impacts. Executives are increasingly caught between wanting to build a better world and the reality of managing value‐add activities that continue to harm people and the environment.Businesses need to distinguish between three types of innovation impacts to maintain their credibility and legitimacy. The first is doing less harm, where the goal is to (...) minimize social wrongs and reduce ecological footprints. The second is incremental positive impact, where the goal is to increase prosperity, regenerate nature, and improve wellbeing through initiatives that are typically of limited scope. The third is system‐wide positive impact, where scalable business innovations have a discernible capacity to “move the needle” on social and global challenges such as climate change and social equity.This conceptual paper provides a framework for assessing business innovations by type of impact and the high‐leverage points needed to create desired change at the scale of the whole. (shrink)

Humanistic management is emerging as a response to the economistic paradigm prevalent in today’s business schools, corporations, and society. There are many compelling reasons why the economistic paradigm is becoming obsolete, and even dangerous, for business if it is to become an agent of world benefit. The purpose of this article is not to explain these reasons but rather to situate the transition to humanistic management in the context of multiple worldviews. We propose an historical sequence of worldviews each with (...) its own paradigmatic assumptions about what it means to be human and the nature of the world. We draw on converging insights between new science and ancient spiritual traditions to outline an emerging quantum worldview. We further submit that integrating elements of the quantum worldview into humanistic management strengthens it in ways that are essential to humankind’s ability to shift to full-spectrum flourishing, defined as a world in which people and all life thrive now and across future generations. (shrink)

This article focuses on the concept of worldviews, arguing that a change in managerial worldviews is the key lever for addressing the social and global challenges facing humanity. We draw from a new synthesis of science and spirituality, with the addition of “other ways of knowing” that go beyond rational-empirical analysis, to suggest that what we call Quantum Worldviews are capable of generating the prosocial and pro-environmental behavior consistent with humanistic management. Using the yin-yang symbol as a metaphor, we suggest (...) that a transformation in consciousness, at the level of the paradigmatic assumptions held by managers about the nature of reality, can be understood through adult development theory. We also go beyond the metaphor to propose a quantum worldview based on a more literal interpretation of quantum science to fundamentally re-conceptualize what it means to be human, drawing on quantum research that suggests ontological wholeness and interdependence of all. Quantum Worldviews can help leaders, and the various systems of which they are a part, transition to a new science-based consciousness - long intuited by indigenous and nonwestern spiritual leaders - of an interconnected and dynamically coherent world. We identify a variety of practices that give managers a direct experience of Oneness, changing who they are at the deepest level of self-concept. Our research suggests that only when using such practices, and in sufficient numbers, will business leaders become agents of world benefit with the collective influence to bring about meaningful solutions to climate change and other wicked problems—in other words, needed system transformation. (shrink)

The paper argues for the necessity of building up a philosophy of the Internet and proposes a version of it, an «Aristotelian» philosophy of the Internet. First, an overview of the recent trends in the Internet research is presented. This train of thoughts leads to a proposal of understanding the nature of the Internet in the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy i. e., to conceive the Internet as the Internet, as a totality of its all aspects, as a whole entity. (...) For this purpose, the Internet is explained in four (easily distinguishable, but obviously connected) contexts: we regard it as a system of technology, as an element of communication, as a cultural medium and as an independent organism. Based on these investigations we conclude that the Internet is the medium of a new mode of human existence created by late modern man; a mode that is built on earlier (i. e., natural, and social) spheres of existence and yet it is markedly different from them. We call this newly formed existence web-life. Finally using two enlightening cultural-historical analogies (the reformation of knowledge and the formation of web-life) several fundamental characteristics of the web-life is presented. (shrink)

Indigenous health is becoming a top priority globally. The aim is to ensure equal health opportunities, with a focus on Indigenous populations who have faced historical disparities. Effective health interventions in Indigenous communities must incorporate Indigenous knowledge, beliefs, and worldviews to be culturally appropriate.

First Published in 1971, Human Values and the Mind of Man examines how value questions have been treated in traditional theories of human nature. The book presents an interdisciplinary dialogue centred around the 'human mind'.

An introduction to the Synthese topical collection "Humeanisms".

Our main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach’s own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend (...) to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of ‘naturalism’ is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism—or, more appropriately, naturalisms—in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach’s naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of common-sense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions, it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as “a crusade.” By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-be-written narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular. (shrink)

Lakatos constructed his major contribution to the philosophy of science, the methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP), in the late sixties and early seventies in England, after he had already become estranged from the Popperian philosophy of science. In this paper, we attempt to show that the MSRP was motivated by his philosophical and political ideas from the forties and fifties in Hungary, when he was imbued with the communist ideology and was influenced by the philosophy of Georg Lukács. From (...) this point of view, the MSRP can be considered to be a special representation of Lakatos' earlier political values and practice in the field of history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

The worldwide development of the revolution in science and technology is still in its initial stage. However, the characteristics of a qualitatively higher stage are already becoming evident in the area of the development of the system of labor, and therefore systematic philosophical study on the basis of the available data is a pressing task. Theory plays a special role precisely in periods when a phenomenon is not yet evident in final form. It is especially then that an acute need (...) arises for scientifically foreseeing, in its major outlines, the course of its development in the future. Within the bounds of the present article we shall attempt to do this with respect to certain aspects of the process of interaction between man and nature. (shrink)

Adorno describes Bergson and Husserl as the proper originators of philosophical modernity. What is characteristic of the initiatives these thinkers take is, according to him, an essay in breaking out both from the philosophical systems of idealism and from neo-Kantian formalism. It is shown in the present paper that Adorno’s own project to elaborate a negative dialectics can be understood as a continuation, or re-enactment, of this Ausbruchsversuch of his great predecessors. Moreover, in one of his lecture courses given in (...) the early sixties of the last century, Adorno makes it clear that his main philosophical project is mediated by Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology. On the other side, however, the justification of a negative dialectics relies, to a large extent, on a criticism of Bergsonian intuitionism, as well of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology. The upshot of these conflicting tendencies in Adorno’s later philosophical work is a tragic feature, which, in the present paper, is exhibited and highlighted on the ground of an enquiry into the idea of a spiritual experience put forward by Adorno in one of his lecture courses from the sixties, as well as in the Introduction to his main philosophical work Negative Dialectics. (shrink)