Le present volume analyse, non plus en amont la definition kantienne de la science, du savoir, de la scientificite en general, mais cette fois en aval la place des divers savoirs dont Kant a pu traiter. Par une serie d'etudes consacrees a diverses sciences en contexte kantien, le present volume etudie comment Kant assigne a chaque science une unite ideale, une region ontique (un domaine d'objets), une methode, voire une epistemologie, ainsi qu'un mode historique de constitution et de progression propres, (...) avec le constant souci (issu du criticisme) de distinguer les sciences, de ne jamais confondre leurs limites. Ce volume revele ainsi un Kant, non pas seulement theoricien de la science, mais theoricien, voire praticien des sciences en leur pluralite. Kant y apparait comme etant lui-meme un Naturforscher, physicien, scientifique, savant dans les sciences de la nature au sens le plus large. Ce volume souligne l'apport de Kant a un grand nombre de sciences de son temps (mathematique, physique, chimie, biologienaissante, geographie physique, cosmologie, astronomie, mais aussi sciences qualifiees aujourd'hui de sciences de l'esprit ou de l'homme, comme anthropologie ou psychologie), comme en attestent les nombreux opuscules scientifiques que Kant consacre, de 1754 a 1794, a divers sujets de science physique ou d'histoire naturelle (seismes, volcans, marees, climats, vents, influence de la Lune sur la Terre, modification de la vitesse de rotation axiale de la Terre, meteores, cometes, etc.). (shrink)

Si Kant n’utilise presque jamais le terme « transcendantal » dans ses œuvres de philosophie morale, cela signifie-t-il que sa philosophie morale soit totalement dépourvue de dimension transcendantale? Il s’agit de savoir si la morale kantienne comprend seulement une métaphysique des mœurs et une simple critique de la raison pratique, ou si elle contient aussi une morale transcendantale, comme semble l’évoquer l’Opus postumum? Jusqu’où peut-on soutenir l’hypothèse d’une morale transcendantale chez Kant, sans contredire la définition donnée en 1781 dans l’Introduction (...) à la Critique de la raison pure, selon laquelle la philosophie transcendantale serait exclusivement spéculative et devrait par conséquent exclure hors d’elle le domaine moral, où se trouvent certes des concepts a priori, mais non encore des concepts purs (en quoi consiste le critère du transcendantal au sens propre)? (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 4 Seiten: 637-639.

Kurt Godel, the greatest logician of our time, startled the world of mathematics in 1931 with his Theorem of Undecidability, which showed that some statements in mathematics are inherently "undecidable." His work on the completeness of logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum theory brought him further worldwide fame. In this introductory volume, Raymond Smullyan, himself a well-known logician, guides the reader through the fascinating world of Godel's incompleteness theorems. The (...) level of presentation is suitable for anyone with a basic acquaintance with mathematical logic. As a clear, concise introduction to a difficult but essential subject, the book will appeal to mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists. (shrink)

La lectura kantiana sobre la obra de Descartes, antes que evidenciar un conocimiento detallado del planteamiento cartesiano, muestra los pretextos claros para que Kant realice precisiones a su sistema. ¿Cuál es el peso y el lugar del "yo pienso" en la filosofía kantiana?, ¿qué se puede derivar de la existencia de las cosas en relación con su conocimiento?, ¿cómo combina Kant el realismo empírico con el idealismo trascendental?, ¿cuáles son los límites del yo pienso trascendente, frente al yo pienso trascendental? (...) En este artículo, el análisis de las diferencias entre la Crítica de 1781 y la de 1787, pasando por los Prolegómenos de 1783, ofrece precisiones sobre las preocupaciones de Kant provocadas por autores como Descartes y, en menor medida, Berkeley. The Kantian reading of Descartes is the pretext for Kant to make clarifications on his system, rather than demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the Cartesian approach. What is the role of the proposition "I think" in the kantian Philosophy? Is it possible to derive the existence of things from their knowledge? Does Kant mix the empirical realism with the transcendental realism? Which are the limits of the transcendent "I think" in confrontation with the transcendental "I think"? In this article, it is analyze the differences between the two editions of the Critique of the Pure Reason and the Prolegomena to any future metaphysic in order to suggest how the disagreement between Kant and Descartes let him to be more accurate with his Philosophy. (shrink)

Goethe n'est pas seulement poete, dramaturge, romancier, artiste. Il est aussi philosophe et surtout philosophe de la nature. Il manifeste un interet constant pour des questions scientifiques variees (physique, theorie des couleurs, chimie, meteorologie, geologie, mineralogie, morphologie, botanique, zoologie) et influencera profondement la philosophie allemande de la nature des annees 1780-1830. Goethe est une reference incontournable pour la Naturphilosophie tant idealiste (Kant, Schelling, Hegel) que romantique (Holderlin, Novalis, Schlegel). Il est, selon l'historien de la philosophie Johann Hoffmeister, parmi la nebuleuse (...) heterogene des philosophes de la nature, comme " le Soleil au milieu des planetes ". Goethe meme considere ses ecrits scientifiques comme un volet majeur de son oeuvre, et dialogue avec d'eminents savants de son temps (Cuvier, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, les freres Humboldt). Sa Naturphilosophie articule une theorie de la connaissance a une redefinition de l'experience privilegiant le recours a l'intuition visuelle, ainsi que la recherche de " phenomenes originaires " (Urphanomene) et des metamorphoses auxquelles ils donnent lieu. Hegel louera dans la Naturphilosophie de Goethe " l'intuition pleine de sens [...] qui ordonne ce qui n'est que phenomene d'une maniere conforme a la suite interieure du concept ". Le present ouvrage eclaire ce Goethe Naturphilosoph fondateur d'une episteme intuitionniste, phenomeniste, voire phenomenologique, aux antipodes de la science physico-mathematique, quantitative et intellectuelle, de Descartes ou Newton et inaugurant un style original de comprehension des phenomenes naturels qui se joue des frontieres a la fois entre les disciplines scientifiques et entre la philosophie et son autre (science, litterature). (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage Kant, une passion française vient éclairer utilement les réceptions des kantismes français de 1795 à 1940. Travail méticuleux et d’ampleur considérable, il embrasse la quasi-totalité des lectures françaises de Kant durant près de 150 ans. L. Fedi rassemble ici une somme impressionnante de matériaux, d’ordinaire objet d’études éparses, souvent peu étudiés en France et seulement assez récemment, par exemple par Jean Bonnet, dans Dékantations. Fonctions idéologiques du kantism...

Bien que Heidegger ne soit l’auteur d’aucune philosophie de la nature au sens que Kant, Hegel ou Schelling donnèrent à cette expression, il définit néanmoins le philosopher, et plus largement tout logos, comme une pensée de la nature, faisant un avec la nature, voire s’identifiant à elle. Heidegger puise le sens de la nature comme uni-totalité des étants mondains, telle que la rassemble, la recueille et la sauvegarde le logos non seulement chez Aristote, mais encore et surtout chez Héraclite. Sa (...) philosophie est en effet hantée par sa lecture rémanente de la phusis d’Héraclite. La libre interprétation que Heidegger donne de la nature héraclitéenne (laquelle aime à se cacher), qu’elle soit ou non fidèle à la philologie et à la langue grecque archaïque, puise du moins son originalité dans la mise au jour d’un double processus de voilement-dévoilement, qui est à la fois celui du logos et celui de l’être en son rapport aux étants, c’est-à-dire le mouvement général même par lequel la nature se manifeste en se retirant. (shrink)

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...) the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?". (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next twenty (...) or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

One of our great behavioral scientists, the bestselling author of Behave, plumbs the depths of the science and philosophy of decision-making to mount a devastating case against free will, an argument with profound consequences Robert Sapolsky's Behave, his now classic account of why humans do good and why they do bad, pointed toward an unsettling conclusion: We may not grasp the precise marriage of nature and nurture that creates the physics and chemistry at the base of human behavior, but that (...) doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Now, in Determined, Sapolsky takes his argument all the way, mounting a brilliant (and in his inimitable way, delightful) full-frontal assault on the pleasant fantasy that there is some separate self telling our biology what to do. Determined offers a marvelous synthesis of what we know about how consciousness works-the tight weave between reason and emotion and between stimulus and response in the moment and over a life. One by one, Sapolsky tackles all the major arguments for free will and takes them out, cutting a path through the thickets of chaos and complexity science and quantum physics, as well as touching ground on some of the wilder shores of philosophy. He shows us that the history of medicine is in no small part the history of learning that fewer and fewer things are somebody's "fault"; for example, for centuries we thought seizures were a sign of demonic possession. Yet, as he acknowledges, it's very hard, and at times impossible, to uncouple from our zeal to judge others and to judge ourselves. Sapolsky applies the new understanding of life beyond free will to some of our most essential questions around punishment, morality, and living well together. By the end, Sapolsky argues that while living our daily lives recognizing that we have no free will is going to be monumentally difficult, doing so is not going to result in anarchy, pointlessness, and existential malaise. Instead, it will make for a much more humane world. (shrink)

At the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle attributed several strange-sounding theses to Plato. Generations of Plato scholars have assumed that these could not be found in the dialogues. In heated arguments, they have debated the significance of these claims, some arguing that they constituted an 'unwritten teaching' and others maintaining that Aristotle was mistaken in attributing them to Plato. In a prior book-length study on Plato's late ontology, Kenneth M. Sayre demonstrated that, despite differences in terminology, these claims correspond to (...) themes developed by Plato in the Parmenides and the Philebus. In this book, he shows how this correspondence can be extended to key, but previously obscure, passages in the Statesman. He also examines the interpretative consequences for other sections of that dialogue, particularly those concerned with the practice of dialectical inquiry. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

This book argues that Plato's Charmides presents a unitary but incomplete argument intended to lead its readers to substantive philosophical insights.

The third volume of the _Adagia_ (Proverbs) of the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus gives an introduction in German and a critical edition of the Latin text of the first half of the second thousand _Adages_.

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...) the HOT theory. A crucial feature of homomorphism theory is that it individuates and taxonomizes mental qualities independently of the way we're conscious of them, and indeed independently of our being conscious of them at all. So the theory accommodates the qualitative character not only of conscious sensations and perceptions, but also of those which fall outside our stream of consciousness. Rosenthal argues that, because this account of mental qualities makes no appeal to consciousness, it enables us to dispel such traditional quandaries as the alleged conceivability of undetectable quality inversion, and to disarm various apparent obstacles to explaining qualitative consciousness and understanding its nature. Six further essays build on the HOT theory to explain various important features of consciousness, among them the complex connections that hold in humans between consciousness and speech, the self-interpretative aspect of consciousness, and the compelling sense we have that consciousness is unified. Two of the essays, one an extended treatment of homomorphism theory, appear here for the first time. There is also a substantive introduction, which draws out the connections between the essays and highlights their implications. (shrink)

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

Much of the discussion since the Arthur case has centred round the rights of handicapped infants to medical treatment. Little has centred round the question of how far one person can rightly be required to sacrifice her life for another, when she has not been consulted beforehand. This may be due to the fact that most of the discussants are men, while nearly all the carers are women. This small study attempts to redress this balance by asking mothers who have (...) cared for 20 years, whether they felt it was worthwhile. (shrink)

Since 1900, debates about the justification of punishment have also been debates about the cause of crime. In the early twentieth century, the rehabilitative ideal of punishment viewed mental illness and dysfunction in individuals as the cause of crime. Starting in the 1970s, retributivism identified the immorality of human agents as the source of crime, which dovetailed well with the “tough-on-crime” political milieu of the 1980s and 1990s that produced mass incarceration. After surveying these historical trends, Wirts argues for a (...) social critical view that crime is best understood as a product of an unjust society, not faulty human beings. This view should take the lessons learned by the critiques of rehabilitation, however, and resist the tendency to reduce human beings to recipients of social services. (shrink)

One of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Hilary Putnam's involvement in philosophy spans philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ontology and epistemology and logic. This specially commissioned collection discusses his contribution to the realist and pragmatist debate. Hilary Putnam comments on the issues raised in each article, making it invaluable for any scholar of his work.