In Respect for Nature Paul W. Taylor argues that there is a moral obligation to respect all living things. I argue that there is no such obligation. Taylor presents three basic premises for his position. The first two are shown to be mistaken but not necessary for Taylor's argument. The third, that being a nonsentient teleological centre of life confers moral significance, while necessary, fails to be rationally compelling. I argue: (1) The relevant concept of teleology as readily applies to (...) inanimate objects as it does to nonsentient life forms. (2) The inanimate–nonsentient distinction (at the relevant molecular level) is founded upon a continuum which offes no basis sufficient to justify The Life Principle. (3) The concept of teleology, as used by Taylor, is too unclear and ill-founded to serve as the basis for a rationally compelling argument. (shrink)

Gewirth and hare claim amoralism is contrary to reason. Gewirth believes amoralism to be logically inconsistent. Hare believes amoralism to be imprudent and hence irrational. By defining the problem as one of amoralism rather than 'non'moralism, Gewirth and hare assume illegitimate moral presuppositions. I show their arguments fail by comparing their arguments to the arguments given by someone who accepts the language and presuppositions of magic. I suggest that what is wrong with amoralism is that it leads to immoralism. If (...) this is so, Morality ultimately must be based upon basic moral insights or intuitions. (shrink)

This almost self-contained introduction to higher recursion theory is essential reading for all researchers in the field.

This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self-respect, the social bases of self-respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self-respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice. I make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self-respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (...) (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self-respect and the social bases of self-respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self-respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self-respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self-respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians—but as central to reasonable social bases of self-respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens. (shrink)

In this issue of Philosophical Studies, Richard Arneson, Jonathan Quong and Robert Talisse contribute papers discussing The Order of Public Reason (OPR). All press what I call “agent-type challenges” to the project of OPR. In different ways they all focus on a type (or types) of moral (or sometimes not-so-moral) agent. Arneson presents a good person who is so concerned with doing the best thing she does not truly endorse social morality; Quong a bad person who rejects it and violates (...) the basic rights of others, and Talisse a morally ugly person, a hypocrite, who criticizes others for failing to do what he does not do. All suggest that OPR does not give a satisfying account of what we are to say to, or how we should act towards, such agents. In my response I highlight some core concerns of OPR, while also seeking to show that OPR does not say quite what they think it says, and it often leaves them room for saying what they would like to say about such agents. (shrink)

Initially found in population studies designed to discover a link between child abuse and population categories, risk has been institutionalized in British Columbia through the use of a risk assessment tool presumed to measure danger to particular children. Recruitment of the risk speech genre reflects a need for government child protection workers to clearly articulate which children are in need of protection from “risks as they really are” while avoiding the accusation of “intervening too much.” Moreover, risk assessment tools are (...) both audit systems and auditable systems connected through an audit chain. Auditors who represent potential blaming procedures track errors in risk valuation to specific decisions. This entrenches a separation between what we want to know about risk from what we want to do about risk. The apparently objective use of numeric values within risk assessments obscures the continuing role of subjective moral values in the practice of child protection. (shrink)

This brief supplement offers students a handy resource that contains codes of ethics for the various professional organizations. Available for packaging with this textbook at a nominal price.

Binding of antigen or lectin to the surface of a T lymphocyte initiates a complex sequence of events which result in both T cell proliferation and the acquisition of immunologic functions. This complex sequence of events is most likely programmed and precisely timed by a series of contingent gene activations in which one member of this series activates the next. The two most obvious examples of these stages are the set of genes activated when antigen interacts with the antigen receptor (...) and the set of genes activated when IL‐2 interacts with its receptor. However, it is likely that several other parallel pathways of gene activation are necessary to bring about T‐cell division. An example would be the antigen‐induced activation of the c‐myc gene, which in turn is likely to be involved in regulating an additional group of genes not directly controlled by either IL‐2 or antigen. A fundamental understanding of T‐lymphocyte activation necessitates identification of the factors involved in initiating each of these contingent levels of gene activation. (shrink)

A free markets needs ethical norms -- Moral maturity -- Ethics in business -- History of business values -- Factories, immigrants, and wealth -- Critics of capitalism -- Personal values and the firm -- Leaders, trust and watchdogs -- Globalization's impact on American values -- Future business values and sustainability.

This is the first comprehensive interpretive and critical analysis of the thought of one of America's foremost phiolosophers and psychologists- William James.

Cet article propose, à la lumière d’un exemple particulier – l’abandon de la croyance en l’existence du Père Noël –, de tester différents scénarios théoriques de la rupture cognitive. L’exemple choisi, en raison de ses spécificités, ne peut prétendre invalider un modèle ou en confirmer définitivement un autre, mais il souhaite être une contribution au débat sur la base d’un matériau empirique rarement réuni en cette matière. Les 142 entretiens mobilisés permettent d’appréhender dans le détail divers aspects de l’abandon de (...) cette croyance : est-elle le fait d’incohérences internes ? de dissonances externes ? d’une concurrence cognitive ? est-elle suivie d’une crise ?This article proposes – with reference to a specific example : the denial of the existence of Santa Claus – to test several theoretical scenarios of cognitive rupture. Owing to its specific nature, this example cannot hope to invalidate one model or to confirm another, once and for all. However, being based on an empirical and original survey, it could emerge as a contribution to the debate. The 142 interviews allow us to examine different visions of the denial of this belief : is it the consequence of an internal disjuncture ? Of external dissonances ? Of cognitive competition ? Will it lead to a crisis ? (shrink)

A central theme in F. A. Hayek’s work is the contrast between principles and expediency, and the insistence that governments follow abstract general principles rather than pursue apparently expedient social and economic policies that seek to make us better off.2 This is a radical and striking thesis, especially from an economist: governments should abjure the pursuit of social and economic policies that aim to improve welfare and, instead, adhere to moral principles. In this chapter I defend this radical claim. I (...) begin by explicating and defending Hayek’s argument against the pursuit of expediency based on his analysis of economic and social complexity. I then turn to a rather more critical examination of his evolutionary account of moral principles. (shrink)

This article is a response to criticisms of my book on Karl Marx’s Theory of History which were made by four authors in last December’s number of Analyse & Kritik. After clarifying (section 2) an ambiguity in an argument for historical materialism which is presented in the book, I contend (3-5), against objections raised by Philippe Van Parijs, that historical materialism is consistent only if it explains production relations functionally, by reference to their propensity to develop the productive forces. Next (...) (6-8) I address and rebut the views of Wal Suchting and Milton Fisk, who both think that the role of class struggle in historical materialism is larger than the one I assign to it. Finally (9-12) I try to vindicate the doctrine of base and superstructure proposed in my book against the skepticism of Steven Lukes. (shrink)