Brentano’s views on psychology influenced the way philosophy was made at the beginning of the 20th century. But did this influence spread as far as to give place to Freud’s revolutionary discovery of the psychoanalytical unconscious? There are reasons to believe that Brentano had a profound influence on Freud. An attentive analysis of Freud’s vocabulary as well as his arguments against “philosophical” objections supports this point rather convincingly. However, Freud was not a philosopher and Brentano’s historical influence does not suffice (...) to transform the Freudian unconscious in a philosophical concept. It is the purpose of this paper to sketch a way to make a philosophical use of Freud’s unconscious by reconstructing the dialogue between Brentano and Freud on a conceptual level. Despite the explicit critique of the unconscious that we find in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, I show that Freud never truly opposed Brentano. He rather took Brentano’s descriptive psychology a step further: he introduced a dynamic component to the analysis of the psyche that is complementary to Brentano’s descriptive psychology and could be considered a type of genetic psychology. (shrink)

This paper aims to show how Husserl’s concept of intentionality detaches itself from the background of a thorough and recurrent argument that Husserl makes against psychologism. Noting that the concept of intentionality was first recovered by Brentano’s psychology, it seemed to us important to show how Husserl’s intentionality, as it is conceived in the Logical Investigations, distinguishes itself from the “intentional inexistence” that Brentano describes in his Psychology from an Empirical Stand­point. Showing which parts of Brentano’s psychology were rejected and (...) which were maintained in Husserl’s theory is indeed the first concern of those who intend to study the phenomenological concept of intentionality. (shrink)

L’objectif de Bolzano, dans la Wissenschaftslehre, est d’exposer les conditions générales de la constitution du domaine des sciences particulières comme découpage à l’intérieur du domaine plus général des vérités en soi. Ce qui intéresse plus précisément Bolzano, c’est la manière dont chacune de ces sciences particulières doit se rapporter à son domaine. Dans cette perspective, le concept de représentation...

Adrian Paul Iliescu, Solitude and the Birth of Modernity Ed. Cris, Bucuresti, 1999, 120 p.

Two theories of subjectivity are born with the twentieth century: Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis. Though sharing the same object, their paths never cross. In order to understand their relation, we have to uncover their common source: nineteenth century philosophical psychology.

Le problème central des Recherches logiques est de déterminer le rapport entre deux types d’actes : les actes de signification et les actes d’in­tuition (perception et imagination), donc entre d’un part des actes dont les objets sont de l’ordre du langage et, d’autre part, les actes qui « accèdent » à la réalité, dans lesquels l’objet réel est présent lui-même. Ce rapport est introduit dans la I re R echerche logique sous le nom de « remplissement » mais sa vraie (...) nature deviendra claire seulement dans la VI e R echerche logique . Le remplissement sera alors la synthèse d’un acte de signification et d’un acte d’intuition visant un même objet. Ce modèle d’une intention vide qui se remplit par la suite pose cependant certains problèmes. Premièrement, les significations peuvent-elles jouer le rôle d’objets et, si oui, quelle est la nature de ceux-ci ? Deuxièmement, peut-on vraiment isoler des intentions de signification, dont l’objet ne serait ni réel (comme dans la perception) ni même possible (comme dans l’imagination), mais d’une tout autre nature ? Puisqu’une imagination peut aussi jouer le rôle d’intuition remplissante, toute intention de signification doit se remplir (aboutir à un objet réel ou, au moins, possible), sans quoi elle ne serait pas une signification du tout, elle n’aurait aucun sens. Enfin, si nous acceptons cette thèse de l’universalité du remplissement, ou au moins de sa possibilité, comment penser le cas des objets idéaux, dont le remplissement ne va pas de soi ? (shrink)

En 1894 Twardowski et Husserl exposent leurs positions divergentes concernant les objets intentionnels tels qu’ils sont introduits par la psychologie brentanienne. Alors que, selon Twardowski, ces objets sont en un certain sens immanents à l’acte de la conscience, Husserl insiste sur le fait que ce n’est rien d’autre que l’objet réel lui-même qui devient intentionnel en tant que visé par un tel acte. Derrière cette controverse se cache, d’ailleurs, la question cruciale de savoir comment penser le passage de la conscience (...) au monde, dont la réponse se trouve dans le concept d’intentionnalité. (shrink)

Les objectifs des Recherches logiques 1 s?inscrivent dans le contexte plus large d?une controverse concernant la possibilité d?une connaissance indépendante du sujet connaissant. Il s?agit de ce qui a été connu par la suite sous le nom de « critique du psychologisme ». Husserl veut montrer dans les Recherches logiques que la façon dont on ordonne les objets dans la connaissance, selon des relations porteuses de valeur de vérité, ne surgit pas de l?expérience particulière que l?on en fait. La connaissance (...) n?est pas la création d?un sujet, ni d?une culture : elle a, au contraire, un caractère absolu. C?est précisément pour soutenir cette position que Husserl introduit un nouveau concept d?intentionnalité qui se distingue des autres concepts présents à l?époque, notamment dans l?école de Franz Brentano, par trois points essentiels. Premièrement, une des conditions essentielles de l?inten­tionnalité husserlienne est que l?objet intentionnel soit transcendant, c?est-à-dire qu?il ne dépende pas de la production effective de l?acte. Deuxième­ment, le contenu (la teneur) de l?acte doit être conçu(e), à la suite de Bolzano, sous la forme d?une signification idéale, toujours identique dans tous les actes du même type, et non pas sous celle d?une image surgissant dans le psychique du sujet individuel, vouée à être chaque fois différente, en fonction de l?expérience personnelle de ce sujet. Et. (shrink)

Ce travail porte sur la question du remplissement des visées d’objets idéaux. Dans la VI e Recherche logique Husserl soulève cette question en introduisant un nouveau concept : le concept d’intuition catégoriale. La connaissance des objets idéaux passe selon Husserl par un remplissement qui se réalise au moyen d’une intuition particulière, dans laquelle l’objet idéal se donne en personne, et qui s’oppose à l’intuition sensible. Dans quelle mesure une telle intuition est-elle possible ? Qu’est-ce qui est à proprement parler intuitionné (...) en elle et comment cette intuition se rapporte-t-elle aux intuitions sensibles ? Telles sont les principales questions que je soulèverai dans cette étude. Ce travail me permettra ensuite de formuler un diagnostic sur les tensions qui persistent dans les Recherches logiques , et qui ne seront résolues que par la réduction transcendantale. (shrink)

Dans sa Psychologie du point de vue empirique Brentano fonde le caractère scientifique de la psychologie sur le geste qui délimite le domaine particulier de cette science aux seuls phénomènes psychiques, en excluant les phénomènes physiques. La distinction entre ces deux types de phénomènes devient ainsi essentielle pour le projet brentanien d’une psychologie scientifique. L’objectif de ce travail est de montrer d’une part que la critique que Husserl fait à la fin de ses Recherches logiques de la distinction brentanienne entre (...) phénomènes psychiques et phénomènes physiques ne tient pas compte entièrement de la finesse de la théorie brentanienne des phénomènes physiques. Il s’agira cependant, par la suite de montrer les difficultés qui découlent précisément de cette conception brentanienne complexe des phénomènes physiques, en particulier ceux qui se présentent sous la forme des sensations. Nous montrerons que la théorie brentanienne des sensations à l’époque de sa Psychologie donne à ces phénomènes un caractère double, à la fois physique et psychique, et met ainsi en danger le projet même de délimiter définitivement le domaine de la psychologie aux seuls phénomènes psychiques. (shrink)

Le concept d?intentionnalité, on le sait bien, n?a pas été inventé par Edmund Husserl. Non seulement il s?agit d?un concept médiéval, mais son utilisation moderne est l?initiative de Franz Brentano et non pas de Husserl. Toute étude sérieuse qui a la prétention d?expliquer l?intentionnalité husser­lienne doit donc, avant tout, se donner la tâche d?expliquer en quoi consiste l?originalité du concept husserlien d?intentionnalité. En d?autres termes, si nous voulons comprendre ce qu?est, pour Husserl, l?intention­nalité, nous devons tout d?abord nous demander en (...) quoi elle diffère de l?intentionnalité brentanienne. Or, le concept d?intentionnalité intervient chez Brentano d?une ma­nière stratégique : il est le trait caractéristique des phénomènes psychiques, qui, en s?opposant aux phénomènes physiques, constituent le domaine propre de la psychologie 1 . L?intentionnalité n?est donc pas considé­rée par Brentano pour elle-même. Elle est un instrument utilisé pour délimiter le domaine de la psychologie, dont Brentano veut faire une science de plein droit. Dans ce contexte, l?intentionnalité est un des deux traits définitoires des phénomènes psychiques : chaque phénomène psychique a un objet propre, sans quoi il ne serait pas véritablement ce phénomène psychique déterminé. Donc, l?inten­tionnalité est le rapport à l?objet propre à tout acte psychique et qui manque aux phénomènes. (shrink)

Un sujet peu exploré dans la phénoménologie husserlienne est encore à ce jour le champ des émotions, longtemps minoré. Or la publication du volume des Husserliana 'Sentiment et valeur' montre que-les émotions sont un thème qui préoccupa Husserl durant toute sa vie. La raison de cette invisibilité est moins son manque d'importance aux yeux du phénoménologue que la difficulté de lui trouver une place cohérente. Si les actes cognitifs (perceptifs, judicatifs, mémoriels, imaginatifs) représentent souvent le cas d'étude privilégié eu égard (...) à la visée de connaissance qui y apparaît en majeur, les affects (émotions, volitions, valeurs) obéissent à une autre logique ou, du moins, à une logique plus complexe : non seulement descriptive, mais aussi génétique-dynamique. Ce qui se joue avec les émotions est moins la connaissance d'un objet que les tensions, les satisfactions et les déceptions propres aux processus vécus des forces psychiques et de leurs valeurs pour le sujet. Un tel défi est ici relevé. On identifie les lieux où les émotions entrent en scène en esthétique, dans la pragmatique de l'action et en philosophie de l'esprit, en lien avec sciences cognitives et phénoménologie. Dès lors se profile une ligne directrice nouvelle autour de la complexité de la dynamique émotionnelle et de l'obsolescence conséquente du clivage cognition-émotion"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

J. Derrida, J. Habermas, Le “concept” de 11 septembre, Dialogues à New York (octobre – décembre 2001) avec Giovanna Borradori Paris: Galilée, 2004.

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl ; (...) Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie. (shrink)

Providing a novel multi-disciplinary theorization of memory politics, this insightful Handbook brings varied literatures into a focused dialogue on the ways in which the past is remembered and how these influence transnational, interstate, and global politics in the present. With case studies from Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, and the United States, the Handbook focuses on the political features of historical memory in international relations. Chapters examine key concepts of memory politics, including accountability, commemoration and memorialization, the (...) Europeanization of memory, and the politics of trauma and victimhood, as well as analyzing different sites of memory, from the human body and memorial sites to media, film, and television. It also answers essential questions such as who and what determines the relevance of the past in the present; how does memory become a political question; and what are the political effects and ethical implications of its mobilization? Exploring the links between the politics of memory, international ethics, law, and diplomacy, this stimulating Handbook will be essential reading for students and scholars of politics and international relations, cultural studies, history, and transitional justice. Its discussion of notable agents and practices of memory politics will also be beneficial for practitioners working in human rights, politics, and public policy. (shrink)

In this Chapter, Maria Kronfeldner discusses whether psychological essentialism is a necessary part of dehumanization. This involves different elements of essentialism, and a narrow and a broad way of conceptualizing psychological essentialism, the first akin to natural kind thinking, the second based on entitativity. She first presents authors that have connected essentialism with dehumanization. She then introduces the error theory of psychological essentialism regarding the category of the human, and distinguishes different elements of psychological essentialism. On that basis, Kronfeldner (...) connects historical, socio-psychological, and philosophical insights in order to show that although essentialism can act as a catalyst for dehumanization, it is not necessary for it. Examples relate to dehumanization in the context of colonialism and evolutionary thinking, to the history of dehumanizing women from Aristotle to 19th-century craniology, and to contemporary self-dehumanization and ‘lesser mind’ attribution. (shrink)

Maria Kronfeldner’s Preface and Introduction to the Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization maps the landscape of dehumanization studies. She starts with a brief portrayal of the history of the field. The systematically minded sections that follow guide the reader through the resulting rugged landscape represented in the Handbook’s contributions. Different realizations, levels, forms, and ontological contrasts of dehumanization are distinguished, followed by remarks on the variety of targets of dehumanization. A discussion on valence and emotional aspects is added. Causes, functions, (...) and consequences of dehumanization, and the prospects for reducing or undoing it, are introduced. The systematic overview closes with a discussion of some important theoretical complexities that arise in studying dehumanization. After these systematic sections, the scholarly work on dehumanization gets situated in the broader intellectual landscape of debates about the ‘human’ in the humanities and social sciences. The Introduction ends with some notes on scope, limitations, and intended readership of the Handbook. (shrink)

Context: The use of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews and their productive interaction with third-person physiological data is a challenging and pressing issue in order to offer an effective and fruitful application of Varela’s neurophenomenological hypothesis. Problem: We aim at offering a generative method of analysis of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. Our challenge is to describe this generative first-person analysis with the third-person physiological framework rather than put Varela’s hypothesis into practice in a generative way (as we did in (...) another paper. Method: The present contribution is a first pioneering study as far as the exposition of such an interactive generative methodology is concerned. It is also a new issue insofar as it deals with a case study, surprise in depression, that has not been thoroughly dealt with so far, either in philosophy or in psychopathology. Results: We show that the analysis of first-person data is an intrinsic generative one, insofar as new refined categories and multifarious circular micro- and macro-processes were discovered in the very process of analyzing. They provide the initial structural generic third-person description of surprise inherited both from philosophical phenomenological a priori categories and from the experimental startle setting with a refined micro-segmentation of the dynamic of the experience. Implications: Our article could be of interest to neurophenomenologists looking for an effective application and to researchers in quest of a method of analysis of first-person data. The present limitations are due to the still preliminary data-results we need to complete. Constructivist content: The article is directly linked to Varela’s neurophenomenological program and aims at extending and reforming it with a cardio-phenomenological approach. Keywords: First-person micro-phenomenological interviews, surprise, generative analysis of first-person data, depression, cardio-phenomenology, generative categories. (shrink)

"Dr. Montessori was par excellence the great interpreter of the child; and though she herself has passed on from the scene of her labours her work will still go on."-- Westminster Cathedral Chronicle One of the landmark books in the history of education--and one of the least expensive editions now available--this volume describes a new system for educating youngsters. Based on a radical concept of liberty for the pupil and highly formal training of separate sensory, motor, and mental capacities, the (...) system enabled youngsters to master reading, writing, and arithmetic rapidly and substantially. Included are discussions of scientific pedagogy; discipline; the importance of proper diet, gymnastics, and manual labor; and many other topics. Unabridged reprint of the classic 1912 edition. (shrink)

Testimonio que recoge algunas experiencias y reflexiones de la artista visual costarricense María Rapela en Alemania y de cómo se involucró en la gestión cultural, coordinando el Fieber Festival, una plataforma colaborativa y auto-gestionada de mujeres artistas migrantes iberoamericanas en Berlín entre el 2011 y el 2017.

Silence is reserved for what cannot be verbally expressed. The well-known Wittgensteinian quote summarizes an established understanding of the relationship between language and silence: because language is not enough to account for reality and thinking, it must be transcended by other means of expression, like music or silence. But what if the opposite is the case and silence is not the extension but the precondition of language, the ultimate source of meaning? This paper explores how this is the phenomenological and (...) Derridean philosophical framework of Coetzee’s novels, a literary universe created from the will to signify and build singular meanings. (shrink)

Food systems transformations require coherent policies and improved understandings of the drivers and institutional dynamics that shape (un)sustainable food systems outcomes. In this paper, we introduce the Chilean National Organic Agriculture Law as a case of a policy process seeking to institutionalize a recognized pathway towards more sustainable food systems. Drawing from institutional theory we make visible multiple, and at times competing, logics (i.e., values, assumptions and practices) of different actors implicated in organic agriculture in Chile. More specifically, our findings (...) identify five main institutional transformative logics underpinning the interests and actions of organic actors. However, we find that the Law was not motivated by these logics and did not advance them. Rather, the Law was designed to support a market niche targeted to elite consumers and to reinforce agricultural exports. As a result, the Law constrains rather than enables the practice of organic agriculture and access to organic food by consumers, especially at the domestic level. We note that attention to institutional logics in the analysis of food systems, and specifically food system transformation, is relevant to more comprehensive assessments of the transformational potential of food systems policies. We conclude that there is a need to further consider and make visible the way in which different drivers (i.e., laws) are constituted through and by diverse, and often competing, institutional logics. (shrink)

Conceptions of evil have changed dramatically over time, and though humans continue to commit acts of cruelty against one another, today we possess a clearer, more moral way of analyzing them. In _Narrating Evil_, María Pía Lara explores what has changed in our understanding of evil, why the transformation matters, and how we can learn from this specific historical development. Drawing on Immanuel Kant's and Hannah Arendt's ideas about reflective judgment, Lara argues that narrative plays a key role in helping (...) societies acknowledge their pasts. Particular stories haunt our consciousness and lead to a kind of examination and dialogue that shape notions of morality. A powerful description of a crime can act as a filter, helping us to draw conclusions about what constitutes a moral wrong, and public debates over these narratives allow us to construct a more accurate picture of historical truth, leading to a better understanding of why such actions are possible. In building her argument, Lara considers Greek tragedies, Shakespeare's depictions of evil, Joseph Conrad's literary metaphors, and movies that portray human cruelty. Turning to such philosophers and writers as Jürgen Habermas, Walter Benjamin, Primo Levi, Giorgio Agamben, and Ariel Dorfman, Lara defines a reflexive relationship between an event, the narrative of the event, and the public reception of the narrative, and she proves that the stories of perpetrators and sufferers are always intertwined. The process of disclosure, debate, and the public fashioning of collective judgment are vital methods through which we make sense not only of new forms of cruelty but of past crimes as well. _Narrating Evil_ describes the steps of this process and why they are a crucial part of our attempt to build a different, more just world. (shrink)

A striking feature of atrocities, as seen in genocides, civil wars or violence against certain racial and ethnic groups, is the attempt to dehumanize – to deny and strip human beings of their humanity. Yet the very nature of dehumanization remains relatively poorly understood. The Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization is the first comprehensive and multidisciplinary reference source on the subject and an outstanding survey of the key concepts, issues and debates within dehumanization studies. Organized into four parts, the Handbook covers (...) the following key topics: (I) The history of dehumanization from Greek Antiquity to the Twentieth century, contextualizing the oscillating boundaries, dimensions, and hierarchies of humanity in the history of the ‘West’. (II) How dehumanization is contemporarily studied with respect to special contexts: as part of social psychology, as part of legal studies or literary studies, and how it connects to the idea of human rights, disability and eugenics, the question of animals, and the issue of moral standing. (III) How to tackle its complex facets, with respect to the perpetrator’s and the target’s perspective, metadehumanization and selfdehumanization, rehumanization, social death, status and interdependence, as well as the fear we show towards robots that become too human for us. (IV) Conceptual and epistemological questions on how to distinguish different forms of dehumanization and neighboring phenomena, on why dehumanization appears so paradoxical, and on its connection to hatred, essentialism, and perception. -- Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, history, psychology, and anthropology this Handbook will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as politics, international relations, criminology, legal studies, literary studies, gender studies, disability studies, or race and ethnic studies, as well as readers from social work, political activism, and public policy --- Table of Contents: Introduction. 1. Mapping dehumanization studies. – Maria Kronfeldner. Part I. Oscillating boundaries, dimensions, and hierarchies of humanity in historical contexts. 2. Dehumanization Before the Columbian exchange – Siep Stuurman. 3. 'Humanity' and its Limits in Early Modern European Thought – László Kontler. 4. Enlightenment Humanization and Dehumanization and the Orang-utan – Silvia Sebastiani. 5. Dehumanizing the Exotic in Living Human Exhibitions – Guido Abbattista. 6. Dehumanizing Strategies in Nazi Ideology and their Anthropological Context – Johannes Steizinger. 7. Theorizing the Inhumanity of Human Nature, 1955-1985 – Erika Lorraine Milam. Part II: Further special contexts of dehumanization. 8. The Social Psychology of Dehumanization – Nick Haslam. 9. Dehumanization and the Loss of Moral Standing – Edouard Machery. 10. Dehumanization and the Question of Animals – Alice Crary. 11. Dehumanization, Disability, and Eugenics – Robert A. Wilson. 12. Dehumanization and Human Rights – Marie-Luisa Frick. 13. Dehumanization by Law – Luigi Corrias. 14. Dehumanisation in Literature and the Figure of the Perpetrator – Andrea Timár. Part III: The complex facets of dehumanization. 15. Dehumanization and Social Death as Fundamentals of Racism – Wulf D. Hund. 16. How Status and Interdependence Explain Different Forms of Dehumanization – Susan T. Fiske. 17. Exploring Metadehumanization and Self-dehumanization from a Target Perspective – Stéphanie Demoulin, Pierre Maurage, Florence Stinglhamber. 18. The Dehumanization and Rehumanization of Refugees – Victoria M. Esses, Stelian Medianu, Alina Sutter. 19. Motivational and Cognitive Underpinnings of Fear of Social Robots that become ‘Too Human for Us’ – Maria Paola Paladino, Jeroen Vaes, Jolanda Jetten. Part IV: Conceptual and epistemological questions regarding dehumanization. 20. Objectification, Inferiorization and Projection in Phenomenological Research on Dehumanization – Sara Heinämaa and James Jardine. 21. Why Dehumanization is Distinct from Objectification – Mari Mikkola. 22. On Hatred and Dehumanization – Thomas Brudholm and Johannes Lang. 23. Dehumanization, the Problem of Humanity, and the Problem of Monstrosity – David Livingstone Smith. 24. Psychological Essentialism and Dehumanization – Maria Kronfeldner. 25. Could Dehumanization Be Perceptual? – Somogy Varga. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 131-132 [Access article in PDF] Christia Mercer. Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 528. Cloth, $80.00. Christia Mercer's massive study is aimed at unearthing the hidden roots of Leibniz's metaphysics by placing the German philosopher back in the intellectual context within which his thought first took shape. In so doing she stresses (...) the fundamental importance of Leibniz's early years for the development of his philosophy. In particular she convincingly argues for the key role played by Leibniz's early exposure to the thought of eclectic thinkers (including his teachers) who were trying to build a new philosophical synthesis centered around the key tenets of Christian theology and combining elements of Aristotelianism, Platonism, and (in at least some cases) the new mechanical philosophy of nature.One of Mercer's central theses is that the methodological and metaphysical commitments that Leibniz developed during his youth formed the bedrock of his mature philosophy (23). More precisely, her bold claim is that Leibniz's core metaphysics (including the complete concept account of substance) was constructed in 1668-71, re-examined and slightly developed in 1672-79, and then used for the rest of his long philosophical career (18, 470). The key inspirational forces driving the development of Leibniz's philosophy, in her view, had even earlier origins. In the mid-1660s Leibniz did not yet have a fully formulated metaphysics; but he already possessed very definite philosophical objectives which were to guide the development of his metaphysics and form the unstated assumptions underlying his mature thought (40). Mercer identifies these unstated assumptions as a "Metaphysics of Method," a "Metaphysics of Substance," and a "Metaphysics of Divinity," all of which she finds fully developed in his early thought (468-9).According to Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Method" (examined in part I), there exists a truth beneath the prominent philosophical schools which can and ought to be discovered. This conciliatory methodology was Leibniz's answer to the political, religious, and philosophical chaos around him. He was deeply convinced that his brilliantly original eclectic metaphysics would provide the foundation of philosophical, theological, and even political peace. Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Substance," Mercer argues in part II, melded an Aristotelian approach to substance with a mechanical physics and originated at the very outset of his intellectual carrier in an attempt to solve specific theological problems (e.g., those of the incarnation and resurrection). Platonism in turn offered the material for Leibniz's "Metaphysics of Divinity" (explored in part III), that is, for his conception of the relationship between God and creatures. The fourth and final part of Mercer's book takes her analysis of Leibniz's writings up to 1679 and describes the laying of the foundations of his mature metaphysics. She concludes not only that Leibniz proposed the doctrine of pre-established harmony prior to his departure for Paris in March 1672, but also, more generally, that the other tenets of Leibniz's mature thought, including his theory of truth, grew naturally out of his early metaphysics (see, in particular, 2, 15-8, 47, 52, 169-70, 250-2, 300-1, 472).Throughout the book Mercer describes her interpretation as "startling," "unfamiliar," "dramatic," and "surprising," and fears that "readers may balk" at her conclusions since "so much of Leibniz's thought has escaped us for so long" (see, for instance, 1, 9, 471). Some readers may feel, on the contrary, that she has underestimated the extent to which several of her central theses—such as the importance of the earliest stages of Leibniz's philosophical development in general and of eclecticism, theological problems, and Platonism, as well as Aristotelianism within that development in particular—are already reflected in the [End Page 131] best recent traditions of international Leibniz scholarship. But her book undoubtedly breaks new ground and remains an important contribution to an exciting field which cannot and will not be ignored. While international Leibniz scholarship may not absorb some of this book's more... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first we outline a version of non-descriptivism, ‘minimal expressivism’, leaving aside certain long-standing problems associated with conventional expressivist views. Second, we examine the way in which familiar expressivist results can be accommodated within this framework, through a particular interpretation that the expressive realm lends to a theory of meaning. Expressivist theories of meaning address only a portion of the classical problems attributed to this position when they seek to explain why the expressions they (...) deal with have a given meaning. A position can nevertheless be termed ‘expressivist’ – in the minimal sense that we favor – based simply on the following key features of the meaning of these expressions: they can be used as functions of propositions, and they are not used to describe the way the world is. (shrink)

To discuss what was the attitude of the Romanian society towards the increasing economic, social and political role of the Jews throughout history is one of the aims of this paper. Serban Papacostea, the outstanding specialist in mediaeval history, makes use of the syntagm “hostile tolerance”, which specified the general attitude towards the Jews of the Orthodox mediaeval world of Byzantine origin. Tolerance - defined the unlimited opportunity for Jews to be accepted, settle, move and act freely within the Romanian (...) principalities, all the way to the status of possessing properties in Moldavia and Wallachia. There were, however, mixed feelings of hostility manifest at three distinct levels: mental, juridical and political. As for the mentalities, both popular and high brow education as well as prejudices held the Jews guilty for the death of Christ. Even if physically the Jewish presence in Romania has become symbolical, the history of the Jews, the traditions of the Jewish culture and spirituality, the imprint of the Jewish contribution on the emergence and development of the Romanian society will remain the perennial values of a historiography aspiring to fulfill its duty, forever preserved in the conscience of generations to come. (shrink)

(1996). Religious denomination and national renaissance: The Transylvanian Romanians in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 756-761.

Postmodern political critiques speak of the death of ideology, the end of history, and the postsecular return of religious attitudes, yet radical conservative theorists such as Mark Lilla argue religion and politics are inextricably intertwined. Returning much-needed uncertainty to debates over the political while revitalizing the very terms in which they are defined, María Pía Lara explores the ambiguity of secularization and the theoretical potential of a structural break between politics and religion. For Lara, secularization means three things: the translation (...) of religious semantics into politics; a transformation of religious notions into political ideas; and the reoccupation of a space left void by changing political actors that gives rise to new conceptions of political interaction. Conceptual innovation redefines politics as a horizontal relationship between governments and the governed and better enables societies (and individual political actors) to articulate meaning through action--that is, through the emergence of new concepts. These actions, Lara proves, radically transform our understanding of politics and the role of political agents and are further enhanced by challenging the structural dependence of politics on religious phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophy in the 20th century witnessed a schism between so called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ schools of philosophy. One of the aims of the IJPS from its inception was to provide a space for articles attempting to overcome, or at least foreshorten, that divide. This paper critically examines the various understandings of the divide and takes a quick glance at some of the attempts to bridge it.

Upshot: Thanks to the commentaries we have been able to further clarify the situation of generative first-person analysis in the general framework of neurophenomenology and more specifically of cardio-phenomenology as its extension and reformulation. We have also provided more detailed information about the way phenomenology as transcendental philosophy is genuinely operating as a practice in cardio-phenomenology and has a central function regarding the creation of categories and their suspensive questioning thanks to the epoché method. We have also drawn great benefits (...) from the questions about how micro-phenomenology allows a refinement of descriptive categories and the way new categories are generated, and we have been able to provide some answers about different scales of newness in the generative process. (shrink)

A paper about cross-cultural and cross-racial loving that emphasizes the need to understand and affirm the plurality in and among women as central to feminist ontology and epistemology. Love is seen not as fusion and erasure of difference but as incompatible with them. Love reveals plurality. Unity–not to be confused with solidarity–is understood as conceptually tied to domination.

What is it about relativism that justifies, or at least explains, its continued appeal in the face of relentless attacks through the history of philosophy? This paper explores a new answer to this old question, casting the response in metaphilosophical terms. § i introduces the problem. § ii argues that one part of the answer is that some of the well-known defences of relativism take it to be a philosophical stance—that is, a broad perspective or orientation with normative consequences—rather than (...) a doctrine or a thesis. § iii draws attention to an assumption, not always explicitly stated by its proponents, that the relativist stance leads to the cultivation of some key intellectual virtues. Open-mindedness, tolerance, intellectual humility, and curiosity are examples of the intellectual virtues that relativism can foster. § iv argues that the defence of relativism on the basis of the virtues that are assumed to follow from it, at best, is only partially successful. Moreover, there is a range of epistemic vices, resulting from the stance, that undercuts the virtue-based defence presented in § iii. (shrink)

Abstract This paper discusses some recent work on the notion of possibility in Wittgenstein's Tractatus assessed by means of an interpretation of the notion put forward in Cerezo 2005. It argues that the proper way to understand the notion of possibility in the Tractatus must pay equal attention both to the picture theory and the truth-functions theory. From this perspective, through an examination of Peach's proposal (2007) it shows that the role played by the notion of logical space in the (...) determination of sense needs to be emphasized. In addition, the paper considers some consequences of the Tractarian notion of possibility, namely, the strong contingency of the world that it involves, which is revealed by the thinkability of logical space as empty envisaged by Wittgenstein in T 2.013, and also discusses the recent debate between Reinhardt (2005) and Geach (2006) on this issue. (shrink)

As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of (...) typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces. (shrink)

The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that have (...) been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)