A short, provocative book about why "useless" science often leads to humanity's greatest technological breakthroughs A forty-year tightening of funding for scientific research has meant that resources are increasingly directed toward applied or practical outcomes, with the intent of creating products of immediate value. In such a scenario, it makes sense to focus on the most identifiable and urgent problems, right? Actually, it doesn't. In his classic essay "The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge," Abraham Flexner, the founding director (...) of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and the man who helped bring Albert Einstein to the United States, describes a great paradox of scientific research. The search for answers to deep questions, motivated solely by curiosity and without concern for applications, often leads not only to the greatest scientific discoveries but also to the most revolutionary technological breakthroughs. In short, no quantum mechanics, no computer chips. This brief book includes Flexner's timeless 1939 essay alongside a new companion essay by Robbert Dijkgraaf, the Institute's current director, in which he shows that Flexner's defense of the value of "the unobstructed pursuit of useless knowledge" may be even more relevant today than it was in the early twentieth century. Dijkgraaf describes how basic research has led to major transformations in the past century and explains why it is an essential precondition of innovation and the first step in social and cultural change. He makes the case that society can achieve deeper understanding and practical progress today and tomorrow only by truly valuing and substantially funding the curiosity-driven "pursuit of useless knowledge" in both the sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

Henri Bergson and William James were great admirers of each other, and James seemed to think he got valuable ideas from Bergson. But early critics were right to see in Bergson the antithesis of pragmatism. Unfolding this antithesis is a convenient way to study important concepts and innovations in Bergson's philosophy. I concentrate on his ideas of duration and intuition, and show how they prove the necessity of going beyond pragmatism. The reason is because knowledge itself goes beyond the utilitarian (...) limitations in which pragmatism confines it. Knowledge is more than utility, more than adaptation, more than pragmatism, because our cognitive powers prove capable of more than any naturally selected service to survival. (shrink)

Global efforts for biodiversity conservation have gained considerable momentum in recent years. Yet much remains to be learned from the minds of the ancient past regarding perspectives on relations between society and the environment. Zhuangzi is one such figure whose works may be of high relevance to contemporary conservation. While many philosophical ideals underpinning conservation stem from a mostly westernized ethos, strategies can be expanded by non-western principles such as Zhuangzi’s. In light of IPBES’ “nature’s contributions to people” concept, a (...) globally reaching framework for conservation, I explore the applicability of one of Zhuangzi’s central teachings; the usefulness of uselessness. (shrink)

“A little masterpiece of originality and clarity.”—George Steiner “A necessary book.”—Roberto Saviano “A wonderful little book that will delight you.”—François Busnel International Best Seller / Now in English for the First Time In this thought-provoking and extremely timely work, Nuccio Ordine convincingly argues for the utility of useless knowledge and against the contemporary fixation on utilitarianism—for the fundamental importance of the liberal arts and against the damage caused by their neglect. Inspired by the reflections of great philosophers and writers (...) (e.g., Plato, Dante, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Borges, and Calvino), Ordine reveals how the obsession for material goods and the cult of utility ultimately wither the spirit, jeopardizing not only schools and universities, art, and creativity, but also our most fundamental values—human dignity, love, and truth. Also included is Abraham Flexner’s 1939 essay “The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge,” which originally prompted Ordine to write this book. Flexner—a founder and the first director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton—offers an impassioned defense of curiosity-driven research and learning. (shrink)

This essay explores some possibilities brought by the question about philosophy’s utility for science. We point to some arguments in favor of the importance of philosophy for science in general and Behavior Analysis in particular. We argue that philosophy is the consciousness of science. Without philosophical consciousness, science incurs epistemological naiveties; it uncritically defends scientific neutrality; it risks turning into a mere technique in the service of ideologies that endangers science’s existence. As the philosophy of Behavior Analysis, Radical Behaviorism can (...) play the role of conscience of that science. (shrink)

In this article, Claudia Ruitenberg argues that the debate for or against instrumentalism in education is less fruitful than (a) a debate about the ends worth striving for, regardless of whether education is the best means to that end; and (b) a debate about the educational practices that are currently valued in and of themselves, regardless of whether these will turn out to serve other ends in the future. Using examples from visual art and examining arguments for and against “art (...) for art's sake” and “education for education's sake,” Ruitenberg argues that education designed for instrumental purposes is already infected by a certain uselessness, while education that supposedly serves no purpose outside of itself “suffers” from a certain usefulness. (shrink)

As the ability to meaningfully process increasingly large quantities of data has improved, the need for systems to support the aggregation and subsequent use of disparate smaller datasets is correspondingly greater. The GBIF is just one such project among a larger group seeking to aggregate the smaller, focused, and disparate sources of information generated for the work of science. GBIF is simultaneously an effort to coordinate and aggregate digital species occurrence data and digitize natural history collections into a single global-scale (...) resource for biodiversity work. The basis for this paper is a critical study of the GBIF database and data portal as a socio-technical system. (shrink)

The nature and value of what might be called formalism constitutes one of the recurrent themes in the history of logic. In each of the great ages of logic much the same pattern of events occurs. There is a period of discovery and development during which the formal element in logical relations is isolated and analysed for itself, and a science of logic is established. Although there may be doubt about the fringes of the subject, logicians at least are then (...) fairly well agreed on what constitutes formal logic. Someone next arises who compares this science of logic with the use of argument in every–day life and, finding it of little relevance, protests against what he considers its vain and useless formalism. Such in substance is the attitude of Cicero towards the ancient formal logic of Aristotle and the Stoics, and of the literary humanists of the Renaissance towards the logic of the late Middle Ages. Such, in brief, is the position of Prof. Toulmin towards the mathematical form of modern logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Happiness of “Those Who Lack the Use of Reason”Miguel J. RomeroHuman beings would have been created uselessly and in vain were they unable to attain happiness, as would be the case with anything that cannot attain its ultimate end.(De Malo, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1)A STUDY OF “those who lack the use of reason” in the thought and spirit of St. Thomas Aquinas has much to offer (...) the patient reader. We better understand what it means to be a rational animal, the image of triune God, when we investigate why, exactly, “mindless persons” (amentes) are not exceptions or even outliers in Aquinas’s account of the creaturely dignity and perfectibility of the human being.Aquinas remarks with some regularity on persons afflicted with the condition amentia, which is variously and inconsistently interpreted (in translation) as “imbeciles,” “fools,” “madmen,” “lunatics,” “the demented,” or “the insane.” The amentes are persons who lack the use of reason in a profound and debilitating way; and, as I will show, the fact that we are sometimes found in this state informs Aquinas’s analysis of human nature and, in particular, Aquinas’s teaching on the good wrought by Christ for the members of his body. Our guiding question is this: Thinking with Aquinas, how do we account for the natural and supernatural happiness of those of us who lack the use of reason?My purpose in this article is to explore what Aquinas has to say about the happiness of persons who are baptized and [End Page 49] confirmed by the Church, and who have what neuro-psychologists would describe as a profound cognitive impairment. The question is particularly striking when we recall that, for Aquinas, the distinguishing aptitude of the human being (proper to our intellectual nature and coordinate with our creaturely perfection) is the operation of an incorruptible intellectual capacity—a capacity, however, that is only reduced from potentiality to act when the corruptible “internal sense organ” is disposed to receive, in terms of health and circumstance, a coordinated sense impression of material species. Thus, a further question emerges: According to Aquinas, what is the perfective effect of grace in this life upon the nature of a person who completely lacks the use of reason due to an organic corruption or disorder of the ‘internal sense organ’?The discussion is divided into five parts. I begin (part I) by locating those who “lack the use of reason” within the theological infrastructure of Aquinas’s moral psychology and I identify the main problematic. With respect to that problematic, the principal conceptual resources provided by Aquinas are then outlined and two challenges are identified (part II).The first challenge is methodological, concerning the speculative import of the sacramental life of the Church. Francisco de Vitoria’s Relectio de eo ad quod tenetur homo veniens ad usum rationis (1534) highlights for us (part III) a constellation of judgments relevant to interpreting Aquinas on these themes, in particular, Aquinas’s formulation of prerational intellectual acts vis-à-vis the participation and membership of “mindless persons” in the sacramental life of the Body of Christ.The second challenge is to show the continuity between Aquinas’s account of the human being and his practical remarks on those who lack the use of reason. Specifically, given the various ways that, and degrees to which, the human being can lack the use of reason, I trace (part IV) Aquinas’s analysis of the power and operation of intellect, focusing on the intellectual acts which can be impaired and, concurrently, the intellectual acts which cannot be impaired in a living human being. Aquinas’s remarks on those latter acts not only reflect the [End Page 50] significance of the doctrine of the image of God in his account of human nature, but, even more, they shed light on the prosthesis of sacramental grace in his understanding of the properly human happiness capacitated and purposed in all whom God has called in Christ—a call to discipleship and devotion that includes those of us who have a profound, lifelong cognitive impairment (Rom 8:28; 9:11; Eph 1:3-14; II Tim 1:8-11).I conclude... (shrink)

A rough translation of my (much-delayed) new professor’s Inaugural Lecture (in Finnish) at the Tampere University, on April 27, 2023. (The original Finnish version is published in Ajatus 80 (2023)).

rené descartes famously and explicitly rejects appeals to final causes in natural philosophy, suggesting that such appeals depend on knowledge of God’s inscrutable ends.For since I now know that my own nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible and infinite, I also know without more ado that he is capable of countless things whose causes are beyond my knowledge. And for this reason alone I consider the whole kind of causes, customarily sought from (...) an end, to be totally useless in physics; there is considerable rashness in thinking myself capable of investigating God’s ends.1This rejection did not go unnoticed nor without controversy. In the Fifth.. (shrink)

Traditionally, Aristotle is held to believe that philosophical contemplation is valuable for its own sake, but ultimately useless. In this volume, Matthew D. Walker offers a fresh, systematic account of Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good. The book situates Aristotle's views against the background of his wider philosophy, and examines the complete range of available textual evidence. On this basis, Walker argues that contemplation also benefits humans as perishable living organisms by actively guiding human life activity, (...) including human self-maintenance. Aristotle's views on contemplation's place in the human good thus cohere with his broader thinking about how living organisms live well. A novel exploration of Aristotle's views on theory and practice, this volume will interest scholars and students of both ancient Greek ethics and natural philosophy. It will also appeal to those working in other disciplines including classics, ethics, and political theory. (shrink)

Singular terms without referents are called empty or vacuous terms. But not all of them are equally empty. In particular, not all proper names that fail to name an existing object fail in the same way: although they are all empty, they are not all equally vacuous. “Vulcan,” “Jacob Horn,” “Odysseus,” and “Sherlock Holmes,” for instance, are all empty. They have no referents. But they are not entirely vacuous or useless. Sometimes they are used in statements that are true (...) or false. We are basically referentialists about proper names. The ordinary semantic function of a proper name is to refer to an object, and to do it directly, that is, without semantically providing any identifying condition that the object should meet to be the referent. To put it differently, we agree that statements containing proper names express singular propositions, i.e., that their truth-conditions involve the referent of the proper name, if it exists, and not any identifying condition of it. Now, since empty names lack a referent, and therefore would not express such a singular proposition, how do we explain that many, if not all, statements containing them have a truth-value? Answering this question for the case of fictional names, in particular, is the aim of this paper. (shrink)

Contemporary metaphysics has undergone a change of perspective due to the irruption of Grounding in discussions of metaphysical dependence. Proponents argue that Grounding is the primitive relationship of determination underlying many of the traditionally posited idioms of metaphysical dependence. In a recent line of scepticism Jessica Wilson has argued that the inability of the notion to be informatively effective regarding substantial matters of metaphysical determination renders it useless in the face of theoretical work. To supply this lack of informativeness (...) proponents must resort to the already available set of specific ‘small-g’ relations, which renders the formulation of ‘big-G’ Grounding pre-theoretically unmotivated. In response two motivations are said to remain: The priority and unity arguments. Wilson insists that neither of these motivations succeeds in establishing ‘big-G’ Grounding as theoretically useful. I argue that none of Wilson’s critiques succeeds in establishing eliminative scepticism. (shrink)

Matthew Walker’s book argues that contemplation is not useless as “traditionally” claimed, but serves the crucial function of guiding what Walker frequently refers to as human life activities, most importantly the self-maintenance of the human organism. By this phrase, he includes the full range of psychic functions essential to a perishable organism, extending down to nourishment and reproduction. As such, contemplation not only becomes the central organizing principle of Aristotle’s ethics, but also must be understood in connection with Aristotle’s (...) natural philosophy.The book’s early chapters strike me as following something like the order of the De anima, leading from what is perhaps... (shrink)

Over the years a few authors have argued that Rawls’s ideal theory of justice is useless for the real world. This criticism has been largely ignored by Rawlsians, but in the light of a recent accumulation of such criticisms, some authors (in particular Holly Lawford-Smith, A. John Simmons, Zofia Stemplowska and Laura Valentini) have tried to defend ideal theory. In this article I will recapitulate the precise problem with Rawls’s ideal theory, argue that some of Rawls’s defenders misconceive it, (...) and show that recent attempts to rescue Rawls’s ideal theory from the charge of being useless fail. While there are useful kinds of ideal theory, Rawls’s is not one of them. In addition, Rawls’s very tentative suggestions for some kind of bridge between ideal and non-ideal theory are contradictory insofar as they implicitly presuppose the non-existence of the problem they are meant to solve. Thus, Rawls’s “non-ideal theory” too, is useless, and not so much a theory at all but a set of ad hoc stipulations. Finally, I will show that certain attempts within the global justice debate to use some variation of the original position to directly derive guidelines for the real world are misguided and yield no useful results. (shrink)

MacIntyre's is one approach among many to explain what philosophy ought to be. For Pieper (in: "Defence of Philosophy"), just to cite another one, "to engage in philosophy means to reflect on the totality of things we encounter, in view of their ultimate" or fundamental truth. And there are others. But my interest here is to explore the circumstances under which philosophers could claim a place in society due to a service they provide, as valuable as that of a mechanical (...) engineer in a factory, a waiter in a hotel or a pilot on an airplane. The circumstances, this is, which would make society see philosophers not (or not only) as oddly useless figures addressing intellectually engaging puzzles and uttering obscure conclusions, but as valuable contributors to the common good. (shrink)

While thrusting the importance of knowledge, Bertrand Russell highlights one special utility of it, i.e., knowledge promotes a widely contemplative habit of mind; and such knowledge, he terms ‘useless’. For Russell, the habit of contemplation is the capacity of rationalized enquiry which enables individuals to consider all questions in a tentative and impartial manner, frees them from dogmas and encourages the expression of a wide diversity of views. Besides ‘useless’ knowledge, Russell admits the importance of ‘useful’ knowledge too, (...) but his appreciation for the intrinsic value of ‘useless’ knowledge more than the extrinsic value of ‘useful’ one brings to light the significance of knowing, i.e., to know is to know something for its own sake. Pursuit of such knowledge is possible only in case of ‘useless’ knowledge; and not in case of ‘useful’ one. Highlighting contemplative habit of mind as the greatest advantage of ‘useless’ knowledge, Russell says that such habit, in order to get accelerated, has to be guided by education; but education without freedom cannot perform the job. To be free, according to Russell, means, to be free from the forces of tradition; and also from the tyranny of one’s own passions. Freedom is thus seen to be the cardinal force in fostering contemplative habit, and is closely found to have been associated with ‘useless’ knowledge. In the present paper, by highlighting the nature of contemplative habit of mind, I have argued that ‘useless’ knowledge has to be appreciated more than ‘useful’ knowledge. Moreover, I have shown why freedom in education has to be considered a necessity for accelerating habit of contemplation. (shrink)

Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued (...) her claim and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm‐formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated. (shrink)

What has a use in the future, unforeseeably, is radically useless now. What has an effect now is not necessarily useful if it falls through the gaps. In _For a Pragmatics of the Useless_ Erin Manning examines what falls outside the purview of already-known functions and established standards of value, not for want of potential but for carrying an excess of it. The figures are various: the infrathin, the artful, proprioceptive tactility, neurodiversity, black life. It is around the latter (...) two that a central refrain echoes: "All black life is neurodiverse life." This is not an equation, but an "approximation of proximity." Manning shows how neurotypicality and whiteness combine to form a normative baseline for existence. Blackness and neurodiversity "schizz" around the baseline, uselessly, pragmatically, figuring a more-than of life living. Manning, in dialogue with Félix Guattari and drawing on the black radical tradition's accounts of black life and the aesthetics of black sociality, proposes a "schizoanalysis" of the more-than, charting a panoply of techniques for other ways of living and learning. (shrink)

In her 2003 article in the British Medical Journal, Ruth Macklin provocatively declared dignity to be a useless concept: either a vague restatement of other more precise values, such as autonomy or respect for persons, or an empty slogan. A recent response to Macklin has challenged this claim. Doris Schroeder attempts to rescue dignity by positing four distinct concepts that fall under the one umbrella term. She argues that much of the confusion surrounding dignity is due to the lack (...) of disambiguation among these four concepts, but that once we understand the different values in question dignity becomes a powerful tool in the fields of human rights and bioethics. It is the goal of this paper to build upon Schroeder's insights by reconnecting the multiple strands of dignity she identifies. It will be argued that the usefulness of dignity as a guiding principle in medical ethics can be much improved by identifying the single conceptual link that ties together the various values flying under its banner. That conceptual link is provided by understanding dignity as the capacity to live by one's standards and principles.



. (shrink)

In this article, I look at those passages in the Zhuangzi usually associated with “uselessness.” I discuss in what way these passages may have been suggestive to Martin Heidegger to explain his ideas of the necessity of the other thinking and of the “waiting people” being entirely unusable to others. Then I make some brief comments concerning basic conditions of interpretation, using examples taken from the Zhuangzi passages discussed. These conditions include family resemblance across the board, a principle of agreement, (...) and the issue of “planetarization”. (shrink)

‘Competitive’ is one of the most commonly and confidently used words in sports. I argue that, while this term does have necessary and sufficient conditions, it is still a fairly useless one. Knowing someone is competitive does not tell one about the type of desire to win, the type of quantity of that desire, and the precise way in which one wants to be better. We also don’t know who a person feels a desire to beat, when winning actually (...) becomes a goal, and what kind of knowledge and talents that person has at their disposal. Without this information, knowing someone is competitive tells you very little. (shrink)

Cesario provides a compelling critique of the use of experimental social psychology to explain real-world group disparities. We concur with his targeted critique and extend “the problem of missing information” to another common measures of bias. We disagree with Cesario's broader argument that the entire enterprise be abandoned, suggesting instead targeted utilization. Finally, we question whether the critique is appropriately directed at experimental social psychologists.

Scientific Models. On the most primitive level of scientific popularization, common sense analogies are omnipresent, and are indispensable to layman and popularizer alike. Reichenbach's discussion of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle--in terms of a police car's inevitable effect on the speed of traffic--is a nice example. "In our intercourse with electrons we cannot don civilian clothes; when we watch them we always disturb their traffic." In this or any other such use of metaphor, however, the purpose is merely illustrative, and in an (...) extremely naive or vague sense at that. The structural form A:B::C:D is clearly present, but the repeated ratios are of such a superficial, inexact and limited nature that no further inferences can be drawn from the one side of the proportion to the other. Only a familiarizing picture, helpful to the layman but fairly useless to the scientist, has been introduced. Still, it is also important to realize that the difference between the metaphorical popularization of science and the creative use of metaphor by scientists themselves is a difference in degree only, not of kind. (shrink)

There’s an interesting debate in moral and political philosophy about the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theory. In this paper we discuss whether an analogous distinction can be drawn in philosophy of language. Our conclusion is negative: Even if you think that distinction can be put to work within moral and political philosophy, there’s no useful way to extend it to work that has been done in the philosophy of language.

Plato’s characterization of the philosopher often emerges as a way to respond to popular conceptions and representations of the intellectual in Athenian society. In book 6 of the Republic in particular, he articulates his greatest defense of the philosopher against two major charges – that of being vicious and useless. Voicing what appears to be a commonly held view among Athenians, this representation of the philosopher is raised by Adeimantus as an objection to Socrates’ proposal of a philosopher-king. Surprisingly, (...) rather than dismissing the allegations as false, Socrates admits ‘that what they say is true’ and incorporates these criticisms into his argument. This paper proposes that the popular depiction of the philosopher as odd, vicious and idle plays a significant role in Plato’s own characterization of the philosopher, illustrating how Plato diagnoses the philosopher’s alienation from public affairs in a manner that defines and legitimates his own ideas of philosophy. (shrink)

Decision theorists tend to treat indicative conditionals with reservation, because they can easily lead a deliberating agent astray. However, many indicatives can be very helpful in contexts of deliberation, so denying them all a role in such contexts seems to be overkill. We show that a recently revived inferential view on conditionals provides a straightforward explanation of why some indicatives are unassertable in contexts of deliberation and hints at a way of telling "deliberationally useless" and "deliberationally useful" conditionals apart.

Formal systems seem to come in two general kinds: useful and useless. This is painting things starkly, but the point is important. Formal structures can either be used in interesting and important ways, or they can languish unused and irrelevant. Lewis' modal logics are good examples. The systems S4 and S5 are useful in many different ways. They map out structures that are relevant to a number of different applications. S1, S2 and S3 however, are not so lucky. They (...) are little studied, and used even less. It has become dear that the structures described by S4 and S5 are important in different ways, while the structures described by S1 to S3 are not so important. In this paper, we will see another formal system with a number of different uses. We will examine a substructural logic which is important in a number of different ways. The logic of Peirce monoids, inspired by the logic of relations, is useful in the independent areas of linguistic types and information flow.In what follows I will describe the logic of Peirce monoids in its various guises, sketch out its main properties, and indicate why it is important. As proofs of theorems are readily available elsewhere in the literature, I simply sketch the relevant proofs here, and point the interested reader to where complete proofs can be found. (shrink)

This paper considers the state of contingent laborers, Ph.D. holders, lovers of robust scholarship, and hopeful academics who toil away in the neoliberal university in the search for the academic good life. The author argues that the academic good life is a fantasy and agrees that the fantasy is cruel, i.e. not attainable or livable, but does suggest the practices of teaching and conducting research, the practices that make up a scholarly life, are sustainable activities of a good life that (...) can and should inform how we use the university. After drawing on Alistair MacIntyre and Chris Higgins to picture the academic good life, Deane turns to theories of refusal articulated by Sandy Grande and Bonnie Honig to suggest refusal practices for reimagining lives that are academic and good. (shrink)

Much fuss has been made of the “spatial turn” in recent years, across a range of disciplines. It is hard to know if the attention has been warranted. A confusion of terms has been used—such as space, place, spatiality, location—and each has signified a cluster of often contradictory and confusing meanings. This phenomenon is common to a range of disciplines in the humanities. This means, first, that it is not always easy to recognize what is being discussed under the rubric (...) of space, and second, that over-extended uses of the cultural turn have stymied meaningful engagement with materiality in discussions of space. This article shows how materiality has been marginalized both by a casual vocabulary and a vigorous a priori epistemological holism on the part of scholars, and how the spatial turn has been too closely linked to the cultural turn to allow it to develop its fullest explanatory potential. It demonstrates how historians might profitably theorize the significance of place and space in their work , and sets out some challenges for using space more effectively in explanatory systems. Inspired by environmental history, sociology, and science and technology studies, I propose a way of establishing space as different from conventional historical handling of materiality, and end by identifying some methodological problems that need to be solved if we are to proceed on a surer footing. (shrink)

Abstract“Suffering” is a central concept within bioethics and often a crucial consideration in medical decision making. As used in practice, however, the concept risks being uninformative, ambiguous, or even misleading. In this paper, we consider a series of cases in which “suffering” is invoked and analyze them in light of prominent theories of suffering. We then outline ethical hazards that arise as a result of imprecise usage of the concept and offer practical recommendations for avoiding them. Appeals to suffering are (...) often getting at something ethically important. But this is where the work of ethics begins, not where it ends. (shrink)

In 1972, R.C. Lewontin concluded that it follows from the fact that the large majority of human genetic variation (≈ 85%) is among individuals within local populations that racial taxonomy is unjustified. Three decades later, Edwards demonstrated that while the accuracy with which individuals may be assigned to groups is poor for a single locus, consideration of multi‐locus data allows for highly accurate assignments. Edwards concluded that Lewontin's dismissal of racial taxonomy was unwarranted. Edwards misidentified the aim of Lewontin's critique, (...) which was directed at the utility of racial classification and not at assigning individuals to groups using genetic data. Moreover, Edwards conflated distinct kinds of correlation when sketching out his argument. If we follow Edwards’ argument to its natural terminus, it becomes clear that it is consideration of all of the correlation structure among local groups in human genetic data that renders racial taxonomy scientifically useless. Lewontin considers the correlation structure relevant to his analysis of racial taxonomy and does not make his eponymous misstep. Rather, critics of Lewontin who use racial taxonomies in their work are the primary offenders when it comes to committing Lewontin's fallacy. (shrink)

In his self-published periodical The Moment, Søren Kierkegaard warns his reader against the possibility of “useless suffering”. Not only that, he urges the reader to make use of her suffering. Taking this caution as a point of departure, I investigate the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus’ deliberations on ethico-religious suffering in the Postscript. I demonstrate that Climacus construes suffering as useful, and with that outlines an economy of suffering that Kierkegaard delineates across his pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous work. The paradigmatic expression of (...) this is the use the subject makes of her suffering in “the moment”, in which suffering is defined according to its relation with the eternal. Suffering is thus a key element of the individual subject’s self-development: The subject is transformed, and transforms herself, in suffering. Finally, I argue that this economy of suffering produces a notion of the subject as actively involved in securing the contribution her suffering can make to her self-transformation. I criticize this notion, showing it renders problematic any ethical or ethico-religious account of the response of the subject to the suffering of the other: The subject is not first and foremost attuned to the other’s suffering, rather she is attuned to the possibility of her own transformation. Suffering becomes in this way both a key exegetical tool for understanding Kierkegaard’s view of the subject and, more significantly, a way to problematize Kierkegaard’s ethical account of the subject’s response to others’ suffering. (shrink)

현대 한국선도를 대표하는 봉우 권태훈의 사상은 그 폭이 매우 넓으면서도 깊다. 이 글은 봉우의 유불도 삼가사상 가운데 도가사상에 초점을 맞춰 그 철학적 의의를 탐색해본 것이다. 특히 봉우가 도가사상을 일방적으로 수용한 측면보다는 도가사상의 철학적 요소들 을 자기화하여 주체적으로 변용한 내용들을 중심으로 그 의의를 살펴본 특징이 있다. 이 글은 『음부경』의 오적(五賊: 오행을 훔쳐옴) 사상을 대체한 호흡법의 의의, 쓸모없음의 쓸 모를 아는 인재관 제창의 문제, 현재적 시의성 강조와 그 도가철학적 지반에 관한 세 가지 주제를 통해 봉우의 도가사상에 대한 입장을 검토해본 것이다. 봉우의 도가사상에 (...) 대한 입 장을 이해하기 위해서는 그가 본 『음부경』과 도가사상의 관계에 대해 주목해보지 않으면 안 된다. 봉우는 도가사상을 대표하는 노장의 사상이 『음부경』에 영향을 미쳤을 것이라는 일반적 사고와는 달리 『음부경』의 사상이 노장에게 영향을 미쳤다고 주장한다. 봉우는 『음부경』의 사상이 후대에 전승되어 노장사상으로 전개된 것이라고 보고, 그 핵심이 호흡 법에 있다고 한다. 그리고 호흡법과 같이 세상사람들이 중요하게 생각하지 않는 쓸모의 문제에 대해 반성한다. 그래서 봉우는 도가사상의 ‘쓸모없음의 쓸모’의 문제에 주목하 고,‘쓸모없음의 진정한 쓸모’를 가진 인재관을 제창한다. 더 나아가 도가철학적 시간관 이 지금-여기의 현재성을 강조한다는 점을 통해 도가철학의 의의가 결코 퇴행적이거나 현실도피적인 것이 아님을 강변한다. 이와 같은 봉우의 도가사상에 대한 주체적 변용의 문 제는 분명 훌륭한 의의가 있음에 분명하다. 그럼에도 봉우의 사상이 학술적인 측면에서 진 정으로 그 의의를 보장받기 위해서는 『음부경』의 저자 및 사상의 성립기원에 대한 문제가 선차적으로 해결되어야 한다는 과제가 남는다. (shrink)

Placebos are allegedly used widely in general practice. Surveys reporting high level usage, however, have combined two categories, ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ placebos. The wide use of placebos is explained by the high level usage of impure placebos. In contrast, the prevalence of the use of pure placebos has been low. Traditional pure placebos are clinically ineffective treatments, whereas impure placebos form an ambiguous group of diverse treatments that are not always ineffective. In this paper, we focus on the impure placebo (...) concept and demonstrate problems related to it. We also show that the common examples of impure placebos are not meaningful from the point of view of clinical practice. We conclude that the impure placebo is a scientifically misleading concept and should not be used in scientific or medical literature. The issues behind the concept, however, deserve serious attention in future research. (shrink)

Mainstream views concerning the uselessness or usefulness of HET are illustrated. These rely on a hidden assumption: a 'cumulative view' according to which the provisional point of arrival of contemporary economics incorporates all previous contributions in an improved way. Critiques of positivism led philosophy of science to recognise the existence of different approaches – in economics, as in other sciences. Conceptualisation, recognised by Schumpeter as the first stage in economic theorising, is the stage in which the different visions of (...) the world underlying the different approaches, take shape – and are better recognised. In this, HET plays an essential role. As an illustration, the differences between the classical and marginalist conceptualisations of the economy are illustrated. Thus HET is essential in both undergraduate and graduate economic curricula, as a decisive help towards a better understanding and evaluation of formalised theories/models in the first case, and as an education to the philological method of research, essential in the first stage of theorising, in the case of graduate curricula. (shrink)

According to N. Goodman, the Carnapian notion of similarity is useless in science and without interest for philosophy. In our paper we suggest that, given the current role that the notion of similarity has in managing biomedical big data, this drastic position should be revised, and similarity should be provided a scientifically useful philosophical interpretation. With the advent of the new sequencing technologies, imaging technologies and with the improvements of health records, the number of genomics, post-genomics and clinical data (...) has exponentially increased. The deluge of data has urged, among others, to devise a new way of stratifying patients. A solution has been found and it is based exactly on the notion of similarity. By discussing two examples focusing on similarity among breast cancer patients, in the paper we illustrate such a use, and analyze it from a philosophical standpoint by resorting to A. Tversky’s features matching approach. We believe that the latter can foster some better understanding of the meaning and current use of similarity in the context of biomedical big data, and that, therefore, be the focus of further reflections in the philosophy of science, in particular in the philosophy of biomedicine. (shrink)

In his seminars on the death penalty, Derrida consistently describes Kant's arguments in favor of capital punishment as “rigorous” and explicitly relates that rigor to the mechanisms of execution and the subsequent rigor mortis of the corpse. ‘Rigor’ has also often been a contested term in descriptions of deconstruction: different commentators have either deplored or celebrated the presence or the absence of rigor in Derrida's work. Derrida himself uses the term a good deal throughout his career, usually in a positive (...) sense, although he also at least once, in passing, suggests the need to question the rigor of the concept of rigor itself. In this paper, I will outline the place of Kant in the Death Penalty Seminars and suggest that it is the very rigor attributed to Kant that makes him (rather than some other writers—whether supporters or opponents of the death penalty—whose arguments seem less rigorous to Derrida) an exemplary object for deconstructive attention, not for the first time in Derrida's work. Broadening the focus beyond the texts Derrida explicitly analyzes, I suggest that this kind of attention can also be fruitfully brought to bear on some more general arguments in Kant about right and justice. In conclusion, I suggest some implications of this situation for the still difficult issue of the more general relation between deconstruction and critique in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000) 1-26 [Access article in PDF] "What Will Surprise You Most": Self-Regulating Systems and Problems of Correct Use in Plato's Republic Patrick Maynard University of Western Ontario 1. Republic's Third Wave: "On Philosophers" The title of this paper is taken from a line in Book VI of Plato's Republic that appears to reject not only the accounts of moral justice and other (...) virtues argued in Book IV, but also an axiom of Plato's earlier dialogues: that the virtues are good and beneficial things. It reads: "What will surprise you most, when you hear it, is that each of the things we praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and to drag it away from philosophy. I mean courage, moderation, and the other things we mentioned" (491b7-10). Although these other things specifically include justice, magnanimity, grace, love of truth, and a tendency to consider "the form [idea] of each thing that is" (486d10), for their part, commentators have never shown surprise at this passage; indeed they have tended either to neglect or minimize it.1 To recall the context of 491b7-10, it actually comes as a second surprise, hard on the heels of a remarkable admission by Socrates, in early Book VI. The admission came in response to Adeimantus' challenge to Socrates' attempt to show that 'Platonic' philosophers, in the famous Book V sense of those who believe in the [End Page 1] forms, will be just and virtuous people, capable of political leadership (484d8-487a5). Book VI's page 487 thus contains Adeimantus' blistering attack on Socratic method, and a counter-argument against the idea of philosopher-rulers, based on common opinions about philosophers—an argument that should give pause to those who say that Republic left elenctic method behind with Book I. It is Socrates who now faces a forceful elenchus: that is, an inconsistency between the philosopher-rulers position he has just argued and another view he himself accepts, for his reply to Adeimantus is that "they seem to speak the truth" (487d10, 489d5), and "what he says is true, that the best among the philosophers are useless to the majority" (489b2), but that "the greatest and more serious slander on philosophy... results from those who profess to follow the philosophic way of life," especially the "vicious" ones (489cd).Most commentators, teachers, readers, eager to join the account of forms at the end of Book V with that of the form of the good well into Book VI, bridge over this discussion of philosophers' reputations, perhaps noting such of its features as the true pilot, the tinker, the figure in the dust storm, etc., but with little attention to argument structure.2 However, low estimate of structure in Plato's writings is usually a mistake, especially with Republic, and some commentators do make space to shape this bit of text, before getting on to what really interests them. They usually bracket the whole philosophers' reputations discussion, including 491b, as an early part of the so-called "third and greatest wave" (472a, 473c) of objections and replies, regarding the feasibility of the earlier social proposals of Republic: specifically, the objection to the possibility of philosopher-rulers. Socrates' reply to the third wave is usually taken to conclude with the transition at 502c7-503d12, which begins: "now that this difficulty has been disposed of, we must deal with what remains"—that is, with how such rulers could come about, and how they would be educated, a transitional remark that makes the gateway to the scholars' great attractor of the form of the good, with its discussions of the sun, the divided line, the cave of shadows—and few readers ever look back. Thus one recent commentator who does discuss the early part of Book VI moves on to those topics as follows: "Now that the combination of traits required in a philosopher-king has been shown to be a natural possibility... (shrink)

We attack the SSK's rejection of the distinction between discovery and justification (the DJ distinction), famously introduced by Hans Reichenbach and here defended in a "lean" version. Some critics claim that the DJ distinction cannot be drawn precisely, or that it cannot be drawn prior to the actual analysis of scientific knowledge. Others, instead of trying to blur or to reject the distinction, claim that we need an even more fine-grained distinction (e.g. between discovery, invention, prior assessment, test and justification). (...) Adherents of the SSK, however, maintain that the distinction is useless and perhaps nonexistent. We first argue against the assumption that the SSK's objection to the DJ distinction is just the same as Thomas Kuhn's. Second, we point out general weaknesses of the SSK's arguments against the DJ distinction. Finally, we argue that the distinction is useful not only in order to explicate what is meant by an evaluation but even for the empirical explanation of knowledge. We use two case studies from the history of cognitive science to support this point. (shrink)

The use of deception in medical care is highly suspect in this country. Yet there is one condition for which deception is often used as a diagnostic tool. Nonepileptic seizures, a psychiatric condition in which emotional or psychological conflicts manifest themselves unconsciously through bodily symptoms, are currently diagnosed by a procedure called “provocative saline infusion.” The test is fundamentally deceptive, requiring the physician to intentionally and directly lie to the patient, causing the patient to believe that the administered solution caused (...) his seizures. Without such deception, the test might be useless. (shrink)

Proof assistants are software-based tools that are used in the mechanization of proof construction and validation in mathematics and computer science, and also in certified program development. Different such tools are being increasingly used in order to accelerate and simplify proof checking, and the Coq proof assistant is one of the most well known and used in large-scale projects. Language and automata theory is a well-established area of mathematics, relevant to computer science foundations and information technology. In particular, context-free language (...) theory is of fundamental importance in the analysis, design, and implementation of computer programming languages. This work describes a formalization effort, using the Coq proof assistant, of fundamental results of the classical theory of contextfree grammars and languages. These include closure properties (union, concatenation, and Kleene star), grammar simplification (elimination of useless symbols, inaccessible symbols, empty rules, and unit rules), the existence of a Chomsky Normal Form for context-free grammars and the Pumping Lemma for context-free languages. The result is an important set of libraries covering the main results of context-free language theory, with more than 500 lemmas and theorems fully proved and checked. As it turns out, this is a comprehensive formalization of the classical context-free language theory in the Coq proof assistant and includes the formalization of the Pumping Lemma for context-free languages. The perspectives for the further development of this work are diverse and can be grouped in three different areas: inclusion of new devices and results, code extraction, and general enhancements of its libraries. (shrink)

In 1981, David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel received the Nobel Prize for their research on cortical columns—vertical bands of neurons with similar functional properties. This success led to the view that “cortical column” refers to the basic building block of the mammalian neocortex. Since the 1990s, however, critics questioned this building block picture of “cortical column” and debated whether this concept is useless and should be replaced with successor concepts. This paper inquires which experimental results after 1981 challenged the (...) building block picture and whether these challenges warrant the elimination “cortical column” from neuroscientific discourse. I argue that the proliferation of experimental techniques led to a patchwork of locally adapted uses of the column concept. Each use refers to a different kind of cortical structure, rather than a neocortical building block. Once we acknowledge this diverse-kinds picture of “cortical column”, the elimination of column concept becomes unnecessary. Rather, I suggest that “cortical column” has reached conceptual retirement: although it cannot be used to identify a neocortical building block, column research is still useful as a guide and cautionary tale for ongoing research. At the same time, neuroscientists should search for alternative concepts when studying the functional architecture of the neocortex. keywords: Cortical column, conceptual development, history of neuroscience, patchwork, eliminativism, conceptual retirement. (shrink)

The concept of 'levels of organization' has come under fire recently as being useless for scientific and philosophical purposes. In this paper, we show that 'levels' is actually a remarkably resilient and constructive conceptual tool that can be, and in fact is, used for a variety of purposes. To this effect, we articulate an account of the importance of the levels concept seen in light of its status as a major organizing concept of biology. We argue that the (...) class='Hi'>usefulness of ‘levels’ is best seen in the heuristic contributions the concept makes to treating and structuring scientific problems. We illustrate this with two examples from biological research. (shrink)

It is a commonly held view, buttressed by utilitarian considerations, that pain and suffering are valueless and not to be borne. Moreover, it is this thought, that they are valueless, which is often deployed in arguing for euthanasia for the terminally ill or those with mental or physical disability. This essay argues that suffering is inextricably part of the human condition and that it is our response to it that determines whether we are ennobled or degraded by it. While it (...) is not sought for itself, suffering provides human beings with the opportunity to be ennobled, to be given unexpected experiences of love and to gain improbable sources of strength and so it can have a use which can make it valuable. (shrink)

This paper investigates the possibility of identifying various ecodomical or constructive possibilities which have the potential to ideologically transform the world at a global scale in the sense that they can promote a set of ideas with positive connotations in dealing with the extremely complex issue of religion. Whether religion is good or bad, positive or negative has nothing to do with this article’s basic methodology which seeks to isolate various theoretical attempts aimed at approaching the issue of religion through (...) a common denominator. For this paper, this common denominator is the human being and, by association, the notion of goodness which will be used in order to demonstrate that, concerning religion, it can provide not only a theoretical framework for positive discussions about religion but also an ecodomic possibility whereby humanity can transform the world into a safer environment for persons of all races and convictions. Four such ecodomical attempts to use the notion of goodness will be analyzed in connection with the reality of religion: John Shelby Spong who promotes goodness in order to free society of religion so for him religion is useless, Ion Bria for whom goodness cannot be detached from religion so religion is vital, Vito Macuso whose conviction is that goodness exists with or without religion so religion is neutral, and Desmond Tutu who believes that goodness can turn religion, any religion for that matter, in a positive reality, so in his understanding religion is positive. (shrink)