Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Presents opposing viewpoints on various ethical, moral, legal, and medical issues concerning euthanasia.

Is it possible that one and the same object x has opposing dispositions at the same time? One's first reaction might be that it is evidently impossible. On the assumption that x is incombustible, it seems to follow that it is not combustible. Surprisingly enough, however, it is claimed that there are a number of examples in support of the possibility of simultaneous co-instantiation of opposing dispositions. In this paper, I will bring under scrutiny some of the examples and come (...) to the conclusion that none of them achieve the desired goal. This will give support to the initial intuition that opposing dispositions cannot be co-instantiated by one and the same object at the same time. (shrink)

Philosophers disagree over whether dispositions can be intrinsically finked or masked. Choi suggests that there are no clear, relevant differences between cases where intrinsic finks would be absurd and those where they seem plausible, and as a result rejects them wholesale. Here, I highlight two features of dispositional properties which, when considered together, provide a plausible explanation for when dispositions can be subject to intrinsic finks and when not.

A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.

In secularized modern Western societies, moral opposition to the liberalization of abortion, gay adoption, euthanasia, and suicide often relies on justifications based on other-oriented motives. Moreover, some argue that the truly open-minded people may be those who, against the stream, oppose the established dominant liberal values in modern societies. We investigated whether moral and religious opposition to, vs. the acceptance of, the above four issues, as well as the endorsement of respective con vs. pro arguments reflect “compassionate openness”, “compassionate conservatism”, (...) or “self-centered moral rigorism”. The results, to some extent, confirmed the third pattern. Thus, compassionate openness does not seem to underline modern moral opposition, possibly in contrast to some rhetoric of the latter. (shrink)

Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent perception is fundamentally unlike a perception. (...) Disjunctivists differ in what they say the fundamental difference is. We’ll get to some of that shortly. First I’ll say where I’m headed here. (shrink)

To avoid the mystical rapture that seizes interpreters put before the theme of unitas oppositorum in Cusanus and Leibniz, this contribution shall move from the prosaic question: what does ensue from such opposites or from their conjunction? 2) interweave the analysis with some external point of view, notably that of Erasmus. This question will be investigated on the background of two antitethical traditions in dealing philosophically with opposition and contradiction, although in the end we shall try and find out other (...) ways and reasons for connecting the two thinkers on the ground of the various possible unitates oppositorum, than those of the metaphysical doctrine of the opposites. (shrink)

Medicine often views hospice care as “giving up,” which results in a reduced quality of end-of-life care for many patients. By integrating a theology of the Sabbath with modern medicine, hospice becomes a sacred and valuable way to honor the dying patient in a comprehensive and holistic way. A theology of Sabbath as “Sacredness in Time” can provide the foundation for a shift in understanding hospice as a legitimate care plan, which shifts the focus from controlling and manipulating space for (...) the body, to rest and enjoyment of time for the whole person. First, I explore vitalism and its negative effects on the institution of hospice. Second, I address the main misconceptions and biases surrounding hospice in order to establish hospice as an appropriate option for the terminally ill. Finally, I argue for a shift away from sacredness in space (as seen in vitalism) to sacredness in time. (shrink)

Purpose: Examination of the main arguments for radical constructivism and the critical arguments put forward against it. Findings: Although there is no reason to doubt the value of constructivism as such, it can be stated that any epistemological radicalism lacks plausibility. There is ample evidence that we still can adopt a critical realist outlook, even if every part of our world view is a construction. Implications: We should engage ourselves in the development of an anti-metaphysical, non-objectivist epistemology. By far the (...) most promising contribution should be a version of pragmatism. (shrink)

Animals have moral standing; that is, they have properties (including the ability to feel pain) that qualify them for the protections of morality. It follows from this that humans have moral obligations toward animals, and because rights are logically correlative to obligations, animals have rights.

Wright, Ken France's state school system has a long tradition of freedom from religion. It owes a great debt to Jules Ferry who was Minister for Public Instruction from 1879 to 1885, and to Ferdinand Buisson, his Director of Primary Education. A law of 28 March 1882 removed the teaching of religion from all primary schools, to be replaced by ethics and civics.

Derrida's purpose in ‘Death Penalties’ (2004), is to show how both arguments in favour of capital punishment, exemplified by Kant's, and arguments for its abolition, such as those of Beccaria, are deconstructible. He claims that ‘never, to my knowledge, has any philosopher as a philosopher, in his or her own strictly and systematically philosophical discourse, never has any philosophy as such contested the legitimacy of the death penalty.’ (2004, 146) Derrida also asks how it is possible ‘to abolish the death (...) penalty in a way that is based on principle, that is universal and unconditional, and not because it has become not only cruel but useless, insufficiently exemplary?’ (2004, 137) In my paper, I examine Derrida's claim about the lack of systematic opposition to the death penalty on the part of philosophers and suggest an answer to his question concerning the possibility of a universal and unconditional opposition to capital punishment. (shrink)

In October 2017, the Trump administration announced that it would not participate in a $17 billion ‘WaterFix’ plan to remake California’s water conveyance system by drilling two massive tunnels und...

Presents opposing viewpoints about the relationship between religion and science, both historically and in the present.

Legal theorists have characterized physical evidence of brain dysfunction as a double-edged sword, wherein the very quality that reduces the defendant’s responsibility for his transgression could simultaneously increase motivations to punish him by virtue of his apparently increased dangerousness. However, empirical evidence of this pattern has been elusive, perhaps owing to a heavy reliance on singular measures that fail to distinguish between plural, often competing internal motivations for punishment. The present study employed a test of the theorized double-edge pattern using (...) a novel approach designed to separate such motivations. We asked a large sample of participants (N = 330) to render criminal sentencing judgments under varying conditions of the defendant’s mental health status (Healthy, Neurobiological Disorder, Psychological Disorder) and the disorder’s treatability (Treatable, Untreatable). As predicted, neurobiological evidence simultaneously elicited shorter prison sentences (i.e., mitigating) and longer terms of involuntary hospitalization (i.e., aggravating) than equivalent psychological evidence. However, these effects were not well explained by motivations to restore treatable defendants to health or to protect society from dangerous persons but instead by deontological motivations pertaining to the defendant’s level of deservingness and possible obligation to provide medical care. This is the first study of its kind to quantitatively demonstrate the paradoxical effect of neuroscientific trial evidence and raises implications for how such evidence is presented and evaluated. (shrink)

Strauss's critique of Heidegger's philosophy aims at a recovery of political philosophy, which he saw as threatened by Heidegger's radical historicism; for Strauss, philosophy as a whole could not survive without political philosophy, and his return to the classical tradition of political philosophy, while inspired by the work of Heidegger, was directed against what he saw as the nihilism that was its consequence. Here I wish to examine a dimension of Strauss's critique which, though hinted at, remains neglected or unexplored (...) by Strauss: that is, how the critique of Heideggarian historicism should naturally link with Strauss's frequent attention to the issue of the ancient 'quarrel between philosophy and poetry'. It has often been observed by other commentators that through Heidegger's work, philosophy appears liable to be supplanted by contemporary literature, whether poetry or philosophy. As some of Strauss's explicit statements extend his definition of what falls under the category of 'poetry' in the modern age to contemporary novels and poetry, this aspect of Heidegger should have commanded more of his attention. Endurance of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry becomes through the prism of Strauss's work the confrontation of political philosophy with literature, particularly the novel form. It was not so much the rise of modern, non-teleological natural science that threatened the endurance and dignity of philosophy, then, but the rise of modern literature; the critique of historicism, when viewed in the light of the enduring 'quarrel', should lead one to a consideration of a crucial issue which remained oddly neglected, or was only hinted at, by Strauss. (shrink)

Construction of the trunk/caudal region of the vertebrate embryo involves a set of distinct molecules and processes whose relationships are just coming into focus. In addition to the subdivision of the embryo into head and trunk domains, this “caudalisation” process requires the establishment and maintenance of a stem zone. This sequentially generates caudal tissues over a long period which then undergo differentiation and patterning in the extending body axis. Here we review recent studies that show that changes in the signalling (...) properties of the paraxial mesoderm act as a switch that controls onset of differentiation and pattern in the spinal cord. These findings identify distinct roles for different caudalising factors; in particular, Fibroblast Growth Factor (FGF) inhibits differentiation in the caudal stem zone, while Retinoic acid (RA) provided rostrally by somitic mesoderm is required for neuronal differentiation and establishment of ventral neural pattern. Furthermore, the mutual opposition of FGF and RA pathways controls not only neural differentiation but also mesoderm segmentation and might also underlie the progressive assignment of rostrocaudal identity by regulating Hox gene availability and activation. BioEssays 26:857–869, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

“Speciesism” accords greater value to human beings and their interests. It is supposed to be opposed to a liberationist stance, since it is precisely the numerous forms of discounting of animal interests which liberationists oppose. This association is mistaken. In this paper I claim that many forms of speciesism are consistent with upholding a robust liberationist agenda. Accordingly, several hotly disputed topics in animal ethics can be set aside. The significance of such clarification is that synthesizing liberationism with speciesism substantially (...) modifies some of the coordinates of the debates over animal ethics. Secondly, defusing some counterintuitive implications of liberationism may make liberationism more popular than it currently is. Liberationism would no longer demand the eradication of ingrained speciesist intuitions. The paper finally presents a form of speciesism that does oppose liberationism, but is too strong and (fortunately) shared by few. (shrink)

This paper presents a transcription of a handwritten Latin text, along with its translation into English, that was identified only very recently in the Kongelige Bibliothek in Copenhagen while preparing the new critical edition of Kant’s Nova dilucidatio (PND). The text consists of remarks by Johann Reinhold Grube, composed in his role as opponent at Kant’s disputation for the venia legendi on 27 September 1755. Grube’s interleaved opposing remarks on Kant’s dissertatio metaphysica pro receptione contain precious starting points for new (...) lines of research, since they vividly exemplify the point of view of one of the participants in the debate, a perspective that is rarely documented. In addition to informing us about how the disputation itself was carried out and which traditional rhetorical techniques were used, these remarks offer a compelling glimpse into the immediate reception of Kant’s first thoughts on logic and metaphysics, giving scholars access to an ingenious reaction to Kant’s stance on the theory of judgment. (shrink)

John Anderson was Australia's most important philosopher in the first half of this century. Coming from Scotland as a young man, he held the chair of philosophy at the University of Sydney for thirty years until his retirement in 1958. The doctrinaire Scots empiricist would become as Australian as a magpie. He developed his own distinctive system of realism and fathered a vigorous local school characterised by inquiry, independence and a deep commitment to philosophy as a way of life. Far (...) from being a remote, albeit distinguished, technical philosopher and university man, he was a formidable public figure and fierce controversialist who, over decades, outraged many of Sydney's clergy and conventionally minded citizenry. From an early Marxist phase, he espoused and applied 'freethought' and criticism in everything, opposing all forms of censorship and mind control - except perhaps, as one intrepid student observed, his own. Anderson was no secular saint and this, his first biography, is no hagiography. Brian Kennedy has uncovered much new material, including personal letters and diaries, about Anderson's Scottish past and his conflicted public and private life in Australia. His relations with students were complex; with women, they were decidedly problematic. Warts and all, Anderson has much to teach us about universities and the intellectual life, as this lucid and incisive book makes clear. In the aftermath of the revolution that has swept our universities and colleges into a brave new world, Anderson's uncompromising calls to unfettered inquiry, criticism and the Socratic way of life are timely. (shrink)

This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural-law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural-law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural-law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies (...) their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude.*In the seed of the city of the just, a malignant seed is hidden, in its turn: the certainty and pride of being in the right. (Calvino 1997, 162). (shrink)

Many philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have held that the predominant modern western theories of ethics like Kant’s deontological theory and Mill’s Utilitarianism have failed to deliver as a “theory” of ethics. In other words, they are not successful as “decision procedures” whereby one can determine which action from a multitude of actions open before the agent would be right and therefore morally obligatory for him to do. In fact, the basic concepts of moral obligation, impartiality, and objectivity of moral (...) standards has been questioned and pitted against the “personal point of view” of the agent. It has been held that the “moral goods” have to be given up for the sake of the “personal goods.” Is this a systemic fault which is linked with the normative nature of ethics? Or, can we understand ethics in a manner where it can be objective and yet not have to give up on the plurality of moral and nonmoral goods? Can ethical theory in this sense function as an “action guide to moral practice”? These are some questions that will be taken up in the paper against the backdrop of the views of the critics of ethical theory. (shrink)

Hilary Yancey has recently defended the view that for the duration of pregnancy, the mother’s body (or much of it) is literally part of the foetus. I argue that if she’s right, then a venerable tradition of pro-choice arguments will become much harder to defend.