This article analyzes appropriate public policies for enhancement use of two most important stimulant drugs: Ritalin (methylphenidate) and Adderall (mixed amphetamine salts). The author argues that appropriate regulation of cognition enhancement drugs cannot be a result of a general discussion on cognitive enhancements as such, but has to be made on a case-by-case basis. Starting from the recently proposed taxation approach to cognition enhancement drugs, the author analyzes available, moderately permissive models of regulation. After a thorough analysis of relevant characteristics (...) of methylphenidate and amphetamine, the author concludes that a moderately liberal permissive regulation of enhancement use by healthy adults might be appropriate for extended release forms of methylphenidate. However, due to their danger profile, amphetamine and instant release forms of methylphenidate should not be made readily available to healthy adults and would need to be prohibited. (shrink)

The prohibition against psychologizing has been a source of confusion to many Randians. Psychologizing is the practice of incorrectly or improperly inferring motives in other people instead of rendering moral judgment. Rand thought that it could manifest in two ways: inquisitorial and excuse-making. However, Rand's concrete examples are preponderantly of the excuse-making type; her bright line between psychology and philosophy is unsuccessfully drawn; and in offering extended, strongly condemnatory analyses of the supposed motives behind psychologizing, she yields to the (...) very temptation she claims to warn against. “Psychologizing” turns out to be an anticoncept. (shrink)

There is a widely held view on measurement inferences, that goes back to Stevens’s ([1946]) theory of measurement scales and ‘permissible statistics’. This view defends the following prohibition: you should not make inferences from averages taken with ordinal scales (versus quantitative scales: interval or ratio). This prohibition is general—it applies to all ordinal scales—and it is sometimes endorsed without qualification. Adhering to it dramatically limits the research that the social and biomedical sciences can conduct. I provide a Bayesian (...) analysis of this inferential problem, determining when measurements from ordinal scales can be used to confirm hypotheses about relative group averages. The prohibition, I conclude, cannot be upheld, even in a qualified sense. The beliefs needed to make average comparisons are less demanding than those appropriate for quantitative scales. I illustrate with the alleged paradigm ordinal scale, Mohs’ scale of mineral hardness, arguing that the literature has mischaracterized it. (shrink)

This paper examines the deontic logic of the Talmud. We shall find, by looking at examples, that at first approximation we need deontic logic with several connectives: O T A Talmudic obligation F T A Talmudic prohibition F D A Standard deontic prohibition O D A Standard deontic obligation. In classical logic one would have expected that deontic obligation O D is definable by $O_DA \equiv F_D\neg A$ and that O T and F T are connected by $O_TA (...) \equiv F_T\neg A$ This is not the case in the Talmud for the T (Talmudic) operators, though it does hold for the D operators. We must change our underlying logic. We have to regard {O T , F T } and {O D , F D } as two sets of operators, where O T and F T are independent of one another and where we have some connections between the two sets. We shall list the types of obligation patterns appearing in the Talmud and develop an intuitionistic deontic logic to accommodate them. We shall compare Talmudic deontic logic with modern deontic logic. (shrink)

According to Jewish dietary laws, known as Kashrut, the meat and milk mixing in the same meal is prohibited. This article examines this prohibition from a theological and modern medical viewpoint.

In this paper, I offer a personal and professional narrative of how Canada went from prohibition to permission for medical assistance in dying. I describe the legal developments to date and flag what might be coming in the near future. I also offer some personal observations and reflections on the role and impact of bioethics and bioethicists, on what it was like to be a participant in Canada's law reform process, and on lessons that readers in other jurisdictions might (...) take from Canada's experience. (shrink)

Can torture be justified in exceptional circumstances? In this timely work, Michelle Farrell asks how and why this question has become such a central debate. She argues that the ticking bomb scenario is a fiction which blinds us to the reality of torture and investigates what it is that that scenario fails to represent. Farrell aims to reframe how we think about torture, and critically reflects on the historical and contemporary approaches to its use in exceptional situations. She demonstrates how (...) torture, from its use in Algeria to the 'War on Terror', has been misrepresented, and appraises the legalist, extra-legalist and absolutist assessments of exception to the torture prohibition. Employing Giorgio Agamben's theory of the state of exception as a foil, Farrell deconstructs these approaches and goes on to propose her own theory of exceptional torture. (shrink)

In normative multi-agent systems, the question of “how an agent identifies norms in an open agent society” has not received much attention. This paper aims at addressing this question. To this end, this paper proposes an architecture for norm identification for an agent. The architecture is based on observation of interactions between agents. This architecture enables an autonomous agent to identify prohibition norms in a society using the prohibition norm identification (PNI) algorithm. The PNI algorithm uses association rule (...) mining, a data mining approach to identify sequences of events as candidate norms. When a norm changes, an agent using our architecture will be able to modify the norm and also remove a norm if it does not hold in the society. Using simulations of a park scenario we demonstrate how an agent makes use of the norm identification framework to identify prohibition norms. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the degree of philosophical attention devoted to the question of the morality of offering financial compensation in an attempt to increase the medical supply of human body parts and products, such as plasma. This paper will argue not only that donor compensation is ethically acceptable, but that plasma donors should not be prohibited from being offered compensation if they are to give their informed consent to donate. Regulatory regimes that prohibit (...) donor compensation thus unethically prevent the typical donor from being able to give her informed consent to donate. (shrink)

Is a Nozickian theory of rights compatible with a no-fault motor insurance scheme? I say, Yes. The argument turns on an explication of the basis on which a Nozickian justifies the prohibition of merely risky activities.

The distinction between 'conduct norms' and 'sanction norms' is widely assumed to be an essential tool for any correct understanding of criminal responsibility. Conduct norms (often also called 'primary') are referred to with the language of 'prohibitions', and it is normally accepted that a crime is by definition a 'prohibited' human behaviour, in the sense that it is always an infraction of a 'conduct norm'. I mean to discuss and criticize this rather consensual assumption. Modern criminal codes don't usually incorporate (...) a catalogue of prohibitions, but this is considered to be of no consequence when it comes to discuss whether the law prohibits those behaviours whose performance may lead to the application of a criminal sanction: there is no question that sanction norms may be properly read out of the special parts of our criminal codes, and from a sanction norm it is always possible to infer the correspondent prohibition. Or so the current understanding goes. I shall first try to make some sense of this common idea, which I call the inference thesis. I will then proceed to show why it is wrong. The inference thesis is necessarily committed to an understanding of conduct norms as prescriptive norms addressed to citizens, and the relevant notion of a prescriptive norm has to be characterized in some detail. Having done so, I will argue that such a prescriptive understanding of 'conduct norms' is incompatible with several aspects common to most modern systems of criminal law and unquestionably essential to the concept of a crime. (shrink)

After nearly 76 years following the UN Charter, the dominant feature of the multilateral international order has shifted from a focus on states’ sovereignty to the rights of the individual. It is now widely accepted that human rights are not the province of any one state’s domestic affairs, but of importance to the entire international community. The UN Security Council sits atop the supra-state order, and holds the ultimate authority to initiate consensus-based, collective action so as to limit or prevent (...) gross human rights violations. Yet, many times the Security Council is slow to act, and consensus is exceedingly rare. This begs the question: in the face of gross human rights violations and Security Council inaction, is unilateral humanitarian intervention justified? The present state of international law on the matter is unsettled and controversial to many. What follows is a discussion on the development of international law relating to unilateral humanitarian intervention, the permissibility of intervention for gross human rights violations, and justification for intervention under existing international law. I conclude that under the present multilateral regime, unilateral humanitarian intervention is legally justified, despite fears that the principle may be invoked for the purposes of cloaking acts of aggression. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the reception and use of Aristotle’s four causes by twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin Christian theologians, primarily at Paris. I pay special attention to the early thirteenth century, when Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy were officially prohibited in the French capital. By looking at a wide range of texts from both prominent and obscure theologians, I hope to contribute to an expanded view of the ways in which intellectuals in the Latin west received and appropriated Aristotle’s (...) ideas. (shrink)

We typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to underwrite these prohibitions, and, in particular, to underwrite our views about when such prohibitions should be amended or overridden. Argues against absolute prohibitions and explores the role of judgement in rule‐consequentialism. The final section explains how rule‐consequentialism can endorse rules giving agents special obligations towards family and friends.

Because they track the Model Penal Code, current criminal law formulations of risk offenses typically fail to distinguish the rule of conduct question—What risks does the criminal law prohibit?—from the adjudication question — When is a particular violator’s conscious disregard of, or his inattentiveness to, a risk in a particular situation sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal liability? Instead, the formulations address only the second question — through their definition of reckless and negligent culpability — and fail to provide a rule (...) of conduct provision to define a prohibited risk. This reliance upon culpability definitions as the core of risk-creation offense definitions is problematic because it fails to announce a useable conduct rule that describes those risks the law prohibits. Instead, this approach subjectivizes the definition of prohibited risks. What may be held "reckless" or "negligent" for one person may not be "reckless" or "negligent" for another person in the identical situation — an effect that strips case adjudications of their value in educating the community as to risks that the rules of conduct prohibit. Current risk-creation offenses also are problematic because they make results — including the creation of a prohibited risk — irrelevant to criminal liability. While this is consistent with the Model Code’s view that resulting harm is insignificant, that only culpable state of mind ought to affect liability, it is inconsistent with the view of most state code drafters. Thus, while the Model Code grades offenses without regard to whether a prohibited risk in fact is created, most state codes logically would want to grade lower in the absence of a prohibited risk. These two fundamental problems—the failure to distinguish conduct rules and adjudication rules and the confusion over the significance of results — are related. The Model Penal Code’s general failure to distinguish conduct and adjudication rules made it less likely that state code drafters would notice what they would have seen as the Code’s inappropriate subjectivization of risk and risk offenses. If the Model Code had systematically segregated conduct and adjudication rules, it would have been more obvious to state code drafters that the Code’s formulation of risk-creation offenses was one that they could not accept. (shrink)

Nigel Walker’s first principle of criminalization declares that ‘Prohibitions should not be included in the criminal law for the sole purpose of ensuring that breaches of them are visited with retributive punishment’. I argue that we should reject this principle, for ‘mala prohibita’ as well as for ‘mala in se’: conduct should be criminalized in order to ensure (as far as we reasonably can) that those who engage in it receive retributive punishment. In the course of the argument, I show (...) why we should not see the criminal law as consisting in ‘prohibitions’; I explain different species of mala prohibita, and show how their commission does involve genuine wrongdoing; and I show the importance of distinguishing the question of regulation from that of sanction. (shrink)

A topic of growing importance within philosophy of science is the epistemic implications of the organization of research. This paper identifies a promising approach to social epistemology—nonideal systems design—and uses it to examine one important aspect of the organization of research, namely the system of patenting and licensing and its role in structuring the production and dissemination of knowledge. The primary justification of patenting in science and technology is consequentialist in nature. Patenting should incentivize research and thereby promote the development (...) of knowledge, which in turn facilitates social progress. Some have disputed this argument, maintaining that patenting actually inhibits knowledge production. In this paper, I make a stronger argument; in some areas of research in the US—in particular, research on GM seeds—patents and patent licenses can be, and are in fact being, used to prohibit some research. I discuss three potential solutions to this problem: voluntary agreements, eliminating patents, and a research exemption. I argue against eliminating patents, and I show that while voluntary agreements and a research exemption could be helpful, they do not sufficiently address the problems of access that are discussed here. More extensive changes in the organization of research are necessary. (shrink)

Employees’ may view prohibitive voice—that is, expressing concerns about harmful practices in the workplace—as a moral yet interpersonally risky behavior. We, thus, predict that prohibitive voice is likely to be influenced by variables associated with moral and relational qualities. Specifically, we hypothesize that employees’ moral identity internalization—i.e., the centrality of moral traits in their self-concept—is positively associated with their use of prohibitive voice. Furthermore, we hypothesize that this association is stronger when employees enjoy a higher quality relationship with their leader. (...) In addition, drawing on the literature on moral symbolism, we hypothesize that workgroup moral identity symbolization—i.e., the extent to which workgroup members symbolically display moral traits—moderates the relationship between moral identity internalization and prohibitive voice in a compensatory manner. That is, workgroup moral identity symbolization enhances employees’ use of prohibitive voice when employees’ moral identity internalization is low. Data collected from hospital employees and their supervisors and coworkers support these hypotheses. These findings suggest new ways to promote prohibitive voice and, thereby, protect organizational stakeholders from harmful behaviors. (shrink)

John Harris criticises the European Parliament’s ‘waft in the direction of human rights and human dignity’ and rejects its suggestion that ‘human cloning violates the principle of equality since “it permits a eugenic and racist selection of the human race”’. He argues that, by parity of reasoning, so too do ‘pre-natal and pre-implantation screening, not to mention egg donation, sperm donation, surrogacy, abortion and human preference in choice of partner’. Conflating the techniques mentioned (ie, human cloning, egg donation, etc) with (...) human preference in choice of a partner, he holds that reproductive liberty must be the operative principle in determining what ought to be prohibited by law in the realm of human reproduction. This article challenges his two problematic assumptions. (shrink)

This paper argues the case for the legalization of addictive drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. It maintains that there are no market failures which could justify a banning of these substances, and that, as in the earlier historical case of prohibition of alcohol, our present drug policy has increased crime, decreased respect for legitimate law, and created great social upheaval.

Methodological naturalism has been widely accepted as a necessary condition of scientific theorizing, the assumption being that it exacts no questionable epistemological or metaphysical costs. In this paper, I argue that this assumption is mistaken. I further argue that the presumed costs of not adopting methodological naturalism are illusory.

Consider a familiar case. A sign reads, “No vehicles in the park.” A man in the park has a heart attack. An ambulance is needed. Does its entry violate the rule? Most people would say that the rule was not meant to apply to needed ambulances. It would not make any difference if the rule read, “No vehicles whatsoever in the park.” The purpose of any rule against vehicles would not be served by a flat prohibition of ambulances. Consider (...) a second case. A child comes to the park on a tricycle. Is he barred from entering? A tricycle is a vehicle. But is it the kind of vehicle the author of the sign had in mind? He may only have wanted to preserve the park from fast or noisy vehicles. The purpose of the rule again becomes crucial. Is the purpose to maintain quiet and security, or is the purpose to assure absolute tranquility? The prohibition of the tricycle will depend on what purpose is accepted. (shrink)

John-Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor examines the commandments, in particular the Decalogue. In so far as it is the expression of ‘natural law’ applicable and reflexively accessible to all, it is a permanent charter not only of Christian inspired ethics but of every human ethic . Using the story of the rich young man, cited in the encyclical’s first chapter, we would like to elucidate in the first part, and in our own way, how prohibitions open the way for freedom (...) and the richness of human creativity.This will show that Christian ethics, for which the Decalogue is of essential importance, cannot limit itself to drawing borders. Prohibitions are only a necessary condition and not a sufficient ground for a Christian ethic inspired by the gospel whose heart is the living person of Jesus the Christ. A Christian ethic does not end with delimiting borders that make possible and protect certain fundamental values; it also opens its own perspectives for a tasteful shaping of a qualified freedom that is ‘won’ thanks to keeping the commandments. This in turn leads to the point of the second part: a look at ‘taste’ and aesthetics in ethics. This will show how a balanced Christian ethic will necessarily be marked by a bipolarity of prohibition and taste.[...]CONCLUSIONEthics is not a simple matter; it is a complex field wherein orientations, commandments and prohibitions, suggestions, examples and experiences all play a role. We hope that it is now evident that ethics, on the existential level of experience, can only function properly when there is a tension between prohibition and taste. A one-sided emphasis or absolutizing of one of the two leads to the self-destruction of ethics. Reducing ethics to obeying commandments and prohibitions leads to a rejection of ethics, while a narcissistic absolutizing of taste leads to a destruction of ethics in as far as it results in the aestheticism of pure taste and in arbitrariness. Only an ethic that remains normatively modest by focusing its attention on the essential delimiting rules that protect basic values opens perspectives towards a creative meaningful life as a ‘lively adventure’. (shrink)

Destined for the Cardozo Law Review. Posted 28 November 2006.

We have no interest whatever in minimizing the continuing history of racist, sexist, homophobic, or otherwise abusive biologisms, or the urgency of their exposure, that has made the gravamen of so many contemporary projects of critique. At the same time, we fear — with installation of an automatic antibiologism as the unshifting tenet of `theory' — the loss of conceptual access to an entire thought-realm. I was left wondering what danger had been averted by the exclusion of biology. What does (...) the nominative `biological or anatomical body' actually refer to? And what secures the separation of its inadmissible matter from the proper purview of Irigaray's textual interventions? When I asked a question to this effect it was met with a certain nervous comprehension. Deciding, perhaps, that I must still be immersed in a precritical understanding of the body, the speaker dismissed me with a revealing theatrical gesture. As if to emphasize the sheer absurdity of my question she pinched herself and commented `Well I don't mean this body'. And so it seemed with a gesture so matter of fact that it required no further comment, the fact of matter was both decided and dispatched. Feminism has been as deeply implicated in routinized antiessentialism as any of our critical procedures. Even though questions of `the body' have become increasingly fashionable in all manner of feminist projects, the schedule of feminism's antibiologism has been little altered. In most of these projects on `the body', the body in question is pursued in its socially, experientially, or psychically constituted forms, but rarely in its physiologically, biochemically, or microbiologically constituted form, the idea of biological construction having been rendered either unintelligible or naive. Despite an avowed interest in the body, there is a persistent distaste for biological detail. These feminist theories have usually been reluctant to engage with biological data: they retain, and encourage, the fierce antibiologism that marked the emergence of second wave feminism. That feminist scholars are particularly prone to a `knee jerk constructivism' helps explain the reluctance of those in the humanities to engage seriously with the claims of science. This book functions primarily as a reminder to social, political, and cultural theorists, particularly those interested in feminism, antiracism and questions of the politics of globalisation, that they have forgotten a crucial dimension of research, if not necessary to, then certainly useful for more incisively formulating the concepts on which they so heavily, if implicitly rely. It is written as a remembrance of what we have forgotten — not just the body, but that which makes it possible and which limits its actions: the precarious, accidental, contingent, expedient, striving, dynamic status of life in a messy, complicated, resistant, brute world of materiality, a world regulated by the exigencies, the forces, of space and time. We have forgotten the nature, the ontology, of the body, the conditions under which bodies are encultured, psychologized, given identity, historical location, and agency. We have forgotten where we come from. (shrink)

A strong moral reason for prohibiting doping in sport is to be found in the bad choices that would be faced by clean athletes in a sporting world that tolerated doping. The case against doping is not, however, to be grounded in the concept of coercion. Instead, it is grounded in a general duty of sport to afford fair opportunity to the goods that are distinctively within sport's sphere of control. The moral reason to prohibit doping need not be balanced (...) against any autonomy claim of athletes who would prefer to dope because, upon closer examination, such claims have no force. The moral reason to prohibit doping does, however, need to be balanced against the enforcement costs imposed on all athletes by effective prohibition. (shrink)

The collapse of confidence in anonymization as a robust approach for preserving the privacy of personal data has incited an outpouring of new approaches that aim to fill the resulting trifecta of technical, organizational, and regulatory privacy gaps left in its wake. In the latter category, and in large part due to the growth of Big Data–driven biomedical research, falls a growing chorus of calls for criminal and penal offences to sanction wrongful re-identification of “anonymized” data. This chorus cuts across (...) the fault lines of polarized privacy law scholarship that at times seems to advocate privacy protection at the expense of Big Data research or vice versa. Focusing on Big Data in the context of biomedicine, this article surveys the approaches that criminal or penal law might take toward wrongful re-identification of health data. It contextualizes the strategies within their respective legal regimes as well as in relation to emerging privacy debates focusing on personal data use and data linkage and assesses the relative merit of criminalization. We conclude that this approach suffers from several flaws and that alternative social and legal strategies to deter wrongful re-identification may be preferable. (shrink)

The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development of mathematics into a general science of quantities. Special reference is made to Proclus’ commentary to Euclid’s first book of Elements , to the sixteenth century translations of Euclid’s work into Latin and to the works of Stevin, Wallis, Viète and Descartes. The prohibition rule on kind-crossing formulated by Aristotle (...) in Posterior analytics is used to distinguish between conceptions that share the same name but are substantively different: for example the search for a broader genus including all mathematical objects; the search for a common character of different species of mathematical objects; and the effort to treat magnitudes as numbers. (shrink)

In this study, we draw on moral cleansing theory to investigate the consequence of unethical pro-organizational behavior from the perspective of the actors. Specifically, we hypothesize that after conducting UPB, people may feel guilty and tend to cleanse their wrongdoings by providing suggestions or identifying problems at work. We further hypothesize that the above relationship is moderated by the actor’s moral identity symbolization. We conducted three studies, including experiment and surveys, to test our hypotheses. Results of these studies show consistent (...) support to our hypotheses. In particular, individuals reported more felt guilt after conducting UPB, and they tended to compensate with more prohibitive and promotive voice subsequently. In addition, the indirect relationship from UPB acting to both voice behaviors via felt guilt was stronger for people with a high level of moral identity symbolization. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and (...) analyses three arguments for a legal exception, based on sexual rights, beneficence, and luck egalitarianism, respectively. It concludes that although the general case for and against criminalisation is complicated there is a good case for a legal exception. (shrink)

An increasing number of global policy regimes are intended to influence international business practices, but their effectiveness is uncertain. This article presents a conceptual framework for understanding the effectiveness of regimes, with seven propositions. The case of the evolving global anticorruption regime is described and used to test the propositions. Two key conclusions are (a) the difficulty of the problem being addressed is a key factor in limiting regime effectiveness and (b) this problem, as well as others, can be addressed (...) in part by careful development of formal regime policies. Implications for scholarship and practice are presented. (shrink)

From 2002 to 2003, the United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority carried out a review of the available methods of sex selection, the central aims of which were, in the words of the subsequent report.

Elizabeth Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ is read and remembered principally as a critique of the state of ethical theory at the time when she was writing—an account of certain faulty assumptions underlying that theory in its different variants, and rendering trivial the points on which they ostensibly disagree. Not unreasonably, the essay serves as a starting point for the recent Oxford Readings collection on ‘virtue ethics’, and as an authoritative text on the failings of other approaches with which philosophy students (...) have to acquaint themselves. Yet what really commands attention on rereading it is Anscombe's denunciation of the impotence of current moral philosophy to generate resistance to certain quite specific forms of wrongdoing. The question that provides a kind of gold standard here, recurring several times in the course of the discussion, is that of the killing of the innocent in order to avoid some putatively greater evil, or to bring about some sufficiently great good. (shrink)

Bataille's version of transgression and prohibition is based on two presuppositions: the first one is coupling of death and ecstasy on the level of energetic principle, which makes the combination of personally grounded experience of transcendence with the dispositions of the subject possible. The second one concerns making use of two existential forces: the will to survival and the will to transcendence. The counterbalance of life and its negation is the basis for understanding and identification of the social function (...) of prohibitions and of individual desire to break them. Bataille is thus consequent in applying the idea of original energetic balance of acceptance and dismissal, which makes all further differences, especially those of transgression and prohibition, possible. (shrink)

The protection of human research subjects in clinical studies is regulated by international guidelines and national laws. Research Ethics Committees play an important role here, as they review the documentation for clinical studies under consideration of ethical aspects. This documentation includes an exclusion or wash-out period which designates when study subjects may not have participated in another study or be allowed to take part in a future one within a specified time period. However not all research subjects comply with their (...) applicable exclusion period. This prohibited multi-participation in clinical studies is known as ‘research subject tourism,’ ‘clinical study overlapping’, or ‘guinea-pigging’. This practice brings with it additional risks for the research subject and the integrity of the research being conducted. No comprehensive data are available to demonstrate exactly how many research subjects participate in overlapping multiple studies. However, the number of them who ‘travel’ from one study to another seems to be significant. Preventing this practice is a matter of concern for ethics committees, but the responsibility for protecting research subjects in this respect apart from approving the ethics of a wash-out period and recruiting from a specific pool or database of patients is solely that of the investigating physician. But how can the investigating physician be certain that a research subject complies with their exclusion period? An international data bank for research subjects who have participated, or are participating, in clinical studies, is a measure that would serve to prevent prohibited multi-participation in clinical studies and thereby protect the research subject, the investigating physician and their institution. VIP Check, International, which was founded by the author in 1990, is an example of such a data bank. This article examines the existence of prohibited multi-participation in clinical studies, the additional risk this practice of itself poses to the research subjects and the integrity of clinical studies, and how this practice might best be reduce or even eliminated through use of an international data bank of research subjects such as that of VIP Check. (shrink)