Om den engelske filosof Francis Bacon (1561-1624).

Ekpo, Anthony Did anything happen at Vatican II? anything of significance? These and similar questions have been posed by the historian John O'Malley, who has offered a historical-theological reflection on the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and its attendant reception over the years. The council has certainly provoked remarkable commentaries and reactions from scholars who have approached it from various viewpoints, namely, theological, historical, ecclesiological, canonical, moral and pastoral. At the end of the council, what emerged as the (...) Vatican II documents are far from forming a neat and tight theological treatise. Some theological issues were discussed briefly in the documents, but a richer theological interpretation and synthesis were left to be fleshed out by post-conciliar scholars. For any reflection on the council to be taken seriously, it has to feel the pulse and take stock of the church's selfunderstanding in today's world. Fifty-three years after the end of the council, the questions are no longer so much about what happened at Vatican II, but about what is happening now. 'How is the council being received today? Is the council, in its simplicity and depth, still relevant after fifty-three years?'. (shrink)

The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.

Pope Francis has set a new tone in papal policies, prioritizing the Good News of the Gospel. and fostering interfaith dialogue. He has won the resoect of youth and the marginalized.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Books Reviewed in this Article: Beyond Ideology: Religion and the Future of Western Civilization. By Ninian Smart. Pp.350, London, Collins, 1981, £9.95. Neophtonism and Indian Thought. Edited by R. Baine Harris. Pp.xiii, 353, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1982, $39.00, $12.95. Monotheism: A Philosophic Inquiry into the Foundations of Theology and Ethics. By Lenn Evan Goodman. Pp.122, Totowa, Allenheld, Osmun, 1981, $13.50. Neoplatonism and Christian Thought. Edited by Dominic J. O'Meara. Pp. xviii, 297, Albany, State University of New (...) York Press, 1981, $39.00, $12.95. The Path to Transcendence: From Philosophy to Mysticism in Saint Augustine. By Paul Henry, introduction and translation by Francis F. Burch. pp.xxix, 120, Pittsburgh, The Pickwick Press, 1981, $10.95. The Adequacy of Christian Ethics. By Brian Hebblethwaite. Pp. 144, London, Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1981, £5.95. Ethics. By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Pp. 220, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1981, $10.95. Human Nature, Election, and History. By Wolfhart Pannenberg. Pp. 116, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1982, £2.95. Ethics, Religion and Politics. By G.E.M. Anscombe. Pp.ix, 161, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981, £12.00. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method and Point. By R.M. Hare. Pp.viii, 242, Oxford University Press, 1982, £11.00, £3.95. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams. Pp.vii, 290. £7.50. Cambridge University Press, 1982, £20.00. Language and Political Understanding. By Michael J. Shapiro. Pp.253, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, £18.20. Marx's Politics. By Allan Gilbert. Pp.xv, 326, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981, £16.50. Feuerbach. By Marx W. Wartofsky. Pp.xx, 460, Cambridge University Press, 1977, £30.00, £9.95. Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art. By Martin Heidegger, translated with notes and an analysis by D.F. Krell. Pp.xvi, 263, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, £11.50. Freedom and Karl Jaspers's Philosophy. By Elizabeth Young‐Bruehl. Pp.xiv, 233, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1981, £14.00. ‘Being and Meaning’: Paul Tillich's Theory of Meaning, Truth and Logic. By I.E. Thompson. Pp.x, 244, Edinburgh University Press, 1981, £15.00. The Rationality of Science. By W.H. Newton‐Smith. Pp.xii, 294, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, £9.95, £5.95. Realism and the Progress of Science. By Peter Smith. Pp.viii, 135, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £12.50. Angels and principalities. By Wesley Carr. Pp.xii, 242, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £13.50. Rconciliation: A Study of Paul's Theology. By Ralph P. Martin. Pp.233, London, Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 1981, £8.95. Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament. Edited by William Horbury and Brian McNeil. Pp.xxi, 217, Cambridge University Press, 1981, £17.50. Constantine and Eusebius. By Timothy D. Barnes. Pp.viii, 458, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981, £24.50. Songs of Glory: the Romanesque Façades of Aquitaine. By Linda Seidel. Pp.x, 220, figs.63, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press. 1981, £17.50. Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer. Translated and edited by Michael J.B. Allen. Pp.x, 274, Berkeley‐Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1981, £18.50. The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, Volume 3. Pp.xiv, 162, London, Shepheard‐Walwyn, 1981, £8.00. The World of the Renaissance Jew: The Life and Thought of Abraham ben Mordecai Farissol. By David B. Ruderman. Pp.xvii, 265, Cincinatti, Hebrew Union College Press, 1981, $20.00. A Dialogue Concerning Heresies. Edited by T.M.C. Lawier, G. Marc'hadour and R.C. Marius. Pp.xiv, 888, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, £56.00. Canterbury and Rome, Sister Churches: A Roman Catholic Monk reflects upon Reunion in Diversity. By Robert Hale. Pp.xi, 188, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982, £5.95. Rome and Canterbury through Four Centuries: A Study of the Relations between the Church of Rome and the Anglican Churches 1530–1981. By Bernard and Margaret Pawley. Pp.xi, 387, London and Oxford, Mowbray, 1981, £4.95. American Indians and Christian Missions. By H.W. Bowden. Pp.xix, 255, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, £10.50. Catholics in Western Democracies: A Study in Political Behaviour. By John H. Whyte. Pp.193, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan. 1981, £13.00. Päpstliche Unfehlbarkeit bei Newman und Döllinger: Ein historisch‐systema‐tischer Vergleich. By Wolfgang Klausnitzer. Pp.280, Innsbruck, Tyrolia Verlag, 1980, 54 DM. The Letters of Baron Friedrich von Hügel and Professor Norman Kemp Smith. Edited by Lawrence F. Barmann. Pp.353, New York, Fordham University Press, 1981, no price given. Merton: A Biography. By Monica Furlong. Pp.xx, 342, London, Collins, 1980, £6.95. The Autonomy of Religious Belief: A Critical Inquiry. Edited by Frederick J. Crosson. Pp.vii, 162, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, £8.95. The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God. By Gordon D. Kaufman. Pp.309. Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1981, $13.95. Spirits of Power: An Analysis of Shona Cosmology. By Hubert Bucher. Pp.231, Capetown, Oxford University Press, 1980, £8.75. Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishnah. By Jacob Neusner. Pp.xix, 419, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, £17.50. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Francis Sparshott THE CASE OF THE UNRELIABLE AUTHOR Narratology, as the study of narrative in its most general sense, has made great advances in the last decade, ranging from the rhetorical and syntactic study of narrative forms to an interpretation of human life as a fabric of stories we tell ourselves and each other. I do not keep up with these studies, and the intention of die present (...) article is not to add to them. The standpoint from which it is written is not that of the literary theorist, but that of the relatively plain reader. I write as someone who reads stories that people have written for relatively naive people like me to read, though I have fortified myselfwith a handful of appropriately down-to-earth theoretical works to help me out. The article presents some reflections prompted by a novel that I have found disturbing, not as a special sort of being called a reader and correlated with an equally special writer, but as someone who has been reading a book and has had to come to terms with the fact of being transformed into a person who has read it. In 1966, the English novelist Anthony Burgess announced his intention of writing a novel "of Tolstoyan proportions."1 In 1980 it appeared, under the title Earthly Powers, and was duly described by some reviewers as his War and Peace.2 But why? Perhaps it was just the size of it, 649 pages. Perhaps it was the way the novel combined a story of private life with a background of world history. But perhaps what the reviewers found relevant in Tolstoy was not only the length and the epic scale but also the way his novel conveyed a view oflife, partly in the story invented, partly in the opinions of favorably presented characters, and partly in the way he supplemented his story with comments directiy addressed to the reader — or should we rather say, projected into the readerly void. As for Burgess himself, he probably had nothing more specific in mind than the narrowness he elsewhere complains of in English novelists, whose interests remain typically domestic and suburban when they could be "expanding the 145 146Philosophy and Literature resources of literature to find out more about die whole human complex, the roots on which societies are built."3 Suppose we take the parallel with Tolstoy seriously. War and Peace reads as if told in a voice which is that of the implicit author, a distinctive and cranky character represented for us by the name "Tolstoy" on the title page. A distinctive character, but not a character in the book; it is just the putative owner of a voice projected by the tone in which the book is written. However, much of the special effect of War and Peace comes from our tendency to identify this highly personalized voice-bearer with a real person. The authorial voice ofthe book becomes that ofthe person who wrote it, Count L. Tolstoy himself, quite widiout regard to who this person was in real life and what the real life was that he was in. The book reads like a communication, and mat is how many ofus read it. As it happens, the actual person Tolstoy was himselfat least sometimes prepared to read books that way. Our first question to a new author, he said when writing about Maupassant, is: "What sort of a man axe you? Wherein are you different from all die people I know, and what can you tell me that is new, about how we must look at this life ofours?"4 That is, a book is not only a text to exercise our readership on, and a story told for us to follow in delight or suspense, but also a message from a real person who writes, to real people who read, about the world they all share. Note that we do not have to read War andPeace that way. Fielding's Tom Jones is written in a comparably distinctive and insistent authorial voice, as of someone buttonholing the reader and sharing a joke about the world; but I, and many other readers, take mis to be a... (shrink)

This is a collection of elegant and learned writings by the late Lord Quinton, one of the most prominent men of letters of the late twentieth century. The first part ranges over the last 400 years of intellectual history; in the second he discusses freedom, morality, politics, language, culture, and the relation between humans and animals.

This new history of Scottish philosophy will include two volumes that focus on the Scottish Enlightenment. In this volume a team of leading experts explore the ideas, intellectual context, and influence of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Reid, and many other thinkers, frame old issues in fresh ways, and introduce new topics and questions into debates about the philosophy of this remarkable period. The contributors explore the distinctively Scottish context of this philosophical flourishing, and juxtapose the work of canonical philosophers with contemporaries (...) now very seldom read. The outcome is a broadening-out, and a filling-in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

This new history of Scottish philosophy will include two volumes that focus on the Scottish Enlightenment. In this volume a team of leading experts explore the ideas, intellectual context, and influence of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Reid, and many other thinkers, frame old issues in fresh ways, and introduce new topics and questions into debates about the philosophy of this remarkable period. The contributors explore the distinctively Scottish context of this philosophical flourishing, and juxtapose the work of canonical philosophers with contemporaries (...) now very seldom read. The outcome is a broadening-out, and a filling-in of the detail, of the picture of the philosophical scene of Scotland in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This essay is the journal editor's introduction to part 3 of an ongoing symposium on quietism. With reference to writings of James Joyce, Francis Picabia, J. M. Coetzee, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Elaine Pagels, and Karen King—and with extended reference to Jonathan Lear's study of “cultural devastation,” Radical Hope—Jeffrey Perl explores the possibility that the fear of anomie is misplaced. He argues that, in comparison with the violence and narrowness of any given social order, anomie may well be preferable, (...) and, in any case, may be no more than another name for quietism. (shrink)

This 20 volume Routledge Revivals collection brings together a selection of groundbreaking Philosophy titles, from the rich and diverse Routledge backlist. With titles published between 1933 and 1991, this is a truly wide-ranging selection, encompassing works by distinguished authors such as: Simone Weil, Hilary Putnam, Franz Brentano, Anthony Kenny, Karl Jaspers and Israel Scheffler. Dealing with everything from the notion of freewill, to concepts of time and space, to theories of morality, this set offers a collection of the best (...) of Routledge publishing in the field of Philosophy from across the Twentieth Century. Please note that all titles have been previously available for sale individually through the Routledge Revivals programme. (shrink)

At M. Bernard's I saw several magnificent paintings on porcelain by Monsieur Constantin. In two hundred years, Raphael's frescoes will be known only through Monsieur Constantin.Stendhal, Voyage en France, 1837If we compare the forms that the act of copying has assumed in various civilizations, we cannot fail to notice that a certain number of phenomena are specific to European culture since the Renaissance. Perhaps one of the most singular of these phenomena is the will to create and to possess imperishable (...) reproductions of works that have been singled out, at a given moment, as the brightest jewels of Western art. The history of the fortune of Graeco-Roman sculptures has been masterfully related by Francis Haskell and Nicholas Penny in Taste and the Antique: The Lure of Classical Sculpture 1500-1900, even if it would no doubt be worthwhile to give further consideration to the critical fortune of materials used for reproduction, and particularly to the particular prestige attached to bronze—from the Mantuan works of Antico to the reconstitutions of Greek Urbilder in bronze, instead of the plaster used earlier, which were executed at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as the two Doryphoros that Georg Römer realized from various ancient marble copies of Polyclitus's athlete. But, in fact, it was not only in modern Europe that copies were made in bronze. The production of copies using this alloy was particularly prevalent in imperial China after the rediscovery, in the second half of the eleventh century of our era, of a collection of archaic bronzes from the Shang era. This is why I prefer to call attention to a practice that appears to me, in contrast, to be unique to the Western world: the copying of renowned paintings in materials that are supposed to defy time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Innova dies nostros, sicut a principio:Novelty and Nostalgia in Thomas of Celano's First and Second Lives of St. FrancisBarbara Newman (bio)IntroductionIn his sixth-century compendium of hagiography, Gregory of Tours argued that one should always speak of the vita patrum or vita sanctorum in the singular. According to Pliny, he noted, grammarians did not believe the noun vita had a plural. More to the point, although "there is a diversity (...) of merits and virtues among [the saints], … the one life of the body sustains them all in this world."1 Just as the Church, the body of Christ, is one, so too the saints. Their project of imitatio Christi re-presents the one and only life of Christ for each new generation. As a literary genre, hagiography fleshes out this insight, for no other genre is so steeped in self-citation. Every vita is such a tissue of biblical verses that, to edit a saint's Life before Google, one had to know Scripture by heart or spend endless hours with a concordance. After the Bible, quotations from a few classic vitae were constantly recycled: Athanasius' Life of St. Antony, Sulpicius Severus' Life of St. Martin, Gregory the Great's Life of St. Benedict. With the passage of time, newer classics joined older ones to produce one vast, self-referential monument, incarnate in the Acta Sanctorum: Gregory's vita sanctorum multiplied ad infinitum. So deep did this tendency run that, when an obscure saint needed a vita to justify a cult, shameless hagiographers would plagiarize whole paragraphs, plundering stories and miracles from earlier vitae to serve their turn.2 [End Page 169]It is small wonder, then, that the hagiographic genre is so often characterized as "traditional" or "conservative." It is nostalgic, too, in the sense that each saint's words and deeds bring a glorious Golden Age back to life—most often the apostolic age or the time of the Desert Fathers, but sometimes the graced beginnings of a religious order. Such memorials enabled later generations to idealize their glorious founders. This tendency to exalt the new as a renovation of the old has deep roots in Christianity; even the evangelist Matthew systematically represents Jesus as a new Moses. In the same vein, it is not unusual to find a saint identified as a new Jacob or a second David. On the other hand, many saints' Lives make an insistent claim to newness, renovatio. For the saints were, and are, extraordinary—not merely good men and women, but radical figures whose words and deeds shocked those around them, beginning with their parents. Like Jesus, they had not only admirers, but detractors in plenty. If their publicists held them up as exemplars of virtue, theirs was no ordinary kind, for the heroic virtue that gave saints their charisma could look much like madness. Despite the precedents of earlier vitae, their ascetic feats and challenging behavior often struck observers as new and unheard-of. In hagiography, therefore, claims of novelty play a key role that balances the familiar topoi. Sometimes the newness of a saint's charism is cause for joyful celebration. Jesus, after all, had declared ecce nova facio omnia (Rev 21:5). But "novelties" also had to be handled with care, for they could easily be condemned as heresies or extreme practices deviating from the tradition of the elders.This tension between novelty and nostalgia emerges most clearly in the vitae of saints who founded genuinely new forms of religious life. In this paper I will explore the way it plays out in two early Lives of Francis of Assisi, perhaps the most popular saint of all time. After his death in 1226, Francis set a speed record for canonization—one that would be surpassed in the Middle Ages only by his disciple, St. Anthony of Padua, and by the Dominican martyr Peter of Verona.3 Aside from his charisma and the exponential growth of the Franciscan Order, the fast-track canonization is due to Pope Gregory IX, who as Cardinal Hugolino had been personally close to Francis and supported his movement. For the ceremony in July 1228, less than two years after the... (shrink)

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better (...) known for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury. The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better (...) known for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the “moral sense” school of thought. (shrink)

Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There’s no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need (...) to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term “empathy” is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy—borrowed from theoretical psychology—has been a major factor in nurses’ negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy’s role in nursing. (shrink)

The concept of vulnerability has been subject to numerous different interpretations but accounts are still beset with significant problems as to their adequacy, such as their contentious application or the lack of genuine explanatory role for the concept. The constant failure to provide a compelling conceptual analysis and satisfactory definition leaves the concept open to an eliminativist move whereby we can question whether we need the concept at all. I highlight problems with various kinds of approach and explain why a (...) satisfactory account of vulnerability is unlikely ever to be offered if we wish the concept to play a genuinely explanatory role in bioethical contexts. I outline why an eliminativist position should be taken with regard to this concept in light of these concerns but mitigate some of the severity of this position by arguing that we can still make sense of retaining our widespread use of the term by viewing it as nothing more than a useful pragmatic linguistic device that acts as a marker to draw attention to certain kinds of issue. These issues will be entirely governed by other, better understood ethical concepts and theories. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in (...) our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

The Liverpool Care Pathway for the Dying has recently been the topic of substantial media interest and also been subject to the independent Neuberger Review. This review has identified clear failings in some areas of care and recommended the Liverpool Care Pathway be phased out. I argue that while the evidence gathered of poor incidences of practice by the Review is of genuine concern for end of life care, the inferences drawn from this evidence are inconsistent with the causes for (...) the concern. Seeking to end an approach that is widely seen as best practice and which can genuinely deliver high quality care because of negative impressions that have been formed from failing to implement it properly is not a good basis for radically overhauling our approach to end of life care. I conclude that improvements in training, communication, and ethical decision-making, without the added demand to end the Liverpool Care Pathway would have resulted in a genuine advance in end of life care. (shrink)

“Public health legal preparedness” is a term born in the ferment, beginning in the late 1990s, that has led to unprecedented recognition of the essential role law plays in public health and, even more recently, in protecting the public from terrorism and other potentially catastrophic health threats.The initial articulation of public health has not kept pace with rapid evolution in the concept and in practical development of public health preparedness itself. This poses the risk that legal preparedness may fall behind (...) construction of general readiness in the public health system—and may, in fact, undercut achievement of comprehensive public health preparedness for massive threats to health in both the United States and world-wide. Inadvertent results might include both negative health impacts and infringement on individual rights. (shrink)

“Public health legal preparedness” is a term born in the ferment, beginning in the late 1990s, that has led to unprecedented recognition of the essential role law plays in public health and, even more recently, in protecting the public from terrorism and other potentially catastrophic health threats.The initial articulation of public health has not kept pace with rapid evolution in the concept and in practical development of public health preparedness itself. This poses the risk that legal preparedness may fall behind (...) construction of general readiness in the public health system—and may, in fact, undercut achievement of comprehensive public health preparedness for massive threats to health in both the United States and world-wide. Inadvertent results might include both negative health impacts and infringement on individual rights. (shrink)

In this essay I propose an environmental ethic in the pragmatic vein. I begin by suggesting that the contemporary debate in environmental ethics is forced into a familiar but highly restrictive set of distinctions and problems by the traditional notion of intrinsic value, particularly by its demands that intrinsic values be self-sufficient, abstract, and justified in special ways. I criticize this notion and develop an alternativewhich stresses the interdependent structure of values, a structure which at once roots them deeply in (...) our selves and at the same time opens them to critical challenge and change. Finally, I apply this alternative view back to environmental ethics. It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed. (shrink)

Life and works -- Cartesian doubt -- Cogito ergo sum -- Sum res cogitans -- Ideas -- The idea of God -- The ontological argument -- Reason and intuition -- Matter and motion -- Mind and body.

Musing for Puncta special issue "Critically Sick: New Phenomenologies Of Illness, Madness, And Disability.".